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Thesis Abstract 
The objectives are to examine the tension between the ethics of care and the 
ethics of justice, offer critical analysis and develop an amalgam of key elements from 
both. A more sufficient framework for moral decision-making will be proposed and 
its validity assessed. 
Part One investigates the ethics of care, beginning with a critical analysis of 
Carol Gilligan's approach to the ethics of care and justice, leading to an exploration of 
the nature and content of care from key authors in the debate. By focusing on nursing 
the tensions surrounding care are highlighted. Critical analysis draws out key themes 
from care including persons, relationships, context and responsibilities. 
Part Two examines the ethics of justice, concentrating on the substantive 
theories of John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre. Through critical analysis the need for 
minimum standards of protection for the vulnerable in society is highlighted. The 
thesis emphasises and argues for justice as equality, fairness and equity, the 
importance of persons, community, rationality, justification, fittingness, morality, 
duties and obligations. 
Part Three argues for an amalgam of key themes from both the ethics of care 
and justice. This model consists of the crucial role of context, persons and 
relationships, responsibilities, justice and appropriateness in moral decision-making as 
a framework for a middle way. After arguing for its sufficiency in theory, it is tested 
in practice by application to the Child B case. The thesis argues a middle way model 
is more adequate than either the ethics of care or justice alone for critically examining 
the decisions and justifications offered in this case. 
In conclusion, critical reflection on the theory and practice of a middle way 
model is offered, and its potential for further application and development regarding 
moral decision-making and training for the caring professions explored. 
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Introduction 
Thesis Genesis and Development 
The origin of this thesis lies in the debate between the ethics of care and the 
ethics of justice. The tensions between 'feminine' and 'masculine' approaches to 
moral decision-making highlighted the two spheres. ' Upon reading Carol Gilligan's 
In a Different Voice, 2 the vast debate in moral theory and feminist literature regarding 
both ethics became apparent. Some authors advocated the need to emphasise the 
ethics of care and a 'female' approach to moral decision-making. This was in 
response to traditional 'male' moral theory which, it was claimed, had not recognised 
the adequacy and appropriateness of the less abstract and more contextual approach of 
women. 3 Critics of the ethics of care, or 'female' ethic, highlighted its weaknesses 
and often emphasised the need for the ethics of justice, abstract principles and rules. 4 
A danger was in polarising much of the debate and implying either that women 
primarily approach moral decision-making from a contextual and relational 
1 Diana T. Meyers and Eva Feder Kittay, eds., Women and Moral Theory, (I7otowa: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1987). They provide a useful summary of the debate in their introduction. Carol Gilligan, 
In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982). Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, '7wo Moralities? A Critical Discussion of an Ethic 
of Care and Responsibility versus an Ethic of Rights and Justice" in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 
143-56. Joan C. Tronto, "Beyond a Gender Difference to a Theory of Care" in Justice in Political 
Philosophy, vol. 2, Critiques and Alternatives, ed. Will Kyn-dicka, (Brookfield: Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 1992), 520-39. Diemut Elisabeth Brubeck, Care, Gender, and Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995). 
2 Gilligan, DV. 
3 Gilligan, DY, 6-9,18-19. Meyers and Kittay, Women and Moral Theory, 3-16. Jonathan Dancy, 
"Caring about Justice, " Philosophy 67 (1992): 447. Patricia Ward Scaltsas, "Do Feminist Ethics 
Counter Feminist Aims?, " in Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and Practice, eds. Eve Browning 
Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 15-16. Nunner- 
Winkler, `rwo Moralities?, " 143-5. Tronto, "Beyond a Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, " 240- 
1. 
" Nunner-Winkler, "rwo Moralities?, " 143-56. Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, eds., 
Explorations in Feminist Ethics: 7heory and Practice, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992), 1-11. Rita Manning, "Just Caring, " in Explorations in Feminist Ethics. Theory and Practice, 
eds. Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, (Bloon-dngton: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
45-54. Moira Gatens, "Between the Sexes: Care or Justice?, " in Introducing Applied Ethics, ed. 
perspective, while men primarily approach it from an abstract and principled view, 5 
or, if accurate, that one approach was superior to the other. Some theorists argue not 
only for the superiority of the ethics of care or the ethics of justice, but that because of 
their distinct natures and orientations the two approaches to morality are 
incompatible. 6 
Within the initial stages of exploring the care versus justice debate the idea 
and core of the thesis emerged. It was that people actually appeal to and utilise both 
ethics in making moral decisions. 7 The problem is that while many theorists 
recognised both ethics have something to offer in morality, a sufficiently coherent and 
comprehensive exploration of the nature and content of an integration of care and 
8 justice was not clearly evident. Moral decision-making need not be a choice between 
Brenda Almond, (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), 42-57. Tronto, "Beyond a Gender Difference to a 
Theory of Care, " 520-39. Scaltsas, "Do Feminist Ethics Counter Feminist Aims?, " 23-4. 
5 Gilligan, DV. Meyers and Kittay, Women and Moral Theory, 3-10. Virginia Held, "Feminism and 
Moral Theory, " in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Diana T. Meyers and Eve Feder Kittay, (Totowa: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), 112-13. Annette C. Baier, "What do Women Want in a Moral 
Theory?, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne 
Larrabee, (New York and London: Routledge), 19-32. 
6 This view was highlighted by the second supervisor. See Dancy, "Caring about Justice, " 464. He 
claims an amalgam of the ethics of care and justice is not possible because there is an 'ineradicable 
tension between the two. ' See also Gatens, "Between the Sexes: Care or Justice?, " 53-4. Gatens 
points out that some feminist moral theory presents the 'care stance' and 'justice stance' as exclusive 
and exhaustive approaches, although she disagrees. Interestingly, as I analysed the literature further, it 
became apparent that a majority of theorists recognise the ethics of care and justice are, in fact, 
compatible to some degree. See footnotes 4,7 and 8. 
7 Mary Brabeck, "Moral Judgment: Theory and Research on Differences between Males and Females, " 
in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 39-45. Catherine G. Greeno and Eleanor E. Maccoby, "How Different is the 
'Different Voice'?, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary 
Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 193-198. Lawrence J. Walker, "Sex Differences in the 
Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 157-76. 
8 Isa Aaron, "Caring and Principles - Opponents or Partners?, " Proceedings of Philosophy of 
Education 44 (1988): 126-35. Robin S. Dillon, "Care and Respect, " in Explorations in Feminist 
Ethics: Theory and Practice, eds. Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), 72-77. Dancy, "Caring about Justice, " 447-66. Manning, "Just 
Caring, " 45-54. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett, "Beyond Either/Or: Justice and Care in the Ethics of Albert 
Camus, " in Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and Practice, eds. Eve Browning Cole and Susan 
Coultrap-McQuin, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 82-8. Marilyn Friedman, What are 
Friends For?: Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory, (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1993), especially part two. Joy Kroeger-Mappes, "rhe Ethic of 
Care vis-A-vis the Ethic of Rights: A Problem for Contemporary Moral Theory, " Hypatia: a Journal o 
Ferninis-tPlilosophy 9 (1994): 108-31. Brubeck, Care, Gender, andJustice. 
2 
the ethics of care and justice, a 'feminine' or 'masculine' approach. They may be 
compatible and complementary and both may be necessary for a balanced approach to 
morality. The aim of the thesis is to explore ways of creating one, but by no means 
the only possible, amalgam between care and justice which produces a useful means 
of approaching moral decisions. This is a middle way. It provides a more balanced 
and sufficient moral framework, incorporating elements from both the ethics of care 
and the ethics of justice. 
In order to investigate this possibility of a middle way, a more specific context 
which provided a testing ground for it and demonstrated the tension between care and 
justice was needed. The arena of health care, and more particularly nursing, provides 
such a context. 9 The changes within and professionalisation of nursing raises 
questions about the nature of carelo and the role of justice in the theory and practice of 
nursing. The tension between care and justice is found particularly within nursing 
literature, " providing a more concrete context for investigating this debate. In 
dealing with patients this tension is exhibited between nurses and other professionals, 
e. g. doctors and managers, particularly regarding treatment decisions, patient care and 
consent, and nurses' advocacy and professional autonomy. It also can arise among 
nurses themselves, as their clinical views and personal values differ. 12 
9 Barbara A. Carper, "The Ethics of Caring, " Advances in Nursing Science 1 (1979): 11-19. Jean 
Harbison, "Gilligan: A Voice for Nursing?, " Journal of Medical Ethics 18 (1992): 202-5. Judith A. 
Cohen, "Caring Perspectives in Nursing Education: Liberation, Transformation and Meaning, " Journal 
of Advanced Nursin 18 (1993): 621-6. 
10 Peter Allmark, "Can there be an Ethics of Care?, " Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (1995): 19-24. Joan 
Bottoroff et al., "Comparative Analysis of Conceptualisations and Theories of Caring, " Image: Journal 
of Nursing Scholarshin 23 (1991): 119-26. Cohen, "Caring Perspectives in Nursing Education: 
Liberation, Transformation and Meaning, " 621-6. 
11 Sara T. Fry, "The Role of Caring in a Theory of Nursing Ethics, " Hypatia: a Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy 4 (1989): 88-103. Jeanne Ross Boyer and James Lindemann Nelson, "A Comment on 
Fry's 'The Role of Caring in a Theory of Nursing Ethics', " Hypatia: a Journal of Feminist Philosophy 
5 (1990) : 153-8. Carper, "The Ethics of Caring, " I 1- 19. Harbison, "Gilligan: A Voice for 
Nursing?. " 202-5. 
12 Verena Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing: The Caring Relationship, (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 
1992), 93-130. 
3 
In the thesis the examination of the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, and 
the possibility of an integration between the two, involves exploring Gilligan's claims 
regarding women and men's approaches to moral decision-making (chapter one), key 
theories and the nature of care (chapter two) and justice (chapters three and four), 
offering a critique of both ethics, drawing out key themes to propose one version of a 
middle way in theory (chapter five), testing its application in practice (chapter six) 
and critically reflecting on the usefulness and further application of a middle way 
model (conclusion). Chapters one through four will offer separate descriptive and 
critical sections, the latter involving two levels of critique. The first level includes 
more general critique, while the second level of critique shows the need for some 
middle way perspective highlighting the themes and elements important to an 
amalgam of the ethics of care and justice. 
4 
Chgpter One: Carol Gilligan's Theor 
Introduction 
The theories and ideas put forth by Carol Gilligan in her book In a Different 
Voice' have helped highlight and focus debate on the ethics of care and justice. An 
ethic of care is concerned with concrete persons, relationships and responsibilities, 2 
3 
while an ethic of justice focuses on abstract rules, rights and principles. She 
discusses and interprets her empirical studies conducted on women and men to draw 
attention to different ways in which people approach, view and make moral decisions. 
In exploring the tensions and connections between care and justice, Gilligan identifies 
a "different voice" in moral reasoning, which is based not on abstract principles, 
rights and rules 4 but contextual decision-making, 5 responsibility in relationships and 
inter-connection with others. 6 
Gilligan's theories have been the impetus for significant discussion and debate 
in many fields. 7 Within health care, Gilligan's theories provide a means of offering 
care, recognising the importance of relationships, responsibilities and context, while 
also acknowledging the need for justice to provide consistency, equality and fairness 
of treatment and set limits. 8 
Part of Gilligan's significance for feminist theory is the distinction she makes 
between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice. 9 She draws attention to what she 
claims is a strong male-oriented bias in research regarding moral development which 
1 Gilligan, DV. 
2 Ibid., 19,73. 
3 Ibid., 19,73. 
4 Ibid., 19,22,73,100. 
5 Ibid., 22,100. 
('Ibid., 19,73. 
See pp. 20-7. 
See chapters 5 and 6. 
9 Karen Green, 7he Woman ofReason: Feminism, Humanism and Political Ihought, (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1995), 152. Susan Moller Okin and Jane Mansbridge, eds., Schools of Thought in Politics: 
5 
has excluded women and their different approach, often labelling a them as less 
morally mature. 10 Perhaps more fundamental issues arising from her theories are 
whether or not women and men are distinctlY different in their approaches to moral 
development, the implications of emphasising relationships as opposed to abstract 
principles, an ethic of care over and against an ethic of justice, and whether these 
different approaches are due to nature, nurture or both. 
In investigating Gilligan's claims further, first we will explore the problem she 
identifies in developmental psychology regarding moral reasoning. Then we will 
examine her hypothesis, qualifications, empirical studies and conclusions. Finally, 
critical responses to Gilligan's work and the possibility of appealing to both the ethics 
of care and justice in a moral framework will be explored. 
Gilligan's Theory 
Gilligan claims this "different voice"" in moral reasoning has not been 
sufficiently acknowledged or represented in psychological studies 
12 done primarily on 
men. 13 She argues psychological theorists have implicitly adopted male experience as 
the norm and thus fallen into an observational bias against women. 14 According to 
Gilligan, this bias can be found at least as far back as Freud, who based his psycho- 
sexual developmental ideas on the male child and Oedipus complex, excluding the 
Feminism, vol. 1, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), xv. In their introduction, Okin and Mansbridge 
claim that 'the most influential single voice in this debate has been that of Carol Gilligan... '. 
10 DV, 6-9,18-19. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
trans. James Strachey, vol. 7, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1961). 7he Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James 
Strachey, vol. 19, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1961). Nancy Chodorow, "Family Structure and Feminine Personality, " 
in Woman, Culture and Society, eds. Michael Zimbalist Rosaldo, Louise Lamphere, and Joan 
Bamberger, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974). Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of 
Mothering, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). In particular see Lawrence Kohlberg, The 
philosophy ofMoral Development, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 198 1). 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Ibid., 1-2,156. 
6 
female child from the formulation of his theories. 15 She claims when Freud was 
unable to fit girls into his masculine conception, he saw them as envying that which 
they missed. Noting the strength of their pre-Oedipal attachments to their mothers, he 
observed a developmental difference. 16 In response to Freud's view, Gilligan claims 
that 
... a problem in theory became cast as a problem in women's development, and the problem in women's development was located in 
their experience of relationships. 17 
For Gilligan, women's departure from Freud's male norm of development contributed 
to their being labelled as inferior. 
Gilligan uses Lawrence Kohlberg to illustrate her claims about male-biased 
theories of psychological development. Kohlberg defines three levels of moral 
development: the pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional levels. 18 
Gilligan describes the pre-conventional level as being egocentric, deriving morality 
from individual needs and exhibiting an inability to construct a shared or societal 
viewpoint. In the conventional level, the right and good are seen as maintaining the 
status quo of societal norms and values, which in turn sustain relationships, groups, 
13 Ibid., 69-70. 
14 Ibid., 6. 
15 This is despite the fact that most of his patients were female. 16 DY, 6-7. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 257-8. 17 Ibid., 7. 
18 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy ofMoral Development. ý Moral Stages and the Idea ofJustice, 
(London: Harper and Row, 1981), 409-12. See also DV, 72-3. Kohlberg's three levels each 
incorporate two stages of development, which move from lesser to greater moral maturity. Stage one is 
that of punishment and obedience, where right is conceived as literal obedience to rules and authority, 
avoiding punishment, and not doing physical harm. Stage two is that of individual instrumental 
purpose and exchange and right is serving one's own or other's needs and making fair deals regarding 
concrete exchange. The third stage is that of mutual interpersonal expectations, relationship and 
conformity. The right is seen as fulfilling a good, or nice, role, being concerned about other people and 
their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and 
expectations. Stage four is that of social system and conscience maintenance, where right is fulfilling 
one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of the society or group. 
The fifth state is that of prior rights and social contract or utility, and the right is upholding the basic 
rights, values and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws 
of the group. The sixth, and final, stage is that of universal ethical principles and it assumes they 
provide guidance that all humanity should follow. 
7 
communities and societies. The post-conventional level reflects on societal values 
and constructs moral principles that are universally applicable, thus transcending a 
societal vision. 19 If what Gilligan claims about women's moral development focusing 
around relationships and connection, rather than abstract principles, is true, then 
women, in contrast to men, may not be able to attain the higher post-conventional 
level of moral maturity on Kohlberg's scale and consequently be viewed as 
deficient. 20 
In expanding her critique of Kohlberg, Gilligan notes that although Kohlberg 
claims universality for his stage sequence, based on research from an all male sample, 
those groups excluded from his original sample, such as women, rarely reach the 
higher stages. 21 Women's moral judgments tend to reach the third of Kohlberg's six 
stages, where morality is perceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is viewed as 
helping and pleasing others. Gilligan argues Kohlberg's view presents a paradox for 
women, because traits which traditionally defined the 'goodness' of women, namely 
their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, label them as deficient. 22 ThUS' 
according to Gilligan, Kohlberg implies that only if women enter the traditional arena 
of male activity on male terms will they see the inadequacy of their perspective of 
goodness and be able to progress, like men, to higher stages of moral development. In 
these stages, relationships must be subordinated to rules and rules to universal 
19 Gilligan, DV, 72-3. See also Kohlberg, The Philosophy ofMoral Development, 409-12. 
20 Ibid., 18-19. Even if what Gilligan claims is not true, she notes that women tend to score lower than 
men on Kohlberg's scale of development. 
21 Ibid., 18. Gilligan notes Constance Holstein, "Development of Moral Judgment: A Longitudinal 
Study of Males and Females, " Child Developmen 47 (1976): 51-61 and Elizabeth L. Simpson, 
"Moral Development Research: A Case Study of Scientific Cultural Bias, " Human Developmen 17 
(1974): 81-106. 
22 Ibid., 18. 
8 
principles of justice, 23 making it unlikely for women to reach these final stages of 
moral development. 
Gilligan critically notes that as Kohlberg's version of moral development 
derives its conception of maturity from the study of men's lives, it reflects the 
importance of individuation and a recognition of human rights in their development. 24 
This is in contrast to women's development which involves relationships and 
responsibilities. From women's perspective, "the moral problem" arises from 
conflicting responsibilities not competing rights, and it requires a "contextual and 
narrative" not a "formal and abstract" mode of thinking for its resolution. 25 Gilligan 
highlights women's distinctive moral framework, as that of care rather than justice, 
stating 
This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care 
centres moral development around the understanding of responsibility 
and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties 
moral development to the understanding of rights and rules. 26 
Gilligan claims when developmental constructs are derived from the study of women, 
different moral conceptions inform the description of moral development. This 
different construction of morality by women may be the primary reason for their 
failure to develop like men within Kohlberg's system. 27 Gilligan recognises women's 
moral development based on the more contextual ethic of care, relationships and 
responsibilities as different from, but not inferior to, men's moral development based 
on the more abstract ethic of justice, fairness and rights. 28 
23 Ibid., 19. These are stages four, five and six. Gilligan cites L. Kohlberg and R. Kramer, 
"Continuities and Discontinuities in Child and Adult Moral Development, " Human Developmen 12 
(1969): 93-120. 
24 Ibid., 18-19. 
25 Ibid., 19. 
26 Ibid., 19. 
1 Ibid., 19. 
28 The themes of context, relationships, responsibilities and justice will be developed throughout the 
thesis. See especially chapter 5. 
9 
To illustrate further the differences between male and female constructions of 
morality, Gilligan discusses Nancy Chodorow's view of development. 29 Chodorow 
believes the primary caretaker for both sexes in the first three years of life is usually 
female and that the core of personality development is firmly established in this time. 
In light of these claims, Chodorow argues female gender identity is developed within 
a relationship where mothers experience their daughters as more alike and a 
continuation of themselves and their sons as a male opposite. Thus, girls view their 
identity more in light of attachment and boys experience a stronger sense of 
separation from their mothers, and thus view their identity in terms of individuation. 30 
So, according to Gilligan, 
Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is 
defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by 
intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation. 
Thus males tend to have difficulty with relationships, while females 
tend to have problems with individuation. 31 
Although Gilligan does not offer much evidence to support these claims and her 
conclusions may be highly debatable, 32 she argues that this "descriptive difference" 
between men and women becomes a "developmental liability" when mature 
development is defined, in psychological literature, by increasing separation. From 
this view, Gilligan claims, that "women's failure to separate then becomes by 
definition a failure to develop". 33 Thus, women are judged as being less morally 
developed than or morally inferior to men. 
29 Gilligan, DY, 7-9. See Chodorow, "Fan-tily Structure and Feminine Personality, " and The 
Reproduction of Mothering. Cf. John Broughton, "Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A 
Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, " in An Ethic of Care: 
Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 
137. He claims Gilligan misinterprets Chodorow's view of women, and that Chodorow characterised 
women's psychological structure not in terms of a simple tendency to connect, but a complex and 
fragile preservation of the tension between merger and individuation. 
30 Gilligan, DY, 7-8. Emphases added. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
32 See pp. 20-3. 
33 Gilligan, DY, 8-9. 
10 
As opposed to being viewed as deficient, Gilligan argues women's moral 
judgments provide an alternative perspective on moral maturity, by which 
developmental differences between the sexes and their implications can be assessed. 34 
Women's perspective is an alternative to the male-oriented approach which 
emphasises abstract principles. Gilligan describes this approach as a "morality of 
fairness", which views moral development as an understanding of rights and rules, 35 
or a "morality as justice", which links development to the logic of equality, 
reciprocity and fairness. 36 A morality focused on "care", in contrast, ties moral 
development to relationships and responsibilities. 37 Gilligan believes women define 
themselves in the context of relationship and the ability to care. 38 For her, women's 
"distinctive" psychology entails a greater orientation toward relationship and 
interdependence and implies a more contextual mode of moral judgment. Thus, it 
offers a different moral understanding from men's. 39 
In light of these differences between the male-oriented ethic of justice and the 
female-oriented ethic of care, Gilligan claims that "it becomes clear why, from a male 
perspective, a morality of responsibility may appear inconclusive and diffuse, given 
its insistent contextual relativism", and "why a morality of rights and non-interference 
may appear frightening to women in its potential justification of indifference and 
, 40 unconcern. However, Gilligan does link a morality of responsibility, relationship 
and care to women4' and a morality of rights, fairness and justice to men. 42 Thus, she 
34 Ibid., 22. 
35 Ibid., 19. 
36 Ibid., 73. For further discussion of reciprocity see pp. 48-52,220-2. 
37 Ibid., 19. 
38 Ibid., 17. 
39 Ibid., 22. 
40 Ibid., 22. 
41 Ibid., 17-19,22. 
42 Ibid., 19,73. 
11 
seems to be offering one explanation for the female-male, care-justice divide in moral 
reasoning. 
Although Gilligan identifies women's ethic of care approach to moral 
reasoning as distinct and different from men's ethic of justice, she is careful to qualify 
her claims about her research. She states explicitly that 
The different voice I describe is characterised not by gender but 
theme. Its association with women is an empirical observation, and it 
is primarily through women's voices that I trace its development. But 
this association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and 
female voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between two 
modes of thought and tofocus a problem of interpretation rather than 
to represent a generalisation about either sex. 43 
In elaborating her claims about difficulties of interpretation, Gilligan argues she 
... began to notice the recurrent problems 
in interpreting women's 
development and to connect these problems to the repeated exclusion 
of women from the critical theory-building studies of psychological 
research. 44 
Despite stating she does not link the "different voice" exclusively to women, Gilligan 
notes that the difficulties she identified within developmental theories were primarily 
in relation to women's development. So there are some inconsistencies between 
Gilligan's claims regarding women and men's approaches to moral reasoning and the 
qualifications she seeks to make about her theory. 45 
Gilligan also refrains from making explicit claims about the origins of the 
differences in development. She states, 
No claims are made about the origins of the differences described or 
their distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through 
time. Clearly, these differences arise in a social context where factors 
of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to shape 
the ex? erience of males and females and the relations between the 
sexes. 6 
43 Ibid., 2. Emphases added. 
44 Ibid., 1. Gilligan claims this 'problem of interpretation' arose against the background of her work 
concerning the psychological descriptions of identity and moral development. 
45 See pp. 21-3. 
46 Gilligan, DV, 2. Emphases added. 
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So, Gilligan may be claiming that both the social environment and biology, 'nature 
and nurture', contribute to the formation of and interactions between the sexes, their 
moral development itself as well as their views of moral development. 
Gilligan draws her claims about the two distinct moral voices from 
observations based on her empirical studies. One study centres around the Heinz 
dilemma. 47 Heinz's wife is going to die if he does not obtain a very expensive drug 
for her which he cannot afford and the chemist refuses to lower its price. Two eleven 
year-olds, Jake and Amy, are presented with the dilemma of whether Heinz should 
steal the drug to save his wife. Gilligan observes Jake is clear that Heinz should steal 
the drug. Seeing the conflict as one between life and property, he discerns the logical 
priority of life and justifies his choice on that basis. 48 According to Gilligan, Jake's 
ability to apply deductive logic to the dilemma, recognise the difference between 
morality and law and the potential limits of law, would score him at the conventional 
level on Kohlberg's scale. She claims Jake's thought process "points toward the 
principled conception of justice that Kohlberg equates with moral maturity. 9949 
Amy, by contrast, is more evasive in her answers. She states that Heinz 
should not steal the drug, but that his wife should not die either. Amy proposes that 
Heinz find a means of obtaining the money to buy the drug. According to Gilligan, 
47 Ibid., 25-6. It is interesting to note this dilemma is taken from Kohlberg. Gilligan states it was 
designed to measure moral development in adolescence by presenting a conflict of moral norms and 
exploring the logic of its resolution. 
She does not seem to recognise or acknowledge explicitly the potential irony here of using a 
dilemma from the very 'male-oriented' perspective which she criticises. She claims although current 
theory sheds light on the logic of the boy's thought, it has little to say about the girl's thought. Perhaps 
the closest she comes to acknowledging this irony is when she states that "Adding a new line of 
interpretation [on current developmental theory], based on the imagery of the girl's thought, makes it 
possible not only to see development where previously development was not discerned but also to 
consider differences in the understanding of relationships without scaling these differences from better 
to worse. " Gilligan might justify the usage of the Heinz dilemma by claiming it illun-dnates the gap 
between women and men's moral development as shown in male-oriented developmental theory. 
48 Ibid., 26. 
49 Ibid., 27. 
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Amy does not construct the dilemma as one between property and law, but instead 
reflects on the impact Heinz's stealing might have on his relationship with his wife 
and locates the heart of the dilemma in the chemist's failure to respond to Heinz's 
wife. 50 Gilligan's more general claim is that Amy views the world in terms of 
51 
relationships and connection rather than isolated individuals and a system of rules. 
Gilligan believes that 
Failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem in moral logic, 
she [Amy] does not discern the internal structure of its resolution; as 
she constructs the problem differently herself, Kohlberg's conception 
completely evades her. 52 
Thus with reference to Kohlberg's stages of moral development Amy would score a 
stage lower in maturity than Jake, according to Gilligan. She claims this is because 
Amy's world is one of "relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of 
the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one 
another, a perception of the need for response. , 53 From this perspective, Amy's 
understanding of morality seems "far from naive or cognitively immature", according 
to Gilligan. Instead "Amy's judgments contain the insights central to an ethic of care, 
just as Jake's judgments reflect the logic of the justice approach. ', 54 Gilligan upholds 
Amy's female version of framing moral dilemmas through an ethic of care and 
relationships as different from, and seeking a more adequate solution than, 55 Jake's 
male perspective based on an ethic of justice and abstract rules. 
In further elaborating the role of relationship and connection, Gilligan claims 
the conflict between self and other is "the central moral problem' 'for women. How 
50 Ibid., 28. 
" Ibid., 29. 
52 Ibid., 29. 
53 Ibid., 30. 
54 Ibid., 30. 
55 Ibid., 30. 
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women resolve this dilemma is the subject of her abortion study. 56 In contemplating 
an abortion, three moral perspectives emerged which "denote a sequence in the 
development of the ethic of care", according to Gilligan. 57 In the first perspective, 
women initially focused on caring for themselves to ensure survival, but then came to 
view this attitude as selfish. They then began to develop a new understanding of the 
connection between self and others, namely responsibility. In the second perspective, 
the elaboration of this responsibility and its joining with "matemal morality" aimed to 
ensure care for the dependent and unequal. The good is equated with caring for 
58 
others. The third perspective focused on the dynamics of relationships and through 
a new understanding of the interconnection between self and other the tension 
between selfishness and responsibility is diffused . 
59 Gilligan claims in this stage, 
Care becomes the chosen principle ofjudgment that remains 
psychological in its concern with relationships and response and 
becomes universal in its condemnation of hurt and exploitation. 60 
Through the abortion study, she claims that inflicting hurt is seen as selfish and 
immoral, while the expression of care, for others and oneself, is seen as the fulfilment 
of moral responsibility. 61 
Gilligan notes in the abortion study that "women" use the language of 
selfishness and responsibility which "defines the moral problem as one of obligation 
56 Ibid., 70-1. If this is the central moral problem for women then contemplating an abortion might 
highlight the tension between self and other. Yet, in attempting to clarify and articulate women's moral 
voice in contrast to the traditional male moral voice Gilligan does not seem to recognise explicitly the 
potential female-oriented bias of an abortion dilemma study or provide an equivalent study of men for 
comparison. See p. 23. 
57 Ibid., 73-4. 
58 Ibid., 74. 
59 Ibid., 74. 
60 Ibid., 74. The need to avoid harm and exploitation is vital within any society or community and is 
discussed further in chapters 3 and 5. 
61 Ibid., 73. 
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,, 62 to exercise care and avoid hurt. She claims this study suggests that women view 
moral dilemmas as conflicting responsibilities. 63 She recognises the tensions between 
different responsibilities, as she mentions conflicting responsibilities which entail the 
64sacrifice of somebody's needs", 64 taking or avoiding responsibility for choices, 65 and 
viewing attention to one's own needs as being selfish as opposed to honest and fair. 66 
Gilligan argues that "once obligation extends to include the self as well as others, the 
disparity between selfishness and responsibili - ty dissolves it . 
67 
She also claims 
Thus a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology 
of human relationships - an increasing differentiation of self and other 
and a growing comprehension of the dynamic of social interaction - 
informs the development of an ethic of care. 68 
Gilligan argues that this ethic, particularly as it reflects a cumulative knowledge of 
human relationships, focuses around a "central insight" that the self and other are 
interdependent. 69 This realisation denotes moral development within the ethic of care. 
Gilligan argues for the centrality of the concepts of care and responsibility in 
women's construction of the moral domain and that the close ties in their thinking 
between conceptions of the self and morality are exhibited in the abortion study. 
Ultimately, according to Gilligan, this study highlights the need for "an expanded 
62 Ibid., 73. Here, Gilligan explicitly ties women, not the "different voice' or a female perspective, to 
the notion of responsibility and care in moral reasoning. This again highlights the inconsistencies in 
hertheory. 
Conceptions of obligation and duty will be linked to responsibility and important for the 
development of the thesis. See pp. 223-9. 
63 Ibid., 105. 
64 Ibid., 80. 
65 Ibid., 85. 
61 Ibid., 85. 
67 Ibid., 94. 
68 Ibid., 74. 
69 Ibid., 74. 
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developmental theory" which includes, rather than excludes, the differences 
highlighted by "the feminine voice". 70 
In describing moral development more generally, Gilligan notes 
The concepts of attachment and separation which depict the nature 
and sequence of infant development appear in adolescence as identity 
and intimacy and then in adulthood as love and work. This reiterative 
counterpoint in human experience, however, when moulded into a 
developmental ordering, tends to disappear in the course of its linear 
reduction into the equation of development with separation .... The limitation of this rendition is most ap arent in the absence of women 
from accounts of moral development. 
Alternatively, the reality of continuing connection in moral development is lost or 
obscured. For women these "developmental markers" of separation and attachment, 
seem to be fused in some way. This points to the incompleteness of their 
development, according to Gilligan. 72 
Gilligan argues that women and men typically recognise the importance of 
different truths in their moral identity. Women address the continual process of 
attachment which creates and sustains the human community, while men address the 
role of separation in defining and empowering the self. 73 Furthermore, Gilligan 
claims the distinct gender constructions of identity, women focusing on self-sacrifice 
and men on freedom of self-expression, create different problems for further 
development. The former creates a problem of truth and compromise and the latter a 
problem of human connection. These difficulties are related as the "shrinking from 
truth" creates distance in relationship and separation removes part of the truth. 
Gilligan notes in her college student study, men's return from "exile and silence", by 
which she presumably means isolation and separation, parallels women's return from 
equivocation. Gilligan states cryptically that intimacy, or attachment, and truth 
70 Ibid., 105. 
71 Ibid., 15 1. Emphases added. 
72 Ibid., 155-6. 
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converge in the discovery of the connection between integrity and care for both 
sexes. 
74 
In light of the developmental differences Gilligan finds between women and 
men in morality and identity, she comments not only on the problems raised, but the 
means of correcting them. She argues that for men, as power and separation secure 
their identity, intimacy is the key to bringing them back into connection. This 
connection, or intimacy, makes it possible for men to see the effects of their action on 
others and the cost to themselves. Thus, the experience of relationship helps end 
men's isolation and potential indifference, according to Gilligan. 75 Alternatively, 
because women define their identity through relationships of intimacy and care, they 
experience moral dilemmas differently. Gilligan cryptically claims difficulties for 
women arise when "relationships are secured by masking desire and conflict is 
avoided by equivocation", as there is confusion about the "locus of responsibility and 
truth". 76 For women the critical experience is not intimacy but "choice", as the latter 
creates an "encounter with the self which clarifies an understanding of responsibility 
and truth. 9s77 
In concluding her remarks about the role of intimacy and choice for men and 
women, Gilligan argues that in the transition from adolescence to adulthood, "the 
dilemma,, is the same for both sexes, namely a conflict between integrity and care. 
Yet viewed from difference perspectives, this dilemma "generates the recognition of 
,, 78 opposite truths. These two perspectives are reflected in different moral ideologies 
73 Ibid., 156. 
74 Ibid., 157-8. 
75 Ibid., 163. 
76 Ibid., 164. Gilligan's comments here are obscure and unclear. She could be implying that women 
seek to avoid conflict through suppressing their desires, compromising their own wants, or by 
F revaricating in order not to hurt others. 
7 Ibid., 164. 
78 Ibid., 164. 
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as separation is justified by an ethic of justice, and attachment is supported by an ethic 
of care. She claims 
The morality of rights is predicated on equality and centred on the 
understanding of fairness, while the ethic of responsibility relies on the 
concept of equity, the recognition of differences in need. While the 
ethic of rights is a manifestation of equal respect, balancing the claims 
of other and self, the ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding 
that gives rise to compassion and care. 79 
Thus Gilligan highlights the differences between an ethic of justice, which focuses on 
equality, fairness and rights, and an ethic of care, which includes responsibility, equity 
and compassion. 
80 
Although Gilligan does emphasise the differences between an ethic of care 
81 and an ethic of justice, still she discusses the possibility of appealing to both in 
moral development. Interestingly, she claims 
Development for both sexes would therefore seem to entail an 
integration of rights and responsibilities through the discovery of the 
complementarity of these disparate views. 82 
She further describes this integration claiming that for women it happens through an 
understanding of the psychological logic of relationships which "tempers the self- 
destructive potential of a self-critical morality by asserting the need of all persons for 
care. 03 For men, this integration happens through "experience of the need for more 
active responsibility in taking care" which corrects "the potential indifference of a 
morality of non-interference and turns attention from the logic to the consequences of 
79 Ibid., 164-5. For further discussion of equity and equality see pp. 46-8,230-7. 
go Rights imply responsibilities. If someone has a right to something, another person has the 
responsibility to see that this right is met and fulfilled. But do responsibilities imply rights? The 
logical answer is no. If someone has a responsibility, another person does not necessarily have the 
right to fulfil it. This would make little sense. It may be more logical and productive to talk of 
freedoms, duties and responsibilities rather than 'rights'. For further discussion of responsibilities and 
duties see pp. 137-40,223-9, and rights see pp. 196-8. 
81 
92 Ibid., 100. Emphasis added. Although Gilligan's main focus is on the differences between the ethics 
of care and the ethics of justice, even she recognises their potential compatibility and the possibility of 
some integration or amalgam. 83 Ibid., 100. 
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choice. ', 84 Thus Gilligan briefly explores the possibility of integrating an ethic of care 
and an ethic of justice within moral development and decision-making. 
Through expounding Gilligan's theories we have seen that she identifies a 
"different voice" in moral reasoning, primarily connected to women, 85 which is in 
contrast to male-based moral development. She identifies this approach as an ethic of 
care which is based on responsibilities, relationships and connection, and a more 
contextual mode of decision-making. 86 Alternatively, an ethic of justice incorporates 
abstract principles, rights and rules, such as equality and fairness. 87 Despite her 
claims of finding gender-based differences in moral reasoning, Gilligan discusses the 
need for the sexes to appeal to both approaches and attempt some integration of 
"rights and responsibilities", 88 care and justice. Before elaborating further on this 
notion of integration, we will examine critical responses to her work. 
Critigue of Gilligan 
A number of critiques have been raised in response to Gilligan's theories 
propounded most prominently in A Different Voice. These objections may be divided 
primarily into two categories - those which focus on her hypothesis about the 
existence of different moral orientations and development for women and men and 
those concerned about her research methodology. Gilligan's views will be evaluated 
through various critiques and the possible integration of care and justice analysed 
through a discussion of one key critic. 
" ibid., 100. 
85 Ibid., 2,22. 
86 Ibid., 19,22,73. 
87 Ibid., 19,73. 
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Gilligan's Hypothesis 
Many critics disagree with Gilligan's hypothesis that there are sex-based 
differences in moral reasoning, claiming there are, in fact, mixed findings, with very 
89 few or no differences found. Similarly Lawrence Blum, arguing from an 
impartialist perspective based on "impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal 
rationality, and universal principle", questions whether a care perspective is actually a 
distinct moral orientation. 90 
In response to such critiques, Gilligan cites three studies which she claims 
"confirm and refine the 'different voice' hypothesis". 91 She argues they show that the 
justice and care perspectives are distinct orientations that organise people's thinking 
about moral problems in different ways; that boys and men, who resemble those most 
studied by developmental psychologists, tend to define and resolve moral problems 
within the justice framework, although they do introduce considerations of care; the 
focus on care in moral reasoning, although not characteristic of all women, is 
characteristically a female phenomenon in the "advantaged populations" that have 
been studied. 92 For Gilligan, these findings provide empirical explanations for the 
equation of moral judgement with justice reasoning in theories derived from studies of 
: 19 Ibid., 100. 
Brabeck, "Moral Judgment: Theory and Research on Differences between Males and Females, " 39- 
45. Greeno and Maccoby, "How Different Is the 'Different Voice'?, " 195. Walker, "Sex Differences 
in the Development of Moral Reasoning, " 176. For a different conclusion see Diana Baumrind, "Sex 
Differences in Moral Reasoning: Response to Walker's (1984) Conclusion that There Are None, " in 
An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 177-92. 
90 Lawrence A. Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, " Ethics 98 (1988): 
472-91. He claims an impartialist could argue care is not a genuinely distinct moral orientation 
because acting from care is really a universalisable principle, or that care is a distinct orientation but is 
secondary to or validated from an impartialist perspective. For a response to Blum's article see 
Jonathan D. Adler, "Particularity, Gilligan, and the Two-Levels View: A Reply, " Ethics 100 (1989): 
149-56. 
11 Carol Gilligan, "Reply to Critics, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 211-12. She refers to Nona Lyons, "Two 
Perspectives, " Harvard Educational Review 53 (1983), 125-44. She also relies on Lyons' doctoral 
dissertation, as well as two others, as a basis for this claim. 
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males, but they also explain why the study of women's moral thinking changes and 
challenges the definition of the moral domain. 93 
In contrast to those who directly oppose Gilligan's hypothesis, some theorists 
agree with Gilligan's identification of different moral orientations, but disagree with 
the significance she gives i? 4 or the reasoning behind it. 95 They argue that even if 
different moral orientations exist, they may not necessarily be gender linked or as 
dichotornised as Gilligan believes. 
Gilligan seeks to clarify her theory in response to such critiques. She states 
the 'different voice' is characterised not by gender but by theme. 96 It is empirically 
linked to women, although Gilligan argues that the care perspective is not biologically 
determined or unique to them, but she cautions that this should not represent a 
generalisation about either sex. Her hypothesis highlights a distinction between two 
modes of thought, but makes no claims regarding the origins of these voices or their 
wider application. 97 
Gilligan's qualifications add confusion to her view rather than clarify it. 98 If 
she argues women do offer a distinct approach to moral development from men, 
which has been undervalued, then this "different voice" should be taken seriously and 
included in moral theory. If Gilligan claims the "different voice" is not gender related 
92 Ibid., p. 212. Gilligan does not elaborate on her definition of "advantaged populations". She might 
be referring to women in Western as opposed to developing countries. 93 Ibid., p. 212. Critics also take issue with her relation to Kohlberg's theories. Owen Flanagan and 
Kathryn Jackson, "Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited, " ELica 97 
(1987): 627. John M. Broughton, "Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender 
Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 137. 
9' Flanagan and Jackson, "Justice, Care, and Gender: the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited, " 624. 
Linda K. Kerber, "Some Cautionary Words for Historians, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 105-6. 
95 Nunner-Winkler, "Two Moralities?, " 152-3. Linda J. Nicholson, "Women, Morality, and History, " 
in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 98,100. 
" See P. 12. 
97 Gilligan, "A Reply to Critics", 209. 
" Ibid., 209. Gilligan, DV, 1-2. 
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or unique to women, then presumably men also utilise it. Gilligan does not explore 
this view. Yet, she does recognise that both men and women need to appeal to both 
an ethic of care and an ethic of justice to attain an integrated approach to moral 
development. 99 Thus her argument is insufficient to defend her view. 
In investigating critiques of Gilligan's view of distinct moral orientations, we 
noted disagreement about separate spheres in moral reasoning, their nature and 
origins, and Gilligan's responses to these critiques. Critics go further, questioning not 
only Gilligan's hypothesis, but also the empirical base and methodology from which 
it emerged. 
Gilligan's Methodology 
In response to Gilligan's theories, critics have cast doubt on her methodology, 
particularly in relation to her data and evidence, 100 the female bias of her samples, 101 
and the potential relativism of her views. 102 
In response to methodological critiques, Gilligan's key claim is that her 
argument was not statistical. It was not based on the representativeness of the women 
studied or on the generality of the data presented. Rather her argument was 
interpretative and hinged on the demonstration that the examples presented illustrated 
a different way of seeing moral discourse. 103 To support her claim that there is a 
voice different from those which psychologists have traditionally represented, 
99 See pp. 19-20. 
100 Zella Luria, "A Methodological Critique, " in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, (London: Routledge, 1993), 200- 1. Brabeck, "Moral 
Judgment, " 38. Walker, "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning, " 160. 
101 Brabeck, 'Moral Judgment, " 38. Luria, "A Methodological Critique, " 200. Kerber, "Some 
Cautionary Words for Historians, " 103. Within the abortion study Gilligan may shift from a description 
and interpretation of the twenty-nine women involved to a prescription for developmental theory as a 
whole. This shift may not be justified given her small, all-female sample. See Gilligan, DY, 3,105. 
102 Brabeck, 'Moral Judgment, " 46-7. CC Blum who argues Gilligan avoids relativism and individual 
subjectivism. Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, " 476. 
103 Gilligan, "A Reply to Critics, " 208. 
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Gilligan argues that she needs only one example. In response to interpretative 
critiques of her work, she argues that the best way to identify a common theme in 
women's voices is through a series of illustrations, so she relied on womenos 
experience and close textual analysis of language and logic to define the actual terms 
of women's thinking. 104 
More specifically, Gilligan could have argued that because her data was 
intended to express a different approach to moral reasoning she chose not to use the 
traditionally structured, male-oriented methods of data collection and scoring. Instead 
she utilised female-oriented methods, which included personally observing and 
interacting with women's accounts of moral dilemmas and decisions and drawing 
conclusions from them. 105 Despite whether critics agree or disagree with her 
methodology, Gilligan's aim of obtaining attention and recognition for a "different 
voice" in moral reasoning seems to have been achieved, as demonstrated by the 
plethora of debate and discussion surrounding her theories. 106 
After investigating critiques of Gilligan's hypothesis and methodology, one 
key critic, Marilyn Friedman, analyses Gilligan's view of the relationship between 
care and justice and explores what she claims are more sufficient alternatives. 
Friedman's Critique of Gilligan 
Although critiques often focus on Gilligan's separate moral spheres, she also 
refers to an integration of care and justice in moral development. 107 This too comes 
104 Ibid., 210. 
105 Cf. Walker, "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning, " 160 and Luria, "A 
Methodological Critique, " 200. Walker lists longitudinal, cross-sectional and experimental evidence as 
being the "usual" means of supporting stage sequence claims, while Luria claims the "usual" rules of 
E roving a psychological hypothesis include shared samples, procedures and scoring. 
06 See Greeno and Maccoby, "How Different Is the 'Different Voice'?, " 193-8. Walker, "Sex 
Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning, " 157-76. Flanagan and Jackson, "Justice, Care, 
and Gender, " 622-37. Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg, " 472-91. 
107 Gilligan, DY, 73,100. 
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under scrutiny. Marilyn Friedman argues care and justice overlap more than Gilligan 
has realised and are mutually compatible. 108 Friedman notes Gilligan does suggest 
mature moral reasoning about care incorporates considerations of justice and rights, 
but Gilligan's view only incorporates the recognition "that self and other are equal" to 
safeguard against care becoming too self-sacrificing, and this view "hardly does 
justice to justice". 109 People who treat each other "justly" are "providing a kind of 
care for each other", in an important, albeit limited, way, ' 10 and "morally adequate 
care involves considerations of justice". "' Friedman notes Gilligan's view 
incorporates a flawed view of justice and fails to grasp its importance and nuances. 
According to Friedman, Gilligan presumes a justice perspective emphasises 
only an individual's rights to non-interference by others. Gilligan fails to recognise 
positive rights, like welfare, which may be endorsed by a justice perspective, as well 
as the possibility of violence and harm in human inter-relationships and 
community. 112 For Friedman, justice, which in general includes giving people their 
due and treating them appropriately, is relevant to care as its considerations determine 
"appropriate ways to treat friends and intimates. " 113 She argues distributive justice is 
relevant to close personal relationships as it constrains the potential imbalance 
involved in the maintenance of a relationship by calling for an appropriate sharing of 
the benefits and burdens by all the participants. Justice is important in the protection 
log Marilyn Friedman, What are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and 
Moral Theory, (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1993), 118-19,126-7. Friedman argues this may be 
one reason why men and women do not show a divergence of reasoning along the care-justice 
dichotomy, particularly a statistical difference. 
'09 Ibid., 128. See Gilligan, DV, 149. 
110 Ibid., 119. 
111 Ibid., 127. 
112 Ibid., 132-3. See Gilligan, DV, 147. For further development of these themes see chapter 5. 
113 Ibid., 127. See pp. 237-45. 
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against harm, abuse and exploitation which are more feasible in close personal 
relationships because of the trust and intimacy involved. ' 14 Friedman states 
The concept of justice, in general, arises out of relational conditions in 
which most human beings have the opportunity, the capacity, and, for 
too many, the inclination to treat each other badly. ' 15 
Thus, Friedman concludes Gilligan is wrong to think the justice perspective neglects 
"the reality of relationships", but rather it is based on a "more subtle and multivalent 
assessment of the complexities of human relationships. " Friedman believes the 
complex reality of social life encompasses the human potential for helping, caring for, 
nurturing and for harming, exploiting and oppressing others. 116 She concludes it 
might be wise to reconsider the seeming dichotomy of care and justice and to question 
the moral adequacy of either orientation dissociated from the other. 117 Both care and 
justice are necessary for amorally adequate perspective on personal relationships. ' 18 
One possible type of integration Friedman offers is 
... to seek 
intimate, responsive, and committed relationships with 
people we know well enough to be reliably familiar with their needs, 
desires, beliefs ... and to settle 
for abstract, rule-based, equal respect 
toward that vast number of others we cannot know in any 
particularity. 119 
While another involves trying to 
... forge and sustain a 
dynamic, although uneasy, balance between 
abstract commitments to important values and principles (including 
equal respect for common moral personhood), on one hand, and 
particularised commitments to the people we care about, on the other 
hand. 120 
114 Ibid., 129-30. She argues when someone is harmed in personal relationships corrective justice has a 
role to play as he/she is owed some rectification. 
115 Ibid., 133. See Friedman, Mat are Friends For?, chapters 2 and 3. A breakdown in relationship 
implies falling short of some standard. This can lead to the affirmation and definition of standards. 
See chapter 5 for discussion of the content of standards, particularly justice, from which we have 
departed. 
116 Ibid., 133. 
117 Ibid., 133. 
118 Ibid., 134-5. See also chapter 5. 
119 Ibid., 138. 
120 Ibid., 138-9. Emphases added. 
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Rather than "to settlefoe' a dichotomization of the spheres of care and justice, 
Friedman supports an attempt to achieve and sustain a "balance between" abstract and 
particularised commitments, "' justice and care, within morality. 122 
Critics have queried and disagreed with Gilligan's hypothesis and 
methodology regarding sex differences in moral reasoning. In particular, the 
inadequacies and dangers of her view of justice and personal relationships were noted 
and the possibility of an integration of care and justice explored. Gilligan's version of 
the relationship between care and justice requires further investigation. 
Critique of Gilligan from a Middle Way Perspgctive 
In further exploring Gilligan's theories first her emphasis on contextual 
decision-making and its implications within an ethic of care will be examined 
critically, particularly in relation to conflicting responsibilities, relationships and 
needs. Then her notion of an integration of care and justice will be explored. 
Gilligan admits the care perspective encompasses "contextual relativism". 123 
Her notion of care may be relative to both a particular individual's views about the 
content of care and what fulfils this in a specific situation. If this is accurate, then 
Gilligan's view of care seems to incorporate moral relativism. Moral relativism 
denies that any single moral code or view has universal validity and normative moral 
relativism holds it is wrong to pass judgment on others who have different values. 124 
Such moral relativism could undermine Gilligan's claims and generalisations 
regarding moral development, as well as her prescription that the "different voice", or 
121 Ibid., 138-9. 
122 For further discussion of integration see chapter 5 and 7. 
123 Gilligan, DV, 22. 
124 David Wong, "Relativism, " in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 
442-3. 
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women"s approach, should be recognised as valid and included in theories of moral 
development. 125 
Furthermore, Gilligan's contextual moral relativism does not provide any 
means of deciding between or assessing different theories of care in practice. Thus 
standards of care are not necessarily agreed in theory and will be difficult to maintain 
in practice. This situation leaves some people, i. e. the vulnerable and marginalised in 
society, in danger of being mistreated, exploited and harmed by others, whether 
unintentionally or intentionally. 126 
Within her view of care, Gilligan seems to assume that "connection" between 
people will result in their "recognition of responsibility". 127 This assumption may 
imply that very recognition of responsibilities will simply result in their fulfilment, at 
least to some degree. Yet, even if people do acknowledge responsibilities to others or 
themselves, individuals can choose to ignore them. Gilligan may be assuming too 
much or being overly optimistic in her view of connection, relationships, human 
nature and fulfilment of responsibilities. 128 
Gilligan claims that women frame moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting 
responsibilities 129 which may include the obligation to exercise care, avoid inflicting 
hurt, 130 and give attention to needs. 131 Gilligan is unclear about the actual content and 
means of deciding between responsibilities when they conflict. 132 In a moral 
dilemma, it is not always possible to avoid inflicting hurt altogether. People 
125 Gilligan, DY, 1-2,18-19,156. 
im For a means of protecting the vulnerable see chapters 3 and 5. See also Robert E. Goodin, 
Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985). 
Gilligan, DY, 30. 
For further discussion of opfin-dstic and pessimistic perspectives of human nature see p. 59. 
129 Gilligan, DY, 105. 
130 Ibid., 73. 
131 Ibid., 80,85. 
132 See p. 9. 
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sometimes have to choose between the lesser of two harms. 133 Gilligan seems aware 
of this tension, to some degree, as she states, in the abortion study, that 
When no option exists that can be construed as being in the best 
interest of everybody, when responsibilities conflict and decision 
entails the sacrifice of somebody's needs, then the woman confronts 
the seemingly impossible task of choosing the victim. 134 
As Gilligan notes potential conflict between needs, harms, best interests and 
responsibilities, her statement can imply some hierarchy of responsibilities, but she 
avoids offering any concrete means of choosing between harms. Gilligan's advocacy 
of fulfilling the moral responsibility or obligation to care may be too vague and 
135 insufficient to help resolve these conflicts. Simply referring to a responsibility to 
care is unlikely to resolve the conflicting needs of and harms to the mother and foetus 
in an abortion decision. To care for the mother might support a decision to abort, 
while caring for the foetus would not, unless a person held the view that foetal life 
was not worth living or that the foetus was not a person. We need something more 
than a responsibility to care in enabling the prioritisation and fulfilment of 
responsibilities. This might include a notion of justice to assess different views of 
care, to prioritise needs and judge between conflicting harms. 136 
Gilligan does briefly discuss the need for both an ethic of care and an ethic of 
justice, or elements of them, to be utilised by women and men in moral decision- 
making. 137 For women the crucial experience in moral maturity involves making 
choices which clarify responsibility and truth, while for men it is experiencing 
133 See pp. 269-71. 
134 Gilligan, DV, 80. 
135 Ibid., p. 73. 
136 For a further discussion of responsibilities and the role of justice see chapter 5. Some people may 
argue the recognition and fulfilment of responsibilities lies more clearly injustice, fairness and equality 
rather than under the auspices of care. 
137 See pp. 19-20. 
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intimacy. 138 Yet, difficulties arise in understanding the import of Gilligan's claims as 
she is vague about the meaning or content of "choice" for women. 139 It could include 
the choice to confront or avoid conflict, accept or reject responsibility. It seems more 
productive to consider that Gilligan actually might be referring to women's 
willingness to accept responsibility for their choices, and the consequences of them, 
as part of moral development. 140 
A second, more empirical, difficulty with Gilligan's notion of moral identity is 
her claim that intimacy will end men's "isolation", as it involves being in relationship 
and a connection to others. 141 It is unclear what type of relationship Gilligan 
prescribes to fulfil these criteria. She may be implying any or all relationships to 
others are sufficient to provide intimacy. If Gilligan is implying or assuming this, 
then she is not distinguishing between different levels of relationship, e. g. with family 
and close friends versus acquaintances, personal versus professional relationships. A 
person can interact and have relationships with numerous people, but not achieve a 
level of intimacy with any of them and even less likely with all of them. Gilligan 
needs to be more specific about the nature and content of the "relationship" which 
will contribute to men's connection with others, balance their moral development, and 
end their "isolation and potential indifference'. 142 So her prescription offered is not 
sufficient. 
In further critiquing Gilligan's views we have addressed some difficulties with 
her contextual and moral relativism and conflicting responsibilities between harms, 
needs and best interests. Her notion of care does not resolve such conflicts which 
indicates the need for justice to provide some standards for protection and 
I" Gilligan, DY, 163-4. 
139 Ibid., 164. 
140 Seep. 18. Also DV, 163-5. 
141 Gilligan, DY, 163. 
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prioritisation. Gilligan's proposed integration of care and justice is useful but unclear 
and insufficient. It reveals the need for a genuine middle way. 143 
Conclusion 
Gilligan's theory highlights the crucial debate between an ethic of care and an 
ethic of justice in moral theory and development. She provides an important base 
from which to begin an exploration of these two approaches and the relationship 
between them. She links an ethic of care to relationships and responsibilities and an 
ethic of justice to abstract principles, rules and rights, including fairness and 
equality. 144 Even though the weight of Gilligan's theory rests on the existence of two 
distinct moral voices, she does propose some integration of an ethic of care and an 
ethic of justice in the moral development of women and men. Although Gilligan does 
not elaborate sufficiently or with great clarity about the interaction of both ethics, she 
does highlight some positive areas for further exploration. These include the 
interaction between an ethic of care and the elements of context, relationships and 
responsibilities. In particular, an analysis of Gilligan highlighted that responsibilities 
may involve exercising care for the self and others, meeting needs or avoiding hurt 
and exploitation. Both the ethics of care and justice will be vital to moral decision- 
making, we will investigate, analyse and critique them further. 
142 Ibid., p. 163. 
143 A more complete integration will be developed throughout the thesis. See especially chapter 5. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the insufficiency of Gilligan's integration suggests that care and 
justice are incompatible. 44 See pp. 5-6,11. 
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Chapter Two: The Ethics of Care 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter Gilligan's ethic of care was examined. 1 Now a more 
detailed analysis of the ethics of care and its basis in theories of caring will be 
explored. As there is no single dominant theorist which represents the ethics of care 
sufficiently, a variety of key theorists will be analysed. The chapter investigates 
themes which emerge within the ethics of care including the caring professions, 
nature and elements of care, caring relationship, personhood and the relationship 
between care and justice. It attempts to provide a structure and framework of analysis 
for both theoretical and practical themes and debate surrounding the ethics of care. 
This will be done through offering distinct descriptions and critiques of different 
ethics of care and an analysis of key themes from both, particularly regarding an 
amalgam with the ethics of justice. 
The Carina Professions 
One major exemplar of the caring professions is nursing. After investigating 
the theoretical in contrast to the more practical role of nurses, the tension between 
professional and personal elements of care and the role of values for caring 
professionals will be examined. 
Views of Nursing 
Alastair Campbell offers four different theories of nursing. 2 He is clear that 
perceptions of the nurse as "mothering figure", "angel" or "body expert" must be 
1 See chapter 1. 
2 Alastair V. Campbell, Moderated Love: A Theology of Professional Care, (London: SPCK, 1984), 
35,49-5 1. He notes the Latin root words for nursing, nutrire and nutricia, mean nurturing or feeding 
and contain the strong image of a child suckling (34). 
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dispelled and proposes "skilled companionship" as an alternative. 3 Viewing nursing 
as essentially feminine in character leads to sexual stereotypes and discrimination. 4 
Alternatively, the nature of nursing should combine tenderness and care for the body 
with respect for the individuality of the patient and consistent effort to promote 
5 independence and self-maintenance. The dangers of seeing the nurse as an "angel" 
include a romanticised view of the nurse and nursing itself .6 Viewing the nurse as 
"body expert" incorporates the danger of alienating patients through exclusive 
terminology and theoretical knowledge. 7 
In response, Campbell describes a better view of nursing as not being caught 
in sexual stereotypes, being professional without being distanced or manipulative, 
being close to the realities of bodily care, but also seeing the personal potential of 
every patient. This perspective also protects the nurse from overwhelming demands 
yet gives every patient full consideration. Campbell proposes viewing nursing as 
,8 "skilled companionship'. The concept of companionship may provide a way of 
understanding "loving as caring". The advantages of this view are that it describes a 
closeness which is not sexually stereotyped. It implies movement and change. It 
expresses mutuality and requires commitment within defined limits. 9 
While Campbell discusses theoretical views of nursing in relation to the caring 
professions, Tschudin offers a more practical perspective. She describes nursing as a 
practical, hands-on job where experience, emotions, affection and relationships make 
3 Ibid., 35,49-5 1. 
4 Ibid., 35-7. He argues that apparent differences between men and women, such as men being more 
spatially oriented and more physically aggressive and women being better at verbalisation and less self- 
confident, do not justify sexual stereotypes or broad generalisations about typically male and female 
occupations. Both men and women are capable of empathising with others' distress, although he 
claims women may be more willing to do so. Campbell cites Margaret Brownlie Sutherland, Sex Bias 
in Education, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), chapter 3. Cf. Gilligan's theory in chapter 1. 
5 Ibid., 42. 
6 Ibid., 40. 
7 Ibid., 44-5. 
8 Ibid., 49. 
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up the bulk of everyday work. 10 The nurse, as caregiver, must have self-knowledge, 
self-understanding and self-assertiveness. This caregiving involves empathy and the 
person must understand the sufferer in his/her position. " Tschudin states that caring 
is not unique to nursing, but it is unique in nursing. In general, caring is about people 
and is done with, for, to and as people. 12 Ultimately, her ideal picture in caring is 
person-oriented care where there is a giving which selflessly enhances the other. 13 
With regard to nursing, Patricia Benner and Judith Wrubel discuss the 
relationship between practice and theory. For them, it is "self evident that theory 
must be informed by real-world experience and experiments, which are in turn subject 
to theoretical interpretation. " 14 More specifically, nursing theory has not been 
adequately shaped by nurses' experience and practice. 15 Benner and Wrubel claim 
that 
Nursing theorists have been overly constrained by the stringent 
requirements of the received view of formal theories and have 
found it difficult to capture the embodied, relational, 
configurational, skilful, meaningful, and contextual human issues 
that are central to expert nursing care. 16 
In response to these theoretical approaches, Benner and Wrubel view nursing practice 
as a "systematic whole with a notion of excellence inherent in the practice itself. " 
This premise asserts that excellence is embodied in practice; therefore, the practice is 
9 Ibid., 48-9. 
10 Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, p. 1. Author's emphases. 
11 Ibid., 9. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 Ibid., 12-13. She argues the term "care-receiver" is preferable to "patienf' or "client" as the first 
implies someone who is static, ill and receptive and the second implies someone who shops for an item 
and pays for it. The term "care-receiver" is intended to include all those with whom nurses are 
professionally in touch. 
Yet, if "care-receiver" is used in this way, Tschudin does not seem to allow for differentiation 
between patients and other professional colleagues. Nurses may not have broadly generalised 
relationships, but may need to acknowledge differences in professional interactions in order to be clear 
about boundaries, lin-dtations and treat people appropriately. 
14 Patricia E. Benner and Judith Wrubel, 7he Printacy of Caring: Stress and Coping in Health and 
Illness, (Menlo Park and Wokingham: Addison-Wesley, 1989), 5. 
15 Ibid., 5. 
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a moral art not merely an applied science or technology. 17 Secondly, they argue 
theory is derived from practice. This is based on Heidegger's view that practical 
engaged activity is more basic than and prior to reflective theoretical thinking. ' 8 They 
conclude that 
... theory shapes practice, and practice shapes theory. In the best of 
worlds, practice and theory set up a dialogue that creates new 
possibilities. 19 
So, the relationship between theory and practice might be dynamic and 
interconnected, rather than static with one being superior or prior to the other. 
The tension between theory and practice may coincide with that between 
professional and personal elements in the caring professions. 
Professional-Personal Tension in Caring 
In relation to the caring professions, Campbell expounds the tension between 
professional and personal love. He seeks to clarify the character, or nature, of love 
imputed to the caring professions in nursing, medicine and social work. He argues the 
16 Ibid., 6. See Patricia E. Benner, From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing 
Practice, (Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley), 1984. 
17 Ibid., 19-20. Emphasis added. They cite Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 198 1). MacIntyre defines 'practice' as 'any coherent 
and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. ' (187). See pp. 166-7. 
18 Ibid., 19-20. See Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter, 
(Bloon-dngton : Indiana University Press, 1982). Benner and Wrubel do recognise the dilemma that 
some people may not see the need for teaching or having theories at all, if the expert practitioner's 
knowledge surpasses current formal knowledge. They argue that the expert has not always been an 
expert and there is a need for all possible guidance to avoid mistakes. Furthermore, an interpretative 
account of advanced practice creates public discourse and a basis for developing knowledge and 
1 ractice. 
9 Ibid., 21. 
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need for rationality and detachment in professional work makes the notion of love in 
those relationships elusive and ambiguous. 20 
Campbell suggests it is possible to glean positive features for some kind of 
love from an analysis of professional caring. He draws out companionship from 
nursing, brotherliness from medicine and hopefulness from social work. Each of 
these imply a commitment to the other's welfare which transcends personal advantage 
and professional advancement. 21 He then discusses different descriptions of 
professional love and whether disinterested love can be genuine. There are four types 
of love which he distinguishes, citing Paul Tillich. 22 These are epithymia or desire, 
eros or the search for value, philia or friendship, and agape or the depth of love. 
Tillich argues that each form requires the others or it becomes distorted, and agape 
has a special relationship to the other forms of love because "it is a love which is also 
God", so it overcomes the ambiguity of the others. 23 Yet, as the more personal 
elements of professional care are added, like philia and agape, new complexities 
arise. Too much distance in the relationship prevents a proper response to need, while 
too little distance means that objective help cannot be offered. What is needed is 
"critical distance" and controlled sympath Y. 24 
Recognising some tension between personal and professional love and caring, 
, 25 Campbell argues caring professionals should be "moderators of love'. The 
20 Campbell, Moderated Love, II- 12. Within professional love, Campbell argues for the need to 
examine "the claim to purity" and motives of professionals and the relationships between self-interest, 
ympathy and altruism (70-86). 
2 Ibid., 70. 
22 Ibid., 73. See also Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 
40- 1. Tillich describes epithymia as the libido (or desire) quality of love, philia as the friendship 
quality of love, and eros as the mystical quality of love. Agape is a quality of love, 'that which 
expresses the self-transcendence of the religious clement in love. ' 
23 Ibid., 73 
24 Ibid., 81-2. See also Campbell's discussion of Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter 
Heath, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954). 
25 Ibid., 84. He uses the example of the Moderator in the Presbyterian church, who keeps order in the 
assembly, but has no status himself and is merely the primus inter pares (or first among equals). 
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"meteorological" function of this role includes the necessary detachment involved in 
professional care. Caring professionals offer "moderated love" as they cannot love a 
person in the same way a relative or friend would, but still offer a form of love. They 
are employed to maintain a "balance of reason and emotion" and there is a necessary 
consistency in the care offered. In the ideal, for Campbell, "the climate of 
professional help is always a moderate one, temperate and without extremes and 
,, 26 sudden changes. 
Furthermore, caring professionals' opposition to pain, illness and social 
disadvantage symbolises the ideal of agape, "a love which restores full value to every 
individual, however damaged, however oppressed, however bereft of hope. , 27 In this 
ecclesiastical sense, the professional commitment is a religious one as professionals' 
actions and attitudes ultimately seek to conquer suffering, and hope for a full 
restoration. This hope is part of the transcendent element of all attempts to love. 28 
Since the caring professions claim the ethics of agape, they can ensure through their 
work that the "disadvantages of weakness are evened out and each person is given 
equal consideration as an individual of worth. 9s29 
Amidst the tension between professional and personal love and distance, 
reason and emotion in the caring professions, values have an important role to play. 
Values 
Downie and Telfer define the conception of value in reference to the caring 
professions, particularly medicine and social work. Values are things which are 
26 Ibid., 85. 
27 Ibid., 85. 
28 Ibid., 85-6. Campbell states this commitment expresses a hope which Christians symbolise by 
talking about incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection and a final victory when all is made new. So agape 
embodies a complete and total hope. 
29 Ibid., 84. See discussion of the worth of individuals pp. 213-15. 
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valued for their own sake and there is no further reason for holding them in esteem. 30 
To judge other people's values as right or wrong, one must have a set of objective 
values or principles. 31 Jeffrey Blustein argues impersonal, or objective, value is that 
which is inherent in something apart from one's caring about or wanting it. 32 in 
contrast, Blustein describes personal value as conferred by an individual on something 
in and through caring. Personal value is posterior to the activity of caring-about, as it 
is the value given to objects of care by caring-about them. 33 Tschudin describes 
values as the personal aspects and foundations of social and ethical living. 34 
Along with definitions there are different types of value. Downie and Telfer 
identify liking values, which people choose for themselves but do not necessarily 
want others to adopt and hold, and ideal values, which people expect and desire for 
others to hold. Ideal values have a universal quality that liking values do not have. 35 
In contrast to types of value, Tschudin distinguishes between values, beliefs and 
attitudes. 36 The values held by caring professionals, whether objective or subjective, 
personal or impersonal and universal, underlie and impact decisions made and actions 
taken. 
The nature of the caring professions, particularly nursing, tensions between 
theory and practice, professional and personal elements and the role of values have 
30 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 7. This definition might be problematic as it seems 
somewhat circular. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment. - Taking the Personal Point of View, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 44. 
33 Ibid., 42-3. 
34 Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 28. 
35 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 8. The authors argue that aims express values, and discuss 
three types . Intrinsic aims are held because a person 
is part of a profession and they are values shared 
by all persons within it. Extrinsic aims might be held as a result of a particular profession, but go 
beyond those aims. Personal aims are those a person might pursue independently of a profession, and 
are not necessarily shared by other members (10). 
36 Tschudin, 28-9. She states values are less fixed and more dynamic than beliefs because there is an 
element of motivation involved. Beliefs are the most basic values, change the least, and are based 
more on faith than fact. Attitudes are dispositions or settled behaviours which are usually made up of 
beliefs. 
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been investigated. Underlying the practice of these professionals is the nature of care 
and caring. 
The Nature of Care 
In examining the nature of care different definitions, types and some ideal 
conceptions of care will be investigated before addressing the importance of caring. 
Noddings argues to care for someone or something includes having regard for 
or inclination toward someone or something. 37 Blustein distinguishes four types of 
caring. He states "caring as liking" entails having affection for, being drawn to or 
being pleased by something. 38 To "have care of" is to be charged with the 
responsibility for supervising, managing, providing for, attending to needs, or 
performing services. 39 To "care that' 'is propositional, has a situation as its object and 
does not necessarily involve action, but does involve joy or distress if the situation is 
not relieved . 
40 To "care-about" entails being personally invested in something and is 
the type to which Blustein devotes the most time. He distinguishes positive from 
negative caring-about. The former benefits, enhances, or keeps from danger, 41 while 
the latter destroys or diminishes people or things. 42 
Blustein further states caring-about requires having and taking an interest in 
the other. It is not possible to "care about" something one is not interested in, but one 
can "care for" something without taking much interest in it. 43 Caring-about 
presupposes the ability to identify some states or conditions of the objects of care as 
3' Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press), 9. 
38 Ibid., 27. 
39 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 27. 
40 Ibid., 28. 
41 Ibid., 28. 
42 Ibid., 28-9. For critical analysis of some definitions within care see pp. 69-71. 
43 Ibid., 32. 
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good and bad, as not all caring is good or equally good care. 44 Blustein further 
distinguishes between personal care, which is particularistic because a person is 
cared-about independent of satisfying general conditions 45 and impersonal care, which 
is non-particularistic and non-preferential. 46 Personal and impersonal caring-about 
may be more subjective and objective, respectively. 
For Mayeroff, the concept of caring entails relating to a person. This involves 
a long process of development. Caring is not merely liking someone, an isolated 
feeling, or a temporary relationship. To care for someone is to help him grow and 
actualise himself. 47 Noddings relates care to responsibility for another and restraining 
harm, claiming caring may mean being charged with the protection, welfare or 
maintenance of something or someone. 48 So care involves a focus on the other, which 
includes some benefit for him/her. 
Regarding the nature of care, Noddings states 
Neither the engrossment of the one-caring nor the perception of 
attitude by the cared-for is rational; that is, neither is reasoned. While 
much of what goes on in caring is rational and carefully thought out, 
the basic relationship is not ... 
4 
Although care, and its foundational relationship, are fundamentally and "essentially 
non-rational", rationality does have a role to play within caring, albeit secondary. 50 
Similarly, Blustein argues caring is emotional and not under direct voluntary control 
and people cannot stop and Start Caring at will. 51 So care and caring may have both 
emotional and rational dimensions. 
44 Ibid., 33-4. 
45 Ibid., 147. 
46 Ibid., 146-7. In making this distinction, Blustein may avoid some impartialist criticisms. See Blum, 
"Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Ileory, " 472-91. 
47 Milton Mayeroff, "On Caring, " International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1965): 462. 
48 Noddings, Caring, 9. 
49 Ibid., 61. 
50 Ibid., 35-6,61. 
51 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 65. People can form intentions regarding caring-about and how to 
care. 
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We have explored different definitions and types of caring. Differing views of 
care may relate to its nature and the ideal or ideals of caring. 
For Noddings ideals in caring are related to both natural and universal aspects 
of care. She states 
'I shall claim there is a form of caring natural and accessible to all ýuman beings. Certain feelings, attitudes and memories will be 
claimed as universal. But the ethic itself will not embody a set of 
universalisable moral judgments. 52 
Furthermore, Noddings rejects absolute principles and rules and universiflability as 
guides for ethical behaviour. 53 She is careful to claim this ethic of caring is not 
situation ethics, focusing on consequences, because it "locates morality primarily in 
the pre-act consciousness of the one-caring. , 54 So, at least part of caring is "natural" 
and contains universal accessibility for all human beings, for Noddings. 
This universal accessibility is connected to Noddings' ideal in caring, 
55 
primarily the ethical ideal. The ethical ideal includes discussion of "virtue" but not 
"the virtues" in abstract. The virtue of the caring ethic is built up in relation and 
reaches out and grows in response to the other. 
56 In response to Hume's description of 
morality as being rooted in and founded upon some universal and natural feeling, 
"that which renders morality an active virtue", 57 Noddings views this "active virtue" 
morality as requiring two feelings. The first is the sentiment of natural caring. The 
58 
second is the sentiment occurring in remembrance of the first. She recognises that 
ethical caring requires an effort that natural caring does not, but states that an ethic of 
care seeks to maintain the caring attitude and is thus dependent upon natural caring, 
52 Noddings, Caring, 27-8. 
53 Ibid., 5,84-5. 
54 Ibid., 28. 
55 Ibid., 49. 
56 Ibid., 80-1. 
57 Ibid., 79. She cites David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, " in Ethical 
Theories, ed. A. Melden, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967), 275. 
41 
not superior to it. 59 Noddings advocates both natural, universal and ethical caring 
within her ideal of care. 
Part of this ideal involves the ethical and ideal self, for Noddings. The ethical 
self is an active relation between the actual self and a vision of the ideal self as one- 
caring and cared-for. It is bom out of a fundamental recognition of relatedness, 
namely acknowledging "that which naturally connects me to the other, then re- 
connects me through the other to myself '. 60 The nature of the ethical self stems from 
the "natural sympathy" felt for others and "longing to maintain, recapture or and 
enhance our most caring and tender moments.,, 61 Noddings argues that as both these 
sentiments may be denied, commitment is required to establish the ethical ideal. 62 
To nurture this ideal, Noddings emphasises the role of the cared-for. In so 
doing, she does not distinguish between "persons" and those not yet persons. Her 
regard for individuals is not based on "respect for persons" or "natural rights". 63 
Noddings specifies three aspects of nurturing the ethical ideal. These are dialogue, 
practice and the "attribution and explication of the best possible motive". 64 Regarding 
the third, and most important element, Noddings claims 
... the motive of the other has an a priori respectability that ma 61 
be 
denied only with justification - if it is to be discredited at all. 6 
58 Ibid., 79. 
59 Ibid., 80-1. This may be seen as a partial answer to impartialist critiques. See Blum, "Gilligan and 
Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, " 472-9 1. 
60 Ibid., 49. 
61 Ibid., 104. 
62 Ibid., 104. See also pp. 53-4. 
63 Ibid., 120. Noddings claims her regard for beings is not derived from a concept of, but provides a 
basis for, respect for persons. Furthermore, she claims there are no "natural rights", only those people 
confer on one another out of natural inclination or commitment. See further discussion of rights, pp. 
196-8. 
64 Ibid., 121-3. 
65 Ibid., 123. 
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Ultimately, the one-caring attempts to see the potential for the best possible motive 
and always to raise their view of the other and never lower it. 66 So Noddings 
emphasises the importance of motives and ideals within caring. 67 
In examining various types of caring, its nature and ideals, it is also necessary 
to explore its importance. Noddings argues caring is important in itself and to human 
beings. 68 Blustein recognises caring is important because it involves being invested in 
people or things. 69 Benner and Wrubel claim caring is primary because it "creates 
possibility", as it determines what matters to a person. 70 One of their main premises 
is that "caring is the essential requisite for all coping" . 
71 Benner and Wrubel offer no 
72 
abstract lists for coping because caring is always specific and relational. Caring is 
important by nature and in relation to people, things and coping. 
Caring also can be important because of its implications. Mayeroff claims 
caring orders other activities around it. People tend to subordinate what is irrelevant 
and exclude what is incompatible with caring and its conditions. 73 Blustein argues 
through critical reflection on caring, people can take control of their carings, make 
decisions and take actions which are expressive of their carings. 74 The implications of 
caring can affect our priorities, while critical reflection on the objects and content of 
caring may be vital in our choices and actions in care. 
In investigating definitions, types, foundations for and the nature of care, 
ideals and motivations, as well as the importance and implications of caring also have 
66 Ibid., 124-4. 
67 For further discussion of motives and motivation see pp. 55-7. 
68 Noddings, Caring, 7. 
69 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 61. This relates to "caring about caring" which Blustein advocates. 
He prioritises the objects of caring, placing people, projects, principles and ideals first, and then "caring 
about caring". 
7013enner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 1-2. They also claim that caring creates risk and 
vulnerability for a person because only things that matter are stressful. 
71 Ibid., 2. 
72 Ibid., 3. CL Gilligan's ethic of care, pp. 5-6 
73 Mayeroff, "On Caring, " 473. 
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been explored. As caring involves a variety of aspects, some of its elements must be 
examined. 
Elements of Care 
Specific elements of care include love, compassion, needs, mutuality and 
reciprocity, types of responsibility and levels of commitment. 
Love 
There are different definitions, types and levels of love, particularly in relation 
to professional and personal realms. 
Regarding professional love, 75 Campbell highlights companionship, 
brotherliness and hopefulness from nursing, medicine and social work respectively, 
which positively provide the basis of some form of love. 76 Caring professionals' role 
as "moderators of love', 77 may serve as an integration of these types of love. 78 
In contrast to professional love Blustein advocates personal love, involving 
particularity and irreplaceability. 79 Blustein claims an account of personal love is 
needed where the irreplaceability of the loved one must have something to do with the 
74 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 65. 
75See p. 57-8. 
76 Campbell, Moderated Love, 70. 
77 Ibid., 84-6. 
78 Ibid., 73. Campbell identifies epithymia, eros, philia and agape as four types of love. See Tillich, 
Morality and Beyond, 40-1. See also Blustein, Care and Commitment, 166-77. He discusses platonic, 
romantic, sexual and parental love. 
Cf. types of love including storge, or "natural affection", eros, the attraction of desire particularly in 
sexual love, philia, or the affection of friends, and agape, or the self-giving love of God. See Sinclair 
B. Ferguson and David F. Wright, eds., The New Dictionary of Theology, (Leicester: Inter-Varsity 
Press, 1988), 398. 
79 B lustein, Care and Commitment, 19 1. He cites John McT. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 
vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), part V, chapter x1i, sections 465-68. Blustein 
argues against McTaggart's idea that love may be "because of qualities" but never "in respect of 
qualifies". In personal love an individual should love the other for himself alone, not as an 
exemplification of a type. A person's characteristics should be relevant to loving that person for who 
he is. While, for McTaggart, love does not need to be justified, is not for a person's characteristics and 
is independent of justificatory reasons. 
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beloved's particular qualities and characteristics, 80 and the object of personal love is 
not just qualities, but a whole person. 81 
As one element of care, love may involve professional and personal levels, 
particularity and irreplaceability. One aspect of love may be compassion. 
Compassion 
The analysis of compassion will investigate definitions, descriptions and its 
place within the caring professions. 
For Blustein, compassion involves viewing others as fellow human beings. It 
identifies the suffering of a person as possible for all human beings. Although it gives 
special attention to that person, it does not necessarily give preferential consideration 
of his/her needs against those of others. 82 Tschudin describes compassion more 
broadly "as a way of living born out of an awareness of one's relationship to all living 
,, 83 1 creatures. Yet, it is also a specific act in response to a specific need, involves more 
than kindness or caring and can be identified only through experiencing it. 84 For 
Downie and Telfer, compassion is part of the caring relationship, but it is not 
intrinsically possessed by all caring professionals. "What is morally required" is a 
steady maintenance of the awareness that the other person has the capacity to suffer. 85 
So compassion may affect our view of humanity, be a necessary part of professional 
caring and arise in response to need. 
So Ibid., 193. 
81 Ibid., 194. He notes although one might admire a particularly attractive quality of the loved one, 
love is not just a response to that quality. Rather, one cherishes the configuration of instantiated 
walities as manifested in his/her life over time (199). See pp. 215-17. 
Ibid., 146. 
83 Tschudin, Caring in Nursing, 5-6. She cites M. Simone Roach, The Human Act of Caring, (Ottawa: 
Canadian Hospital Association, 1987). 
" Ibid., 5-6. 
85 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 90. 
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Need 
Need or needs in caring involve descriptions and types of needs, and the basis 
for any responsibility to meet or respond to them. 
Downie and Telfer distinguish between absolute needs, which a person must 
have for a reasonable human life, and relative needs, which are not necessary for a 
reasonable human life and are relative to a particular purpose. This distinction 
counters the objection that anything can be spoken of as a need. 86 They discuss needs 
in relation to interests and wants. Personal interests are defined as whatever meets an 
individual's own wishes, taken as a whole with regard to future and present. A 
person's needs are the most central part of these interests. 87 Downie and Telfer state 
interests are related to a person's desires and that which brings a person what he/she 
wants. This view implies the calculation of a person's wants but can include 
something wanted for its own sake, according to Downie and Telfer. 88 Needs may be 
absolute, or basic, and relative and are distinguishable from interests and wants. 
These distinctions can be linked to minimum and maximum levels of need and 
standards in society. 89 
In discussing possible bases for responding to needs, Downie and Telfer 
explore types of equality and equity. Derivative equality depends on another value 
before it comes into operation. Relative equality involves equality only with others in 
the same group. Egalitarian equality aims to serve people's needs in an equitable 
manner and redistribute benefits "simply to make people more equal when need is not 
86 Ibid., 29. 
97 Ibid., 30. 
88 Ibid., 28. Interests may not always coincide with what a person wants. For example, a nurse may be 
torn between what a patient wants, such as not to have an enema or eat a meal, and what is in the 
patient's best interests. 
See pp. 225-9. 
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in question. "90 Relative and egalitarian equality presuppose that there is some 
criterion by which all humans are to be treated as equals. This criterion is that 
humans have intrinsic worth and value, which make these concepts derivative, 
because they are based on the value of respect for the individual, according to Downie 
and Telfer. 
91 
As part of respect for persons, Downie and Telfer describe equal consideration 
as consistent treatment between people in accordance with some rule, or, preferably, 
equity where there are justified differences of treatment. These justified differences 
are based on need, where like cases are treated similarly and unlike cases are 
distinguished for "morally appropriate reasons". 92 Equity presupposes some criterion 
It. 
93 for these justifiable differences, such as desert, merit, or capacity to benefi There 
are different means of allocating resources with respect to needs. Equality and equity 
play an important role in response to needs. 94 
Furthermore, there is a responsibility to meet needs, according to Downie and 
Telfer. The philanthropic ideal of medicine and social work states that those in need 
ought to be helped, not just because the helpers want to do so, but because the needy 
make a claim on society. 95 
Noddings also comments on the responsibility to meet needs and care. In 
response to the need of the cared-for, Noddings claims the impulse to care, the "I 
90 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 77. They recognise there is a further distinction to be made 
between equality of opportunity and that of satisfaction (78). See also p. 86. 
91 Ibid., 73-9. This view may be one way of countering the critique that the ethics of care allows 
inappropriate partiality or is inegalitarian. For further discussion of the worth of persons and 
conceptions of justice see pp. 213-15,230-7. 92 Ibid., 76. 
93 Ibid., 76-7. One key example is Aristotle's notion of justice as equity. See Nichomachean Ethics, 
trans. and introduction by W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 132-4. 
94 Equality and equity will be important themes in developing a middle way model. See pp. 230-7. 95 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 12. 
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must do something", arises naturally in people, at least occasionally. 96 There is not a 
"demand" to care. People cannot demand others to experience this impulse, but they 
can choose to accept or reject it. 97 Noddings recognises some type of responsibility in 
meeting needs of others. 
There are absolute and relative needs, interests and wants, which can be 
connected to minimum and maximum standards in society. Equality and equity are 
important in responding to and meeting needs. Furthermore, a response to needs also 
might involve a level of reciprocity and mutuality. 
Reciprocity and Mutuality 
To investigate the role of reciprocity and mutuality in caring involves 
definitions, descriptions of their content and relationship to needs, responsiveness, 
receptivity and care. 
Noddings argues there is necessarily some form of reciprocity in caring. 98 
Caring involves the one-caring and the cared-for and is completed when "fulfilled" in, 
or recognised by, both parties. 99 Reciprocity is the freedom, creativity and 
spontaneous disclosure of the cared-for that manifest themselves under the nurture of 
the one-caring. 100 The one-caring is receptive to the cared-for, 101 sees his best self 
and works with the cared-for to actualise that self. 102 The cared-for must receive and 
" Noddings, Caring, 8 1. Noddings states this impulse arises naturally for people, in the absence of 
pathology. So she may be implying that all people experience this impulse at some time. 
" Ibid., 25,49,8 1. See also pp. 42-3. 
98 Ibid., 71. Cf. Lawrence L. Becker, Reciprocity, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), chapter 
3. He argues the disposition to reciprocate is a moral virtue and people ought to be disposed, as a 
matter of moral character, to make reciprocity a moral obligation (74-5). 
99 Ibid., 68. 
100 Ibid., 734. She refers to Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kauffman, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons), 1970. 
101 Ibid., 59. 
102 Ibid., 64. 
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recognise the care offered'03 and be responsive in some way, 104 for there to be a 
reciprocal'05 and caring relationship. 106 
Campbell also discusses the importance of reciprocity in a caring relationship. 
He claims a key to reciprocity in professional caring is that the needy person needs 
help but that help is most likely offered by someone who needs to be needed. Both 
parties in a covenant relationship are the recipients of gifts and neither is a totally 
selfless giver. 107 Recognising subtle needs of and rewards for the caring professional 
may protect against imbalance in the relationship and restore reciprocity. 108 
Along with reciprocity, Campbell discusses mutuality in professional 
caring. 109 The aim of mutuality is to improve knowledge. 110 A person must reveal 
his/her particularity, as the true welfare of the other always must be sought through 
sharing. "' Because the knowledge of the helper has limits, there must be a meeting 
of the world of the patient and the world of the professional to gain the most useful 
and helpful knowledge. 112 Yet, Campbell recognises the patient is dependent on the 
carer in a way which is not mutual. Campbell cautions against a "false 
egalitarianism" which refuses to acknowledge the "appropriateness" of the 
professional help offered. ' 13 There may be appropriate and inappropriate levels of 
mutuality expected depending on the type of relationship involved, whether 
professional or personal. 
103 Ibid., 69. 
104 Ibid., 71-2. 
105 Ibid., 74. 
106 Ibid., 69. The validity and practicality of requiring reciprocity raises difficulties. See pp. 69-70. 
107 Campbell, Moderated Love, 105. See pp. 5 8-9. 
log Ibid., 106. 
109 Ibid., 90-5. He discusses mutuality in relation to particularity and incompleteness in professional 
canng. 
110 Ibid., 92. 
111 Ibid., 91. 
112 Ibid., 92-3. 
113 Ibid., 92. For further exploration of appropriateness see pp. 23745. 
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Within personal caring, Noddings supports "an ethical responsibility for 
behaving as cared-foe' in a situation where reciprocity and natural affection break 
down. ' 14 This involves the cared-for straining to receive what should come through a 
caring relationship and interpreting the one-caring in the best light. This state is 
66magnanimous receptivity"! 15 
Noddings argues that "the receptive mode is at the heart of human 
existence"! 16 It is reflexive and reflective, ' 17 and required of the one-caring and the 
cared-for. The one-caring conveys an attitude of receptivity through feeling the 
emotions of the cared-for, and commits herself to act accordingly! 18 The carer 
behaves appropriately by feeling with, or empathising, responding to, or acting for the 
cared-for. 
Likewise, for Noddings, receptivity is required from the cared-for. If it is 
lacking a relationship cannot be characterised as one of caring. In identifying the 
logic of the caring relationship Noddings states 
(W, X) is a caring relationship if and only if. 
i) W cares for X (as described in one-caring) and 
ii) X recognises that W cares for X. 119 
The recognition of care means the cared-for receives the caring honestly, not hiding 
from or denying it. The receptivity to care becomes "part of what the one-caring feels 
114 Noddings, Caring, 74-5. 
I's Ibid., 76-7. She notes two ways it can be achieved. First, the cared-for might have a long, rich 
history of being genuinely cared-for and thus meets the other with the expectation of being cared-for. 
Second, the cared-for may respond to the needs of the one-caring, consciously giving up his status as 
cared-for because of a concern for the other, and thus "behaves as" cared-for. Noddings argues the 
latter is not an authentic caring relationship because there is no cared-for. 
116 Ibid., 35. Noddings uses the term "existence" in the existential sense. She claims it means more 
than merely living or subsisting, and includes an awareness of, and commitment to, what we are doing 
and living. 117 Ibid., 35. 
118 Ibid., 59. Cf. Mayeroff, "On Caring", 465-6. He also addresses receptivity in caring. 
119 Ibid., 68-9. Emphases added. 
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when she receives the cared-foe'. 120 In caring, for Noddings, receptivity is required of 
and inter-related for both parties, involving reciprocity and mutuality. 
Noddings not only requires receptivity in a caring relationship, but part of this 
responsiveness involves engrossment. 
Caring is largely reactive and responsive. Perhaps it is even better 
characterised as receptive. The one-caring is sufficiently engrossed 
in the other to listen to him and to take pleasure or pain in what he 
recounts. Whatever she does for the cared-for is embedded in a 
relationship that reveals itself as engrossment and in an attitude that 
warms and comforts the cared-for. 121 
Engrossment is seeing and feeling with the other, not analysing how one would feel if 
one was the other. Engrossment is not only emotional feeling. There is a 
"characteristic and appropriate mode of consciousness in caring". 122 Sartre describes 
the condition in which the higher consciousness of rationality gives way to the lower, 
non-reflective consciousness of emotion as a "degradation of consciousness". 
Noddings argues "appropriate" or "inappropriate" and "effective" or "ineffective" are 
more fruitful terms for this shift. 
123 In caring, a permanent or untimely move from 
affective engrossment to abstract problem-solving is "degradation", according to 
Noddings. She denies saying a temporal or lateral move to objective thinking is 
"degradation", but claims one should be able to invest in the appropriate mode with 
dominance. 124 In caring there are rational and emotional modes of consciousness, 
which can be appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation. 125 
Caring involves reciprocity and mutuality, which entail receptivity and 
engrossment. The appropriateness or inappropriateness of different levels of 
120 Ibid., 69. 
121 Ibid., 19. 
122 Ibid., 33. 
123 Ibid., 34. She cites Jean Paul Sartre, 'The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, ' in Essays in 
Existentialism, ed. Wade Baskin, (Secaucus, NJ: The Citadel Press, 1965), 189-300. 124 Ibid., 34-5. 
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reciprocity or mutuality correspond to the type of caring relationship, whether 
professional or personal. This also may be true of responsibility in caring. 
Responsibility 
There are different types and levels of responsibility in care, including positive 
and negative. 
Tschudin distinguishes between having responsibility, being answerable to 
someone or something usually defined by contract, and being responsible, a personal 
aspect which grows from engaging with people and their values. 126 According to 
Mayeroff, although people are liable for their actions in caring, this is not the 
pervasive sense of responsibility. Caring can be considered responsible behaviour 
and involves responsiveness to the other. 127 
Tschudin links responsibility to many other conceptions in a somewhat 
confusing way. She connects responsibility to rights and duty, 128 as well as freedom, 
rightness, goodness. 129 One person's rights, which are based on human needs, are 
another's duties. 130 Both persons and institutions can have rights and duties, which 
sometimes conflict. Rights tend to emphasise the negative of doing no harm, rather 
than the positive of care. 131 The conception of advocacy arose from the conflict 
between individual and collective rights and duties, and involves principles of justice, 
125 The themes of appropriateness, rationality and emotion will be developed further throughout the 
thesis. See chapter 5. 
126 Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 74-5. 
127 Mayeroff, "On Caring, " 472. 
128 Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 74-5. In contrast to responsibility, she claims duty is linked to 
something prescribed and contractual. Cf. Noddings who does not link responsibility to rights and 
duties. Seep. 42. 
129 Ibid., 74. 
130 Ibid., 75-6. Tschudin argues the State make it its duty to protect its citizens by providing basic 
goods and services, such as clean water, food and shelter. These personal rights are in contrast to legal 
rights which include voting, protection and defence. For further discussion of duties and rights see pp. 
109-10,144-5,176-8,196-8. 
131 Ibid., 75-7. She notes the rights and duties of nurses, patients and institutions as examples. 
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fairness and non-maleficence, according to Tschudin. 132 As responsibilities can be 
linked to rights and duties, they may be positive, relating to care and benefit for the 
other, or negative, entailing non-maleficence or restraint of harm. 133 
James Gustafson and James Laney state that responsibilities arise within the 
"fabric" of relationships. 134 In general, structures of mutual responsibility are 
incorporated in human experience and involve habituation. Deviation from these 
habitual, or normal, expectations is considered irresponsible and untrustworthy. 135 
Yet, habitual reactions are not always available to define or clarify responsibilities. 
Responsibilities also can conflict. So, moral reflection on and about them is needed. 
This includes assessing to whom and for what a person is responsible and the 
appropriateness of responsibilities, actions and choices. 136 
Responsibility can be contractual or personal, positive or negative, and involve 
behaviour, actions, rights, duties and conflict. Responsibilities also may entail a level 
of commitment. 
Commitment 
Commitment in caring involves different types and descriptions and is 
connected to values, identity and integrity. 
Tschudin notes commitment may be defined as a complex affective response 
characterised by a convergence between one's desires and obligations and by a 
132 Ibid., 77-8. 
133 See pp. 223-9. 
134 James M. Gustafson and James T. Laney, On Being Responsible: Issues in Personal Ethics, 
(London: SCM Press, 1969), 4-5. 
135 Ibid., 4-6. 
136 Ibid., 4-8. The authors note that choosing to be responsible for one thing often excludes the 
possibility of being responsible for another. This reality points to the necessity of accepting 
"limitation, finitude, and contingency in the moral life" ( 7). 
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deliberate choice to act in accordance with them. 137 Noddings also stresses the 
importance of a commitment to act within caring, as the feeling that I must act on 
behalf of the other may not be sustained. This commitment manifests itself through 
actually acting on behalf of the cared-for, taking a continued interest in his reality 
through an appropriate time span, and the continued renewal of that commitment. 138 
Commitment involves a deliberate choice, thus exercising autonomy, and the positive 
focus of acting on behalf of another. 
Blustein addresses "identity conferring commitments", as discussed by 
Gabriele Taylor and Lynne McFall. 139 These commitments involve a person's 
centrally important values, namely those that contribute to one's identity. Any change 
in them has far reaching consequences on the nature and order of other evaluations. 
These commitments are required to have personal integrity. 140 
Blustein claims comprehensive integrity is only possible if people's lives 
consistently reflect a coherent conception of the good and they are committed to 
living in accordance with coherent commitments. 141 Persons who are faithful to their 
core commitments, those that have privileged status in people's lives because they 
reflect what is most important to people, are persons of integrity. A person's integrity 
depends on these commitments and they constitute his/her identity. 142 A person who 
takes his/her own integrity seriously views himself/herself as an unique individual 
137 Tschudin, Caring in Nursing, 8-9. She cites Roach, The Human Act of Caring. Cf Benner and 
Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 48. They use "concern" rather than "commitment" because it is more 
qualitative and descriptive of meaning and is a key characteristic in the phenomenological view. See 
ff. 60-2. 
88 Noddings, Caring, 16. See also pp. 42,47-8. 
139 B lustein, Care and Commitment, 49-5 1. See Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985), 130-1. Lynne McFall, "Integrity, " Ethio 98 (1987), 5-20. 
140 Ibid., 49-50. Taylor and McFall claim people have different identity conferring commitments and 
they need not be moral in nature. 141 Ibid., 50-1. 
142 Ibid., 23 1. 
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with distinctive worth. 143 Integrity is also bound up with putting others' welfare as an 
overriding moral concern. Integrity is connected to commitment, does not entail 
transitory attachments or peripheral concerns, and its maintenance and attainment lie 
in the process of self-definition. 144 So, commitment relates to persons, their integrity 
and values. 
In examining specific elements of care various descriptions, definitions, types 
and implications of love, compassion, need, reciprocity and mutuality, responsibility 
and commitment have been investigated. These elements are manifested in a caring 
relationship. 
The Caring Relationship 
In examining the caring relationship motivations, a demand or moral 
imperative to care, professional and personal levels, and conflicts will be explored. 
Regarding the motivation behind caring, Downie and Telfer claim the 
philanthropic ideal can be an intrinsic aim and an ideal value. 145 The motivation for 
caring, particularly in the professional realm, might stem from a social base or some 
requirement to care. 
For Noddings the motivation to care arises naturally, but there is not a demand 
to care. 
There can be, surely, no demand for the initial impulse that arises as a 
feeling, an inner voice saying'I must do something, 'in response to the 
need of the cared-for. This impulse arises naturally, at least 
occasionally ... We cannot demand that one have this 
impulse, but we 
shrink from one who never has it. 146 
143 Ibid., 235. 
144 Ibid., 10-1. Blustein argues extreme apathy or indifference are incompatible with integrity because 
neither motivates our deepest commitments. See the discussion of holism pp. 215-17. 
145 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 11-12. See p. 47. 
146Noddings, Caring, 8 1. This type of person is pathological. 
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This impulse can be rejected because a person shifts from I must do something" to 
"Something must be done", removing that person from the possible people through 
whom the action will be accomplished. Alternatively, this impulse might be rejected 
because a person feels there is nothing she can do. If either happens without 
reflecting on what can be done for the cared-for, then a person does not care, as caring 
requires a response to this initial impulse with a commitment to act. 147 If caring is not 
natural, then one should call upon ethical caring. For Noddings, when in relation or 
when the other has addressed the one-caring, she must respond as one-caring. The 
imperative is categorical. When the relation is not yet established or can be "properly 
refused", the imperative is hypothetical. 148 
In moving from categorical and hypothetical to moral imperatives, Noddings 
claims the connection between caring and moral imperative is that most intimate 
situations of caring are natural. 149 The impulse and imperative to care for the other is 
natural and related to people's moral being, involves reflection and choice, and is 
grounded in a desire for relatedness. 150 
Noddings also addresses the ethical ideal in caring, arguing it seems preferable 
to place it above principles as a guide to moral action. 151 In a traditional view, moral 
principles must be universalisable. 152 For Noddings, this principle relies on the 
sameness of dilemmas and must prove human predicaments exhibit sameness. 
147 Ibid., 8 1. Noddings claims this commitment to action may be overt or a commitment to think about 
what one might do. This latter case may involve abstaining from action, when one judges that any 
action is likely not to be in the best interests of the cared-for. 
149 Ibid., 86. She defines this proper refusal to care as when no formal chain or natural circle of caring 
is present. Although the notion of moral imperatives is taken from Immanuel Kant's philosophy, 
Noddings' approach is at odds with Kant's universalisable categorical imperative. See Immanuel Kant, 
Foundationsfor the Metaphysics ofMorals, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1969), with critical essays edited by Robert Paul Wolff, (London and New York: MacMillan, 1985), 
36,44. Also H. J. Paton, The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1961), 27-30. 
149 Ibid., 83. By "natural" she states the impulse to act on behalf of the other is innate, not instinctual. 
1" Ibid., 83. See pp. 63-6 for a further discussion of morality, rationality and relatedness. 
151 See pp. 41-3. 
56 
Sameness cannot be proved without moving away from the concrete situations. 
Noddings argues the condition which makes situations different cannot be satisfied by 
the application of principles developed out of sameness. Furthermore, the ethical 
ideal contains a universal component, the "maintenance of the caring relationship", so 
is not cast into relativism. 153 
Motivations for a caring relationship may arise naturally or from choice. 154 
There may be a moral imperative, obligation or requirement to care. 155 This 
obligation may arise or be altered depending on whether the nature of the caring 
relationship is professional or personal. 
In contrast to personal caring relationships, Downie and Telfer primarily 
discuss professional ones. They define relationship as the situation, bond or occasion 
which links two or more people together, or the attitudes people so linked have 
toward one another. 156 This "bond" relationship consists of formal rules which 
govern the provision of health care and welfare or the "ethics" of a profession, which 
are a vaguer set of rules and expectations. 157 Downie and Telfer argue the attitudes 
which "ought to" accompany the "bond" are impartial and objective ones. 158 A caring 
professional should have a non-judgmental attitude toward clients and their 
I" For Kant, individuals should always act on principles which they could will to become universal 
rules. This is the categorical imperative. Kant, Foundationsfor the Metaphysics of Morals, 36. 
153 Noddings, Caring, 84-6. She cites Fredrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann, 
(New York: Random House, 1967), 476,670. 
" '4 Ibid., 8 1. 
155 Ibid., 81-3,86-7. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 11-12. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 
25. Blustein claims it is difficult to object to there being some things which people "oughf' to care 
about, provided they are sufficiently general. 
156 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 83. 
157 Ibid., 84. 
158 Ibid., 85. They note inappropriate objective attitudes include the idea that clients are at the mercy of 
forces out of their control and are not self-determining agents. This attitude may be used to excuse 
behaviour and is deterministic toward clients. 
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choices, 159 compassion, 160 and may seek to build a personal relationship alongside the 
professional one. 
161 
In a professional caring relationship, Campbell highlights the tension between 
personal and professional love. 162 Campbell discusses contract and covenant as two 
forms of professional relationships. 163 Both forms entail an agreement between 
parties which imposes mutual obligations, but they differ radically in spirit. Contracts 
define a precise set of relationships, are quid pro quo arrangements and calculate 
equal opportunity. Covenants are more dynamic and nourish, rather than limit, a 
relationship. They contain an element of promise and begin with a gratuitous act or 
gift. So spontaneous giving characterises the relationship. 164 
Campbell recognises a contractual approach protects clients against 
paternalism and exploitation and helps define expectations and obligations of and for 
professionals and clients. Ultimately, he claims the contractual approach ignores the 
fact that clients are not in a position to protect their interests and are rarely sufficiently 
well-informed to know exactly what is expected from the professional. They must 
rely on professional expertise to determine what must be done. Furthermore, the 
contractual approach can encourage minimalism and defensive over-treatment by 
professions. So, Campbell advocates the covenant approach as it avoids extremes due 
to self-interest, which neglects the client's welfare. The caring professions have a 
commitment to people which should promote an active concern and helpfulness. 165 A 
contractual relationship may provide minimum safeguards for patients and 
159 Ibid., 87-90. 
160 Ibid., 90. 
161 Ibid., 90-2. They note dangers with this aspect of professional relationships and question its 
desirability. 
162 See pp. 35-7. 
163 Campbell, Moderated Love, 102-4. He cites William F. May, "Code, Covenant, Contract or 
Philanthropy" The Hastings Center Report 5 (1975) : 29-38. 
164 Ibid., 102. 
165 Ibid., 103-4. CL Rawls who advocates a social contract theory of justice. See pp. 93-4. 
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professionals, while a covenant relationship moves beyond protection to a maximum 
standard of benefit for the other. 166 
The tension within both personal and professional caring relationships may be 
due to differing motivations, expectations and choices. These differences may lead to 
conflict within a caring relationship. 
For Noddings, conflicts in caring arise between it and abstract rules and 
principles, 167 different people's needs, desires, wants, best interests and beliefs. 168 
Downie and Telfer recognise conflicts of interests and values. There may be 
problems in choosing between conflicting ideal values, and disagreements about how 
to apply them. 169 Conflicts in caring arise on many levels. 
Within the caring relationship we explored whether its motivation is natural or 
based on obligation or imperative, the professional or personal nature, contract versus 
covenant, and conflicts in caring. A key part of the caring relationship is the persons 
involved. 
Personhood 
When exploring assumptions about and the nature of personhood and 
humanity, the context and content of personhood, moral and rational capacities, 
individual value and worth, human action and social roles will be examined. 
Behind various views of persons lie different assumptions about human 
nature. John Locke is optimistic about men as free, equal and independent beings in 
`6 Campbell's description of a covenant relationship may represent one approach to integrating the 
ethics of care and justice. For further discussion of such integration and n-dnimum and maximum 
standards see chapter 5. 167 Noddings, Caring, 5,84-5. 
168 Ibid., 55. 
169 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 10. See the discussion of values pp. 37-9. 
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the state of nature. 170 Men will consent to give up their powers and fonn a civil 
government, or political society, to provide limits, decide disputes and punish 
offenders. 171 In contrast, Thomas Hobbes argues nature has made men basically 
equal, but they can become enemies. 172 When men live without a common power to 
keep them all in awe, they exist in "that condition which is called wax", the war of 
"every man, against every man". 173 So, underlying assumptions about humanity can 
be optimistic or pessimistic. 
Context: Background Meaning 
Benner and Wrubel address the context of persons, claiming people are 
formed by both personal and cultural history. Culture connects the present to the past 
and contains meanings that have been passed down. 174 Benner and Wrubel hold a 
phenomenological view and argue one key concept of what constitutes a person is an 
inhabited world that is a context organised according to human purposes. 115 
Regarding context, David Hesselgrave and Edward Rommen recognise its 
importance in shaping persons. They identify "contextualisation" as a new word and 
claim it denotes ways in which we adjust messages to cultural contexts. 176 Similarly, 
Aylward Shorter identifies culture as a comprehensive concept which embraces all 
170 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, ed. J. W. Gough, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1946), chapter 2. 
171 Ibid., pp. 8-9 and chapter 8. Locke optimistically believes within that state of nature men may make 
promises which are binding on them "for truth and keeping of faith belong to men as men, and not as 
members of a society. " 
172 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. John Plamenatz, (London and Glasgow: Fontana, 1972), 141-2. 
173 Ibid., 142-3. 
174 Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 27-8. 
175 Ibid., 40. 
176 David J. Hesselgrave and Edward Rommen, Contextualisation: Meanings, Methods, and Models, 
(Leicester: Apollos, 1989), 28. They approach contextualisation from and evangelical theological 
perspective and claim it is part of how people go about doing theology. They note there is no clear 
consensus on the meaning of this word which may be problematic (33). Cf. Aylward Shorter, 
Evangelisation and Culture, (London and New York: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), 30. Shorter 
identifies "inculturation" as interchangeable with "contextualisation" and the dialogue between faith 
and culture. 
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that individuals acquire or learn as members of a human society. 177 These authors 
highlight the impact of context and culture on persons. 
Hesselgrave and Rommen comment on the individual's relation to the 
immediate situation. Context functions as a mechanism of reference for participants 
in a given situation. 178 Benner and Wrubel state Heidegger was concerned to 
illuminate contextual knowledge because most of a person's being is in a contextual 
situation. 179 Contextual knowledge includes background meaning, which is a shared, 
public understanding of what is, that which determines what counts as real for a 
person, and a way of understanding the world. 180 Background meaning is neither 
subjective nor propositional, but it is provided by the culture, subculture, and family 
to which an individual belongs. Furthermore, people can take in cultural background 
meaning from birth because they are embodied intelligences. 181 
Embodied Intelligence 
According to Benner and Wrubel, another aspect of personhood is embodied 
intelligence. 182 They draw on Heidegger's view that the individual is a self- 
interpreted being. 183 A person has an effortless, non-reflective understanding of the 
self and the world, ' 84 and when embodied intelligence works well it is in this way. 185 
People can be reflective, but abstract thought is not the only way they encounter the 
177 Shorter, Evangelisation and Culture, 30. 
178 Hesselgrave and Rommen, Contextualisation, 166. Participants learn a given situation and reuse its 
major components, physiological, intellectual and emotional, by recalling from memory various 
experiences of it. 
179 Benner and Wrubel, 77ze Primacy of Caring, 41. Cf. W. H. Walsh, "Knowledge in its Social 
Setting, " Mind 80 (1971): 321-36. 
180 Ibid., 46. They cite Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson, 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962). 
181 Ibid., 45-6. 
182 Ibid., 42-5. 
183 Ibid., 41. They note that for Heidegger the question of being comes before knowing. 
184 Ibid., 41. 
185 Ibid., 43. 
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world. 186 Reflection often causes embodied intelligence to breakdown. If human 
beings have embodied intelligence, then they have the capacity to be in a situation in 
meaningful ways and have mind-body unity. 187 
An understanding of the context within which individuals exists relates to 
knowledge and understanding, reflection, rationality, knowledge of the self and its 
connection to personhood. 188 
Blustein discusses the self from the perspective of self-knowledge, and the 
role that care and relationships play in it. Both disinterested and self-regarding care 
are important sources of self-knowledge. The good of care partly consists of the 
affording of opportunities for greater self-understanding. 189 Self-knowledge and 
caring are connected because disinterested and self-regarding concerns can be either 
peripheral or deep-seated. The mutual monitoring within intimate relationships is 
perhaps the most potent source of objectivity for people. Because people are more 
likely to obtain a truer picture of themselves from intimates than elsewhere, intimacy 
plays an important role in maintaining and fostering personal integrity, according to 
Blustein. 190 Care, relationships and intimacy are important in gaining an 
understanding and knowledge of the self. 
Another key to understanding persons may relate to their rational and moral 
capacities. 
186 Ibid., 41. 
187 Ibid., 43. Benner and Wrubel argue embodied intelligence has been neglected because of the 
prevalence of Cartesian n-dnd-body dualism, the nature of cultural heritage and embodied intelligence 
itself. From the time of Plato, skilled activity has been devalued and intellectual, reflective activity has 
been more highly valued. Yet, this skilled body may be essential for the application of "higher levels" 
of human intelligence. 
... Campbell, moderated Love, 90-4. He identifies particularity, mutuality and incompleteness as three 
essential features in the knowledge of persons within professional caring. See p. 49. 
189 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 54-5. He argues disinterested care, when it gives a more detached 
and diminished view of the self, promotes self-knowledge. Disinterested care can still benefit the carer 
as it is an antidote to self-preoccupation because it shifts the attention away from the self to the world. 
Likewise, self-regarding care can free one from inordinate self-preoccupation and promote self 
knowledge, as striving toward personal goals can increase insight into one's capacities. 
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Capacities: Rational and Moral 
In contrast to a phenomenological, non-reflective view of persons, 191 Downie 
and Telfer focus on the rational capacities of the individual. Although they support 
respect for persons, that respect seems to lie, for them, in the particular value of 
human beings centring upon two capacities. The first is self-determination, which 
involves adopting ends and formulating policies of action to achieve them. The 
second is forming and pursuing ideal values, which includes the capacity for 
morality. 
192 
In contrast, for Noddings, rationality does not necessarily mark the initial 
impulse or action undertaken in caring, but reason can be used to enhance caring by 
figuring out a course of action after one has committed oneself to do something. 193 
For Noddings, rational capacities are used to pursue and achieve ends, but may not 
have a significant role in forming them. 
Downie and Telfer recognise potential difficulties with placing great value on 
individual's rational capacities. By isolating the properties of distinctive human value, 
the stress on individuality which prompted it is undermined. What is valued is not 
only the capacity for self-determination and forming ideal values, but the capacity for 
choice and commitment, which protects the individual. This exercise of choice is 
vital. 194 Choice may be linked to freedom or liberty, which Downie and Telfer define 
as the right to be allowed to act as one chooses. They claim liberty includes the duty 
not to do something and to refrain from preventing another from doing what he 
190 Ibid., 55-6. Yet, intimates also are likely offer a biased or more subjective picture of a person than 
non-intimates who may be able to offer an objective description of the person. See also pp. 54-5. 
191 See pp. 60-2. Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 41-50. 
192 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 38-9. They note the capacity for morality was the essence 
of uniquely human value, for Kant. 
193 Noddings, Caring, 35-6. 
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chooses. Yet, they also recognise no one has the unlimited right, or liberty, to do as 
he chooses. 195 Downie and Telfer note the importance and limits of liberty, choice 
and self-determination, or autonomy. 196 Furthermore, these capacities are linked to 
rationality. 
Downie and Telfer recognise a further difficulty with emphasising rational 
capacities. Not all human beings possess these specific capacities. In response, 
Downie and Telfer distinguish between "normal" and "sub-normal" human beings. 
The former are referred to as "persons", and worthy of full-respect, while the latter are 
worthy of some respect, but not due all the respect of "normal adults". 197 This 
distinction allegedly allows the authors to maintain that the "distinctive endowment" 
of a human being is central to respect for individuals, while acknowledging not all 
human beings possess this endowment. Regarding rights of human beings, if Downie 
and Telfer set an ultimate value on the individual's exercise of certain attributes 
characteristic of a persons, then they acknowledge, "we have to respect the life 
without which the exercise cannot take place. "198 
Blustein continues the exploration of what is distinct and valued in a person, 
noting in Kantian ethics human beings have dignity and are ends in themselves and all 
people have this "unconditional and incomparable worth" regardless of their moral 
194 Ibid., 39. 
195 Ibid., 5 1. They cite J. S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. M. Warnock, (London: Collins, 1962), 187. Mill 
puts forth a qualification for interfering in liberty, that of self-protection. He states that a person's 
liberty could be limited if he could be shown to be limiting to another's liberty. 
Furthermore, to make choices people must have knowledge and information. Downie and Telfer 
stress the right to know the truth within the caring professions and social services, and claim the caring 
worker has a duty to tell clients the truth rather than withhold the truth in order to avoid complicated 
explanation and potential distress (60-5). 
19' For ftirtlier discussion of autonomy see pp. 95,130. 
197 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 40-1. The authors include infants, the severely mentally ill, 
senile and those in terminal coma, as examples of sub-normal human beings, not persons. 198 Ibid., 4 1. 
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character or actions. 199 For Kant, things are replaceable, persons are not. Persons 
have dignity because of their capacity for impartially principled conduct and their 
irreplaceability is grounded in the dignity of humanity. 200 Kant described dignity as 
... that which constitutes the condition under which alone something 
can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i. e., a price, 
but an intrinsic worth, i. e., dignity. 201 
As dignity is related to a person's value, Kant believed that individuals should 
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that 
of another, always as an end and never as a means only. 202 
So, for Kant, being treated as an end and not only a means is linked to individuals' 
dignity, intrinsic value and worth. 203 
This Kantian concept of person involves not manipulating another for one's 
own ends, according to Blustein. The concept of "person" is a moral one. Each 
person is not only as valuable as every other, but a unique individual and, therefore, 
uniquely valuable in himself/herself. 204 Blustein claims it is morally significant that 
persons are the particular persons they are and have intrinsic and unique value in 
being such. 205 Personhood includes a moral element, as individuals are intrinsically, 
uniquely and equally valued. 
Related to the intrinsic worth of persons, are the roles they have in a society or 
community. Downie and Telfer argue against physical and psychological 
determinism in their view of humanity. 206 They analyse the nature of human action 
'" Blustein, Care and Commitment, 205-7. He cites Kant Immanuel, Foundations of the Metaphysics 
ofMorals, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Meffill, 1959). 
Ibid., 210. He cites Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, 46. 
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, 60. 
Ibid., 54. Also Paton, The Moral Law, 32. 
203 See pp. 213-15. 
204 Blustein, Care and Commitment, p. 214-15. 
205 Ibid., 215. Blustein does not endorse a "uniqueness view" where we treat people only in respect of 
their uniqueness and there are no universal principles for morally appropriate actions (215-16). 
2"Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 127-32. Physical determinism is the view that decisions 
have physical detern-dnant in the brain and the occurrence of physical events is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of a decision. It can explain only the occurrence of events but 
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and choice, 207 and implications of social roles in understanding persons. 208 Social 
roles are one aspect of persons, which aids a more complete understanding of persons 
and a particular context within which they function. 209 
Regarding personhood the role of context, culture and background, a 
phenomenological view, and the importance of rational and moral capacities have 
been examined. Morality involves concrete and abstract elements, which parallel an 
ethic of care and ethic of justice. 
Care and Justice 
After analysing the nature, content and implications of the ethics of care, 
exploring its relationship to the ethics of justice also is necessary. There are different 
ways of viewing this relationship including that they are separate and incompatible or 
different but compatible. 
As discussed, Gilligan analyses an ethic of care and an ethic of justice as two 
distinct spheres of moral development. 210 It could be inferred from her description of 
both ethics that they are incompatible. Yet, she recognises the possibility of and need 
for integrating these two approaches, 211 providing a useful basis for examining further 
the relationship between care and justice. 
Noddings also notes two approaches to morality. A 'traditional' approach 
begins with moral judgment and reasoning and gives public and tangible statements 
not of actions, and no theory of events is adequate as a theory of action. Psychological detern-dnism 
states that actions are events open to causal explanations, but that it is misleading to claim that causes 
of human action compel events to happen. In this view, choice is a result of a person's desires and the 
believed consequences of them. It equals processed desires. Downie and Telfer counter psychological 
determinism arguing people can make choices which go against their desires, primarily through an 
expression of the will. 
2w Ibid., 126-7,132-3. 
2m Ibid., 135-9. 
20 See p. 207. 
"0 See chapter 1. 2,1 Gilligan, DV, 100. 
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that describe people's thinking regarding moral matters. This approach is too formal, 
mathematical and problematic for three reasons: people miss sharing the heuristic 
process in ethical thinking; this approach supposes ethics must be cast in the language 
of principle and demonstration; and it presents only the justification for people's acts 
and not what motivates them. 212 
In the alternative caring approach to morality, women place themselves in 
concrete situations, assume personal responsibility for choices and define themselves 
in terms of caring. 213 This approach requires a process of concretisation, which 
Noddings advocates, not abstraction. It arises out of the experience of women, just as 
the traditional logical approach arises out of men's experience. The former does not 
exclude men, but it is characteristically and essentially feminine, according to 
Noddings. 214 
in contrast to viewing the ethics of care and justice as separate and potentially 
incompatible, Blustein argues the traditional dichotomy between them is an 
implausible position. 215 An ethic of care is not appealing by itself, because the 
devotion and loyalty associated with care are only virtues provided they do not 
encourage morally wrong actions. 216 Blustein argues care must be subject to "moral 
constraints" regarding the amount of energy and attention people devote to 
beneficiaries of their concerns and constraints on the caring itself. 217 
212 Noddings, Caring, 7-8. She is unclear exactly what is meant by 'traditional'. 
213 Ibid., 8. Noddings notes Gilligan's work in relation to this point. 
214 Ibid., 8. 
215 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 7. 
216 Ibid., 7. He gives the example that loyalty that puts the welfare of those close to us before all else 
and blinds us to the legitimate needs and interests of others is not a virtue. CE Noddings, Caring, 46-7. 
She seems to accept and support impartiality toward family and intimates. 217 Ibid., 7. 
67 
For Blustein, care and justice are not competitors, but belong to different parts 
of morality. 
21 8A "care orientation" focuses on ingredients and conditions for the 
good life, on personal love, commitment to the good of particular others, the 
formation and maintenance of self-identity and concern for one's integrity. 
219 A 
"justice orientation" focuses on rights, duties and obligations. 
220 Blustein claims 
since morality consists both of a theory of the good and right, "neither care nor justice 
can stand alone as a comprehensive theory of morality. "221 
In investigating 'traditional' and alternative approaches to morality, the 
tension between and possible integration of the ethics of care and justice has been 
highlighted. Before this relationship and the ethics of justice are investigated further, 
the ethics of care must be analysed critically. 
Critigue of the Ethics of Care 
Critical analysis of the ethics of care initially is mainly negative. This 
involves brief exploration of definitions, assumptions, descriptive and prescriptive 
shifts, contradictions, tensions and implications regarding care. Then a more 
substantive, primarily positive critique, focuses on key themes for an amalgam of the 
ethics of care and justice. 
218 Ibid., 7. He cites Owen Flanagan and Jonathon Alder, "Impartiality and Particularity, " Locial 
Research 50 (1983): 576-96 and Nunner-Winkler, "Two Moralities? A Critical Discussion of an 
Ethic of Care and Responsibility versus an Ethic of Rights an Justice, " in Morality, Moral Behaviour, 
and Moral Development, eds. W. Kurtines and J. Gewitz, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984), 
348-61. 
219 Ibid., 7. These include the commitment to the good of particular others, formation and maintenance 
of self-identity and a concern for one's integrity. 220 Ibid., 7-8. 
221 Ibid., 8. Although Blustein acknowledges the need for both care and justice within morality, he 
does not provide an account of how they might be integrated. For further discussion of such an 
amalgam, see chapter 5. 
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Definitions 
The critique will focus on key definitional issues, the description and content 
of care. 
Definitions of love, compassion and needs are problematic. Campbell's 
descriptions of professional and "moderated" love are ambiguous. 222 The content of 
compassion, whether it is primarily cognitive or emotive and the omission of empathy 
and sympathy, are confusing. 223 Different types of compassion can support meeting 
needs. The parameters of Downie and Telfer's descriptions of "absolute", in contrast 
to "relative", needs is unclear. 224 The former can be described as basic, or minimum 
level, needs which are required for people to survive. The latter can be linked to 
maximum level needs which positively benefit human beings. The distinction 
between minimum and maximum levels of need is useful in assessing the means and 
priority of meeting them. 225 Meeting needs may involve both the caring professional 
and patient. 
There is little clarity in the definitions of reciprocity, mutuality, engrossment 
and commitment. The general question of whether Noddings can require reciprocity 
is important because of its implications for a view of care and relationships. It seems 
difficult to insist that someone in a persistent vegetative state or an elderly demented 
person be reciprocal in order to validate a relationship as one of caring. Yet, 
Noddings seems unaware of the difficulties her view presents. 226 
222 Campbell, Moderated Love, II- 12,84-6. See pp. 35-7. 
223 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 90. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 146. See p. 45. 
27A Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 28-9. See p. 46. 
22s See pp. 226-9. 
m Noddings, Caring, pp. 69-74. See pp. 48-9. For further discussion of the role of reciprocity and 
mutuality, see pp. 220-2. 
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More specifically, whether reciprocity is sustainable and addresses the balance 
of needs, 227 and whether mutuality primarily focuses on obtaining knowledge, are 
highly debatable. 228 Within reciprocity, Noddings' distinction between empathetic 
and sympathetic engrossment may be implicit, but is not made sufficiently explicit. 229 
Furthermore, Blustein's discussion of and the relationship between commitments and 
integrity are vague. 230 Yet, some form of reciprocity, mutuality, commitment and 
integrity seems important in formulating an amalgam of the ethics of care and 
justice. 231 
Part of the confusion regarding the content of care relates to its ideal and non- 
ideal situations. For instance, Noddings' description of the ethical ideal 232 and 
Downie and Telfer's statement of the philanthropic ideal 233 lack sufficient clarity in 
their content and implications. 234 In a less than ideal situation, Noddings recognises 
there may be 'proper refusal' in caring, namely when the caring relationship is not, yet 
established. Differentiating between this hypothetical imperative and a categorical 
imperative to care is somewhat unclear. 235 Furthermore, Noddings' meaning of 
66appropriate" and "inappropriate" modes in caring are potentially useful, but vague, 
and so are problematic. 236 Blustein's advocacy of "moral constraints" on and 
description of wrong actions in care lack sufficient content. So identifying and 
avoiding the dangers within non-ideal situations of care is difficult. 237 The 
recognition of different levels within caring, both ideal and non-ideal, and their 
'7 Campbell, Moderated Love, 206-7. Noddings, Caring, 68-74. See pp. 48-9. 
2n Ibid., 91-3. See p. 49. 
229 Noddings, Caring, 35. Seep. 5 1. 
230 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 49-51,147. See pp. 54-5. 
231 See pp. 220-2. 
232 Noddings, Caring, 49-51,104,120-4. See pp. 41-3. 
233 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 12. See p. 47. 
234 See pp. 75-6. 
235 Noddings, Caring, 86. See p. 56. 
236 Ibid., 33-5. Seep. 5 1. 
237 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 7. See pp. 67-8. 
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appropriateness or inappropriateness, may be important in highlighting minimum and 
maximum standards in caring and for amalgamating care and justice. 238 
Underlying definitions and descriptions of the content of care are assumptions 
about its theory and practice. 
Assumptions 
Critical examination focuses on assumptions about the nature of care and 
views of humanity. 
Regarding the nature of care there are dangers with its emotional and 
subjective bases and emphasis. For instance, Noddings assumes caring is non- 
rational239 and relies on natural caring and sympathy based on people experiencing 
"caring and tender moments". 240 These assumptions are problematic because caring 
feelings and emotions do not necessarily arise naturally for all people, and all people 
have not had positive caring backgrounds from which to draw. Furthermore, these 
assumptions support an optimistic view of persons. 
241 
An optimistic view of humanity harbours difficulties. For example, Noddings' 
requirement of attributing "the best possible motive" in care, 
242 and assumption that 
people will make a commitment to others in caring are dangerous. 
243 Campbell's use 
of transcendent language and hope in caring is problematic in its support of an 
idealistic view of caring professionals. 244 Such optimism is unrealistic given human 
motives are not always of the highest moral standard, as persons often are more 
concerned with their best interests than others'. Furthermore, an optimistic 
's See p. 78. 
239 Noddings, Caring, 6 1. Seep. 40. 
240 Ibid., 27-8,104. See p. 42. 
241 See p. 80. 
242 Noddings, Caring, 123-4. See pp. 42-3. 
243 Ibid., 104,120. Seep. 54. 
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perspective assumes individuals will not harm people, leaving individuals vulnerable 
to others' good will, decisions and actions. One means of protecting people in society 
is through a more realistic view of human nature which includes safeguards, or 
maintaining minimum standards. 245 
Assumptions also relate to descriptions and prescriptions in theories of care. 
Descriptive versus Prescriptive 
Difficulties within care can stem from shifts from the descriptive to the 
prescriptive in theory or practice. For instance both Campbell, addressing 
professional and personal love, 246 and Downie and Telfer, regarding values, 247 are 
unclear whether the nature of their theories is realistic or idealistic, descriptive or 
prescriptive. 
The same confusion is true of Noddings' naturalistic and universalistic view of 
care. 248 She is in danger of committing the naturalistic fallacy, of moving from 'is' to 
sought' in her description of the nature of care and humanity. Furthermore, naturalists 
may assume that what exists in nature, what 'is', is good. Regarding naturalism more 
generally, Charles Pidgen notes moral conclusions cannot be derived from non-moral 
premises. Values cannot be derived from facts. 249 Noddings is in danger of sliding 
244 Campbell, Moderated Love, 70,85-6. See pp. 35-7. 
245 See chapter 5. 
2A6 Campbell, Moderated Love, 85. See pp. 35-7. 
247 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 10. See pp. 37-9. 
248 Noddings, Caring, 27-8. See p. 41. 
249 Charles R. Pidgen, "Naturalism, " in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996), 421-2. See also R. M. Hare, Moral 7hinking, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198 1), chapter 
4. W. D. Hudson, The Is-Ought Question: A Collection of Papers on the Central Problems in Moral 
Philosophy, (London: MacMillan, 1969). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1903). G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modem Moral Philosophy, " in The Collected 
Philosophical Papers of G. E. A Anscombe, vol. 3, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1981), 3 1. In contrast, it can be argued that the naturalistic fallacy is not a fallacy. See Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the SeV. Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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from a description of care and morality to a prescription without sufficient recognition 
of this shift or its implications. 
Assumptions in and about caring are potentially dangerous if they and their 
implications for people and situations are unacknowledged. Assumptions also relate 
to underlying tensions in care. 
Tensions in the Ethics of Care 
Tensions arise between the ethics of care and justice, as well as personal and 
professional, subjective and objective, emotional and rational elements. 
There is general tension between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. It 
arises between the concrete and relational and abstract and principled, 'female' and 
gmale', approaches to moral decision-making. 250 Tension also is found within 
elements of care itself. For example, between specific relatedness and abstract 
reflection, 
251 the actual and ideal self252 and concrete and abstract coping strategies in 
caring. 
253 
Tension also exists between personal and professional relationships, 
particularly regarding love, care and limits. 
254 These may relate to the tension 
between emotional and rational elements in care. This is located, for example, in 




and types of engrossment. 
257 
2" Noddings, Caring, 7-8. Gilligan, DY, 18-19,73. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 7-8. See pp. 66- 
8. 
" Noddings, Caring, 83. See pp. 56-7. 
252 Noddings, Caring, 49. See p. 42. 
" Benner and Wrubel, 7he Primacy of Caring, 3. See p. 43. 
2m See pp. 35-7,37-9,55-9. 
255 Noddings, Caring, 6 1. Seep. 40. 
256 Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 41-50. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 38-41. 
See p. 62. 
257 Noddings, Caring, 33-5. Seep. 5 1. 
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These different tensions point to the tension between the subjective and 
objective, which relates to values, 258 types of care, 259 needs, 260 elements of 
relationships. 261 More abstractly, subjectivity and objectivity point to difficulties 
within philosophical theories, including a phenomenological view, relativism and 
naturalism. 
A phenomenological view of persons emphasises individual interpretation of 
the self and experience. 262 Thus it is subjective. As this view is subjective, 
individuals' interpretations of themselves and their experiences will be disparate and 
are likely to conflict. This creates tension between persons and their accounts of 
reality, with no objective means of assessing their validity or deciding between them. 
As phenomenology provides no objective truth or moral standards, it easily 
degenerates into relativism. 
Regarding relativism, Noddings claims her ethic of caring is not "situation 
ethics" or relativistic. 
263 On one level she rejects absolute principles or rules and 
universalisability as guides for ethical behaviour. 
264 On another level, Noddings 
claims the maintenance of the caring relationship is apparently a universal component 
265 
of the ethical ideal . 
Noddings claims "certain feelings, attitudes and memories" in 
caring are expected of all people. 
266 Noddings' position is confusing. 
Discussion of Noddings' theory raises a more general critique of the ethics of 
care. This ethic claims to reject universalisable principles as being too abstract and 
removed from the particularities of situations, persons and relationships. One danger 
258 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 42-4. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 8. See pp. 37-9. 
259 Ibid., 146-7. See pp. 39-40. 
260 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 29. See p. 46. 
261 Ibid., 85,87-8,90-2. See pp. 57-8. 
262 Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 41-50. See pp. 61-2. 
263 Noddings, Caring, 5,28,85. See pp. 56-7. 
2" Ibid., 5,84-5. See pp. 41,56. 
265 Ibid., 85. See p. 57. 
266 Ibid., 27-8. See p. 4 1. 
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is it simply substitutes a particular type or narrow aspect of care for such principles. 
Thus, some picture or requirements of care serve as the universalisable principles by 
which people are to live and interact. If this is true of the ethics of care, then it 
harbours a fundamental dishonesty about its nature and content. Furthermore, it fails 
to recognise the positive contribution principles make in morality and possible 
benefits of an integration with the ethics of justice. 267 
In morality, tensions arise between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice 
and within care itself. The latter includes tensions between personal and professional, 
emotional and rational elements of relationships and their limits. The ethics of care 
also highlights a tension between subjective and objective accounts of persons and 
situations. If care provides no objective universalisable guides for moral decisions it 
is relativistic and misses a crucial opportunity to provide either a genuine alternative 
to or amadgam with the ethics of justice. 268 
These general and specific tensions also highlight some implications related to 
the ethics of care. 
implications 
Critical discussion of some implications of the ethics of care will focus on 
theoretical and practical elements. 
There are difficulties regarding the nature of ideals and models of care within 
theories of caring. Noddings fails to recognise the implications of her reliance on 
subjective ideals. 269 If ideals are subjective then each individual could hold different 
ideals without any necessary common universal threads. If the nature of each 
individual being is utterly unique, then shared, common ideals might not exist. Such 
267 See chapter 5. 
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subjectivity provides no means of objectively assessing the nature, content or 
implications of ideals. It also offers no way of deciding between conflicting ideals 
either in theory or practice. In contrast, ideals could have some objective, universal 
base, independent from particular, subjective views. Both objective and subjective 
ideals may be expressed in theory and practice. 
Two models of caring in practice are covenant and contract. Campbell 
advocates the former, claiming it is characterised by an attitude of spontaneous 
giving. 270 Yet, he does not acknowledge the underlying optimistic, and idealistic, 
view of persons. Nor does he acknowledge the dangers of expecting people to behave 
positively toward others. 271 
Within professional caring, the implications and role of responsibility is vital. 
Yet, Mayeroff and Tschudin fail to address the abuse of responsibility. 272 Thus, they 
ignore the need to protect people, particularly patients within professional settings, 
from such abuse or exploitation. 273 
One key element in the theory and practice of caring is prioritisation. Blustein 
fails to recognise the implications of his claims about and to provide content or 
guidelines for prioritising or monitoring time and energy in caring. 
274 Furthermore, 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of expending time and energy may depend 
on the nature of the caring relationship, whether professional or personal, or degree of 
need. 275 
268 See chapter 5. 
269 Noddings, Caring, 6. See pp. 41-2. 
270 Campbell, Moderated Love, 102. See pp. 5 8-9. 
271 See pp. 71-2. 
272 Mayeroff, "On Caring, " 472. Tschudin, Caring in Nursing, 74-5. See pp. 52-3. 
273 See pp. 230-7. 
274 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 7. See pp. 67-8. 
275 See pp. 223-9. 
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After critically analysing definitions, assumptions, tensions and implications 
within the ethics of care, key themes for an integration between care and justice must 
be examined more carefully. 
Critigue of the Ethics of Care from a Middle Way Perspective 
After exploring general critiques of the ethics of care, which are mostly 
negative, more specific positive critique will be offered from a middle way 
perspective. Further critical analysis of key themes will focus on the necessity and 
potential means of conflict resolution and prioritisation in care, which relates to needs 
and responsibilities, particularly minimum standards, and elements of personhood. 
Conflict, Prioritisation and Minimum Standards 
Although there is some recognition of conflict in the ethics of care, there is a 
significant lack of attention given to its content and potential resolution. Tschudin 
and Gustafson and Laney recognise the potential for conflicting responsibilities, while 
Noddings and Downie and Telfer address conflict only briefly. 276 Within theoretical 
and practical caring, a model of addressing conflict is vital if the ethics of care are to 
offer a viable alternative to the ethics of justice. Justice can offer abstract objective 
means of prioritisation, but is not always sensitive to particular persons and 
relationships. A caring approach which incorporated acknowledgement of 
relationships without being too biased or subjective would be useful. Gustafson and 
Laney come the closest to offering a means of prioritising conflicting responsibilities, 
as they stress the need to reflect on to whom and for what a person is responsible. 
277 
Yet, this description is vague and does not necessarily provide an adequate means of 
276 Noddings, Caring, 55-7. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 10. See p. 52-3. 
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resolving conflict, either in specific situations or as general rules. A more sufficient 
approach to conflict resolution and prioritisation would draw on elements from both 
the ethics of care and justice. This might entail recognising the importance of 
specific, concrete aspects of a situation, or context, as well as abstract rules and 
principles. 
278 
One means of approaching conflict and difficulties in prioritisation may 
involve differentiating minimum from maximum needs and standards. The necessity 
of minimum standards is highlighted within the ethics of care. Meeting the minimum 
needs necessary could have a higher priority than maximum needs and standards. As 
part of a nurse's minimum professional responsibility, she must ensure a patient 
receives food, warmth and comfort. These basic, or minimum, needs must be met 
before the maximum needs, such as curing the patient, can be usefully addressed. 
Downie and Telfer helpfully distinguish between "absolute" and "relative", 
minimum and maximum, needs, 279 but do not apply this distinction to meeting needs 
within the philanthropic ideal . 
280 This ideal implies that just because a demand or 
need is made on society, it should be met. The dilemma of competing needs and 
demands is difficult, and a means of prioritising and meeting them may be vital. One 
descriptivist approach to human needs is propounded by Abraham Maslow. He 
argues there is a hierarchy of human needs beginning with the physiological, then 
building up to safety, esteem, and, finally reaching a summit of, self-actualisation 
needs. Lower level needs must be fulfilled before moving on to the next level . 
281 The 
distinction between human needs which are necessary for survival, e. g. basic needs, 
277 Gustafson and Laney, On Being Responsible, 4-8. See pp. 52-3. 
278 See chapter 5. 
279 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 29. See p. 46. 
280 Ibid., 12. See P. 47. 
281 See Jack Lyttle, Mental Disorder. - Its Care and Treatment, (London: Bailliere Tindall, 1986), 134- 
5 for a description of Maslow's hierarchy. 
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and those which contribute to flourishing, or minimum and maximum standards, 
seems vital in any society attempting to assess, prioritise and meet needs and 
demands. 282 Care theories need to develop such a means of prioritisation. 
Approaches to meeting needs also may involve notions of equality or 
equity. 283 Both may be important in addressing needs and treatment of others, as 
equality provides a level of consistency, while equity allows for justified differences. 
Yet, Downie and Telfer fail to provide sufficient content to the "morally appropriate 
reasons" which justify equity. 284 This absence could allow discrimination under the 
guise of equity, if other standards of protection are not provided. A clearer definition 
of both equity and equality may be needed to safeguard the vulnerable and prevent 
harm. 285 Addressing some form of needs is one aspect of relating to persons. 
Meeting needs and prioritisation is connected to responsibilities in care. 286 For 
example, Blustein and Noddings both recognise the importance of responsibility 
within care and distinguish between some form of positive and negative caring. 287 
positive caring involves benefiting or enhancing the other, which is linked to his/her 
welfare. 288 It also may include restraining harm and protecting him/her. 
289 in 
contrast, negative caring destroys or diminishes the other. 
290 Furthermore, Tschudin 
recognises duties, rights and responsibilities can be positive, involving care, or 
negative, involving non-maleficence. 
291 She also links individual and collective 
duties and rights to principles of justice and faimeSS. 
292 The distinction between 
282 See pp. 226-9. 
283 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 76-7. See pp. 46-7. 
2" Ibid., 100. See p. 47. 
285 See pp. 230-7. 
286 See Gustafson and Laney, On Being Responsible, 4-8. See pp. 52-3. 
287 B lustein, Care and Commitment, 27,28-9. Noddings, Caring, 9. See pp. 3940. 
2sg Ibid., 28. See p. 39. 
2s9 Ibid., 28. Noddings, Caring, 9. See pp. 39. 
290 Ibid., 28-9. Seep. 39. 
291 Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 74-7. See pp. 52-3. 
292 Ibid., 77-8. See pp. 52-3. 
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positive and negative care, responsibilities and duties may be useful in identifying 
minimum and maximum responsibilities and needs and in relating to persons. 293 
Persons 
Critical analyses of personhood within caring reveal underlying idealistic and 
optimistic views and tension between rational and emotional aspects of people, which 
emphasise the importance of holism and the need for minimum standards. 
Noddings' reliance on subjective standards and ideals in caring supports an 
optimistic and idealistic perspective of human nature. 294 Her view assumes feelings 
of care and sympathy toward others will arise naturally. 295 She does recognise such 
feelings may not be sustained 296 and reciprocity and 'natural affection' may 
breakdown in caring. 297 Yet, her advocacy of 'magnanimous receptiVity'298 and her 
assumption that people will make commitments to act in caring 299 are highly 
optimistic and unrealistic. 
In contrast, reality may not support an optimistic and idealistic view of 
persons, as individuals can choose to put their needs, wants and desires before those 
of others. People can exploit and abuse others. Noddings' optimistic view of persons 
does not provide any safeguards for hann in relationships. Protection against such 
instances may involve minimum standards below which treatment of others is not to 
fall, whether personally or professionally. 
300 
293 See pp. 223-5. 294 See pp. 70-1. 
295 Noddings, Caring, 27-8,104,120,123-4. 
2% Ibid., 16. Seep. 54. 
297 Ibid., 74-5. See p. 50. 
298 Ibid., 76-7. Seep. 50. 
299 Ibid., 16. See p. 54. 
300 See chapter 5. 
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Regarding persons, Benner and Wrubel advocate a phenomenological view, 301 
but do not explore sufficiently its implications. One danger of upholding embodied 
intelligence and de-emphasising reflection is of creating a tiered view of personhood, 
where non-reflective, non-rational elements are superior to reflective and rational 
ones. This imbalanced view of persons is to be avoided. A more balanced view of 
persons recognises the importance of both reflective and non-reflective, rational and 
intuitive, types of knowledge and being. This more holistic perspective of persons is 
to be encouraged. 
302 
Within holism, both reason and emotion have a role within caring. Although 
for Noddings the fundamental nature of care is non-rational, she recognises rationality 
303 
does have a role to play, although secondary. Similarly, Blustein claims caring is 
emotional, but people can alter specific carings 'by choice'. 
304 Furthermore, 
Campbell advocates a balance between reason and emotion, which provides 
consistency and protection in professional caring. 
305 So emotional and rational 
elements of persons are important within care. 
Downie and Telfer emphasise individuals' rational capacities, i. e. self- 
determination and choice regarding values. 306 Yet, there are difficulties with over- 
emphasis on the capacities of persons, as not all individuals will possess them. These 
"less capable" persons may be vulnerable in a given context, community or society. 
Downie and Telfer acknowledge this danger, and try to distinguish between attitudes 
to "persons" and other human beings, and emphasis respect for all human life. 307 yet, 
this distinction between fully-fledged "persons" and other human beings allows some 
301 Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 41-50. See pp. 61-2. 
302 See pp. 215-17. 
"3 Noddings, Caring, 35-6,61. See p. 40. 
304 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 65. See p. 43. 
30 Campbell, Moderated Love, 84-5. See pp. 36-7. 
306 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 38-9. See pp. 62-3. 
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individuals to be judged as more complete or valuable than others. This creates a 
two-tiered hierarchy, leaving some at risk of being seen as dispensable and 
undervalued. This hierarchy undermines care and contradicts justice. It contradicts 
our instinct as persons and training as caring professionals. Downie and Telfer's 
problematic and dangerous arguments leave people vulnerable to having their worth 
judged by possession or exhibition of capacities. 
In contrast, Blustein argues each person is as valuable as every other and that 
value lies in himself/herself. This is based on a Kantian view of persons which 
upholds their intrinsic worth and dignity, regardless of moral character or the 
possession of certain capacities. 
308 This perspective may serve as a safeguard for all 
people, particularly the vulnerable, as it recognises the intrinsic value of all human 
beings. It is vital to a holistic view of persons. 309 
Blustein accurately recognises the need to love the whole person. He also 
stresses particularity and irreplaceability within personal love. 
310 One danger of 
particularistic love or care is that it focuses too much on specific qualities and 
characteristics of the loved one, and the person as a whole becomes secondary. A 
nurse might care for a patient because of his liveliness and vivacity. These qualities 
might be an integral part of his personality, but may alter if he becomes depressed. 
The patient could become apathetic and disengaged or difficult and demanding. The 
nurse's particularistic care will not survive if it is primarily focused on specific 
qualities and characteristics. A more productive approach involves a stronger 
emphasis on holistic care or love first, with attention to a person's particular qualities 
307 Ibid., 40-1. 
308 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 205-8. See pp. 64-5. 
"9 See pp. 215-17. 
310 Blustein, Care and Commitment, 191-3. See pp. 44-5. 
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and characteristics. This would encourage a balance between holism and 
particularity. 311 
Part of a holistic approach to persons also might entail an understanding of the 
context within which they exist and function. Benner and Wrubel, Hesselgrave and 
Rommen and Shorter accurately highlight the import of context in relation to 
people. 
312 Context can be linked to background '313 Culture 
314 
and personal history. 315 
Investigation of potential middle way themes has addressed the role of conflict 
resolution, prioritisation of needs and responsibilities, minimum and maximum 
standards, equality, equity, and a holistic notion of persons which includes their 
context. 
Conclusion 
As there was no single, overall crucial theorist from which notions of care 
were gleaned, in exploring and analysing the ethics of care, a variety of theories, as 
well as the nature and practice, of care and caring have been critiqued. Dangers of the 
ethics of care include being too naturalistic, relativistic, subjective and optimistic 
regarding human nature. It also does not provide a sufficient means of resolving 
conflict in caring. 316 Evaluating the ethics of care has highlighted the need for 
prioritisation of needs and responsibilities, which may be accomplished through 
differentiating between minimum and maximum standards. Furthermore, a holistic 
view of persons is vital to a balanced understanding of and interaction with them. 
311 See pp. 215-17. 
312 Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 40-1. Hesselgrave and Rommen, Contextualisation, 
166. Shorter, Evangelisation and Culture, 30. See pp. 60-1. The vital role of context, and its 
elements, in understanding people will be developed further in the thesis. See especially pp. 203-8. 
313 Ibid., 45-6. See pp. 60- 1. 
314 Ibid., 27-8,45-6. Hesselgrave and Rommen, Contextualisation, 28. Shorter, Evangelisation and 
Culture, 30. See pp. 60-1. 
315 Ibid., 27-8. See pp. 60-1. 
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Crucial to a holistic view of humanity and persons are the notions of rationality, 
rational capacities, integrity and dignity, while recognising the intrinsic worth and 
value of individuals. 317 As persons exist and function in specific situations, the 
importance of context involves their background, history and culture. 3 18 Relating to 
persons involves reciprocity, mutuality and commitment. It also entails 
responsibilities and needs, both of which may be fulfilled to a maximum or minimum 
degree. Maximum standards benefit persons, while minimum standards enable them 
to function and survive. One aspect of these minimums may include the notions of 
equality and equity, which are linked to justice. 3 19 These themes show the need for an 
investigation and critique of the ethics of justice to parallel that done in this section on 
the ethics of care. 
316 See pp. 68-77. 
317 The theme of a holistic approach to persons is highlighted in chapter 4 and further developed in 
chapter 5. 
318 T'he role of context is emphasised in chapter 4. 
319 Minimum and maximum responsibilities and different views of meeting needs will be explored in 
greater depth in chapters 3 and 5. 
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Chgpter Three: John Rawls' Theory of Justice 
Introduction 
The limits of Gilligan's ethic of care and understanding of an ethic of justice 
have been explored critically. Both theoretical and practical aspects and ideas of care 
also have been analysed. The role of context and a holistic view of persons, as well as 
the importance of differentiating minimum and maximum standards, responsibilities 
and needs were emphasised. 1 An examination of the ethics of justice is necessary to 
explore its role within morality. It may operate primarily as a minimum standard to 
protect against the potential subjectivism, relativism and optimism of the ethics of 
care. The ethics of justice will be investigated through offering separate and parallel 
descriptive and critical sections, an analysis of key terms from both, and exploring 
themes for an amalgam with the ethics of care. An original critique of the ethics of 
justice will be offered, particularly highlighting the importance of positive and 
negative responsibilities and duties within morality. 
The number of political and moral theorists who address issues of justice 
include Robert Nozick, Brian Barry, Michael Sandel and Will Kymlicka. 2 However, 
for most commentators, the crucial authors are John Rawls 3 and Alasdair MacIntyre. 4 
Their views on justice have been highly influential in the twentieth century and no 
discussion of justice would be complete without them. Before investigating 
MacIntyre's notion of justice, Rawls' example of the abstract, rule-based theories of 
'See chapters I and 2. 
2 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Brian Barry, The 
Liberal Theory ofJustice: A critical examination of the principle doctrines in 'A Theory ofJustice' by 
John Rawls, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Will Kymlicka, ed., Justice and Political 
Philosophy, (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1992). 
3 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 197 1). 
4 MacIntyre, AV. Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1988). See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1990). 
85 
justice against which Gilligan and care theorists argue will be examined. 5 This 
includes Rawls' two principles of justice, the original position, social contract, theory 
of justice, personhood and moral theory. 
The Two Principles 
Throughout A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues for the acceptance of "the two 
principles" for just institutions. 
6 They are the basis of his theory and are to govern the 
basic structure of society. 7 He claims they would be chosen by free, rational and self- 
interested persons in an initial situation of equality as defining the fundamental terms 
8 
of their agreement. The first principle states 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all. 9 
While the second principle is that 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the 
just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 10 
Regarding the importance of each principle, Rawls' first priority rule states the two 
principles are to be lexically ordered. Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of 
liberty. " A less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by 
all. A less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with lesser liberty. 12 So 
Rawls notes the importance of liberty, while recognising some limits. 
5 See pp. 9-12,66-7. 
6 Rawls, TJ, chapter 2. 
7 Ibid., 7-11. For Rawls, this basic structure is the primary subject of justice and focuses on how the 
ma or social, political and economic institutions distribute duties, rights and advantages in society. 
8 Ibid., 11. See pp. 91-3. 
9 Ibid., 302. 
10 Ibid., 302. 
11 Ibid., 302. Rawls describes the lexical ordering of the two principles is the long-run tendency of the 
F eneral conception of justice consistently pursued under reasonably favourable conditions (542). 
2 Ibid., 302. 
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Rawls' second priority rule is that the second principle of justice is lexically 
prior to the principles of efficiency and maximising the sum of advantages. 
Furthermore, fair opportunity is prior to "the difference principle". 13 Rawls states, in 
general, all social primary goods are to be distributed equally unless unequal 
distribution is to the greatest advantage of the least favoured. 14 Natural distribution is 
itself neither just nor unjust. What is just or unjust is the way institutions deal with 
it. 15 The difference principle protects the interests of all individuals, especially the 
least advantaged, regarding distribution of goods in society. 
Regarding distribution in society, particularly of goods, 16 advantages 17 and 
natural endowments 18 Rawls' advocates the difference principle. 19 As it seeks to 
ensure equal benefit and gain for all parties in society, regarding primary goods, it 
expresses mutuality and reciprocity. 
20 It is connected to the principles of fraternity, 
which entails people not wanting to have greater advantages unless they benefit the 
less well_off, 21 and redress, which focuses on compensation for "undeserved 
inequalities". 22 So the difference principle expresses a level of mutuality and 
reciprocity in society. 
In relation to the difference principle, Rawls proposes the "maximum 
minimorunf'. The "maximin" directs attention to the worst that can happen under any 
13 Ibid., 302-3. 
14 Ibid., 303. In applying the difference principle Rawls notes one type of case where the expectations 
of the least advantaged are maximised, and no changes in the expectations of the better off can improve 
the situation of the worst off. Rawls refers to this as a "perfectly just scheme". The second case is 
where the expectations of the better off contribute to the welfare of the more unfortunate. Rawls states 
the maximum is not achieved, and although this scheme is just throughout, it is not the best just 
arrangement (75,78-9). 
15 Ibid., 102. 
16 Ibid., 303. 
17 Ibid., 75. 
18 Ibid., 100,102-4. 
19 Ibid., 75-8. 
20 Ibid., 102-3. 
21 Ibid., 105. 
22 Ibid., 100-2. These include inequalities from birth and natural endowment. 
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23 proposed course of action. People are to decide in light of that situation. Rawls 
argues the "maximin" is connected to the two principles of justice, as parties in the 
original position would choose them if trying to protect themselves against the worst 
eventualities. 
24 
Rawls' two principles are the basis for a just society. They ensure a minimum 
standard of distribution and protection for the least advantaged in society, through the 
difference principle. After noting their general purpose, the focus of Rawls' first 
principle is examined. 25 
Liberty 
Rawls' first principle is liberty. It even has priority over equality. A person is 
free or not free from a constraint to do or not do something. Liberty can always be 
explained by the agents who are free, the restrictions and limitations they are free 
from, and the content of freedom. Liberty, in relation to constitutional and legal 
restrictions, is a certain structure of institutions and system of public rules defining 
rights and duties. 26 
The importance of liberty is represented by the complete system of the 
liberties of equal citizenship and is the same for all. 27 In contrast, the worth of liberty 
is proportional to a person or group's capacity to advance their ends within the 
23 Ibid., 154. He notes the objection that since we are to maximise the long-term prospects of the least 
advantaged, it seems the justice of large increases or decreases in the expectations of the more 
advantaged may depend on small changes in the prospects of the worst off. He responds that the 
conditions of the two principles ensure that the disparities likely to result will be much less than the 
differences tolerated in the past (157-8). 
24 Ibid., 152-3. 
25 Minimum standards and protection will be crucial to developing an amalgam of justice and care. Sec 
Ep. 230-7. 
Ibid., 202. 
27 Ibid., 542. Rawls notes that within the framework for the priority of liberty, areas on conflict include 
liberty of conscience, paternalism and toleration (205-21). 
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defined framework of the system and is not the same for all . 
28 For Rawls, basic 
liberties must be assessed as a whole. Liberty is unequal when one class of people 
has greater liberty than another or liberty is less extensive than it should be. These 
restraints do not affect liberty itself, but the worth of liberty. 29 Thus, there is a 
distinction between the importance of liberty in general and its worth or value to 
particular individuals. 
From Rawls' liberal individualistic view, liberty is the most important 
principle in society and for institutions. Yet, even freedom has limits. Posterior to the 
principle ensuring equal liberties, Rawls stresses the importance of equality. 
Equality 
The second principle of equality deals with the description, content, levels and 
implications for a well-ordered society and social union. 
Rawls explores three interpretations of equality - natural liberty, liberal 
equality, and democratic equality. 
30 As natural liberty3l and liberal equality32 allow 
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by morally arbitrary factors, i. e. 
income, wealth and natural assets, 33 Rawls proposes democratic equality as an 
alternative. 
34 In it, the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive 
prospects of those better off unless it is to the advantage of the less fortunate. 35 
2s Ibid., 204. He defines the worth of liberty as the value to individuals of the rights the first principles 
of justice define. 
29 Ibid., 2034. Furthermore, the inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities because 
of poverty, ignorance, or a lack of means can be a constraint definitive of liberty. 
30 Ibid., 65. 
31 Ibid., 66-72. It incorporates the principle of efficiency, which states a configuration is efficient when 
it is impossible to change it to make some people better off without making others worse off. 
32 Ibid., 734. 
33 Ibid., 724. 
34 Ibid., 75-83. It involves the difference principle. See p. 87. 
35 Ibid., 75 
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For Rawls, because people are "chain-connected" and their expectations are 
"close-knit", as "it is impossible to raise or lower the expectation of any 
representative man without raising or lowering the expectation of every other 
representative man, especially the least advantaged. P936 Rawls argues fundamental 
equality is based on mutual respect and owed to individuals as moral persons. 37 
For institutions and people, equality involves justice as regularity. This entails 
consistent interpretation and impartial application of rules. 38 It also includes the 
application of equality to the structure of institutions, and deals with moral persons 
who are owed the guarantees of justice. 39 For Rawls, equality is vital as it contributes 
to just institutions, as a primary component of the basic structure, and provides a 
necessary level of fairness and consistency for all individuals in society. 
Rawls recognises one difficulty with equality is that it cannot rest on natural 
attributes. There is no natural feature which all humans have to the same degree. 40 
He responds that the doctrine of equality is a procedural principle that assumes 
treating people alike. Essential equality is that of consideration. Furthermore, 
departures from equal treatment must be defended and judged impartially by the same 
system of principles. 
41 For Rawls, the procedural principle of equality ensures people 
are treated consistently and jUStly. 
42 
Rawls emphasises the simplicity of the contract view as the basis of equality, 
43 because a minimum capacity for a sense of justice ensures equal rights. One 
advantage of this approach is that by giving justice to those who can give it in return, 
36 Ibid., 80. 
37 Ibid., 511. 
38 Ibid., 504. This form of equality also involves the adn-dnistration of institutions as public systems of 
rules. 
39 Ibid., 504-5. See pp. 104-5. 
40 Ibid., 507. 
41 Ibid., 507. 
42 This procedural equality of Rawlsian justice can be one feature of the ethics of justice which 
counters some of the weaknesses of the ethics of care, particularly its potential relativism and partiality. 
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the principle of reciprocity is fulfilled at its highest level. Rawls argues equality of 
distribution and that of respect can be reconciled more fully. The latter is 
fundamental, defined by the first principle and owed to people irrespective of their 
social position, according to Rawls. 44 
In arguing for his two principles of justice, Rawls advocates the importance of 
maximising liberty while recognising its limits and the need to ensure equal treatment 
of individuals in a just society. He also opposes the inequalities of natural 
distribution 45 and argues for justice as equality, regularity and consistency. His two 
principles of justice incorporate a minimum level of distribution, protection and 
reciprocity in society. They arise, for Rawls, through the original position. 
Original Position 
What is known as the "original position" is the starting point in developing 
Rawls' theory of justice. 46 In his hypothetical choice situation, 47 the two principles of 
justice are chosen unanimousl Y. 48 Derived from them are frameworks for conduct in 
society, the social contract, relationships and moral development and choices, all of 
which uphold his conception of justice. 
49 
Rawls argues that although there are many possible interpretations of the 
initial situation, " the "most favoured" interpretation is referred to as the "original 
, 51 position'. In it, Rawls assumes there is a broad level of agreement that "principles 
43 See pp. 97,104-5. 
44 Rawls, TJ, 5 10-11. 
"I Rawls views differences in the natural distribution of talents and abilities as insufficient criteria for 
deserving or meriting a greater portion of resources distributed. See Rawls, Ti, pp. 12,14-15. 
46 Rawls, TJ, chapter 3, especially pp. 118-22. 
47 Ibid., 12. 
49 Ibid., 122-3,139. 
49 Ibid., 11,13,302-3. 
50 Ibid., 121. 
51 Ibid., 121. 
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of justice should be chosen under certain conditions". 52 In the original position, all 
are equal. All have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles. 53 
Eventually, people will find a description of the initial situation which expresses 
reasonable conditions and principles which coincide with their "considered 
judgments". 54 This state is "reflective equilibriunY . 
55 Jt reflects consistency and 
balance between principles of justice. 
The aim of the original position is to provide a fair procedure which ensures 
any principles agreed to will be just. To achieve this, Rawls assumes parties are 
behind the "veil of ignorance". 56 Rawls claims the veil ensures that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural 
chance or contingency of social circumstances. 57 Within the veil, Rawls stipulates 
that parties have limited knowledge about themselves. They do know general facts 
about human society and that it is subject to the circumstances of justice. 58 Rawls' 
restrictions on knowledge within the veil of ignorance attempt to counter self-interest 
and promote justice. 
Rawls recognises objections to his idea of the veil of ignorance. The meaning 
of the original position is difficult to grasp, because of the restricted knowledge and 
52 Ibid., 18. The specific elements of the initial situation are the nature of the parties, subject of justice, 
presentation of alternatives, time of entry, circumstances of justice, formal conditions on the principles, 
knowledge and beliefs, motivation of the parties, rationality, the agreement and compliance conditions 
and the point of no agreement (146-7). 53 Ibid., 19. 
54 Ibid., 20. 
55 Ibid., 20. Rawls claims the need for "reflective equilibrium" arises when a person's idea of justice is 
challenged and he must either change the idea or sense of justice, or maintain confidence in his original 
idea (48). 
56 Ibid., 136. 
57 Ibid., 12. It can be argued that the point of the veil of ignorance is for people to agree which 
disadvantages they are willing to accept once the veil is lifted. 
58 Ibid., 137. Rawls identifies these general facts as political and economic theory, laws of human 
psychology and the basis for social organisation. Individuals do not know their place in society, social 
status or class, fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, conceptions of the good, 




59 Furthermore, the veil is irrational, as principles should be chosen with 
all available knowledge. 60 Rawls' responds that with a hypothetical idea the 
restrictions must ensure the same principles are chosen always. The veil of ignorance 
is key in meeting this requirement, as it ensures the information available is always 
the same and relevant. 61 These restrictions on information are of fundamental 
importance because without them people would not be able to work out any definite 
theory of justice. There would be no unanimous choice of principles, 62 and people 
would seek their own advantage. 63 The veil provides a necessary level of consistency 
in the choice of principles for society. 
Rawls argues that his two principles would and should be chosen to formulate 
a just society. To ensure they are selected by individuals, he proposes the original 
position and the veil of ignorance. The veil attempts to contain self-interest and 
counters natural advantages. After investigating the content of Rawls' original 
position it is important to explore its form in society. 
Social Contract Theot 
Rawls claims the guiding idea of a social contract is that principles of justice 
for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. He claims 
They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of 
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These 
principles regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of 
59 Ibid., 138. 
60 Ibid., 139. 
61 Ibid., 138-9. 
62 Ibid., 140. 
63 Ibid., 139. He also lists three misunderstandings about the initial situation to be avoided. Ile parties 
are theoretically defined individuals, which is not to be confused with how well humans can assume 
this role in regulating their practical reasoning. Second is the misunderstanding that justice as fairness 
is an egoistic theory, since people are assumed to take not interest in another's interests. Third, if 
parties are conceived as making proposals themselves, they have no incentive to suggest pointless or 
arbitrary principles be used, because no one can predict if or when such principle will be to their 
advantage (147-9). 
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social co-operation and forms of government that can be established. 
This way of regarding the principles of justice I shall call justice as 
fairness. 64 
Like some other contract views, Rawls' consists of agreed principles, an interpretation 
of the initial situation and the problem of choice of principles posed there. 65 
Rawls explains the basic structure for the choice of his two principles of 
justice as that of the social contract. He relates this structure to justice as fairness and 
social interactions. 
Society and Social Union 
Rawls assumes that in a social union and well-ordered society parties are 
guided in the choice of a conception of justice by knowledge of the general facts 
about society. 66 A well-ordered society is a form of social union. 
67 Furthermore, 
people have choices and are not indoctrinated or inculcated with a sense of justice. 
This sense does not equal compulsive psychological mechanisms to ensure 
compliance. 68 The essential and characteristic features of a well-ordered society are a 
shared final end and accepted ways of advancing it which allow for the public 
recognition of the attainments of everyone. 
69 When the shared final end is achieved, 
all people find satisfaction in a common aim. This affirms the tie of community. 
70 
64 Ibid., 11. See p. 98. 
65 Ibid., 15. Rawls qualifies his idea of the social contract claiming a person can accept one part and 
not the others. Furthermore, the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of an entire ethical 
U stem which includes principles for all the virtues (17). See chapter 4. 
Ibid., 547. 
67 Ibid., 527. The idea of social union may be contrasted with private society, where the individuals or 
associations have their own private ends which are either competing or independent, but not 
complementary (520-2). 
" Ibid., 513-15. 
69 Ibid., 526-7. 
70 Ibid., 526. Rawls notes the common aim is often profound and complex. 
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Rawls argues that a well-ordered society affirms the autonomy of persons and 
encourages the objectivity of their considered judgments of justice. 71 Autonomy and 
objectivity are compatible with a contract view, as there is no antimony between 
freedom and reason. Acting autonomously is acting from those principles consented 
to as free and equal rational beings. These principles are objective, those we want all 
people to follow, and not made from a personal slant or judgments. Thus our moral 
principles and convictions are objective too, for Rawls. 72 Moral principles relate to 
goods in society. 
The chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights, liberties, 
opportunities, powers, income and wealth. They are things a rational man wants 
regardless of whatever else he wants. 
73 Primary goods can be accounted for by the 
"thin theory of the good", namely a conception of goodness as rationality, general 
facts about human wants, abilities, phases, and requirements of nurture, the 
Aristotelian Principle, and the necessities of social interdependence. 74 
Rawls notes difficulties regarding how primary goods are to be weighed. 
Expectations should not be an index of primary goods, but satisfactions to be expected 
when plans use these goods. In contrast, justice as fairness views expectations as the 
index of primary goods which a representative man can anticipate. The "publicly 
recognised objective measure" is to compare men's situations solely by reference to 
things of which they all prefer more. 
75 So primary goods are linked to expectations 
and provide an objective standard. 
The social contract provides the framework for Rawls' theory of justice. 
71 Ibid., 520. 
72 Ibid., 516-17. 
73 Ibid., 62,92,303. 
74 Ibid., 434. For further discussion of the Aristotelian Principle and 'thin theory of the good', see pp. 
105-6,106-7. 
75 Ibid., 93-5. 
95 
Theory of Justice 
Rawls' theory of justice includes a sense of justice, justice as fairness, the 
context or circumstances of justice, its justifications, limitations and the alternative of 
a utilitarian framework. 
Description 
For Rawls, principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object 
of the original agreement. 76 Justice provides the principles needed to decide between 
various social advantages and for underwriting an agreement on proper distributive 
shares. 
77 
All social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these is to everyone's advantage. 78 
in contrast, injustice is when inequalities exist that are not beneficial to all. 79 
in general, Rawls theory of justice sets out principles governing people's 
moral powers and their sense of justice. 
80 Rawls argues the "intuitive idea" is to 
separate the theory of justice into two parts. 
81 The first, or ideal, part assumes strict 
compliance and works out principles that characterise a well-ordered society under 
favourable circumstances. This is Rawls' main focus. The non-ideal theory, which 
focuses on principles for meeting injustice, is worked out after the ideal has been 
76 Ibid., 11. These principles are those that free, rational and self-interested people would accept from a 
position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association, and they regulate all further 
! Feements. See p. 86. 
" Ibid., 126. 
78 Ibid., 62. 
79 Ibid., 62. 
80 Ibid., 50-1. 
81 Ibid., 245. 
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chosen. 82 Thus the ideal and non-ideal levels of Rawls' theory may correspond to 
preventative and corrective justice. 
Rawls' theory of justice is linked to a sense of justice. 
Sense of Justice 
For Rawls, people have a capacity for and a sense of justice. 83 A sense of 
justice is an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles and point of view 
of justice. 84 It is public knowledge that parties in the original position are capable of 
this sense. This condition guarantees the integrity of the original agreement in 
society. The capacity for a sense of justice ensures that the principles chosen will be 
respected. 
85 
Respect for these principles is linked to Rawls' claim that justice is congruent 
with goodness. 86 For those in a well-ordered society, the rationality of affirming their 
sense of justice as regulative of their life plan and that being guided by the justice 
perspective accords with an individual's good must be established. 87 Rawls assumes 
human actions come from existing desires. As people cannot change their system of 
ends immediately, they must decide in advance whether to affirm their sense of 
justice. " 
A sense of justice is vital to Rawls' theory, as is the application of justice as 
fairness in society. 
82 Ibid., 245-6. 
93 Ibid., 145. See p. 104. 
" Ibid., 567. 
85 Ibid., 145. Rawls states this assumption also helps guarantee strict compliance. 
96 Ibid., 567-77. Rawls states that whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a 
crucial factor in determining the stability of a sense of justice and well-ordered society. He argues for 
this congruence by claiming the contract doctrine requires the principles of justice are public, that 
participating in the life of a well-ordered society is a great good and acting justly is something people 
want to do as free and equal rational beings. 
87 Ibid., 567. 
88 Ibid., 568-9. 
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Justice as Faimess 
Injustice as fairness Rawls argues the mutual disinterest of the parties is a key 
89 feature. Justice as fairness is the principle of justice chosen by free, rational, self- 
interested and equal persons to define the terms of their association and regulate all 
further agreements. 90 Furthermore, "the force of justice as faimess" arises from the 
requirement that all inequalities be justified to, and to the greatest benefit of, the least 
advantaged and the priority of liberty. 91 
Rawls emphasises the importance of individual rationality and autonomy with 
regard to moral principles, particularly justice. 92 For Rawls, a Kantian interpretation 
of justice as fairness is based on autonomy. 93 For Kant, moral principles are the 
object of rational choice. These principles define moral law and govern ethical 
conduct. Kant believed this moral legislation is agreed under conditions that 
characterise men as free and equal rational beings. According to Rawls, the original 
position is an expression of this conception. 94 Rawls' principles of justice are 
categorical imperatives in the Kantian sense. 95 
Justice as fairness is chosen by individuals and applied to their interactions in 
society. It also is related to the circumstances of justice. 
89 Ibid., 12-3. 
90 Ibid., 11. See pp. 934. 
91 Ibid., 250. See p. 86. 
92 Ibid., 251-2. 
93 Ibid., 25 1. Rawls claims it is a mistake to over-emphasise the place of generality and universality in 
Kantian ethics. 
94 Ibid., 251-2. 
95 Ibid., 253. See Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, 36,44. Paton, The Moral Law, 25- 
9. Rawls notes his views of a person's choice as a nournenal self as a collective one and assumption 
that the parties in the original position know they are subject to the conditions of human life are 
departures from a Kantian perspective (256-7). 
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Circumstances of Justice: Context 
Rawls states the aim of addressing the circumstances of justice is to articulate 
the relations between individuals which give rise to questions of justice. 96 Society is a 
co-operative venture for mutual advantage marked by the conflict and identity of 
interests. Principles are needed for the determining of and agreement on the 
distribution of advantages in society. The "circumstances of justice" are the 
background conditions which give rise to these necessities, 97 and the normal 
conditions under which human co-operation is possible and necessary. 98 These 
circumstances obtain when people put forward conflicting claims on the division of 
social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity. 99 Thus the circumstances of 
justice explain the context and background of the need for principles of justice, 
particularly regarding distribution of advantages in society. 100 
A theory of justice and its principles have a context, part of which entails 
justification. 
Rawls' Justification 
in supporting his view, Rawls states the theory of justice includes the 
essentials of the theoretical structure, an examination of the types of institutions 
justice enjoins, duties and obligations it imposes on individuals, and an investigation 
of the feasibility of justice as fairness. The theory of justice is intended to compose a 
unified whole. 101 
96 Ibid., 130. 
97 Ibid., 126. 
98 Ibid., 126. 
99 Ibid., 128. These circumstances can be objective or subjective (126-7). 
100 Context and background will be further explored in a Middle Way Model, pp. 203-8. 
101 Rawls, TJ, 579-80. 
99 
Regarding the two principles, Rawls argues that first principles are central 
elements and devices of theory, but 
... justification rests upon the entire conception and how it fits in with 
and organises our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.... 
justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, 
of everything fitting together into one coherent view. 102 
While Rawls offers regulative comments regarding the justification of his 
theory, he also recognises some of its weaknesses. 
Limitations Recognised by Rawls 
Rawls acknowledges the limitations of his theory. 103 Rawls notes that critics 
argue his principles of justice are not derived from a notion of respect for persons 
based on the recognition of their inherent worth and dignity. Because the original 
position does not include this idea explicitly, justice as fairness may be unsound. 104 
Rawls responds by saying, 
I believe, however, that while the principles of justice will be effective 
only if men have a sense of justice and do therefore respect each other, 
the notion of respect or of the inherent worth of persons is not a 
suitable base for arriving at these principles .... Once the conception of justice is on hand, however, the ideas of respect and of human dignity 
can be given a more definite meaning. 105 
So in defending his theory, Rawls regards a conception of justice as more 
fundamental regarding human beings than a notion of respect for persons or their 
intrinsic worth and dignity. 106 
In describing his theory of justice, Rawls argues for the necessity of a sense of 
justice and the importance of justice as fairness. He recognises a Kantian view of the 
102 Ibid., 579. See p. 212. 
103 Ibid., 583-6. Elsewhere he notes that his theory of justice leaves aside many aspects of morality and 
an account of right treatment of animals and nature. He states that a "conception of justice is but one 
part of a moral view" (512). 
104 Ibid., 585-6. 
105 Ibid., 586. 
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worth of persons, but argues a conception of justice is more fundamental. An 
alternative view of justice is found in utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism 
Rawls defines utilitarianism as the view that "the principle of utility is the 
correct principle for society's public conception of justice". 107 It is the moral theory 
for which his theory of justice is to be an altemative. 108 Utilitarianism does not regard 
persons as ends in themselves, as the principle of utility might require some people to 
forgo greater life prospects for the sake of others. 109 Furthermore, utilitarianism may 
entail the sacrifice of some people's aims, ends and self-esteem for the good of 
others. 110 
Rawls distinguishes between average utilitarianism, which directs society to 
maximise the average, not the total, utility, "' and classical utilitarianism, which 
requires that institutions be arranged to maximise the absolute weighted sum of the 
expectations of the relevant representative man. 112 Rawls ranks average above 
classical utility. 113 The concept of the "impartial sympathetic spectatoe, clarifies the 
intuitive base of the classical version. 114 In classical utilitarianism a principle of 
rational choice for one man is taken as a principle for social choice too. 115 Rawls 
argues classical utilitarianism mistakes impersonality for impartiality. In contrast, 
106 See Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, 54,60-1. See pp. 213-15. 
`7 Rawls, TJ, 182. 
108 Ibid., 22. 
109 Ibid., 180-1. See Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 54. Rawls recognises this 
sacrifice is not always necessary, but claims it often is the case within utilitarianism. 
110 Ibid., 180-1. 
111 Ibid., 162. 
112 Ibid., 161. Rawls notes the average principle is based on the ethics of a single rational individual 
prepared to take whatever chances are necessary to maximise his prospects from the standpoint of the 
initial situation (167). 
113 Ibid., 184. Although he notes the classical form has been the most important historically. 
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justice as fairness offers judgment where the impartial person judges according to 
principles from the original position without bias or prejudice. 116 So, justice as 
. 
fairness offers a source of objective judgement. ' 17 
In Rawls' theory, justice as fairness, a sense of justice, the circumstances or 
context forjustice, individual rationality and autonomy, principles, justification and 
dangers within utility and utilitarianism have been investigated. Underlying and 
affecting any theory of justice for a society is a view of persons and humanity. 
Personhood 
Personhood for Rawls includes rationality, autonomy, choice, forming rational 
life plans and ends, moral dimensions, being good and the capacities for a sense of 
justice and moral personality. 
Rationality 
Regarding the content of rationality, Rawls assumes persons, within the 
original position, are rational and trying to advance their own interests. ' 18 Rawls' 
notion of rationality is primarily the standard view from social theory. ' 19 He states 
Thus in the usual way, a rational person is thought to have a coherent 
set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these 
options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows 
the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and 
which has the greater chance of being successfully executed. 120 
114 Ibid., 184. This idea is that something is right when an ideally rational and impartial spectator 
would approve of it from a general point of view, should he possess all relevant knowledge of the 
circumstances. 
115 Ibid., 188. 
116 Ibid., 190. 
117 It is interesting to note that both Rawls and utilitarianism seem more focused on ensuring objectivity 
and impartiality than the ethics of care. 
118 Ibid., 11,142,144. See p. 93. 
119 Ibid., 143. Fen-dnist theorists have been critical of Rawls' version of rationality. For example, see 
Susan Moller Okin, "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, " E-thics 99 (1989): 229-49. 
120 Ibid., 143. 
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Rawls departs from standard social theory in assuming a rational person does not 
suffer from envy. 121 He assumes rationality is mutually disinterested, as parties in the 
original position seek principles which advance their ends, but do not impose benefits 
or injuries on one another. 122 
For Rawls, a person's plan of life is rational if and only if it is consistent with 
principles of rational choice applied to all relevant features of his situation and is 
chosen with deliberate rationality, i. e. full awareness of the facts and consequences. 123 
Because a rational plan of life establishes the point of view from which all value 
judgements for a particular person are to be made and eventually rendered consistent, 
it is fundamental to a definition of the good. 124 Thus, a rational plan of life is crucial 
within morality. 
Rational life plans can be short or long-term in aim. 125 A person's aims and 
interests are rational if and only if, they are to be encouraged and provided for by his 
rational plan. 126 Rawls acknowledges that people may reach a point where they must 
choose between incomparable aims or ends and argues rationality is needed in 
choosing between them. 
127 
For Rawls, rationality is a key aspect of persons in the original position. He 
recognises individuals are generally self-interested, but argues rationality is mutually 
disinterested. A rational plan of life provides an important means of making and 
assessing value judgments and deciding between conflicting aims and ends. 
121 Ibid., 143-4. In response to the objection that a conception of justice cannot ignore the fact that men 
are afflicted with such feelings, Rawls argues "the conception eliminates the conditions which give rise 
to disruptive attitudes. " Rawls also claims envy makes everyone worse off and is collectively 
disadvantageous. 
122 Ibid., 144. 
123 Ibid., 408. This requirement seems to contradict Rawls' restrictions on knowledge identified in the 
original position. 
124 Ibid., 409. 
125 Ibid., 409-16. 
126 Ibid., 408-9. 




Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable 
of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good ... and 
second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense 
of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the 
principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree. ' 28 
As the large majority of people possess a sense of justice, the question of necessity 
does not pose a serious practical problem. 129 There is "no recognised race or group of 
human beings who lack this attribute" and if an individual does lack the potential for 
moral personality, it is considered a defect. 130 While individuals have varying 
capacities for a sense of justice, this is not a reason to deprive those with lesser 
capacities of the full protection of justice. 131 Rawls states 
It is sometimes thought that basic rights and liberties should vary with 
capacity, but justice as fairness denies this: provided the minimumfor 
moral personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of 
justice. 132 
The capacity for moral personality is a sufficient, but not stringent, condition for 
being entitled to equal justice and liberty. 133 So, a sense of justice is required to fulfil 
the minimum standard for being a moral person and entitled to the full protection of 
justice! 34 
For Rawls, a "good person", or a "person of moral worth", has a higher degree 
than the average of the "broadly based features of moral character" it is rational for 
128 Ibid., 505. Emphases added. 
129 Ibid., 505-6. 
130 Ibid., 506. Rawls acknowledges there are scattered individuals who lack this capacity, or its 
realisation to the minimum degree, but claims this is the consequence of unjust or impoverished social 
circumstances, or fortuitous contingencies. It could be argued that Rawls is making a naturalistic claim 
for justice which can be paralleled to Noddings' naturalistic claim for care. See pp. 71-3. 
131 Ibid., 506. 
132 Ibid., 506-7. Emphases added. 
133 Ibid., 505-6. 
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persons in the original position to want in each other. 135 He believes there are 
properties it is rational to want in persons when viewed with respect to almost any 
social roles. These include the fundamental moral virtues and a sense of justice. 136 
Rawls supports a view of persons as free, autonomous beings 137 and treating 
men not as means only but as ends in themselves. 138 Within this view, self-respect, or 
self-esteem, is important. 139 The conditions for persons respecting themselves and 
others requires that their common plans be rational and complementary. 140 
Rawls assumes people have a social nature 141 and being a member of some 
community is a condition of human life. 142 Within human community members enjoy 
one another's excellences and individuality, recognise the good of each as an element 
in the complete activity and the whole scheme is consented to and gives pleasure to 
all. 
143 
People's choices relate to their motivation for action, which Rawls connects to 
the Aristotelian Principle. It states 
... other things equal, 
human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised 
capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment 
increases the more the capacity is realised, or the greater its 
complexity. 144 
"4 The themes of a minimum standard and justice as protection will be vital to the development of the 
thesis. See chapter 5, especially pp. 230-7. 
133 Rawls, TJ, 437. He notes the difficulty of identifying the point of view from which these properties 
are rationally preferred and the assumptions upon which this preference is founded. 
136 Ibid., 434-6. He defines these virtues as "the strong and naturally effective desires to act on the 
basic principles of right". 
137 Ibid., 251-7. He relies on Kant's ideas regarding individuals. See Kant, Foundations of the 
Metaphysics ofMorals, 54. 
138 Ibid., 179-80. He claims this notion is found in and achieved by the two principles of justice. 
139 Ibid., 440. Rawls states self-respect is the most important primary good. 
140 Ibid., 441. 
141 Ibid., 522-3. See pp. 93-5. 
142 Ibid., 438. See p. 94. TJ, pp. 520-9. 
143 Ibid., 523. 
144 Ibid., 426. Rawls claims this principle is not stated explicitly, but is implied in Aristotle's thoughts 
and statements about the relations between happiness, activity, and enjoyment. See Nichontachean 
Ethics, VII, 11-14 and X, 1-5. 
Furthermore, Rawls claims the intuitive idea is that human beings take more pleasure in doing 
something as they become more proficient at it and prefer activities which call on a larger repertoire of 
more intricate discriminations. 
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So the Aristotelian Principle contributes to an understanding of our motivations, 
desires and preferences within morality. 145 
Rawls' notion of persons includes the capacity for a sense of justice as a 
minimum standard for receiving equal liberty and justice and protection within a 
society. He notes the importance of being moral and good persons, the moral worth 
of human beings, their autonomy and social nature. 146 Morality of persons also 
relates to a broader notion of moral theory. 
Moral Thgogry 
Rawls' moral theory involves fundamental notions of the right and good, the 
role of moral capacities, judgments, attitudes and virtues. Morality implies duties and 
obligations, to, for and from persons and societies. 
The Right and the Good 
For Rawls, 
... a conception of the right is a set of principles, general in form and 
universal in application, that is to be publicly recognised as a final 147 
court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons. 
These conditions are "constraints" on the conception of right which reflect the 
restrictions ftom within the original position. 148 Rawls uses "righf' to mean 
"rightness as fairness", or an "ideal contractarian concept of right' 1.149 
145 Ibid., 426-7. 
146 See pp. 208-23 for a further discussion of these crucial themes in developing an amalgam of the 
ethics of care and justice. 147 Ibid., 135. 
148 Ibid., 130-5. Rawls claims these restraints hold not only for the choice of principles of justice, but 
for all ethical principles. 
149 Ibid., I 11. He notes this is not the usual or 'normal' moral sense of 'right'. 
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Within justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. 150 In 
general, a person's good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term 
plan of life given reasonably favourable circumstances. The good is the satisfaction 
of rational desire. 151 Rawls describes "thin" and "full" theories of the good. The 
former includes the bare essentials necessary to argue for the principles of justice, 152 
while the latter views the principles of justice as secured and uses them in defining the 
other moral concepts related to goodness. 153 The full theory includes a notion of 
judgment and fittingness. 154 Thus, these theories point to minimum and maximum 
standards within morality. 
Morality 
Rawls describes the development of morality in three stages. 155 First it 
involves the morality of authority, where Rawls assumes the sense of justice is 
acquired gradually by younger members of society as they grow Up. 
156 The morality 
of association is provided by the "moral standards appropriate to the individual's role 
in the various associations to which he belongs". 157 These standards may include 
66common sense rules of morality", "the adjustments necessary to fit them to a 
person's particular position"158 and rely on ideals regarding roles and positions. 159 
Finally, the morality of principles involves the process by which a person becomes 
attached to highest order principles, namely acting justly and advancing just 
"50 Ibid., 396. 
151 Ibid., 92-3. See p. 103. 
152 Ibid., 396-7. Seep. 95. 
'53 Ibid., 398. 
1-" Ibid., 434. 
155 Ibid., 462-79. Cf. Gilligan's notion of moral development in chapter 1. 
156 Ibid., 462,465-6. 
157 Ibid., 467. 
158 Ibid., 467. These rules or standards are impressed upon a person by the approval or disapproval of 
those in authority and other members of the group. The family is viewed as a small association, 
normally characterised by a definite hierarchy where each person has certain rights and duties. 
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institutions. 160 So principles, roles, appropriateness and fittingness are important 
within morality. 
161 
Moral theory also involves judgments and moral capacities. 162 A key moral 
capacity is developing a sense of justice, which is "acquired as a skill in judging 
things to be just and unjust, and in supporting these judgments by reasons. " 163 Rawls 
assumes the person making a "considered judgment" has the ability, opportunity, and 
desire to reach a correct decision. 164 
Underlying moral judgments are feelings and attitudes, which may be moral or 
natural. 165 For Rawls, moral sentiments are more complex than natural attitudes 
because in their complete form they presuppose an understanding and acceptance of 
certain principles and an ability to judge accordingly. 166 
Moral virtues are sentiments and habitual attitudes leading people to act on 
certain principles of right, 






The fundamental moral virtues are part of the "broadly based properties" rational 
159 Ibid., 468. 
160 Ibid., 472. Rawls notes that by principles he means first order principles such as those considered in 
the original position. 
161 See chapter 5. 
162 Rawls, TJ, 46-7. 
163 Ibid., 46. See pp. 97,106-7. Rawls recognises that this moral capacity is extremely complex. 
164 Ibid., 47-8. 
165 Ibid., 479-8 L 
166 Ibid., 486-7. 
167 Ibid., 437. See also Rawls' earlier, but less concise, description of the virtues (192). For further 
discussion of virtues, see pp. 160-5,190-2. 
169 Ibid., 442-5. He defines shame as the feeling a person has when he experiences an injury to his self- 
respect or self-esteem. Natural shame arises from this type of injury to self-esteem due to a person not 
having or failing to exercise certain excellences. Moral shame arises from failing to achieve some 
food and, therefore, feeling unworthy of others. 
169 Ibid., 442. Rawls describes regret as the feeling aroused by the loss or absence of what we think is 
food for us. 
70 Ibid., 442,445-6. For Rawls guilt focuses on the infringement of the just claims of others and the 
injury we have done to them and their resentment or indignation should they discover our deed. Moral 
guilt arises from acting contrary to one's sense of right and justice. 
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persons want in each other, 171 linked to moral sentiments and attitudes and vital to a 
person's capacity for morality. 172 
Regarding morality, Rawls argues that no one deserves his place in the 
distribution of natural assets any more than his initial starting place in society. 173 
Rawls recognises common sense often supports distribution according to moral 
desert. 174 Justice as fairness rejects this idea because it would not be chosen in the 
original position. 175 Furthermore, Rawls states 
A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies 
their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But 
what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon 
their intrinsic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic 
structure and specify the duties and obligations of individuals do not 
mention moral desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares 
to correspond to it. 176 
So Rawls argues against distribution according to desert and notes that entitlement 
may not do justice to the intrinsic worth of persons. 177 
Morality involves moral judgments, capacities, feelings, attitudes and virtues. 
There are dangers with basing the moral worth of persons and distribution on desert or 
entitlement. Morality also entails duties and obligations. 
Duties and Obligations 
Rawls identifies positive duties to do something good and negative duties not 
to do something bad. 178 Natural duties apply to people regardless of their voluntary 
acts, have no necessary connection with institutions or social practices, their content is 
171 Ibid., 436-7. 
172 Ibid., 437. 
173 Ibid., 104,311. See pp. 86-8 for a discussion of this point in relation to the difference principle. 
174 Ibid., 310. This distribution pertains to income, wealth and the good things in life generally. 
175 Ibid., 3 10-11. 
176 Ibid., 311. 
177 Ibid., 3 10-11. For a further discussion of desert and entitlement see pp. 213-14,233. 
178 Ibid., 114. 
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not defined by the rules of these arrangements, and they obtain between all as equally 
moral persons. 179 Justice as fairness is incomplete without principles of natural 
duties. 180 They would be chosen in the original position because they are "an 
essential part of a conception of right". 181 Natural duties include justice, 182 mutual 
respect 183 and mutual aid. 184 
Obligations arise as a result of voluntary acts, their content is always defined 
by an institution or practice whose rules specify what one is to do. 185 For Rawls, the 
primary obligation, not gaining from the efforts of others without doing our fair share, 
is based on the principle of fairness. 186 So Rawls emphasises the importance of 
fairness, mutual benefit and some form of reciprocity within obligations and social 
co-operation. 
187 
The role of positive, negative and natural duties has been explored. 
obligations entail fairness, mutuality and reciprocity, particularly within a society. 
Conclusion zl=-W. ý 
in advocating the choice of his two principles for a just society, Rawls' theory 
of justice highlights themes without which no moral framework is complete. These 
179 Ibid., 114-15. 
'so Ibid., 333-4. Rawls notes from the standpoint of the theory of justice, "the most important natural 
duty" is to support and further just institutions. It requires people to support and comply with just 
institutions, when they exist and apply to them. People are to assist in the establishment of just 
arrangements when they do not exist and this can be done without too much cost to themselves (115). 
181 Ibid., 333. 
182 Ibid., 115. Justice is a fundamental natural duty within justice as fairness. 
183 Ibid., 337-8. 
1" Ibid., 337-9. Rawls cites Immanuel Kant, The Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, Academy 
edifion, vol. 4,423. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics ofMorals, vol. 6, part H, section 30,451L 
Alternatively, Rawls does not support this duty from self-interest, but claims its primary value is the 
confidence and trust we can have in men's good intentions and the knowledge they are there to help if 
we need them. A sufficient ground for accepting this duty is its pervasive effect on the quality of 
everyday life. 
185 Ibid., 113. 
186 Ibid., 342-3. This principle is the source of all obligations. It states people acquire obligations by 
doing things voluntarily and propounds the condition that the institution be just, as people do not have 
obligations to unjust institutions. 
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include justice as equality and fairness, awareness of the least advantaged or most 
vulnerable in society, and a notion of persons which includes rationality, justification, 
moral judgment, autonomy, and intrinsic and moral worth and dignity. Along with 
the notion of persons the importance of a human community, mutuality and 
reciprocity, and a recognition of positive and negative duties and obligations were 
examined. 
Critigue of Rawls 
Analysis of the plethora of critical discussion surrounding Rawls' theory of 
justice is not intended to be entirely comprehensive, or unnecessarily detailed, but to 
examine his theory on its own terms and highlight key areas which have been debated 
and are important for the development of a middle way. A general critique will be 
offered before focusing on more specific critique from a middle way perspective. 
General Critigues 
Rawls' theory of justice is vastly criticised in method' 88 and content, 189 for the 
philosophies it incorporates or addresses, specifically liberalism, 
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Rawls' key notion of the original position also is much debated and criticised. 
Original Position 
The original position has been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate, 
focusing on the nature and form of social contract, 193 the principles chosen or 
agreed, 194 the difference principle, 195 Rawls' interpretation of Kantian principles, 196 
and the veil of ignorance. 197 Other critics highlight difficulties with Rawls' view of 
persons, 198 intergenerational justice, 199 and the neutral theory of the good 200 in the 
original position. 
191 R. M. Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice, " The Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1973), 144-55. Wcjciech 
Sadurski, "Contractarianism and Intuition: On the Role of Social Contract Arguments in Theories of 
Social Justice, " Australasian Journal of Philq=hy 61 (1983): 231-47. 
192 David Lyons, "Rawls versus Utilitarianism, " Journal of Philosophy 59 (1972): 535-545. Stephen 
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44. Anthony Flew, "The Concept, and Conceptions of Justice: A Response to Le Grand, " in Applied 
philosophy: Moral and Metaphysics in Contemporary Debate, eds. Brenda Almond and Donald Hill, 
(New York: Routledge, 1992), 196-201. 
113 Jean Hampton, "Contract and Choices: Does Rawls have a Social Contract Theory?, " in Justice in 
political Philosophy, vol. 1, Mainstream Theories ofJustice, ed. Will Kymlicka, (Brookfield: Edward 
Elgar, 1992), 137-60. Stephen L. Esquith and Richard T. Peterson, "The Original Position as Social 
Practice, " Political Theoly 16 (1988): 300-34. Sadurski, "Contractarianism and Intuition, " 231-47. 
Jeremy Waldron, "John Rawls and the Social Minimum, " Journal of AV121ied Philosophy 3 (1986): 
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Minimum, " 21-33. See also pp. 111- 12. 
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Critical Studies on Rawls 'A Theory ofJustice', ed. Normal Daniels, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 170- 
1,177. Arrow, "Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice, " 245-63. Sadurski, 
"ContractarianiSm and Intuition: ' 23147. McKenna, Wade and Zannoni, "Rawls and the Minimum 
Demands of Justice, " 85-108. Jones, "Should Christians Affirm Rawls' Justice as Fairness, " 251-7. 
"' Gregory Jones, 'Should Christians Affirm Rawls' Justice as Fairness: A Response to Professor 
Beckley, " Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (1988): 251-7. Patrick Gardiner, "The Original Position, " 
7he London Times Educational Supplement, 12 January 1973,23a. 
1" Thomas Pogge, "Rawls on Global Justice, " The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1988): 245- 
51. Sugden, "Impartiality and Mutual Advantage, " -Ethica 
101 (1991): 639. Brian Barry, A Treatise 
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The Two Principles 
Critical comments on the content of the two principles focus on liberty and 
equality, the role of justice as fairness, the difference principle and maximin. 
Liberty 
Nozick claims Rawls does not state why people in the original position would 
reject a system of natural liberty. Nozick argues it must be because calculated self- 
interest does not lead them to adopt entitlement principles. 201 
In spite of Rawls' claim regarding the priority of liberty, Hart argues the 
rationality of men restricting their present choices because in future they may not 
want to do a particular thing is unclear. 202 Furthermore, Rawls' insistence on the 
priority of liberty conceals the character of the advantages and disadvantages of 
resolving conflicts. If liberty can be restricted to prevent violation of natural duties 
and obligations, it may be limited severely. 203 
Goldman argues Rawls' view of the priority of liberty does not provide help 
when liberties conflict. 
204 Goldman claims Rawls argues for liberty on the wrong 
grounds 205 and that his list of basic liberties is too narrow. 
206 Its bases should be the 
idea that all rational people place a great emphasis and value on liberty and that no 
on Social Justice: Theories ofJustice, vol. 1, (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989), 189-9 1. Arrow, 
"Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice, " Journal of Philosophy, 260- 1. 
200 R. L. Fern, "Religious Beliefs in a Rawlsian Society, " The Journal of Religious Ethics 15 (1987): 
33-58. Nagel, "Rawls on Justice, " 220-34. 
201 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 213-15. Nozick argues for these principles throughout this 
text. 
M H. L. A. Hart, "Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority" in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls ' 'A 
Theory ofJustice', ed. Norman Daniels, (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 250-1. See also Carens, 
"Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society, " 43-44 and Norman Daniels, "Equal Liberty and Unequal 
Worth of Liberty, " in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' 'A Theory ofJustice, ed. Norman 
Daniels, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 253-8 1. 
m Hart, "Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, "238,247-8. 
204 Goldman, "Responses to Rawls from the Political Right, " 442-3. 
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one has a right to restrict certain liberties except to prevent harm to others. 207 The 
reality of conflicting liberties may be one which Rawls neglects, but is vital to the 
functioning of society. Avoiding harm to others might be part of a minimum standard 
or means of ordering liberty and freedom. 208 
V- 
Lquality 
Brian Barry argues the more Rawls' ideal shift from liberal equality to 
equality of outcome is pondered the less certain people will be that it is attractive. 209 
Rawls assumes liberal equality is acceptable. Barry argues it only eliminates some 
morally arbitrary features, but still permits natural endowments to have a role. 210 
Michael Gorr claims, despite Rawls' support for "Natural Inequality Theory", 
that "natural differences among persons require some form of correction as a matter 
of justice", 21 1 Rawls does not argue for it because he regards it as unnecessary and 
self-evident. Rawls may assume that to establish satisfactory principles of justice 
must not be based on contingent differences in the distribution of natural assets 
suffices to establish that satisfactory principles must nullify, or compensate for, these 
differences. 212 For Gorr, this is a seriously flawed argument because it places great 
restriction on personal liberty. 
213 Although Rawls' attitude toward natural differences 
205 Ibid., 444. 
206 Ibid., 442. 
207 Ibid., 444. 
" See pp. 230-7. 
20 Brian Barry, "Equal Opportunity and Moral Arbitrariness, " in Equal Opportunity, ed. Norman E. 
Bowie, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 33-5. 
210 Ibid., 34. Barry claims these natural endowments are equally arbitrary from a moral point of view. 
211 Michael Goff, "Rawls on Natural Liberty, " The Philoso2hical Quarterly 33 (1983): 13. 
212 Ibid., 13. Goff states if Rawls does assume this he is guilty of deep and serious confusion that could 
undermine the contractarian edifice he carefully sets out. 
213 Ibid., 13. Goff is hesitant in his critique of Rawls. 
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is faulty and unclear, he recognises the need for providing minimum standards for all 
members of society. 
214 
Justice as Faimess 
In spite of Rawls' focus on justice as fairness, Klosko argues Rawls glosses 
over the danger of "free-riders", those who benefit without co-operating, in a 
community or society. 21 5 Further difficulties with justice as fairness focus on what 
constitutes a joint enterprise or co-operative scheme, how individuals incur 
obligations to contribute to it, and distribution of goods, including those necessary for 
a minimally acceptable life. 216 Klosko highlights the need for safeguards and 
minimum standards regarding the distribution of goods in a community. 217 
The Difference Principle and Maximin 
Regarding the difference principle, critics argue against its content and 
function '218 particularly regarding 
distribution of social advantages. 219 They claim it 
conflicts with Rawls' notion of equal liberties, 
220 and entails the contradictory themes 
of justice as impartiality and mutual advantage. 221 
Distributive theories of justice might be based on entitlement, desert or more 
egalitarian approaches to goods and assets in society. Nozick propounds desert and 
entitlement theories as an alternative to Rawls' view of distributive justice. Nozick 
214 See pp. 230-7. 
215 George Klosko, "rhe Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, " Ethica 97 (1987): 354. 
216 Ibid., 353-5. 
217 See pp. 230-7. 
218 Scanlon, "Rawls' Theory of Justice, " 205. Pat Shaw, "Rawls, the Lexical Difference Principle and 
Equality, " The Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992): 75-7. 
21$ Choptiany, "A Critique of John Rawls' Principles of Justice, " 147. Nozick. Anarchy, State and 
Utopia, 192-5. Sugden, "Impartiality and Mutual Advantage, " 641. R. M. Franklin, "In Pursuit of a 
Just Society: Martin Luther King JR and Rawls, " The Journal of Religious Ethics 18 (1990): 73. 
M Matson, "Justice: A Funeral Oration, " I 11. 
221 Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice: Theories ofJustice, 215. See also part 3. 
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argues in a social non-co-operation situation each individual deserves what he gets 
through his own efforts. No one else can make a claim of justice against this holding 
and it is perfectly clear who is entitled to what. 222 
David Cummiskey states desert theorists disagree with Rawls' claims that 
people should regard natural talents and abilities as common assets and share in their 
distribution. Cummiskey claims it does not follow from the moral arbitrariness of 
natural distribution that it may be treated as a common asset. 223 
Critics contrast Rawls' difference principle with views of justice as 
entitlement or desert. For Rawls, this principle is linked to the maximin. 
Maximin 
Goldman critiques the maximin in relation to the more advantaged in 
society, 224 while other critics focus on the worse-off members of society. 225 Critics 
claim the maximin does not provide the successful alternative to the principle of 
utility which Rawls proposes and his theory may be closer to utility than he 
realises. 226 
Barry argues the maximin criterion is not appropriate if the minimum 
achievable in a society either falls short of this set minimum or exceeds it. The most 
222 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 185-6. Rawls does describes society as a social co-operation 
marked by an identity and conflict of interests which leads to the need for principles to govern the 
distribution of social goods. Yet, Nozick's interpretation of the problem of distributive justice may be 
too narrow. It may be more accurate to note the force of Rawls' principles of distributive justice are 
formulated to counter natural distribution of talents, assets, abilities and opportunities. See TJ, 15,302- 
3,507. 
223 David Cummiskey, "Desert and Entitlement: A Rawlsian Consequentialist Account, " Analysis 47 
(1987): 15. Cummiskey cites Nozick as a proponent of entitlement theory. 
224 Goldman, "Responses to Rawls from the Political Right, " 433-5. 
225 Ball, "Maximin Justice, Sacrifice, and the Reciprocity Argument, " 158. Ronald Dworkin, "What is 
Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources, ", in Justice in Political Philosophy, vol. 1. Mainstream 
Theories ofJustice, ed. Will Kymlicka, (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992), 289-96. Rupert 
Buchanan, "Investment Income in Rawls' Theory of Justice, " Dialogue 22 (1983): 541. RoyC. 
Weatherford, "Defining the Least Advantaged, " The Philosonhical QuarterlY 33 (1983): 63-4. 
226 Ball, "Maximin Justice, Sacrifice, and the Reciprocity Argument, " 177-8 1. Arrow, "Some 
Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice, " 251-2. 
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Rawls could establish about the structure of preferences is that parties would insist if 
some specified minimum could be provided for all, then it should be provided. 227 
This critique highlights the role a minimum standard, which may include distribution 
of goods, equal liberty or some notion of protection, might have in a society. 228 
Society and Communily 
Critiques of Rawls' view of society include the nature and content of his 
community, within which duties arise and human goods are to be shared, and their 
implications, including the dangers of patriarchy. 
In general, Jackson critiques the assumptions of a Rawlsian community, and 
claims the fundamental issues are whether commupities should or what kind can 
exist. 229 Francis argues Rawls is mistaken about what genuine community means and 
his notion of community is inadequate and unstable. 230 
Part of a Rawlsian society or community involves duties and goods. 
Natural Duties 
Regarding Rawls' primary duty to "support further just institutions", Klosko 
notes the general tension between requirements and duties which all human beings 
have versus those acquired as part of a particular political state, society or community 
in Rawls' theory. 231 More specifically, Carens claims Rawls is vague in the meaning 
of this primary natural duty, as compliance with natural duties is sometimes 
2' '7 Brian Barry, "Derivation of the Maximin Criterion, " in Justice in Political Philosophy, vol. 1. 
Mainstream Theories ofJustice, ed. Will Kymlicka, (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992), 
176. Emphases added. 
2n Ibid., 176. For further discussion of minimum standards, see pp. 225-32. 
229 Jackson, "Aristotle on Rawls: A Critique of Quantitative Justice, " 101. Jackson argues once the 
community exists these things may have a place. 
230 Francis, "Responses to Rawls from the Left, " 485,489. 
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supererogatory. 232 If people can choose to fulfil or not fulfil natural duties for Rawls, 
his view might encompass a maximum rather than a minimum standard of duties 
necessary for the functioning of individuals and a community. 233 
Human Goods 
In general, Jackson notes Rawls attempts to combine two contradictory 
concepts by arguing the good both is singular and plural, in his thin and full theories 
of the good. 234 Goods are conceived only as consumer items to be judged privately 
not as parts of the public weal. 235 
More specifically, Richard Arneson critiques Rawls' claim that advantages 
and disadvantages of social co-operation are measured by primary goods. Arneson 
argues for a fair socialisation process and fair preference formation. 
236 Francis claims 
Rawls is unclear whether primary goods, and his claims about them, are supposed to 
be true by definition or as empirical generalisations. 237 There are difficulties in 
precisely defining and comparatively ranking these goods. 
238 Ian Shapiro argues 
Rawls' characterisations and orderings are idiosyncratic and rely on controversial 
assumptions about human psychology. 
239 
231 George Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice, " Philosophy and Public 
Affaira 23 (1994) : 25 L 
232 Carens, "Rights and Duties, " 41-2. See also V, 114-15. For Rawls, natural duties are not binding 
when they are too demanding and involve excessive risk or loss to oneself. Carens' concern is whether 
Rawls' system and principles leave room for a social duty to make good use of talents and skills. 
233 Ibid., 4 1. For further discussion of maximum and minimum standards, see pp. 223-9. 
234 Jackson, "Aristotle on Rawls, " 105-6. Jackson claims what is thin and full is not the good but 
Rawls' account of it, and states the singular good is money, as it entails distributions in income and 
wealth by the difference principle. 
235 Ibid., 107. 
236 Richard J. Arneson, "Primary Goods Reconsidered, " Nous 24 (1990): 429-32. See also Arrow, 
"Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice, " 254. Arrow critiques Rawls' view of 
primary goods with regard to the problem of interpersonal comparison and an index-number problem 
in commensurating different goods. 
237 Francis, "Responses to Rawls from the Left: ' 475. 
238 Ibid., 475. 
239 Ian Shapiro, "Three Ways to be a Democrat, " Political The= 22 (1994): 131. For example 
people's propensity toward risk and human motivation, according to Shapiro. 
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Dangers of Patriarchy 
Feminist critics, in particular, address Rawls' omissions regarding knowledge 
about and implications of sexual identity and gender in the original position, 240 his 
sexism and male terms of reference. 241 They also critique his assumptions about the 
institution of the family, 242 particularly its alleged justice, 243 and marriage. 244 
Along with Rawls' assumptions about society, his view of individual persons 
also must be scrutinised. 
Personhood 
In general, Rawls is critiqued for his view of individuals, 245 specifically their 
conflicting egoism and mutual disinterest, 
246 moral development, 247 the social nature 
of human beings, 248 and circularity of his view of self-esteem. 
249 
240 Susan Moller Okin, "Justice and Gender, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 45-6,66-8. 
Okin also argues Rawls' principles of justice are incompatible with gender-structured society. 
Furthermore, she claims Rawls does not specify that persons in the original position do not know their 
sex, but this knowledge could affect their decisions given society's male-oriented structure. Karen 
Green, "Rawls, Women and the Priority of Liberty, " The Australasian Journal of Philosoph 64 (1986): 
28. She claims that the history of liberal tradition leads feminists to be suspicious that people in the 
original position will be male because they are referred to as "heads of families". 241 Ibid., 46. 
2A2 Ibid., 45. Okin notes although Rawls does not state explicitly that heads of families are men, he 
does nothing to counter the assumption they will be men (47). 
243 Ibid., 47-8. Carole Pateman, "'The Disorder of Women: Women, Love and the Sense of Justice, " 
Ethia 91 (1980): 24. Matson, "Justice: A Funeral Oration, " 107. They argue justice does not hold 
true for the family. 
244 Ibid., 47. See also Green, "Rawls, Women and the Priority of Liberty, " 28. Green argues that 
Rawls does not scrutinise the family for justice or injustice, and in his discussion the institution of 
marriage is virtually invisible and regulated to the private sphere of morality. She believes marriage is 
a fundamental institution, by Rawls' own definition, and should be investigated by him. Cf. Pateman, 
"'The Disorder of Wornen', " 33. 
245 Alejandro, "Rawls' Communitarianism, " 77-8,82-6. Arrow, "Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian notes on 
Rawls' Theory of Justice, " 262-3. Delaney, "Rawls and Individualism, " 112,116. 
1 Schollmeier, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship, 147-9. Francis, 
"Responses to Rawls from the Left, " 474-5. 
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Alejandro argues Rawls' view of human nature is essentially dogmatic, as 
justice is the only virtue that best expresses the individual's nature, is at the self's core 
and foundation of humanity. This monopoly of justice also offers an impoverished 
view of society. 250 It does not provide any room for isolation, democratic sentiments 
or moral conflicts within or among individuals. 251 So, Rawls' view may be too 
simplistic and reductioniStiC. 252 
Discussing individuals' moral nature, Deigh argues the missing element in 
Rawls' first two stages of moral development is an explanation of how the child 
develops an allegiance to parents or others as possessors of authority. 253 Rawls leaves 
unexplained how one advances to a morality of principles. 254 As principles are 
important in distinguishing the ethics of justice from the ethics of care, this omission 
is noteworthy for moral decision-making. 255 
Within moral development, Francis argues Rawls' account of producing a 
sense of justice fails. Rawls stresses the crucial element of human caring in his three 
stages of moral development, as reciprocal caring and beliefs in the good of justice 
interact to produce the sense of justice. Rawls needs a different explanation for the 
development of a sense of justice. 256 Yet, reference to both care and justice in moral 
development is vital in developing an amalgam of these two ethics. 257 
Alejandro argues although the principle of reciprocity is central to the 
acquisition of a sense of justice, it finally consumes the Rawlsian self. The self is to 
250 Alejandro, "Rawls' Communitarianism, " 85-6. Alejandro believes that Rawls' argument relies on 
stice being at the core of the self, the foundation of humanity. 
1 Ibid., 98. Alejandro claims there is no room for moral conflicts within an individual or among 
individuals because all are part of the social plan of society. 
25' See pp. 215-17. 
253 Deigh, "Love, Guilt, and the Sense of Justice, " 405-9. 
254 Ibid., 409-11. Deigh notes Rawls' explanation of how one acquires an effective desire to act on 
principles of justice is not in dispute. The dispute is that not every attachment to moral principles, and 
so not every desire to act on them, gives rise to moral feelings as Rawls claims. 255 See chapter 1. 
256 Francis, "Responses to Rawls from the Left, " 486. 
120 
be the only source of aims and ends, but the Rawlsian self develops sentiments and 
attachments, not out of itself, but out of the influence of dealing with other selves. 
Alejandro concludes the self cannot be prior to its ends since a developed sense of 
justice requires the actions of others, and for people to value those actions they need a 
64common perspective" which assumes communal standards of worthiness to judge 
ends and endeavours. 258 An integration of the ethics of justice and care may provide 
such a standard. 259 
Deigh critiques Rawls' for his optimistic view of human nature. This 
optimism is shown through Rawls' thesis that the sense of justice is a form of good 
will toward humankind . 
260 Furthermore, Francis notes Rawls wrongly assumes 
people in the original position are mutually disinterested and do not suffer from 
enVy. 261 So, underlying Rawls' theory of justice is an optimistic view of humanity. A 
more accurate view recognises the tension between this optimism and Rawls' 
insistence on minimum standards which protect the least advantaged. 
Critigue of Rawls from a Middle Way Perspective 
The primary theme which emerges from an analysis of Rawls' theory of 
justice is the need for minimum standards to protect the vulnerable in society. It 
arises from further critique of the principles of justice, society or community, persons, 
morality and duties and obligations. 
Principles of Justice 
257 See chapter 5. 
258 Alejandro, "Rawls' Communitarianism, " 824. See V, 517-18. 
259 See chapter 5. 
20 Deigh, "Love, Guilt, and the Sense of Justice, " 393,4034. 
261 Francis, "Responses to Rawls from the Left, " 474-5. 
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Further critique of Rawls' theory of justice will focus on liberty, freedom and 
their limits. Then equality, distribution involving mutuality and reciprocity, his 
recognition of and provision for the least advantaged, the role of responsibilities, 
fairness and appropriateness are examined. 
Liberty 
Questions may arise about the extent and limits, coverage and adequacy of 
Rawls' first principle of liberty. 262 Rawls addresses the "equal basic liberties" and the 
66most extensive" system of liberty which may conflict. Yet, he recognises the role 
and importance of both minimum and maximum liberty or standards within his 
principle. 
263 
Regarding liberty, autonomy and freedoms are not unlimited in society. Our 
freedom is limited in doing harm to ourselves, like having to wear a motorcycle 
helmet or a seat belt. It is also restricted in causing harm to others, i. e. assault, 
murder, liability or slander . 
264 Yet, protecting freedoms also is necessary. There are 
some freedoms so highly valued in society that despite their potential harm to some, 
they are protected for the greater public good, i. e. freedom of speech or the press. 265 
Liberalism can lead to anarchy. Anarchy allows chaos and harm to others. It 
is not sufficient to claim that liberty will be modified or restrained by other people's 
liberty, thus avoiding problems regarding freedoms and restraints in society. If 
freedom does pose restraints, they might occur only after harm has been done. It 
seems preferable to be preventative not corrective regarding harm in a just society. A 
" See pp. 85,87-8. Rawls, TJ, 302. 
263 Rawls, TJ, 302. 
264 These limits may be preventative, corrective or restorative. 
265 As these freedoms allow people to speak out against ideas and policies with which they disagree and 
may expose immoral or illegal dealings, they are seen to contribute to the greater public good. Thus, 
they are protected. 
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preventative society would be proactive, putting in place legal, moral and social rules 
which avoid harm from happening. 266 This can involve incentives or deterrents. 
Alternatively, a corrective society would base its rules on punishment for wrong 
doing and seek to be restorative, being reactive and involving retribution. 267 These 
two types of society are based on either a pessimistic or optimistic view of human 
beings. 268 The former assumes harm to others will be done and should be restrained, 
while the latter assumes people will be and do good to others. As far as is possible, a 
preventative approach is preferable as it aims to avoid and restrain harm from 
occurring. 
Equality 
Regarding equality, Rawls advocates distribution which allows the least 
advantaged to benefit equally. 
269 His difference principle also expresses reciprocity 
or mutual benefit. 
270 There are at least two senses of reciprocity. People may receive 
exactly the same benefit from a transaction in society, or they may receive a different, 
but sufficient or appropriate, benefit. 
271 As some people will demand too much and 
others will not require enough, some means of regulating benefit to ensure reciprocity 
is needed. This might be achieved through a notion of desert, where people earn their 
benefits, or needs, where people with like needs enjoy similar benefits and all have 
their basic needs met. Rawls usefully emphasises mutuality and reciprocity in 
'" In spite of the dangers of liberalism, this preventative aim of society can be viewed as the essence of 
contractarianism and so is not a negative but a positive critique of Rawls. 
267 A further danger of liberalism is that being based on individualism it may, in its more extreme 
forms, move into subjectivism where there is no objective perspective from which to assess choices, 
actions, freedoms or standards of justice as right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate. Ultimately, 
this kind of liberalism can lead to relativism where there is no absolute truth or guidelines. 
2" Locke, 7he Second Treatise of Civil Government, chapters 2 and 8. Hobbes, Leviathan, 141-3. See 
also pp. 59-60. 
269 Rawls, TJ, 302-3. 
270 Ibid., 102. 
"I This may be expressed as the difference between strict equality and equity. See pp. 230-7. 
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society. They also play a role in moving beyond basic distribution of goods and 
inequalities, being connected to relational elements and aid the flourishing of people 
and society. 
272 
Mutuality and reciprocity are related to redress, which deals with differences 
in society and means of compensating for them. Rawls advocates compensating for 
273 
natural endowments, claiming these inequalities are undeserved. Because it is 
difficult to assess and compensate tangibly for these inequalities, Rawls' version of 
redress may be unworkable both in theory and practice. With natural physical 
endowments like bigger or smaller noses or breasts, it is not only difficult to 
understand why society should compensate for them, but also how. If plastic surgery 
was offered to redress physical differences, who would judge which people should 
receive it and what they should receive? Plastic surgery might be given on request, 
based on clinical judgment or degrees of need. As people have different wants, some 
would request enlargements, while others would want reductions. If redress for 
natural endowments was implemented, the result could be a society of very similar 
people. So, the implications of redress for natural endowments and inequalities are 
potentially dangerous. 
274 
Rawls' principle of equality ensures that social and economic inequalities are 
to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. 275 This is Rawls' attempt to protect 
minorities, the weak and vulnerable in a liberal democratic society, as they cannot 
necessarily protect their best interests and are at the mercy of others. Thus, Rawls 
272 These elements also are found within the ethics of care. See pp. 48-52. For further discussion of 
their role within a middle way, see pp. 217-23. 
273 Seep. 86. Rawls, TJ, 100. 
274 Even if Rawls' notion of redress worked in theory, as it is in favour of those the least advantaged, 
they may not always be the weakest and most vulnerable in society. For example, in the health care 
system in the United States it is not the poorest who suffer the most because they receive government 
coverage for their health care. It is the lower middle class, those who just fail to qualify for 
government aid and cannot afford private heath care insurance who are in the most precarious and 
vulnerable position. 
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rightly builds into his notion of social justice a safety net to make sure the most 
advantaged do not construct a society which is only or primarily to their benefit. 276 
Some safety net is important and necessary to protect against a self-interested 
Majority. 277 Whether Rawls' conception is the only or best way to protect the 
278 
vulnerable in society is debatable. Weighting society and its standards in favour of 
the less advantaged can be seen as unfair to the more advantaged . 
279 The function of 
such parameters is to serve as a protection. The existence of more and less 
advantaged people is intrinsically unfair, so weighting society in favour of the latter 
helps redress the ultimate balance of fairness and justice. Without such minimum 
standards, the less advantaged will not necessarily be helped or aided by others. 
Absolute minimums, such as restraint of harm, can be defined in attempting to ensure 
a basic level of treatment for all in society. Alternatively, maximum standards which 
seek to contribute positively to a person's growth or flourishing can be identified. 280 
There are at least two distinct notions of society at work here. One is that 
individuals should be and are responsible only for themselves and those they choose 
to help, including family, friends and particular individuals or organisations. 281 
Another perspective is that all people have a wider social responsibility to others. 
These perspectives highlight the tension between individual versus communal 
responsibility. 
275 Rawls, V, 302. 
"I Attention may be draw to the tension between needing redress and its potential dangers. Here, the 
focus of critique is that Rawls highlights its importance, but his view of redress is inadequate. 
277 Rawls recognises the self-interest of the parties in the original position. Rawls, V, 11. 
278 See pp. 114-16. 
279 See pp. 116-17. Goldman, "Responses to Rawls from the Political Right, " 433-5. Ball, "Maximin 
Justice, Sacrifice, and the Reciprocity Argument, " 158. 
280 See chapter 5. 
281 This view of responsibilities, which may be found within the ethics of care, is critiqued from an 
impartialist perspective. For example see Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral 
Theory, " 477-8. 
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If there is some communal responsibility, how do we accept social 
responsibility while avoiding the dangers of free-riders, those who want the benefits 
from society without the CoStS? 282 Incentives or disincentives could be provided for 
anti-social members to participate in society and not be free-riders. Yet, perhaps this 
danger cannot be avoided completely. It is the price paid by a society in meeting 
everyone's basic needs. 
Regarding needs and minimum standards, Rawls' idea of fair and equal 
opportunity being open to all also requires examination. 283 To achieve this principle, 
society would have to recognise a high degree of control is necessary. This control 
can be in relation to information about people, making and enforcing laws, or agreed 
social sanctions where individuals or groups exercise power over others. Laws and 
social sanctions can serve as the minimum standards required to achieve the goal of 
fair and equal opportunities related to justice. Rawls again focuses on a minimum, 
but society also might need a maximum standard or ideal at which to aim. 284 
Rawlsian equality contains the minimum assumption that all people will be 
treated alike or consistently, given equal consideration. Departures from this 
conception must be defended or justified . 
285 This equality is useful in providing a 
basic acceptable standard within which to treat people. Yet, treating people exactly 
alike might not be appropriate in all cases. Rawls acknowledges the possibility of 
departures from equality and the need to justify these differences in treatment. 286 
Such justification is linked to equity, allows appropriate differentiation and ensures 
282 See p. 115. Klosko, "Tbe Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, " 354. 
283 Rawls, TJ, 73-4. 
2" This maximum may relate to care and encourage members to flourish. See pp. 216-17. 
2s5 See pp. 89-91. Rawls, TJ, 507. 
286 See p. 90. 
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people are not exploited. So it provides a minimum means or level of protection for 
people, while being appropriately sensitive to differences between them. 287 
Furthermore, Rawls claims democratic equality ensures the prospects of the 
less fortunate are protected. 288 If this type of equality is democratic, then the majority 
will decide the best way to protect the less fortunate and content of 'best interests'. 
Difficulties arise in determining whose interests are best served by a decision. The 
majority might protect their own, not others', interests. Perspectives on 'best 
interests' can change with time, political and social climates, technology, 
relationships and emotions. So, using 'best interests' alone is a very intricate and 
complex means of ensuring equality. 
289 
Minorities are not always very vocal, or able to articulate their needs, wants, 
desires and values, particularly in the public domain. Within health care, often the 
most vocal and persistent patients receive the treatment they want. Nurses and 
doctors are sometimes persuaded by or concede to these demands. 290 In hospital 
patients are unwell, in a strange environment, and not themselves. To ensure their 
needs, wants and values are expressed nurses recognise the importance of speaking on 
behalf of the patient and protecting his/her best interests. The nurse articulates what 
she thinks or knows the patient would want regarding treatment decisions or relations 
with doctors or families, ensuring he/she receives fair, equal, appropriate and desired 
treatment. So the role of the nurse advocate is important in safeguarding against the 
danger that individuals and minorities are overlooked, ignored or marginalised. 
After investigating limits of liberty, the dangers to the vulnerable in society, 
the emphasis on minimum standards, while recognising the need for maximum 
287 See chapter 5, especially pp. 230-7. 
238 See p. 89. Rawls, TJ, 75. 
2s9 For disparate views of best interests see the Child B case analysed in chapter 6. 
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standards, justice as equality and fairness have been examined. Rawls' principles of 
justice focus on the formation of society. 
Society and Social Union 
Social co-operation, motivations, the need for minimum standards, shared 
ends and means, autonomy and objectivity will be analysed. 
A Rawlsian society is based on social contract theory. 291 A primary question 
regarding this form is whether or not all people benefit from the social co- 
operation. 292 Rawls tries to ensure that the worst-off do benefit, as society, and its 
inequalities, are geared to their advantage and protection through the second 
principle. 293 If social co-operation is constructed to protect the worst-off, then what 
motivates the best-off to participate? 294 It seems likely that there is some material or 
emotional benefit which motivates them. The former can include the best-off 
contributing to a society because they receive a material gain, whether financial or in 
the form of other resources. Emotional reward or gain can involve feeling a sense of 
fulfilment because they are doing their moral duty, in helping others, and fulfilling 
their social responsibility. 
' For instance, middle class people are known for having high expectation and demand levels with 
nurses and doctors, as well as less hesitation about complaining if they fail to receive what they want. 
"' See pp. 91,93-4. Rawls, TJ, 11. 
292 See pp. 115-16. 
293 See p. 86. Rawls, TJ, 302. 
294 For example, many American do not want to pay for other people's health care. They believe 
individuals should work to take care of themselves, and if they do not then they must accept the 
consequences, which may include having no health care insurance. In contrast, many British citizens 
accept some redistribution of resources to contribute to the National Health Service, meeting the health 
care needs of others, and themselves. This situation may be due to different social or cultural 
frameworks or a more pragmatic reason such as different taxation systems. British citizens may have a 
more socialist notion of social responsibility, whereas American citizens may be more individualistic. 
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In assessing potential motivations, the material incentive seems more likely, as 
human nature can be generally self-interested. 295 Rawls notes the role of self-interest 
for people, but also claims they are mutually disinterested. 296 There may be a tension 
between these two aspects of humanity. 297 Yet, as people may be generally self- 
interested, society will need minimum rules and standards to provide protection for all 
members. 298 
A well-ordered society includes justice as fairness or equality, organised 
protection, a means of distributing goods and meeting the basic needs of all members, 
and a notion of responsibility and care. 299 One key feature is a shared end, which 
Rawls advocates as a goal of community. 300 Furthermore, a means of achieving this 
shared end is needed. Yet, this can be difficult. We must recognise we are born into 
some tradition or society with values and perhaps end goals and that this context 
influences our decisions. Western society, for example, is pluralistic and consists of a 
number of different communities and values systems. There are disparate views on 
what the ends of society should be. Furthermore, even if we could agree an end, 
disagreement on acceptable means of achieving it is highly likely. One way to reach 
some consensus on the ends of a community or society, in spite of differing contexts 
and cultures, may be through focusing on minimum, not maximum, standards. 301 
Rawls' claim that a shared end gives satisfaction and pleasure to all may be 
too optimistic, 302 particularly when contrasted with his recognition of self-interested 
295 Obviously, some individuals are altruistic and concerned for the least advantaged and vulnerable in 
society, but they seem notable by exception and do not constitute the norm or general view of 
humanity. 
296 See p. 98. Rawls, TJ, 11,13. 
297 Whether these two aspects of human nature are evenly balanced and clear opposites may be 
debatable. A clearer opposite of self-interest may be caring for others. 
298 See pp. 230-7. 
'" These elements will play a role in developing an integration of care and justice. See pp. 223-9. 
300 See p. 94. Rawls, TJ, 527. Cf. Maclntyre, After Virtue, 148. 301 See pp. 230-7. 302 Rawls, TJ, 523,526. 
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humanity and protective measures required in the formation of his society. 303 
Furthermore, a shared end can bring unforeseen consequences. The agreed means 
may not work. Some members might have compromised and be unhappy with the 
result. Not all members agreeing on the shared end will see its fulfilment, as there 
may be a considerable time lag. All of these circumstances potentially contribute to 
people's dissatisfaction with the shared end. Perhaps the aim of the shared end should 
not be bringing satisfaction or pleasure to all, but minimising the harm experienced. 
The purpose and result of the shared end may be more conservative and minimalistic, 
rather than ideal and maximal. 
304 
Rawls also argues a well-ordered society would include autonomy. 305 One 
difficulty with Rawls' criterion of autonomy is the extent to which it applies. 
Autonomy has two strands, namely freedom and self-determination. If every member 
of a well-ordered society is completely autonomous it may be individualistic to such 
an extent that this society cannot function or leads to anarchy. 
306 Self-determination 
encounters difficulties when individuals' choices conflict in society. 
A well ordered society also involves objectivity, according to RawlS. 307 yet, it 
is difficult to assume individuals are or can be totally objective. We all interpret 
situations based on our subjective perspective. We cannot avoid sub ectivity j 
altogether. This is not necessarily problematic provided it is recognised and taken 
into consideration. Objectivity is possible, but it may be more difficult for some than 
others. There seems to be a degree of uncertainty in predicting, in advance, 
individuals' degrees of objectivity. 
303 See pp. 86,93-4. 
304 See pp. 230-7. 
"5 See p. 95. Rawls, TJ, 513-5. 
306 See pp. 122-3. 
"7 Rawls, TJ, 513-15. 
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Although Rawls emphasises autonomy and objectivity, he also notes the 
"close-knitted" expectations of individuals in society. 308 Although he does not place 
great weight on the latter, he does recognise individuals' connectedness and 
relationships on some level. 309 What is important to note is the objective and rational, 
subjective and emotional, autonomous and relational elements are all part of being 
human. We need to focus on maintaining a balance between and doing justice to all 
of them, not over-emphasising one dimension. 310 
In critiquing a Rawlsian society, the vital role of minimum standards in 
society again was evident. The importance of motives, role of shared ends and means 
and a balanced and holistic perspective of persons also were explored. 
Personhood 
Critical analysis of Rawls' view of persons emphasises the importance of a 
holistic perspective, motivations, and investigates the notion of 'good' persons. 
Rawls accurately stresses the importance of rationality in relation to 
persons. 311 Yet, rationality alone is too narrow. It is not the only important element 
of a person. Alternative perspectives from the ethics of care stress relational, 
312 
experiential313 and theological aspects. 
314 Depending on which perspective of 
personhood is weighted more heavily, there are different explanations not just for 
what makes a person, but also for what motivates people. 
308 See p. 90. Rawls, TJ, 80. 
309 This recognition of connectedness by Rawls highlights a common feature between his ethic of 
justice and that of the ethics of care. See chapter I and pp. 48-52,55-9. Interestingly, MacIntyre also 
notes the importance of community within his ethic of justice. See pp. 148-50. 
310 Recognising these dimensions is vital to a holistic view of humanity. See pp. 215-17. 
311 See pp. 102-3. Rawls, TJ, 142,144. 
312 Gilligan and Noddings in particular stress this aspect of persons. See chapters I and 2. 
313 See pp. 60-2. Benner and WrubeI, The Primacy of Caring, 41-50. 
34 See pp. 35-7. Campbell notes this element of persons, particularly in his discussion of agape and 
transcendence. Other alternatives include sociological, psychological and biological perspectives. 
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Rawls propounds the Aristotelian Principle, that people prefer and enjoy 
activities which call on more complex capacities, claiming it states a deep 
psychological fact about people. 315 Is this an accurate description of human beings? 
In the workplace, different types of individuals and motives are found. Some people 
want to be challenged, promoted and are happy to assume more responsibility. One 
danger with the highly motivated can be their willingness to do anything to get what 
they want, including harm to others and themselves. Alternatively, other people work 
to pay the bills, are not ambitious and are content to do the same job for many years. 
Furthermore, the Aristotelian Principle would not hold true for the "free-riders". 316 
To guard against free-riders and harm done to others by the highly motivated, society 
might need minimum standards below which treatment of persons must not fall and 
which everyone must meet before receiving benefits. Maximum standards also may 
be needed to challenge the highly motivated and seek to maximise the potential of 
each member to flourish. 
317 
In relation to the motivations of different people, rewards and punishments 
might attempt to develop 'good' or virtuous people. 
318 Rawls believes a good person 
has a higher degree than the average of the 'broadly based features of moral character 
it is rational for persons in the original position to want in one another. ' These 
properties include the fundamental moral virtues and a sense of justice and 
obligation. 319 His notion of a good person is vague, as agreement on the content of 
his requirements is unclear. A variety of descriptions of fundamental virtues and 
315 Rawls, TJ, 426. 
316 See pp. 115. Klosko, "The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, " 354. 
317 See chapter 5. 
319 Whether or not we need to encourage people to be good depends on what we believe to be the 
fundamental nature of human beings and whether and how genuine goodness is related to reward and 
punishment. See pp. 59-60. Locke, The Second 
Treatise of Civil Government, chapters 2 and 8. 
Hobbes, Leviathan, 141-3. 
319 See pp. 104-5. Rawls, TJ, 435-7. 
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sense of justice can be found, for example, in a pluralistic society. It is hard to judge 
between competing accounts of virtues; so Rawls' criteria are not very helpful. 
Developing 'good' people might come from more informal structures, like 
family and friends, or more formal structures like education and law. It might involve 
training and practice. A society can try to develop 'good' people, but as it cannot 
guarantee they will always be or do good. So, standards which provide a minimum 
threshold for behaviour and expectations can be useful and necessary. They might act 
as a safety net in case people are not good. 
320 
For Rawls, the minimum standard for moral personality is the capacity for a 
sense of justice. This entitles people to equal justice and liberty on a par with 
others. 321 Yet what about individuals who either do not exhibit this capacity or not to 
the minimum degree Rawls requires? Although Rawls allows for variations in this 
capacity, 322 those lacking it could be denied the protections and guarantees of justice. 
So a more adequate minimum standard must provide more complete protection for 
individuals within a moral framework. 323 
Within morality, there is a necessary distinction between being and doing 
good. The former involves the whole person, including values, morality, and actions. 
Being good is both internal and external. Doing good focuses on external actions. A 
person could perform a good action for a selfish or bad reason. A person might help 
an elderly woman across the street, because he/she knows the woman is wealthy and 
hopes for some tangible gratitude or wishes to be seen as doing good. Motives matter 
in morality and descriptions of goodness. 
320 See pp. 230-7. 
321 See p. 104. 
322 See p. 104. Rawls, TJ, 506-7. 
323 See pp. 230-7. 
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Explicit and external behaviour is a more easily identifiable than internal and 
subjective attitudes in evaluating someone's moral stance. Behaviour is a more 
objective base from which to judge a person, while attitudes and characteristics are 
more subjective and difficult to asses. In morality, minimum standards which ensure 
an objectively acceptable level of treatment for all people are needed. 
Simultaneously, encouraging people to aim for maximum standards in morality also is 
vital. Nurses and doctors have criteria which they must fulfil before being qualified. 
These include minimum standards, like a selection process, exams and basic clinical 
skills. There also are maximum standards, such as relational skills, care and 
compassion, that patients desire in nurses and doctors, which surpass basic clinical 
skills and knowledge. So, both minimums and maximums have an important role in 
morality. 
324 
in critically exploring Rawls' notion of the person, the importance of a holistic 
view of humanity, understanding the role of motives, and the need for minimum and 
maximum standards in morality have been explored. 
_Morality 
For Rawls, morality involves virtue, moral capacities and judgments, and a 
notion of the right and good. These aspects of morality be connected to ideal and 
non-ideal, maximum and minimum, standards. 
Virtue plays a role in morality. Rawls describes the nature of moral virtues as 
sentiments and habitual attitudes leading people to act on principles of right. 
325 
Seeing them as sentiments seems a rigid view, as persons then either possesses them 
or not. Perhaps virtues are not just sentiments but capacities, qualities and 
324 This combination of minimum and maximum standards may be paralleled to amalgamating 
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characteristics. Depending on which perspective a person accepts, there are different 
views of whether or not virtues can be encouraged or enhanced. 326 This contributes to 
a static, rather than dynamic, view of morality. 
If virtues are viewed as "habitual attitudes", 327 they are considered primarily 
products of habit. Yet, individuals can be encouraged, through education, training 
and incentives, to acquire or exhibit virtues to greater degrees. 
328 A person might 
have no self-control regarding chocolate. This individual could recognise the 
desirability of and need for self-control and take measures to acquire or increase it 
through exercising the will. So, people are able to attain or strengthen their 
possession of virtues. 
If the virtues are primarily "habitual attitudes" they might derive from the 
environment, family, friends, society and culture in which we are raised, a profession, 
or the broader tradition to which we belong. 
329 These sources of such attitudes 
highlight the role of context in shaping moral views and virtues. 
Rawls accurately recognises the role of context and background regarding 
justice. For him, the "circumstances of justice" explain the need for principles of 
justice and are related to human co-operation and conflict. 330 It is important to note 
that the background and context of any situation can have an effect on the people 
involved. This impact can be observed in the values from which people operate and 
their moral choices on at least two levels. In different contexts a persons may make 
either similar or different decisions regarding the same moral issue. He/she also may 
give similar or different justifications for that choice. More fundamentally, people 
elements of justice and care. See chapter 5. 
325 See pp. 108-9. Rawls, TJ, 437. 
326 See pp. 132-3. 
327 Rawls, TJ, 437. 
328 See pp. 132-4. 
329 For further discussion of such contexts, see pp. 203-8. 
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from differing backgrounds might hold varying and disparate moral values and views. 
These may be compatible or be conflicting when approaching morality. Context and 
background can affect the moral decisions and judgments made as well as 
justifications given. 331 
Rawls argues the core of moral theory is moral capacities which entail 
"judging things to be just and unjUSt". 332 In moral judgment, justice is important but 
may not be the most important criterion for assessing people and situations. Morality 
also includes notions of right and wrong, good and bad, responsibilities and duties, 
and virtues. Rawls accurately acknowledges the role of the right and good, duties and 
virtues, 333 but may be in danger of over-emphasising justice in his moral theory. 
Rawls also accurately notes the importance of moral judgement and 
justification. He assumes judgments are made by persons with the ability, opportunity 
and desire to reach a correct decision. 
334 Not all persons have the ability or are given 
such opportunity, i. e. children, the elderly, mentally ill and unconscious. Rawls 
seems to hold a particular view of decisive individuals as being healthy, rational, 
autonomous adults. Yet, an adequate moral theory needs a place for the vulnerable, to 
ensure their wishes and choices are acknowledged and protected and that they are not 
exploited. Furthermore, Rawls presumes people have the desire to reach a correct 
decision. Not all individuals have this desire, as some want to rebel and choose to do 
what is wrong. Rawls' assumptions are inaccurate and optimistic regarding humanity 
and desires. 
335 
330 See p. 99. Rawls, TJ, 126-30. 
331 See pp. 203-8. 
332 Rawls, TJ, 46-7. 
333 See pp. 106- 10. 
334 See pp. 108. Rawls, TJ, pp. 47-8. 
335 See Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, chapters 2 and 8. 
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Regarding justification, Rawls interestingly stresses the importance of 
"everything fitting together into one coherent view" and being a "unified whole". 336 
Justification requires coherence. In justifying a moral judgment, one must point to 
what is fitting. Fittingness may be related to what is appropriate. 337 Rawls also 
acknowledges this concept regarding moral standards being appropriate to, or fitting, 
a person's role or position. 
338 So, fittingness and appropriateness may be important 
notions within justification and a moral framework. 339 
one practical application of appropriateness is in the area of distribution of 
goods and resources. Distribution can be based on desert or merit, needs, wants or 
entitlement. Rawls accurately argues justice as fairness rejects distribution based on 
Inoral desert, because this notion would not be chosen in the original position. 
340 He 
is correct in his rejection of desert, but not in his reasons for it. The notion of desert is 
dangerous because some members of society may not contribute in the requisite ways, 
leaving them vulnerable to those who determine such desert. Furthermore, a few 
highly deserving individuals can obtain a greater share of societal resources, while 
others' basic needs are not met. A rejection of desert emphasises the need to protect 
members in society. 
341 
A key part of morality includes duties and obligations in a society or 
community. 
336 See pp. 99-100. Rawls, TJ, 579-80. This position can be linked to the coherence theory of truth. 
See Alan R. White, 'The Coherence Theory of Truth, " in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1-2, ed. 
Paul Edwards, (New York and London: Collier Macn-tillan), 1967,130-3. See also F. H. Bradley, 
Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). F. H. Bradley, 
Essays on Truth and Reality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914). 
337 See E. David Cook, Responsible Decisions, (Bramcote: Grove Books, 1974), 12. 
338 See p. 107. Rawls, TJ, 467-8. 
339 See pp. 237-45. 
340 Rawls, TJ, 3 10-1. 
" See pp. 230-1. 
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Duties and Obligations 
For Rawls, duties can be positive, to do good, or negative, not to do harm. 342 
This seems a useful distinction and will play an important role within the 
development of a middle way. 343 We will experience situations where we can and 
should do good, and those in which we can only limit the bad or harm being done. 
Nurses and doctors have a negative duty not to harm (non-maleficence) and a positive 
duty to do good (beneficence) to their patients. This distinction between negative and 
positive duties, or responsibilities, offers a parallel with the relationships between 
justice and care. We can interpret justice as requiring the minimum and care the 
maximum standards. Justice may serve to protect, like negative duty, seeking to 
avoid or minimise harm done. It also may be corrective regarding damage done. In 
contrast, care may serve to encourage and maximise the good done, like a positive 
duty, surpassing the minimum and encouraging people to fulfil an ideal. The roles of 
minimum and maximum standards might be distinct, as they may serve different 
functions in a society or community. They also might overlap, where justice is part of 
a maximum and care part of a minimum standard. 
344 
Rawls also discusses the fundamental duties of mutual respect, mutual aid 345 
and justice. 346 Justice can be the minimum duty and mutual respect and aid viewed as 
less fundamental. Individuals could argue we have no fundamental duties, except the 
duty to look after ourselves. They might want some protection from society, but only 
in light of maximum self-interest and freedom. Alternatively, we may have a duty to 
care for or take care of others in society. If so, Rawls' inclusion of mutual aid is 
342 Rawls, TJ, 114. 
141 For further development of the notion of positive and negative responsibilities, or duties, see pp. 
223-9. 
' See pp. 228-34. 
345 Rawls, TJ, 337-9. 
3" Ibid., 116. 
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accurate because we have a duty not just to meet our own needs but to meet 
everyone's basic needs in a compassionate way. Society needs some means of 
recognising duties and responsibilities and agreeing minimum and maximum 
standards. 
347 
Rawls accepts the Kantian duty of mutual aid, "' noting people should adhere 
to it because they may need other people's help in the future. Rawls argues the 
primary reason for accepting this duty is the sense of confidence we can have in the 
good intentions of others and the knowledge they are there if we need them. 349 This is 
not mutual aid, but self-interest. Individuals act not out of concern for others, but 
protecting their own eventualities. Rawls' interpretation of Kant and emphasis may 
be subject to suspicion, as Kant strongly advocates treating people as ends in 
themselves and never merely as means. 350 Treating people as ends versus means is 
important, especially when it is not to an individual's advantage, because it affects 
how people view and interact with others. Such a view may entail the recognition of 
the individual worth and value of others. 351 
Treating people as ends in themselves may involve a degree of respect for 
others, as human and moral beings. Perhaps this is part of the reason Rawls advocates 
mutual respect. It may be important to a balanced notion of others, society and 
morality. Respecting the importance and value of other people might help curb self- 
interest. Mutuality might be one way of monitoring those who demand more in 
society, and those who do not ask for enough. Mutual respect might be a method of 
balancing our moral frameworks, differences and conflicts. It also might be a means 
317 See pp. 230-7. 
348 John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: Rational and Full Autonomy, " The Journal 
of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-72. 349 Rawls, V, 337-9. 
350 For Kant, this is the categorical imperative, a maxim which must be universalisable. Kant, 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 44. Paton, 7he Moral Law, 29-30. 
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of assessing what is appropriate in our actions toward, decisions about, and treatment 
of others. So both mutuality and respect may play an important role within morality 
regarding minimum and maximum standards in our dealings with others. 
The role of the virtues, moral judgment, justification, fittingness, some 
dangers of desert and the need for minimum standards of protection have been 
analysed. The importance of positive and negative duties within morality and society, 
their connection to treating people as ends and not means, mutuality and respect and 
minimum and maximum standards were examined. 352 
Conclusion 
Rawls' theory of justice is liberal, individualistic and contractarian. At its 
base is the belief and rationale that individuals will select his two principles of justice, 
focusing on liberty and equality, which will establish a just society. 
353 This is 
achieved through the original position and applying justice as fairness. 354 
In the critical investigation of Rawls' ethic of justice, two levels have 
emerged. The first is key themes necessary for further development in any attempt to 
consolidate an ethic of justice and to develop a middle way. The second is 
clarification and development of crucial common themes in both Rawls' ethic of 
justice and the ethics of care. In relation to the themes for further and future 
development the notion of and need for minimum standards is central. This arose 
from analysing liberty and preventative measures in society, equality and inequality, 
particularly regarding redress and fair and equal opportunity for all. Some means of 
protection for the least-advantaged, vulnerable and minorities is vital especially 
351 See pp. 213-15. 
352 See chapter 5. 
353 See pp. 86-91. 
" See pp. 91-3,98. 
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against self-interest. This leads to an emphasis on holism. As within the ethics of 
care, a holistic understanding of persons, mutuality and respect is important in 
safeguarding the vulnerable, or those lacking certain capacities. Rawls accurately 
highlights both positive and negative duties in society, which can parallel minimum 
and maximum, non-ideal or ideal standards. Maximums can relate to shared ends, 
motivation for persons and morality. We have seen that Rawls offers us an analysis 
of morality in which rationality, moral judgment, justification and fittingness play 
important roles. 
In terins of the congruence of the ethics of care and Rawls' ethic of justice 
there are common themes of personhood, rationality, morality, holism, minimum and 
maximum standards and responsibilities and society or community. 
355 Furthermore, 
justice as fairness and equality may provide a means of protection against the 
subjectivism and relativism of the ethics of care. Justice as equity and a notion of 
fittingness and appropriateness, require further exploration in relation to developing a 
middle way. Before addressing that task, it is important to examining Alasdair 
MacIntyre's view of the ethics of justice. 
355 See pp. 77-84,121-40. 
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Chgpter Four: Justice in Alasdair MacIntyre's Theory 
Introduction 
In investigating the relationship between the ethics of justice and care, critical 
analysis of Gilligan provided a grounding in the debate and the highlighted the 
possibility of some integration! Then the ethics of care was explored and analysed 
further, both negatively and positively. 2 Rawls has provided an ethic of justice based 
on social contract and where justice is primarily centred on abstract, hypothetical 
rules. 3 In contrast, MacIntyre provides a theory of justice centred on morality, virtues 
and community. 4 Discussion will focus on separate and parallel description and 
critique of elements in MacIntyre's theory, including a view of traditions and history, 
humanity, community, rationality, justice, the virtues and the good or flourishing. 
Desc iption 
MacIntyrc explores the breakdown of modem morality, which entails the loss 
of traditional Aristotelian moral language, values and virtues. 
For MacIntyre, modem moral utterance and practice can be understood only as 
a series of fragmented survivals from an older past. The insoluble problems they have 
generated will remain so until this is well understood. 
5 Regarding the breakdown of 
moral language and clear meanings, MacIntyre states 
What we possess... are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts 
which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. 
We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of 
1 See chapter 1. 
2 See chapter 2. 
3 See chapter 3. 
4 MacIntyre, AV and WJWR. See also MacIntyre, Alasdair. Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 
5 MacIntyre, A Y, 110- 11 - 
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the key expressions. But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost 
our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. 6 
Maclntyre further argues 
In this conceptual milange ... What is lacking ... is any clear consensus, 
either as to the place of virtue concepts relative to other moral 
concepts, or as to which dispositions are to be included within the 
catalogue of the virtues or the requirements imposed by particular 
virtues. 7 
MacIntyre argues modem morality has broken down, especially regarding the virtues, 
and implies this results in a pluralistic society. 
For MacIntyre, the result of this pluralism and interminable state of modem 
morality is that an emotivism offers an account of all value judgments. Emotivism 
propounds that all moral judgments are nothing but expression of preference, attitude 
or feeling. People use moral judgments not only to express their own feelings and 
attitudes, but to produce the same effect in others. 8 MacIntyre argues against 
emotivism, 9 but notes even if it is a faulty account of the meaning of moral utterances, 
analytical philosophy cannot provide a convincing escape from emotivism as a theory 
of use. 10 
In response to the moral condition of our modem culture, MacIntyre offers 
two theoretical alternatives for anyone trying to analyse it, Aristotle or Nietzsche. " 
In the opposition between the Aristotelian tradition and liberal individualism, we lack 
any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist position. 
MacIntyre also argues the Aristotelian tradition can be restated so that it restores 
6 Ibid., 2. MacIntyre claims that philosophical analysis will not help in achieving the necessary shift in 
viewpoint which enables us to see our incapacity to use moral language, be guided by moral reasoning 
and define our interactions with others in moral terms. 
7 Ibid., 226. 
8 Ibid., 11-12. 
9 Ibid., 12-22. 
10 Ibid., 21. 
11 Ibid., I 10. 
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intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments. 12 For 
MacIntyre, 
If a pre-modem view of morals and politics is to be vindicated against 
modernity, it will be in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all. 13 
The breakdown of Aristotelian values, contributes to the fragmented state of modem 
morality. 
14 
Another flaw in modem morality is its focus on human rights, according to 
MacIntyre. He identifies "rights" as 
... those rights which are alleged to 
belong to human beings as such 
and which are cited as a reason for holding that people ought not to be 
interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. 15 
He does not mean those rights conferred on specific classes of people by positive law . 
or custom. 
16 He argues against human rights, particularly Alan Gewirth's portrayal, 
stating 
It is first of all clear that the claim that I have a right to do or have 
something is a quite different type of claim from the claim that I need 
or want or will be benefited by something. From the first ... it follows 
that others ought not to interfere with my attempts to do or have 
whatever it is, whether it is for my own good or not. From the second 
it does not. And it makes no difference what kind of good or benefit is 
at issue. 17 
Rights, unlike claims to goods, presuppose social rules which only exist in a particular 
historical time and circumstances. MacIntyre argues, "they are in no way universal 
features of the human condition. "18 In one of his strongest statements against human 
12 Ibid., 259. 
13 Ibid., 118. 
14 Ibid., I 10- 11,118. The importance of the Aristotelian tradition is because MacIntyre claims a great 
part of modem morality is intelligible only as a set of 
fragmented survivals from that tradition, and the 
rejection of the Aristotelian tradition was a rejection of a 
distinctive kind of morality where rules, 
predominant in modem conceptions of morality, are placed 
in a larger scheme in which the virtues are 
central (257). 
13 Ibid., 68-9. 
16 Ibid., 68. 
17 Ibid., 66-7. See Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
For a further analysis of MacIntyre's dialogue with Gewirth see pp. 176-8. 
'a Ibid., 67. 
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or natural rights, MacIntyre states there are no such rights, 19 they are "fictions"20 and 
"belief in them is one with belief in witches and in uniCOMS". 
21 He claims the best 
reason for arguing there are no such rights is that every attempt to give good reasons 
for believing in them has failed. 22 In discussing and arguing against rights Macintyre 
distinguishes between them and need, want or benefit. 23 
In exploring the background and context for modem morality, MacIntyre 
opposes liberal individualism and human rights, supports Aristotelian values and 
investigates other moral traditions. 
Historical Roots and Traditions 
For MacIntyre, a tradition is an argument extended through time in which 
fundamental agreements are defined and redefined regarding external and internal 
debates which express the meaning and rationale of these agreements. Traditions can 
be destroyed, fragmented, or connected. 24 
MacIntyre claims a person is largely what he/she inherits from his/her 
tradition and history. 25 What sustains versus destroys traditions is primarily the 
exercise or lack of exercise of the relevant virtues, i. e. justice, truthfulness, courage 
and the intellectual virtues. 
26 A living tradition is an historically extended, socially 
embodied argument, which is partly about the goods which constitute it. 27 Thus, the 
" Ibid., 69. 
20 Ibid., 70. 
21 Ibid., 69. MacIntyre's opposition to human rights may be paralleled to the opposition to rights found 
within the ethics of care. Cf. Gilligan and Noddings, chapter I and p. 42. 
22 Ibid., 69. 
23 See pp. 196-8. 
2A MacIntyre, WJWR, 12. 
25 MacIntyre, AV, 221. History is such that the tradition through which a practice is transmitted and 
reshaped never exists in isolation from larger social traditions (222). 
26 Ibid., 221-3. MacIntyre claims that to acknowledge this situation is to recognise an additional virtue, 
that of having an adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one. 
27 Ibid., 222. 
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individual's search for good or goods is "generally and characteristically" defined by 
those traditions of which his/her life is a part. 28 
MacIntyre also investigates specific traditions. He argues that Aristotle is the 
protagonist against which he places liberal modernity. Aristotle's account of the 
virtues has a central place in MacIntyre's theory. 29 For Aristotle, the city-state, or 
polis, is the unique political form in which the virtues of human life can be genuinely 
and fully exhibited. 30 MacIntyre notes a specific context for exercising the virtues. 31 
MacIntyre claims Thomas Aquinas extends and disagrees with Aristotle. 32 
For Aquinas, the precepts of natural law are the expression of divine law as 
apprehended by human reason. 
33 This single most important experience of human 
beings in relation to divine law is disobedience to it, which can be remedied only by 
grace. 34 
Regarding natural law, Marcus Tullius Cicero claims "true law is right reason 
in agreement with nature". 35 He discusses the connection between natural law and 
morality in relation to "decorum", or fit. 
36 Cicero describes "decorua' as modesty, 
self-control, reasonableness, the calming of the passions and observations of the 
21 ibid., 222. This is true of goods internal to practices and those of a single life. 
29 Ibid., 146. 
30 Ibid., 148. 
31 See p. 149. This context may be paralleled to MacIntyre's notion of community. 
32 MacIntyre, WJWR, chapter 11,191-2,205. Especially in relation to the defects of Aristotle's views 
on the teleology of human life. 
33 Ibid., 18 1. Cf. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 23. 
Regarding natural law, Finnis argues there is a set of practical principles which indicate the basic forms 
of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realised, and which are used by everyone who 
considers what to do. There is a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness 
which distinguishes between acts that are reasonable and unreasonable, morally rights or wrong. 
34 Ibid., 180-1. For Aquinas, the crucial elements for human life are the primary precepts of natural 
law. These include synderesis, indelible consciousness that survives in all human beings, and 
conscientia, consciousness of good and evil which can be extinguished (184-6). MacIntyre 
acknowledges his interpretation of Aquinas differs from other commentators (187-8). For discussion 
of these terms, see pp. 154-5. 
35 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Re Publica, trans. C. W. Keyes, Loeb Library Classical Ed., (London: 
Heinemann, 1928), 211. 
3' Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Moral Obligation, trans. John Higginbotham, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1967), section III. 
146 
happy mean. 37 So natural law may be one basis for morality and incorporate some 
notion of decorum, what is fitting. 38 
MacIntyre investigates histories and traditions and their relation to persons. 
Humanity 
As any theorist, MacIntyre has a perspective of humanity and how persons are 
situated in the context of history and society. His perspective emphasises narrative 
unity and community. 
Narrative Unity 
Regarding the narrative unity of a human life, MacIntyre's central thesis is 
that man, in his actions, practice and fictions, is essentially a story-telling animal, and 
becomes, through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. 39 In understanding 
what someone else is doing we place an episode in the context of narrative histories, 
those of the individuals concerned and their settings. 40 MacIntyre defines setting in a 
relatively exclusive way, as an institution, practice or other milieu. It is crucial that 
setting has a history within which the histories of individual agents have to be 
situated. Without the setting and its changes the history of the agent and his changes 
will be unintelligible. 41 Because we live out and understand our lives in terms of 
narratives the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of 
37 Ibid., 72. 
38 Cf. H. Richard Niebuhr, 'The Meaning of Responsibility, " in On Being Responsible, eds. James M. 
Gustafson and James T. Laney, (London: SCM Press, 1969), p. 3 1. Niebuhr argues a fitting action 
alone is conducive to the good and right. See pp. 237-45. 39 Macintyre, AV, 215-16. Unpredictability is crucial to and required by the narrative structure of 
human life. 
40 Ibid., 211. 
41 Ibid., 206. MacIntyre claims we render the actions of others intelligible within a set of narrative 
histories because action has a basically historical character. Furthermore, to identify an occurrence as 
an action is to identify it under a type of description which enables us to see it as flowing intelligibly 
from an agent's intentions, motives, passions and purposes (209). 
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others. 42 So, narrative structure and setting provide further context for understanding 
human life and action. 43 
MacIntyre defines the unity of a human life as the unity of a narrative 
embodied in a single life and a narrative quest, where a quest is always an education 
as to the character of that which is sought in self-knowledge. 44 According to 
MacIntyre, "any contemporary attempt to envisage each human life as a whole", 45 as 
a unity, will encounter social and philosophical obstacles. The unity of a human life 
becomes invisible when a sharp separation is made between the individual and the 
roles he/she plays or between "different role ... enactments's . 
46 
MacIntyre's view of persons stresses narrative unity, setting and roles. 47 
Self and Personhood 
MacIntyre elaborates on his narrative concept of selfhood, stressing a person is 
the subject of a history that is his own and has its own peculiar meaning. "s MacIntyre 
argues accountability is a key to understanding intelligibility and human action, as a 
person can be asked for an intelligible account of his/her action, past or present, at any 
point. 49 MacIntyre states 
... I am not arguing that the concepts of narrative or of 
intelligibility or 
of accountability are more fundamental than that of personal 
identity .... The relationship 
is one of mutual presupposition. It does 
42 Ibid., 211-2. 
43 For further discussion of setting see pp. 204-5. 
44 Ibid., 218-19. Maclntyre claims without some partly determinate conception of the final telos, there 
could be no beginning to a quest. His view is based on a medieval concept of a quest. He also argues 
the virtues are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practice and enable us 
to achieve the goods internal to practices, but will sustain in us the relevant kind of quest for the good. 
'Mey will do this by enabling us to overcome the obstacles, i. e. harms, dangers temptations and 
distractions, we encounter and which will give us increasing self-knowledge and knowledge of the 
pod. 
45 Ibid., 204. 
46 Ibid., 204. If this happens an individual human life appears as nothing but a series of unconnected 
isodes. we 
See pp. 215-17. 
41 Macintyre, AV. 217. 
49 Ibid., 209,217-18. For MacIntyre, the narrative of one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives. 
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follow of course that all attempts to elucidate the notion of personal 
identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, 
intelligibility and accountability are bound to fail. 50 
So, the relationship between personal history, identity, intelligibility and 
51 
accountability is important to MacIntyre. 
If people are accountable, there must be a specific context within which it 
applies. For persons this context is community. 
Communi! y 
In exploring the notion of community, MacIntyre is strongly Aristotelian. 52 
For Aristotle, the polis is a political community which has a common project, " is the 
54 55 
context for the pursuit of goods for humans andthevirtues, particularly justice and 
practical rationality. 56 The virtues are tied to and can be fully exhibited in this 
57 
political community alone, for Aristotle. A citizen of the polis is required to obey 
and respect the law and recognise the importance of desert. 
58 
MacIntyre claims there is a crucial difference in the way liberal individualist 
modernity and his traditional view the relationship between political community and 
moral character. For the former, 
a community is simply an arena in which individuals each pursue iýeir 
own self-chosen conception of the good life, and political 
50 Ibid., 218. 
51 See pp. 222-3. 
52 Cf. Philip Conford, ed., The Personal World. John MacMurray on Self and Society, (Edinburgh: 
Floris Books, 1996), 7 1. MacMurray states that people become persons within the context of 
community. See also pp. 217-23. 
5' MacIntyre, AV, 156. 
54 MacIntyre, WJWR, 107-8. 
55 Ibid., 103. See also AV, 147-8. 
56 Ibid., p. 103,121-2. 
5' MacIntyre, AV, 148. MacIntyre notes two types of failure in community. The failure to be good 
enough, which entails a lack of virtues, or doing positive wrong. These failures are intimately linked as 
both injure the community, its pursuit of the common good and potentially limit its shared project (151- 
2). 
" MacIntyre, WJWR, 103-4. Maclntyre acknowledges Aristotle's account of the polis is potentially 
problematic given it is hierarchical, but claims that the best kind of polis is one of teaching and 
learning, not of domination (105-6). 
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institutions exist to provide that degree of order which makes such 
self-determined activity possible. 59 
For MacIntyre, learning to be virtuous and exercising the virtues always happen 
within a community. 60 
MacIntyre notes the importance of a common project and desert in 




MacIntyre emphasises practical reasoning, rational inquiry and an Aristotelian 
notion of practical syllogism. 
Practical Rationality and Reasoning 
For MacIntyre, in general, each philosophy of practical rationality must be 
understood as a whole and in terms of its historical context of tradition, social order 
and confliCt. 
62 For MacIntyre, practical rationality is one crucial virtue, 63 and he 
claims "Aristotle's account of practical reasoning is in essentials surely right.,, 64 This 
practical reasoning contains the wants and goals of the agent, an assertion about what 
is good to seek and achieve, the agent's judgment about it, and the action. 65 
MacIntyre claims an important virtue in practical reasoning is having an adequate 
sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one, which manifests 
59 Ibid., 195. 
60 Ibid., 194-5. MacIntyre specifically criticises the modem individualist views of Rawls and Nozick 
for excluding an account of human community in which desert could provide a basis for judgments 
about virtues and injustice (250). See p. 160. 
61 See pp. 217-23. 
62 MacIntyre, WJWR, 389-90. 
63 Ibid., 3 89. It is intertwined with justice, the other crucial virtue. See pp. 157-60. 
64 MacIntyre, AV, 161. See also WJWR, 145 and chapter 8 where MacIntyre states the truth of 
Aristotle's central thesis has been confirmed. 
65 Ibid., 161-2. 
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itself in the capacity for judgment which the agent possesses in knowing how to 
choose from the relevant maxims and apply them in particular situations. 66 
In contrast, Hume states, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. , 67 
Hume, like Aristotle, thinks practical reasoning always will be a performance on a 
particular occasion. 68 The person who aspires to success in satisfying the passions 
will have to include reasoning about his/her means, ends and passions, and how they 
relate to each other and to actions, according to MacIntyre. 69 
MacIntyre addresses the problem of conflicting approaches to rationality. 70 
When disagreements between views are sufficiently fundamental, as with practical 
rationality and justice, they will extend to decisions about resolving them. 71 
MacIntyre also addresses whether neutral rationality is possible. One problem with a 
view of rationality which requires divesting oneself from any theory or social 
relationships, 72 is people disagree about the concept of justice which is rationally 
acceptable. MacIntyre argues neutral rationality is faulty and not possible. 73 
Rationality not only involves a practical element in applying relevant rules to 
situations, but also a level of rational inquiry. 
"" Ibid., 223. This capacity is linked to the virtue of wisdom. See p. 163. 
6' MacIntyre, WJWR, 304. See David Hume, A Treatise OfHunwn Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 
(oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), IL iii, 3. For Hume, the role of practical reasoning is to answer 
questions which the passions provoke regarding the existence and nature of things which the passions 
move people to obtain, and the actions and characteristics people want to do or be. Reason also may 
prescribe the means for the achievement of such ends and judges those means as more or less efficient. 
8 Ibid., 304. 
69 Ibid., 305-6. He argues Hume and Aristotle differ in their views of the relationship of reason to the 
passions, the nature of the standards for correcting the passions, and the structure of practical 
reasoning. One similarity is that both present an account of practical rationality in which the individual 
who reasons rightly does so qua member of a political society, not just qua individual human being 
(321). 
70 Ibid., chapters I and 20. 
71 Ibid., 4. 
n Ibid., 3. 
73 Ibid., 3-4. 
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Rational Inquiry 
MacIntyre argues that the concept of rational inquiry is inseparable from the 
intellectual and social tradition in which it is embodied. He emphasises four points to 
avoid misunderstanding it. First, the concept of rational justification is essentially 
historical. 74 Second, doctrines, theses and arguments have to be understood in their 
historical context, but this does not mean that claims to timeless truths are not being 
made. 75 Third, once the diversity of traditions has been properly characterised, a 
better explanation of this diversity is given than the Enlightenment provides. 76 
Finally, it is crucial that the concept of tradition-constituted and constitutive rational 
enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications. 77 So, rational inquiry 
involves a historical context, truths, diversity of traditions as well as specific accounts 
of rationality. 
practical Syllogism 
MacIntyre explores one specific form of rationality, namely practical 
Syllogism. 78 It involves a Major Premise, where the agent declares what good is at 
stake in his acting, or not acting, as he should. A Minor Premise is where the agent 
' Ibid., 8. 
75 Ibid., 9. He claims given the diversity of traditions of enquiry with histories, there will be 
rationalities not rationality. 
76 Ibid., 9-10. MacIntyre claims the acknowledgement of the diversity of traditions of enquiry does not 
mean the differences between rival and incompatible traditions cannot be resolved rationally. From the 
standpoint of traditions of enquiry, the problem of diversity is not abolished, but transformed to render 
it amenable to solution. Yet, Maclntyre's optimism may be dubious, particularly as he does not explain 
how such a transformation occurs. 77 Ibid., 10. 
78 Ibid., 129. In discussing Aristotle's notion of practical rationality, MacIntyre notes that Aristotle 
never used the term, but commentators do use it to describe the form of deductive reasoning which 
immediately precedes and generates action. 
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declares the situation in which action is required, given this good is at stake. The 
conclusion which follows from these premises is the required action . 
79 
For MacIntyre, every practical syllogism is a performance by a particular 
person on a particular occasion. So, its soundness depends on the occasion and who 
utters it. 80 The good will provide the agent's action with a telos (end or purpose), and 
will be the immediate arche (beginning), ultimate first principle and concepts, of his 
. 
81 1 next performed action When premises have been affirmed, they must afford 
sufficient reasons for the immediate performance of the action, if they are true, the 
inference valid and the agent fully rational. There is no logical room for something 
else to intervene, i. e. a decision. 82 If nothing hinders the conclusion, yet the agent 
does not act immediately, then he must not be fully rational. For something 
contingent and accidental from the standpoint of rationality must have intervened, 
according to MacIntyre. 83 
MacIntyre continues the discussion by comparing this description of the 
rational agent with modem thought, claiming the former is at odds with the latter. For 
him, in modemity no set of practical reasons, however compelling, need be treated as 
conclusive. 84 
79 Ibid., 129. MacIntyre cites Aristotle in De Anima 343a 16-21. De Motu Aninwlium 701 a 7-25, 
Nichomachean Ethics 1146b 35-1147a7 and 1147a 25-3 1. 
go Ibid., 129. MacIntyre cites Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics 11 12a 18-1113b 14. 
81 Ibid., 131-2. 
82 CL For Socrates to know what is good and right is to do it. 
93 MacIntyre, WJWR, 139-40. MacIntyre does not seem to recognise that the weakness of the will, 
akrasia, may contribute to an agent failing to act. Also, he assumes ceteris paribus, but other things 
may not be equal. 
84 Ibid., 140. MacIntyre claims that the difference between an Aristotelian and modem view of conflict 
resolution and practical reasoning is most apparent in reference to interpretations of tragedy. In the 
modern view, it can be held that the agent should do something, because one good requires it, and 
simultaneously should refrain from doing it, because another good requires such restraint. The key for 
MacIntyre is if both these statements can be true, then the concept of truth has been transformed. It is 
not the truth as transmitted in valid deductive arguments. For this reason, from the Aristotelian view, 
the apparent existence of a tragic dilemma always must rest on one or more misconceptions or 
misunderstandings. For "the apparent and tragic conflict of right with right arises from the 
inadequacies of reason, not from the character of moral reality" (140-2). 
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A practical syllogism involves rational assessment of the agent's good, the 
specific situation or context, and an end or action. 
Action 
The nature of action entails causes and motivations and what constitutes 
rational, good and just actions. 
Causes and Motivationsfor Action 
MacIntyre briefly states a cause is always something that makes a difference 
in an outcome. Reasons for action, good or bad, are causes when they are effective in 
guiding action-85 Causes, as well as motivations, help explain actions. MacIntyre 
discusses Aquinas' perspective on motivations, which involves intentio, conscientia 
and synderesis. Intentio is when the intellect first judges some end good and an act of 
will toward the end is elicited. It may be directed at the immediate end or be a means 
to a further end. 86 Synderesis is the natural disposition exhibited in our most basic 
apprehension of those precepts which we do not comprehend as a result of enquiry if 
only because a knowledge of their truth is already presupposed in all practical 
activity. 87 Conscientia is the name applied to the following capacities, for Aquinas. 
88 
The application of fundamental principles to a particular situation 
requires an additional set of capacities, both that involved in deducing 
from the universal and general fundamental principles more specific 
Ibid., 24. In judging actions good or bad, MacIntyre relies on Aquinas' four criteria. A person must 
judge an activity good with respect to the kind of activity it is. An activity is morally good insofar as a 
person only uses resources which are his/her own to use, no harmful consequences ensue per accidens, 
and its cause is the relevant kind of goodness in the individual carrying out the activity. Aquinas 
specifies for an action to be judged good it must be so in all 
four ways, but to be bad it need be 
defective in only one way (194-5). MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa Theologiae la-IIae, 18,4. Yet, 
MacIntyre does not seem to recognise the difficulty with predicting and/or controlling the 
consequences of an action in this discussion. 
86 MacIntyre, WJWR, 190. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa 7heologiae Ia-Ilae, 12,1-4. 
87 Ibid., 184-5. Macintyre cites Aquinas in Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate 16,15. 
88 Ibid., 185. MacIntyre notes conscientia can be in error, while synderesis is infallible. 
154 
principles, with more immediate application to specific types of 
situation, and that involved in deriving from both of these principles 
the particular practical judgments about what is to be done here and 
now or in some particular circumstances which may some day be ... 
89 
MacIntyre notes the importance of general principles being applied to specific 
situations and contexts through a person's judgment. 90 
Regarding motivation, MacIntyre discusses views of the will. Hume closely 
connects the will to passions. 91 The exertion of the will is an effect of that pain or 
pleasure which immediately gives rise to the direct passions, and it is that which 
immediately precedes an action. 92 For Augustine the human will, not the intellect, is 
the ultimate determinant of human action . 
93 The will is anterior to reason. 94 in 
contrast, for Aquinas the will is always moved to action by intellect not necessity. 95 it 
is always free and open to alternative contingent judgment. The focus of the will is 
prohairesis, or choice, meaning that which comes from deliberation and expresses the 
agent's conclusion as to what it is good for him/her to do as an immediate means to 
the ends being considered. 96 Furthermore, the will must consent to the means judged 
appropriate by the intellect through deliberation. 97 
The role of judgment, the passions, intellect, will and reason have been 
examined as causes and motivations for action. Rationality and justice also impact 
human action. 
89 Ibid., 185. 
91 See pp. 237-45. 
91 MacIntyrc, WJWR, 300-1. Hume recognises conflict between calm and violent passions. See Hume, 
Treatise on Human Nature, II, iii, 3. 
92 Ibid., 300. MacIntyre cites Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, I, i, 4. 
93 Ibid., 156-7. MacIntyre notes Augustine affirms both the necessity of grace for the redirection of the 
will and the necessity of the will's freely assenting to the divine grace. For Augustine, the fundamental 
virtue, humility, is a virtue of the will and its returning to freedom, just as the fundamental human vice, 
p! ide, is the will in its self-enslaved condition. 
" Ibid., 156. 
95 Ibid., 190. 
96 Ibid., 189. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Commentary on Ethics VI, lecture 2. 
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Rational and Just Action 
In discussing the nature of and criteria for rational and just actions, MacIntyre 
relies on Aristotle's account, which emphasises their role in the good life for humans. 
MacIntyre claims for Aristotle the three criteria needed for a practically 
rational action are: a person must be moved by a belief about what it is best for him 
to achieve here and now; this belief must be rationally well-grounded and supported 
by good reasons; and the individual needs some conception of what is good for 
him/her. 98 So, some form of justification is required for actions to be deemed 
rational. 
MacIntyre also addresses just actions. For Aristotle, just acts are among those 
the virtuous want to perform for their own sake and the part these acts play in 
"constituting and effecting the good life for humans beings. "99 MacIntyre argues 
being just is taken to be a condition of achieving any good and it requires caring about 
and valuing beingjust, even when it leads to no further good. " As some actions by 
nature are unjust to perform, an action should be performed because it is just, 
inherently good and not simply one preference of a virtuous person. 101 
Actions require rational justification and should be inherently just. These 
actions contribute to the good for humans. MacIntyre's view of rationality is closely 
linked to the virtue of justice. 
97 Ibid., 189-91. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa Theologiae Ia-Hae, 15,1. 
98 Ibid., 125. From this conception of the good a person is then able to reason about what is best to 
achieve in the particular situation for Aristotle. See Metaphysics, 2,1029b5-7 and Nichomachean 
Ethics, 1129b4-6. 
" Ibid., 112-13. The reasons Aristotle gives for error in action are immaturity or lack of education. 
These errors cause people to exhibit intellectual limitations in reasoning about what to do. Another 
type of person fails because his passions are not yet under his rational control or because his knowledge 
of what is good is not brought to bear on them. This person is incontinent, or akratic, while the 
continent person is enkratic. See MacIntyre, WJWR, 127-8 and Nichomachean Ethics, 1093a2-10, 
1095b 4-6,1179b 23-9,1179b 26-7,1146b3l-1147a 24. 
100 Ibid., 112-13. 
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Justice 
Examining MacIntyre's perspective of justice involves definitions and 
different historical perspectives, primarily Aristotelian which focuses on desert. 
Historical Perspectives 
MacIntyre states justice requires that we treat people based on merit or desert 
according to impersonal, uniform standards. To depart from these standards in a 
specific instance is to define our relationship with a particular individual as special or 
distinctive. 102 MacIntyre aligns himself closely with Aristotle in basing justice on 
desert, 103 giving it a key position among the virtues, 104 and necessarily linking it to 
practical reasoning. 
105 
For MacIntyre, part of the background of the concept of justice is that we 
inherit from the conflicts of the social and cultural order of the Athenian polis a 
number of mutually incompatible and antagonistic traditions regarding justice. The 
Homeric term dike has been translated as "justice" and to be dikaios was to act in 
accordance with the single fundamental order of the universe. 
106 MaCIntyre 
'01 Ibid., 113. MacIntyre notes for Aristotle people become just by first performing just acts. 
10'MacIntyre, AV, 192. 
11 MacIntyre, WJWR, 104. See Nichomachean Ethics 113 1a 24-9. 
104 Ibid., 106. Cf. Aquinas who agrees with Aristotle that every virtue is exercised in conformity to a 
mean, but does not agree thatjustice is virtue midway between two vices. Justice can be opposed by 
giving someone either more or less than what is his/her due, and herein the standard of the mean can be 
discerned. Injustice is a single-minded vice, namely being deliberately disposed to oppose what justice 
requires (204). See also Summa Theologide Ila-Ilae, 64,2 and IIa-IIae, 59. 
105 Ibid., 103,389. MacIntyre states each conception of justice requires a conception of practical 
rationality as its counterpart, and vice versa. For Aristotle, justice in its fullest proper sense is 
exercised between and governs only the relationships of free and equal citizens within a polis (169). 
106 Ibid., 13-15. MacIntyre notes this Homeric view of the universe involved an order of both nature 
and society, so the modern distinction between natural and social cannot be expressed in it. Agathos 
was to do well what one's role requires, or "good", while arete, the corresponding noun, came to mean 
"excellence" or "virtue". 
Cf. Aristotle who refers to dikaiosune, in general, as everything which the law requires for the 
exercise of all the virtues by each citizen. In specific, it is the virtue of justice. Aristotle propounds 
that each virtue has two corresponding vices. For dikaiosune they are acting to aggrandise oneself, 
whether deserved or not, and acting so as to suffer injustice voluntarily and undergoing undeserved 
harm or less than one's deserved good (103,111). See Nichomachean Ethics II 29b 9. 
157 
emphasises that dike and practical reasoning are related conceptually. 107 Furthennore, 
justice names a virtue, as good practical reasoning requires virtues in those who 
exhibit it. 
108 
Maclntyre contrasts Homeric notions of justice with injustice. Justice as 
fairness involves an equality of tasks and standards in evaluating rival competitors 
within fair competition. Injustice, or unfairness, not only impedes the making of true 
evaluative judgments, but may furnish a means where the less excellent can defeat the 
more excellent on occasion. 109 
After initially exploring MacIntyre's definition of justice, involving desert, 
merit and fairness, historical perspectives raises the necessity of comparing different 
theories of justice. 
Different Theories of Justice 
MacIntyre discusses rival theories of justice, and further examination of them 
includes their definitions, different types of justice, and the connection between 
justice and the virtues. 
MacIntyre argues that underlying the wide diversity of judgments regarding 
what justice requires and permits are a set of conflicting conceptions about justice. ' 10 
These include the theories of Aristotle, "' Aquinas, ' 12 Augustine"' and Hume, 114 
107 Ibid., 23. Neither are understood adequately apart from the larger conceptual scheme from which it 
draws its distinctive character. 
i's Ibid., 23. 
109 Ibid., 28. MacIntyre draws on the Homeric distinction between excellence and winning regarding 
justice and injustice. CE Augustine who believed the full intellectual apprehension of the timeless 
form of justice, which is the measure of right action, was not sufficient by itself to generate right 
action. We need to direct our love toward justice which perfectly embodies that form of justice and its 
actions. This is achievable only when our love is directed toward the life of Jesus Christ (154). 
"0 MacIntyre, WJWR, I- 
111 Ibid., chapter 7. See also MacIntyre, AV chapters 9 and 12. 
112 Ibid., chapter 11. 
113 Ibid., chapter 9. See especially pp. 152-5. 
114 Ibid., chapter 16. See especially pp. 306-10. 
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covering ideas of justice ranging from the central concept of desert' 15 to inalienable 
human rights, ' 16 the social contract' 17 and standards Of Utility. 118 These rival theories 
raise disagreements about the relationship of justice to other human goods, the kind of 
equality justice requires, a range of transactions and persons to which considerations 
of justice are relevant, and whether a knowledge of justice is possible without a 
knowledge of God's law. 119 Sojustice involves human goods, equality, persons and 
situations. 
In deciding between these rival and incompatible accounts of justice, 
MacIntyre suggests we may accept the standards of justice guided by those of 
rationality. For in learning what rationality requires of us in practice, we discern and 
know what justice is. 120 MacIntyre notes Aristotle's distinction between corrective 
and distributive justice, 
121 the latter entailing the application of a principle of desert to 
situations. 122 
Regarding desert, MacIntyre notes Aquinas defines ius, orjustice, as what is 
rightly owed to another in accordance with the natural or positive law. 123 JUStitia 
names both the virtue of living by the norms which define the relationships of each 
person to others, exhibiting in one's disposition a constant will to render to each what 
is due him, and the standard of right required of each and owed to every human 
Ibid., chapter 7. See especially pp. 104-7. 
MacIntyre, AV, 247-8. 
117 Ibid., 246-52, especially 25 1. Cf. Rawls' social contract theory of justice in TJ chapter 3. 
118 Ibid., 251-2. 
1" MacIntyre, WJWR, L See also chapter 11, especially p. 198. 
120 Ibid., 2. He notes this may be difficult as debates about the nature of rationality are as manifold and 
intractable as those about justice. 
121 Macintyre WJWR, 103-4. 
122 Ibid., 106-7. For Aristotle, justice is valued for its own sake and for that of the telos, because it 
enables us to avoid those vicious states of character incompatible with that kind of life which is best for 
humans to live. It enables us to act according to a mean, or middle state between two extremes of vice 
(I 11). See Nichomachean Ethics 1006b 36-1107a 3. 
123 Ibid., 199. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa Theologide IIa-IIae, 67-7 1. 
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being. 124 For Aquinas, distributive justice is satisfied when each person receives in 
proportion to his/her contribution, or receives his/her due. 125 
MacIntyre critiques Rawls and Nozick for the absence of the notion of desert 
in their theories of justice. 126 Nozick supports entitlement, where principles of just 
acquisition and entitlement set limits to redistributive possibilities, 127 and Rawls 
propounds just distribution, where principles set limits to legitimate acquisition and 
entitlement. For Nozick, justice is based on what a given person is entitled to in 
relation to what he has justly acquired and earned either through original acquisition 
orjust acts of transfer. For Rawls, justice focuses on the equality of the claims of 
each person in respect of basic needs and the means to meet them. Because neither 
principle is socially or politically neutral, and since their underlying frameworks and 
approaches are vastly different, rationally settling disputes may be difficult, according 
to MacIntyre. 128 
In describing justice, MacIntyre focuses on desert, recognises fairness and 
equality may have a role, notes corrective and distributive forms, and connects it to 
practical reasoning. For him, justice is a key virtue. 
Virtues 
Investigation of MacIntyre's view of the virtues includes their nature, 
definitions and descriptions, relation to practice and rules, and alternative 
conceptions. 
124 Ibid., 198-9. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa Theologiae IIa-Ilae 57-8. CE Hume who centres 
the problem of justice around the rules of property and their enforcement. He states a regard for justice 
is not among the natural sentiments of humanity but arises from artifice and human convention. See 
Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, III, ii, 2 and 5. 
125 Ibid., 199. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa Theologiae Ra-IIae, 61-6. For Aquinas justice also 
requires no wrong be committed 
126 MacIntyre, AV, 246-52. See also chapter 3. 
127 It could be argued that Nozick's view of justice as entitlement is based on desert. 
128 Ibid., 245-6. 
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Nature of the Virtues 
For MacIntyre the search for a core conception of the virtues is crucial, but he 
claims there are a number of rival theories. 129 For example 
Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament and Medieval 
thinkers differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us 
different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different 
rank order of importance to different virtues; and they have different 
and incompatible theories of the virtues .... It would be all too easy to 
conclude that there are a number of rival and alternative conceptions of 
the virtues, but, even within the tradition which I have been 
delineating, no single core conception. 130 
MacIntyre argues without the necessary basis for agreement about justice and political 
community there is an inability to agree upon a catalogue of the virtues, their relative 
importance, as well as the content and characters of particular virtues. 131 
In spite of his claim that no core conception of the virtues may be evident, 
MacIntyre notes each of the five moral accounts makes a claim for universal 
allegiance. 132 Furthermore, MacIntyre argues a core conception of the virtues can be 
129 Maclntyre, AV, 18 1. For Aquinas the four cardinal virtues are prudence, justice, temperateness and 
courage. See MacIntyre, WJWR, 197 and Aquinas 
in Summa Theologiae la-ile, 61,2. 
110 Ibid., 18 1. He also offers three different historical concepts of virtue from five thinkers. The 
Homeric idea of virtue is a quality which enables an individual to fulfil his social role. For Aristotle, 
Aquinas and New Testament thinkers a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards 
the achievement of the specifically human telos, whether natural or supernatural. While for Benjamin 
Franklin a virtue is a quality which has utility in achieving earthly and heavenly success (184-5). 
Maclntyre provides only a passing reference to why he uses Franklin, as he disappears from the 
discussion rapidly. Perhaps it is because of Franklin's moral theory, with its emphasis on the 
64mundane virtues". See Ralph Ketcham, "Benjamin Franklin, " in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards, (London and 
New York: Macmillan), 220-1. 
131 Ibid., 244. 
132 Ibid., 186. MacIntyre's reference to "five moral accounts" here may mean those of Homer, 
Aristotle, the New Testament thinkers, Aquinas, and Franklin as he refers to them on the previous page 
of his discussion. Yet, in the beginning of the chapter 
he cites Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, New 
Testament and Medieval Thinkers. So his reference to the accounts which claim universal allegiance 
may be unclear. 
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discovered. A key feature is it always requires, in its definition and explanation, the 
acceptance of some prior account of features of social and moral life. 133 
In describing his core view of virtue, MacIntyre initially claims 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving 
any such goods. 134 
He later states 
For since a virtue is now generally understood as a disposition or 
sentiment which will produce in us obedience to certain rules, 
agreement on what the relevant rules are to be is always a 
prerequisite for agreement upon the nature and content of a 
particular virtue. 135 
Furthermore, MacIntyre argues there are three stages in the development of the 
concept of virtue, including an account of a "practice", the narrative order of a human 
life, and what constitutes a moral tradition. 136 
Regarding the first stage, MacIntyre suggests the Aristotelian notion of 
practice provides grounds for the virtues to be exhibited, their primary definitions 
received, and is crucial to identifying a core concept of the virtues. 137 By "practice" 
MacIntyre means 
... any coherent and complex form of socially established co- 
operative human activity through which goods internal to that form 
of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended. 138 
"' Ibid., 186. For example, in the Homeric tradition the concept of virtue is secondary to a social role, 
for Aristotle it is secondary to the good life for man, conceived as the telos of human action, and for 
Benjamin Franklin virtue is secondary to utility, according to MacIntyre. 
134 Ibid., 19 1. CE notions of vice which MacIntyre discusses (154,204-5). 
135 MacIntyre, AV, 244. He claims this prior agreement in rules is something which modem 
individualist culture is unable to secure. 
136 Ibid., 186-7. MacIntyre claims each stage has its own conceptual background and each later stage 
presupposes the earlier stages, but not vice versa. 
137 Ibid., 187. 
138 Ibid., 187. As examples, MacIntyre states tic-tac-toe and bricklaying are not, while the game of 
chess and architecture are practices. 
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This notion of "practice" is important to Maclntyre's view of a virtue. 139 Since a 
practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those participating in it, the 
virtues are those goods by reference to which we define our relationship to others with 
whom we share the purposes and standards which inform practices. 140 
MacIntyre acknowledges similarities and differences between his and 
Aristotle's core conceptions of virtue. 141 The most notable difference is MacIntyre 
locates the point and function of the virtues in practices. While Aristotle locates their 
point and function in a whole human life which can be termed good. 142 MacIntyre 
argues a human life only informed by the conception of the virtues thus far would be 
defective. First, it would contain too many conflicts and too much arbitrariness. 
Second, without a conception of the telos of a whole human life a conception of 
individual virtues remains incomplete. 143 Third, integrity or constancy is a virtue 
which cannot be recognised at all without reference to the wholeness of a human 
life. 144 
Further examination of different views of the virtues is necessary. 
139 Ibid., 187. 
140 Ibid., 19 1. 
141 Ibid., 197-9. MacIntyre's claims his conception of virtue is Aristotelian in three ways. It requires 
for its completion a cogent elaboration of those distinctions and concepts which Aristotle's account 
requires, namely voluntariness, the distinction between intellectual and character virtues, the 
relationship of both to natural abilities and passions, and the structure of practical reasoning. Second, it 
can accommodate an Aristotelian view of pleasure and enjoyment, whereas it is irreconcilable with any 
utilitarian view. Third it links evaluation and explanation in a characteristically Aristotelian way. 
142 Ibid., 201. Two other differences MacIntyre notes are although his account is teleological, it does 
not require allegiance to Aristotle's metaphysical biology, and just because of the multiplicity of 
human practices and consequently of goods in the pursuit of which the virtues may be exercised 
conflict will not spring only from the flaws in individual character (196-7). 
143 Ibid., 202. 
144 Ibid., 203. 
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Different Views of the Virtues 
MacIntyre states Aristotle's account of the virtues is central to his theory. 145 
For Aristotle, phronesis, exercising judgment in particular cases, is a central and an 
intellectual virtue without which none of the virtues of character can be exercised. "' 
MacIntyre claims in Aristotle's view, excellence of character and intelligence cannot 
be separated, as one cannot possess any of the virtues of character in a developed 
form without possessing all the others. 147 
MacIntyre notes that some activity is not rule-govemed. 148 For Aristotle, 
phronetic activity is not rule-governed, and are no rules for generating this kind of 
practically effective understanding of particulars. 
149 Aquinas also held there are no 
rules for applying rules, as there is uncertainty and variation in moral matters, despite 
their universal aspects. So, judgment regarding individual cases must be left to the 
prudentia, or phronesis, of each person, 
150 as without it judgment and action in 
particular situations are resourceless beyond the bare level of what synderesis 
provides. 151 So, there may be no general rules for applying rules, highlighting the 
need for practical judgment. 
145 MacIntyre, AV, 146. 
146 Ibid., 154. 
147 Ibid., 155. MacIntyre cites Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics 1145a. MacIntyre claims this inter- 
relatedness of the virtues explains why they do not provide a number of distinct criteria to judge an 
individual's goodness, but one complex measure. MacIntyre also acknowledges applying this measure 
in a community whose shared aim is the realisation of the human good presupposes a wide range of 
agreement on goods and virtues, and it is this agreement which makes possible the kind of bond 
between citizens which, for Aristotle, constitute the polis. 
14'MacIntyre, WJWR, 116-7. MacIntyre considers if phronesis were rule-governed in exercising it we 
might have to apply rules to particular cases and follow rules in applying these rules. These second- 
order rules would be applied by the exercise of some non-rule-governed capacity or third-order rules. 
So, either we have an infinite hierarchy of rules or there is some activity which is not rule-governed. 
Since there are compelling reasons to reject the former, MacIntyre accepts the latter. 
149 Ibid., 116. MacIntyre also claims Aristotle insists there are natural and universal as well as 
conventional and local rules of justice (AV, 150). Furthermore, although Aristotle recognises natural 
justice, he claims everything in justice is susceptible to variation, whether natural or conventional. As 
human beings differ in their formulation of rules of justice, there is no universal formulation of any 
such rule, except among the gods (WJWR, 121). See Nichomachean Ethics 1134b 29-30. 
150 Ibid., 195-6. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Commentary on Ethics II, lecture 2. 
151 Ibid., 196. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in Summa Theologiae Ila-Hae, 47,3 and 6. Aquinas notes that 
by prudentia we understand the relevance of the precepts of natural law to particular situations. 
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MacIntyre investigates rival theories of virtue, argues a core concept can be 
found, based on an Aristotelian view including practice, the contribution of virtues to 
a whole human life, and agreement on standards of justice and political community. 152 
For rival theories of virtue, the good is a vital concept. This also is true for 
MacIntyre. 
The Good 
In exploring MacIntyre's discussion of the good, we will address his general 
idea of "the good for man", 153 its relation to human flourishing, types of goods and 
the role of practice. 
The Good and Goods 
MacIntyre argues eudaimonia, 154 is a complete human life lived at its best and 
the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life. 155 MacIntyre argues because this concept is 
intrinsically tied to the virtues, as they are those qualities which enable an individual 
Furthermore, for him, the right kind of rule-following is not possible without education in the moral 
virtues because rule-governed actions are genuinely good only as they are expressions of the virtues, 
and because rule-following itself requires the virtue of prudence (194). See pp. 154-5. 
152 For further discussion of wholeness and community see pp. 215-17,217-23. 
153 MacIntyre, AV, 148-9. 
"4 Ibid., 148. Aristotle's definition of eudaimonia is the state of being well and doing in well in being 
well, and man's being well-favoured in relation to the divine. Aristotle argues against identifying the 
good for man with money, honour or pleasure. See Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, sections 4-5. 
MacIntyre also notes eudaimonia is difficult to translate and can mean blessedness, happiness or 
prosperity. Cf. W. D. Ross notes it is usually translated as happiness, although this is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. See W. D. Ross, introduction to Nichomachean Ethics, by Aristotle, (Oxford and New 
York. Oxford University Press), vi-vii. For Aristotle's main discussions of eudaimonia see books I 
and X. 
155 Ibid., 149. For further discussion of flourishing see Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, 
Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order, (Peru: Open Court, 1991). Gilbert 
Harman, "Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty, " PhilosoRhy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 307-22. 
D. 7. Phillips, Interventions in Ethics, (Albany: Suny Press, 1992). David B. Wong, "On Flourishing 
and Finding One's Identity in Community, " Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988): 324-41. 
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to achieve eudaimonia, we cannot characterise the good for man, in Aristotle's 
framework without referring to the virtues and their exercise. 156 
A key point for MacIntyre is his provisional conclusion that 
... the good 
life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for 
man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will 
enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man 
is. 157 
He is concerned with the transformation of the virtues in conception and practice, and 
its history. 158 
So MacIntyre emphasises the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, its universal 
and particular aspects and role in the good for humans. He also is concerned about 
the role of practice in seeking the good or goods in human life. 
Goods in Practice 
MacIntyre claims a practice involves standards of excellence, obedience to 
rules and the achievement of good. Entering a practice means accepting the authority 
of those standards and the inadequacy of one's own performances as judged by 
them. 159 Practices can flourish within societies with differing codes but not where the 
virtues are not valued. 
160 
MacIntyre describes the relationship between goods and practice. 161 Internal 
goods are practice-specific and concern the good of the whole community 
156 Ibid., 148-9. 
"7 MacIntyre, AV, 219. 
158 Ibid., 228. 
119 Ibid., 190. MacIntyre also claims that in the realm of practices the authority of both goods and 
standards operates to rule out all subjectivist and emotivist analyses of judgment. 
160 Ibid., 193. He does acknowledge the possibility of practices being evil, and the difficulty of relating 
such practices to virtues (199-200). 
161 Ibid., 188-91. He also stresses that a practice is not to be confused with a set of technical skills or 
institutions. For a distinctive element of practice is the way it transforms the goods and ends which the 
technical skills serve, by a regard for its own internal goods. He argues institutions are largely and 
characteristically concerned with external goods, as they use these goods to sustain themselves and the 
practices they bear. Although there is an intimate connection between practices and institutions, the 
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participating in that particular practice. 162 External goods are externally and 
contingently attached to the practice and characteristically objects of competition. 163 
For MacIntyre, community provides the context for evaluative practice. There 
is a difference between the virtues and a morality of laws and one way to elucidate the 
relationship between them is to consider what founding a community to achieve a 
common project and bring about some good involves. Two types of practice are 
needed: i. e. one which values qualities of mind and character, which contribute to the 
realisation of their common good, and another which identifies action which would 
destroy community and impair the good. According to Maclntyre, we need both 
types of practices because a member of such a community could fail in his/her role by 
not being good enough or doing positive wrong. 164 Maclntyre differentiates between 
positive and negative practices and their impact on a community. 165 
MacIntyre recognises the need for standards in practice, achieving the good 
and providing protection from human inadequacies. The community is the context for 
exhibiting goods in practice and it can be benefited or destroyed by types of practice. 
Conclusion 
In examining MacIntyre's theory of justice a number of the themes have been 
noted. These include the importance of tradition, setting and personal history as part 
of context. His view of persons recognises the importance of practical rationality, 
justification and judgments regarding decisions and actions, community, 
former is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the latter. For MacIntyre, the virtues help 
practices resist the corrupting power of institutions (193-4). CL Rawls who highlights the need to 
ensure institutions are just. See pp. 90. 
112 Ibid., 188-9,190-1. 
163 Ibid., 188,190. 
164 Ibid., 151-2. 
165 11is distincdon parallels that of positive and negative dudes and responsibilities. See pp. 223-9. 
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accountability, wholeness, the good and human flourishing. MacIntyre's emphasis on 
the virtues and conflicting approaches to justice, particularly as desert, and rationality 
also were investigated. 
Critigue of Maclntyre 
After exploring MacIntyre's theories it is necessary to engage with a range of 
critiques of his views. The analysis offered is not intended to be comprehensive, but 
to examine MacIntyre on his own terms and highlight areas of import for further 
investigation within the thesis. Critical analysis will be offered on a more general 
level, focusing on crucial weaknesses and ambiguities in MacIntyre's view of history 
and tradition, humanity, justice, the virtues and different philosophies, before 
critiquing his theory from a middle way perspective. 
HistoEy and Tradition 
MacIntyre stresses the importance of histories and being located in a particular 
tradition, and critics have taken issue with his claims about both. In regard to 
MacIntyre's views on history, some general critiques discuss his historicism, 166 
traditionalism, 167 and inaccuracy in representing various philosophers and 
traditions. 168 More specifically, some of these critics have analysed MacIntyre's 
166 J. B. Schncewind, "MacIntyre and the Indispensability of Tradition, " Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 50 (1991): 168. E. J. Bond, "Could there be a Rationally Grounded 
Universal Morality?, " Journal of Philosophical Research 15 (1990): 33. Julia Annas, "MacIntyre on 
Traditions, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 394. 
"' Schneewind, "MacIntyre on the Indispensability of Tradition, " 165-8. Annas, "MacIntyre on 
Traditions, " 388-404. 
169 John Horton and Susan Mcndus, "Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After, " in After MacIntyre: 
Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair MacIntyre, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 14. Thomas Nagel, "Agreeing in Principle, " London Times Literga 
Supplement, 8-14 July 1988,748. 
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treatment of Aristotle, 169Kant, 
170 Hume 171 and AquinaS172 and found it to be deficient 
and inaccurate. 
Critics also comment on MacIntyre's view of persons which underlies his 
tradition and histories. 
Flawed View of Humanit 
For MacIntyre, a central feature of human beings is the narrative unity their 
lives do and should possess. 173 Critiques focus on his claims about it171 and its 
relation to the virtues. 
175 
General critiques highlight the vague content of MacIntyre's view of the 
good 176 and difficulties with his Aristotelian conception of the "good for Man". 177 
Furthermore, critics highlight a crucial weakness in MacIntyre's theory, as his view of 
rules does not provide a means of agreeing common goods or rules and deciding 
between conflicting goods. 178 
169 Bond, "Could there be a Rationally Grounded Universal Morality?, " 36. Nagel, "Agreeing in 
Principle, " 748. Peter Johnson, "Reclaiming the Aristotelian Rule" in After Maclntyre: Critical 
perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair MacIntyre, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus, (Cambridge: 
polity Press, 1994), 55-6. Horton and Mendus, "Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After, " 7. 
170 Ibid., 36. Nagel, "Agreeing in Principle, " 748. 
171 Nagel, "Agreeing in Principle, " 748. Annette Baier, "MacIntyre on Hume, " Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 159-63. 
172 Robert P. George, "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions, " Review of Metaphysics 42 
(1989): 593-605. 
173 See pp. 147-8. 
174 Gregory L. Jones, "Alasdair Maclntyre on Narrative, Community and the Moral Life, " Modem 
TheolgU 4 (1987): 53-69. Johnson, "Reclaiming the Aristotelian Ruler, " 57-8. Horton and Mendus, 
"Alasdair Maclntyre: After Virtue and After, " 9. D. E. Cooper, "Life and Narrative, " International 
journal of Moral and Social Studies 3 (1988): 164-7. Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and 
Community: Maclntyre and Morality, " 653-63. For a response to Schneewind see Alasdair Maclntyre, 
"Intelligibility, Goods, and Rules, " Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 664. 
175 Johnson, "Reclaiming the Aristotelian Rule, " 57-8. Jones, "Alasdair MacIntyre on Narrative, 
Community and the Moral Life, " 61-2. 
176 Alan Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " Review of Metaphysics 38 (1895): 753,754. Madigan, 
-Plato, Aristotle and Professor MacIntyre, " Ancient Phi]oLQD-h-Y 3 (1983) : 178. 
"n Philippa Foot, "Goods and Practices, " London Times Literga Supplemen 25 Sept. 1982,1097. 
179 Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community: Maclntyre and Morality, " 661. Madigan, "Plato, 
Aristotle and Professor MacIntyre, " 176-8. Foot, "Goods and Practices, " 1097. For a reply refer to 
Maclntyre, "Intelligibility, Goods, and Rules, " 664-5. 
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These critiques point to a flawed view of humanity and human good and 
goods in MacIntyre's theory. A notion of human good is Part of understanding 
morality. 
Flawed View of MoLajity 
In addressing more general areas of critique of MacIntyre's morality, some 
critics explore his notions of political morality, 
179 his use of Aristotle and Aquinas, 180 
and view of moral vocabulary. 181 
Although MacIntyre recognises the importance of morality, his view of theory 
and practice, 182 conception of moral truth, particularly regarding objective and 
subjective meanings, 183 and past and present morality, 
184 have been scrutinised. So 
critics stress the inadequacy of MacIntyre's account of morality. 
Important to MacIntyre's perspective of morality and humanity is his theory of 
rationality. 
Flawed View of Rationality 
General critiques focus on the lack of clarity in MacIntyre's argument about 
and definition of practical rationality and, this being a fundamental concept for 
1'9 Johnson, "Reclaiming an Aristotelian Ruler, " 59-6 1. 
'so Ibid., 59. Bond comments on MacIntyre's use of Aristotle here in "Could There be a Rationally 
Grounded Universal Morality?, " 34-6. 
Is' Stephen Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality and Rationality: MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell, " in After 
Macintyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair Macintyre, eds. John Horton and Susan 
Mendus, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 218-19. 
182 Bond, "Could there be a Rationally Grounded Universal Morality?, " 34-6. 
193 Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality and Rationality: MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell, " 218. 
184 Stephen Lukes, "In a New Dark Age?, " New Statesman 102 (1982): 18. Bond,, 'Could There be a 
Rationally Grounded Universal Morality?, " 34. Peter Winch, "Reconstructing a 'good for man', " The 
London Times Higher Educational Supplement, 18 Sept. 1981,14a. He argues MacIntyre's diagnosis 
that the primary manifestations of contemporary moral disorder is the widespread and intractable 
character of disagreement on fundamental moral issues is not a particularly modern problem. 
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MacIntyre, is especially problematic. 185 Other critics claim MacIntyre's arguments 
about rationality 186 and justification are not convincing. 187 So MacIntyre's view of 
rationality seems inadequately stated. 
For MacIntYre, rationality is linked closely to justice. 
Flawed View of Justice 
In exploring MacIntyre's claims and theories about justice, critics take issue 
with the content of his theory, including his use of Aristotelian justice, 188 both in his 
inclusions and omissions. 1 89 Thomas Nagel notes difficulties caused by MacIntyre's 
omissions regarding social justice. 
190 Julia Annas highlights omissions concerning 
what justice requires, including human and legal rights, injustices, inequalities, and 
freedoms. 191 
In critiquing specific types of justice, Taylor discusses desert in relation to 
MacIntyre's Aristotelianism and distributive justice. The basic intuition underlying 
Aristotle's distributive justice is that in any common attempt to achieve the good, all 
genuine collaborators benefit from the contribution of others. Some people will 
contribute more, so mutual debt may not be reciprocal entirely. While we must all 
185 Winch, "Reconstructing the 'good for man', " 14a. 
186 Annas, "MacIntyre on Traditions, " 391-2. Lukes, "Return to a World We have Lost, " 36. 
187 Andrew Mason, "MacIntyre on Liberalism and its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and 
Disagreement, " in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair MacIntyre, eds. 
John Horton and Susan Mendus, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 232-6. Mason notes this moral 
justification is particularly in relation to rival theories and moral beliefs. 
88 Norman Dahl, "Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason, " Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Resgarch 51 (1991): 153 
189 Annas, "MacIntyre on Tradition, " 389. She notes WJWR is devoted entirely to the task of 
description. 
190 Nagel, 'Agreeing in Principle', 747 
191 Annas, 'MacIntyre on Tradition', 389. She notes MacIntyre's view focuses narrowly on notions of 
desert and distribution, as he believes they are crucial to Aristotelian justice. 
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share in the good, it is clear that more is owed to these outstanding contributors, in 
Aristotle's principle of proportional equality. 192 
Taylor states, for MacIntyre, this notion of rightful distribution by desert 
among associates seems deeply embedded in human consciousness. 193 Taylor 
suggests part of the confusion in this discussion of mutual indebtedness versus 
distribution is that the same terms are being used for the "justice" that underlies both 
distributions. Whereas, in fact, they answer different questions of what type of 
distribution corresponds to the demands of the highest transcendent good, and what is 
the balance of indebtedness in our particular community. Taylor surnmarises the 
situation by claiming it is absolute versus local justice. 
194 Within theories of justice 
questions of desert are linked to distribution of goods. 
Gewirth claims MacIntyre gives no clear answer regarding which further 
goods people ought to pursue, or distributive goods, but only refers to the telos of a 
whole human life and places the relevant criteria in terms of the needs of 
community. 195 To deserve well is to contribute substantially to the achievement of 
these goods, the sharing and pursuit of which provides the foundation for human 
community. So, an understanding of what MacIntyre means by "human community" 
is vital for understanding his criteria of merit or desert, and therefore justice. 196 
Gewirth asks whether there is any determinate criteria for "merit or desert99? 197 He 
questions whether an egalitarian conception of community, where persons share 
equally in the relevant goods, is offered by MacIntyre. Furthermore, Gewirth implies 
192 Charles Taylor, "Justice After Virtue, " in After Maclntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of 
Alasdair MacIntyre, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 37. 
193 Ibid., 38. Taylor notes MacIntyre claims desert is deliberately set aside by Rawls. See also pp. 159- 
60. 
194 Ibid., 40. 
1"Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 759-60. 
196 Ibid., 759. 
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that an egalitarian conception of community may be important both to justice and 
distribution of goods. 198 
The notion of desert in MacIntyre's theory can be contrasted with the notion 
of wants and rewards. Dahl argues what people 'want' differs, and the only aim they 
share is a social context in which they have a relatively fair opportunity to secure their 
good. Such a conclusion will lead to a conception of justice close to that of 
effectiveness, not excellence. 199 Dahl's point is that there is no a priori basis for 
expecting one of these conceptions of justice to be better than the other. 200 He also 
addresses the crucial question of how rewards should be apportioned over different 
kinds of achievement, in relation to MacIntyre's Aristotelian justice and goods. Dahl 
claims a failure to provide such a measure deprives people of a shared standard of just 
apportionment. The only community that could provide this standard is one where 
human life is structured by a hierarchy of goods, this structure carrying the central 
features of Aristotelian justice. 201 Desert can be linked to wants, rewards and 
punishments. 
MacIntyre's theory of justice has been critiqued regarding his notions of desert 
and merit, distribution of goods and community, needs, wants and rewards. Critics 
also investigate his related theory of virtue. 
'97 Ibid., 759. Gewirth argues if justice is only a virtue of participation in "practices", it shares the 
relativism or indeterminacy of MacIntyre's practices. See also Mason, "MacIntyre on Liberalism and 
its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and Disagreement, " 236. 
198 Ibid., 759. Gewirth notes MacIntyre criticises Rawls and Nozick for having views which exclude 
any account of human community where desert, in regard to the common task of that community in 
pursuing shared goods, could provide a basis for judgments about virtue and injustice. Gewirth claims 
MacIntyre remains vague about how goods are to be recognised in the "shared vision and 
understanding of goods". He cites AV, 233,240. 
199 Dahl, "Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason, " 155-7. 
200 Ibid., 156-7. 
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Flawed View of the Virtues 
Critics analyse MacIntyre's perspective of the virtues in general, and examine 
his ideas of the priority of the virtues in contrast to rules, rights and laws. 
General criticisms regarding MacIntyre's virtue theory include its content and 
descriptions. 202 MacIntyre also connects the virtues to practices, and critics have 
focused on both his definition 203 and content of practice. 204 They note the difficulties 
of dealing with conflict in or between practices and how these relate to conflict 
between virtues, from MacIntyre's view. 205 
More specifically, Johnson notes confusion between MacIntyre's definition of 
the virtues and the conception of need and defence of practical wisdom. 206 
Schneewind argues MacIntyre's theory does not show the virtues are prior to moral 
rules 207 and, thus, has a problem about the priority of the virtues. 
208 
201 Ibid., 155. Furthermore, Dahl argues even if Aristotelian practical reason was meant to justify a 
hierarchy of goods, it still could justify other forms of justice. 
"2 Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 752. Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community: Maclntyre 
and Morality, " 659-61. 
203 Foot, "Goods and Practices, " 1097. Horton and Mendus, "Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and 
After, " 10. Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, "MacIntyre, Feminism and the Concept of Practice, " in 
AfterMacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdairMaclntyre, eds. John Horton and 
Susan Mendus, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 265-82. David Miller, "Virtues, Practices and 
justice, " in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair MacIntyre, eds. John 
Horton and Susan Mendus, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 255-62. See Alasdair Maclntyre, "A 
partial Response to My Critics, " in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair 
MacIntyre, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 283-305. 
204 Schneewind, 'Virtue, Narrative, and Community: MacIntyre and Morality', 655-6. Johnson, 
--Reclaiming the Aristotelian Rule, " 55. Foot, "Goods and Practices, " 1097. Horton and Mendus, 
"Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After, " 10. Miller, "Virtues, Practices and Justice, " 248-9,252- 
3. 
w5 Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community: MacIntyre and Morality, " 656. Johnson, 
"Reclaiming the Aristotelian Rule, " 56. 
2" Johnson, "Reclaiming that Aristotelian Ruler, " 61. 
2w Ibid., 660. See MacIntyre, AV, 208-9. He claims the rules derived from MacIntyre's idea of the 
common good are only those necessary to allow for common 
life and co-operation no matter what the 
aim. So, MacIntyre only can insist people work together to secure the common good, 
but MacIntyre's 
position collapses into that which he repudiates as being the core of modernity. 
Schneewind claims in 
arguing MacIntyre's virtue-centred theory fails to pass one of 
his own tests, it fails to provide a real 
alternative to the morality currently embodied in our culture 
(661). 
208 Ibid., 661. See MacIntyre, AV, 141-3. Cf. Gilligan who highlights the tension between contextual, 
relational versus abstract, rule-oriented morality. See pp. 
5-6. 
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In analysing the relationship of virtues to rules, Gewirth claims Maclntyre 
rejects a morality of rights and duties and upholds the virtues instead. 209 When the 
criteria for a quality's being a virtue does not include the requirement that the virtue 
reflect or conform to moral rules, there is no assurance the alleged virtue will be 
morally right or valid . 
210 Gewirth argues such moral indeterminacy means a virtue 
may be both morally right and morally wrong. 
211 
Furthermore, Gewirth concludes a crucial difficulty with MacIntyre's whole 
doctrine is his removal of the virtues from their necessary grounding in human 
rights. 212 If MacIntyre had made human rights central, he would have avoided the 
moral indeterminacy which mars the relation of the virtues to practices, the telos of 
whole human lives, and traditions and communities. Thus, MacIntyre's central 
project is not successful. 
213 
MacIntyre's virtue theory has been critiqued regarding its content, priority of 
moral rules, indeterminacy, lack of grounding in human rights and its relation to his 
view of practices. Underlying MacIntyre's theory are different philosophies. 
phies 
Regarding the relation of MacIntyre's theories to philosophies, critics address 
his opposition to liberalism, individualism and rights, advocacy of communitarianism, 
and some dangers of relativism. 
20 Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 751-2. Yet, MacIntyre would not necessarily view this comment as a 
criticism. Gewirth also claims the centrality of the virtues is a reversal of the traditional conception of 
the relation between moral virtues and the law, in which moral virtues derive their contents from moral 
rules. See also pp. 176-8. 210 Ibid., 752-3. 
211 Ibid., 752. Gewirth argues in MacIntyre's morality of law he tries to counter these charges but fails. 
Following Aristotle, Maclntyre might respond that he distinguishes between the morality of virtues and 
law. The morality of law prohibits the doing or production of harm that destroys the bonds of 
community so that doing or achieving good is impossible. While the morality of virtues requires the 
moral law as a counterpart (757-8). 212 Ibid., 762. 
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Liberalism and Individualism 
Critiques address the clarity of MacIntyre's account, characterisation of and 
charges against liberaliSM. 214 They also examine MacIntyre's diagnosis of liberalism, 
draw attention to the diversity and differences within liberalism, and argue it is more 
complex than MacIntyre realises. 
215 Mulhall also highlights MacIntyre's historical 
diagnosis of and change in position regarding liberalism. 216 
One specific manifestation of liberal individualism is rights. 
Rights 
One key aspect of modem moral culture is a conception of rights. MacIntyre 
argues against reliance on human rights and rules within morality, 217 and his claims 
have been the source of much criticism. 
In contrast, Gewirth argues for rights. Because freedom and well-being are 
the necessary conditions of action, no agent can act to achieve any of his purposes 
without having these conditions. Gewirth concludes that every agent must accept "I 
have rights to freedom and well-being", which Gewirth calls generic rights because 
213 Ibid., 760-2. See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 243. 
214 Mason, "MacIntyre on Liberalism and its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and 
Disagreement, " 226,229-30. Horton and Mendus, "Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After, " 14. 
Lukes, "Return to a World we have Lost, " 35-6. For a response to Mason, see Macintyre, "A Partial 
Response to My Critics, " 291-2. 
215 Mason, "MacIntyre on Liberalism and its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and 
Disagreement, " 227-8. George, "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions, " 604-5. 
216 Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality, and Rationality: MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell, " 219-20,224. 
Mulhall argues that MacIntyre's position on the weaknesses of liberalism changes from AV to WJWR. 
In the former MacIntyre claims the crucial methodological weakness of liberalism is that it claimed to 
offer a distinctive account of human agency and morality, when it was incapable of doing so, while in 
the latter he acknowledges liberalism is a fully-fledged tradition and so possessed of the resources he 
originally suspected it of lacking, according to Mulhall. For a response to Mulhall, see MacIntyre, "A 
Partial Response to My Critics, " 292-3. 
217 See pp. 144-5. Cf. Brenda Almond, 'Rights' in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996), 259-69. 
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they are rights to the generic features of action. 218 
MacIntyre objects to the form and content of Gewirth's argument for proving 
the existence of human rights. 219 He argues Gewirth's shift from agreeing on 
necessary goods for exhibiting rational agency to being logically committed to having 
a right to them is problematic. MacIntyre emphasises that if a person claims a right in 
virtue of his/her having certain characteristics, then he/she is logically committed to 
holding that anyone with those same characteristics has that right too. 220 
MacIntyre counters Gewirth's position, stating rights-claims are not 'universal 
features of the human condition'. 221 Rather they, and their presupposed social rules, 
only come into existence at particular historical periods under certain social 
circumstances. Rights-claims have not existed universally in human societies. 222 
Furthermore, MacIntyre suggests there is a difference between claiming one has a 
right to something versus one needs, wants or will benefit from it. 223 
In one of his most sweeping claims, MacIntyre states human or natural rights 
are "fictions" and that "there are no such rights and belief in them is one with belief in 
witches and unicorns". 
224 The primary reason MacIntyre provides to support this 
claim is "every attempt to give good reasons for believing there are such rights has 
failed. tt225 
Gewirth claims MacIntyre's arguments do not prove rights do not exist and he 
fails to note the extensive work in this area. 226 The phenomenon of human rights can 
219 Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 744. MacIntyre discusses Gewirth's position in AV, 66-70. 
219 Ibid., 742-50. 
210 MacIntyre, AV, 66-7. See Gewirth, Reason and Morality. 
221 Ibid., 67. See p. 144. 
2u Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 747. See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 98-9. 
213 MacIntyre, AV, 67. My emphases. See Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 745. 
22' See pp. 144-5. See also MacIntyre, AV, 69-70. 
15 Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 739. See MacIntyre, AV, 69. 
M Ibid., 745-50. 
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be shown empirically, so they are not "fictionS99.227 Gewirth argues that MacIntyre9s 
primary claim against believing in rights is very extensive and sweeping, and not 
accompanied by the historical evidence needed to support it adequately. 228 
Discussing human rights involves language and they may be expressed in the 
form of rights claims. 229 Gewirth argues it is unduly conservative to insist, as 
MacIntyre does, that rights-claims always must presuppose social rules or institutions 
which already exist. 230 Gewirth argues that the agent's rights-claim is logically prior 
to and independent of a community or social rules, except in a minimal sense, 
precisely because it is based on his own needs. Thus, rights-claims are at least 
sometimes demands that social rules or institutions be established. 231 
Although MacIntyre's opposition to a morality of rights has been the subject 
of critique, his view accurately notes some dangers of rights-claims. Rights are linked 
to needs, wants, goods, benefit and may function as minimum rules or standards in a 
society or community. 
232 
Communitarianism 
In his opposition to individualistic modernity, MacIntyre's view of community 
is an important alternative. 
Carlos Nifio suggests a communitarian position is problematic in its potential 
support of tribalist or nationalist attitudes and the possibility it may generate a 
totalitarian vision of society. Furthermore, the view that the social dimension is 
2`7 Ibid., 739. 
2's Ibid., 741. 
2" Jon P. Gunnemann, "Human Rights and Modernity: The Truth of the Fiction of Individual Rights, " 
Journ I of Rel-laiQu-s-EXthwia 16 (1988) : 162. 
230 Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 746-7. 
231 Ibid., 746-7. 
232 See p. 223. 
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dominant in a conception of the good may lead to justifying sacrifices of individuals 
for the sake of promoting a society conceived in holistic terms. 233 
The charges against MacIntyre's particular expression of communitarianism 
include its vagueness, moral indeterminacy, contradictionS234 and that it falls prey to 
elements of liberalism. 235 
Gunnemann attacks MacIntyre's idealistic view of past moral communities. 236 
He claims MacIntyre assumes that at some time in the past there was a real moral 
world consisting of his moral communities, as opposed to the fictional moral world of 
the present. MacIntyre relies on a "once we had it but now we don't argument". 237 
The whole of After Virtue is an account of the fall from moral community. 
Gunnemann states it can be argued that most moral communities of the past had 
inherent moral limitations which led to their undoing. They were inherently 
ity. 238 
particularistic. This collided with quests for universal Thus, Gunnemann 
opposes MacIntyre's idealistic picture of past moral communities and notes tension 
between the particular and universal, the individual and community. 239 
MacIntyre's communitarianism is too vague, idealistic and shares features 
with liberal modernity. Critics note it also may be relativistic. 
2" Carlos S. Nifio, "The Communitarian Challenge to Liberal Rights, " Law and Philosophy 8 (1989): 
41-2. Rawls notes the latter criticism in relation to utilitarianism. See pp. 101-2 and Rawls, TJ, 180-2. 
234 Bond, "Could there be a Rationally Grounded Universal Morality?, "38. Nifio, "The Communitarian 
Challenge to Liberal Rights, " 46-7. Gewirth, "Rights and Values, " 756. 
235 Ibid., 46-7. Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community: Maclntyre and Morality, " 662-3. 
Schneewind claims MacIntyre envisages communities whose key feature is the lack of doubt members 
will have about their socially given identities and, therefore, will not have to make any decisions about 
them. Yet, Schneewind's interpretation may be debatable. MacIntyre's communities may be 
represented as emphasising the virtues and eudaimonia. See pp. 149-50,165-6. 
23" Gunnemann, "Human Rights and Modernity: The Truth of the Fiction of Individual Rights, " 162. 
Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community, " 662-3. He notes past communities have not always 
been fair. 
237 Ibid., 162. 




Critics hold differing opinions as to the degree of relativism of which 
MacIntyre is gUilty. 240 Other critics oppose MacIntyre's perspectives on the place of 
truth in history, 241 arguing he does not avoid moral relativism. 242 
More specifically, both Nagel and George criticise MacIntYre's particularistic 
view of tradition. 243 For George, MacIntyre's burden is to retain his particularism 
while demonstrating that ultimately choices among traditions need not be arbitrary. 
MacIntyre is unable to support this burden and, in answering the dilemma of how to 
decide between rival traditions, is evasive. For MacIntyre it depends on who you are 
and how you understand yourself. This is a deeply unsatisfactory answer, according 
to George. 
244 
Dahl notes MacIntyre claims he is not committed to a form of relativism that 
maintains the belief that whatever a tradition claims is true. Yet, MacIntyre does not 
take seriously enough the possibility of more than one successful tradition. If this is 
possible, then there will be two sets of mutually exclusive claims about justice, for 
21' Cf. Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community: MacIntyre and Morality, " 662. He states that 
MacIntyre's view of modem morality is profoundly pessimistic. 
240 Annas, "MacIntyre on Traditions, " 393. George, "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions, " 
595-9. For a broader discussion of, and distinction between meta-ethical and normative, relativism, see 
David Wong, "Relativism, " in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 
442-50. 
241 Nagel, "Agreeing in Principle, " 748. Bernard Williams, "Messing about with Modem Morality, " 
London 3pnday Timgs, 15 Nov. 1981,42g. 
W Horton and Mendus, "Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After, " 12. George, "Moral 
particularism, Thomism, and Traditions, " 598. Cf. Brenda Almond, "Alasdair MacIntyre: The Virtue 
of Tradition, " Journal of Applied Ethics 7 (1990): 101. Almond argues MacIntyre leaves room for the 
development of traditions and the possibility of rational inquiry within a tradition, thus distinguishing 
himself from the relativist. 
243 Nagel, "Agreeing in Principle, " 747-8. George, "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions, " 
598-600. Nagel argues it is particularistic because MacIntyre claims there are no universal reasons for 
accepting a tradition of rationality or truth. 
244 George, "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions, " 598-9. See MacIntyre, WJWR, 393. 
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example, both being true. Dahl argues that it is difficult to see how this could occur 
without truth being relative to a tradition, contrary to MacIntyre. 245 
MacIntyre's theory is critiqued in relation to different philosophies and Rawls' 
theory. 
Maclntvre and Rawls 
General comments on the dialogue between MacIntyre and Rawls include 
critiques of MacIntyre's presuppositions, 246 treatment of textual points about and 
representation of Rawls. 
247 More specific critiques discuss differences between 
MacIntyre and Rawls' views of justice as fairness, the role of desert, the good life for 
humans248 and the individual versus the community. 249 
MacIntyre critiques a Rawlsian society as radically individualistic. 
Individuals with their own interests formulate common rules out of necessity. 
Because Rawls gives the individual priority over society, MacIntyre claims Rawls' 
theory will be unable to accommodate the concept of social justice on which it is 
predicated. 250 Since the original position encapsulates the idea of individuality prior 
to community, 25 1 Rawls' theory is doomed to failure. 252 
2A3 Dahl, "Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason, " 157. Nifio, "The Communitarian Challenge to 
Liberal Rights, " 42. See pp. 178-9. Two problems with relativism are that it is self-contradictory and 
not true. See also E. David Cook, Dilemmas of Life, (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1990), 5 8-67. 
Wong, "Relativism, " 442-50. 
2" Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality, and Rationality, " 207-11. For further comparison and contrast 
between MacIntyre and Rawls' ethics of justice see pp. 198-9. 
247 Daniel A. Dombrowski, "MacIntyre, Rawls and the 'Republic'. " Philosophical Studies 31 (1986-7): 
63. Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality, and Rationality, " 205-9,221-2. 
248 mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality, and Rationality, " 210. 
249 Taylor, "Justice After Virtue, " 24. Dombrowski, "MacIntyre, Rawls and the 'Republic', " 66. 
Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality, and Rationality, " 206. Taylor states that MacIntyre critiques Rawls 
because he has a fundamentally derived notion of the virtues, as they are defined in terms of right. 
MacIntyre opposes this type of moral theory to that which would begin with and give the virtues a 
more central place. 
"0 Ibid., 206. He cites MacIntyre, AV, 232-3. 
251 Ibid., 206 
Z2 Ibid., 206. 
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MacIntyre argues Rawls' social contract view of society rules out the notion of 
human community, and thus desert. When Rawls excludes notions and references to 
the past he also excludes claims of desert based on past actions and suffering. 253 
Rawls makes primary a principle of equality with respect to needs. He claims that the 
46worst-off 'sector is a conception of those with the gravest needs with respect to 
income, wealth, and other goods. How they come to be in gravest need is irrelevant, 
for Rawls, and so justice is a matter of present patterns of distribution to which the 
past is irrelevant. 254 MacIntyre argues Rawls' conception of justice is faulty because 
of its reliance on the original position, 255 Rawls' conception of need, and most 
importantly the lack of any notion of desert. 256 
MacIntyre and Rawls differ in their view of society and human beings, being 
communalistic or individualistic, the good, and justice as equality versus desert. 
Conclo-ion 
After investigating general critiques of MacIntyre's theory, strengths and 
weaknesses of his view of tradition and history, humanity, including narrative unity 
and the good, morality, rationality and virtues were examined. His 
communitarianism, relativism and view of liberal individualism, including his 
opposition to rights claims, were critiqued. Furthermore, different notions of justice, 
based on desert, needs or wants were analysed. 
253 MacIntyre, AV, 25 1. Rawls does allow that common sense views of justice connect it to desert, but 
argues that people do not know what anyone deserved until they have formulated the rules of justice. 
When these rules are formulated, it is not desert that is in question, but legitimate expectations. Rawls 
notes that justice as fairness rejects this notion of desert and it would not be chosen in the original 
ý osidon. See Rawls, V. 310-12. 
Ibid., 248. 
211 Ibid., 246-7. MacIntyre cites Rawls, TJ, 136. MacIntyre accepts that the rational agent in some 
such situation as the veil of ignorance would choose some such principle of justice, as Rawls claims. 
MacIntyre carefully points out that it is only a rational agent in such a situation who would choose such 
nciples. 
6 Ibid., 246-5 1. 
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Critigue of Maclntyre from a Middle Way Perspective 
Traditions and Histojy 
MacIntyre accurately recognises the importance of a context, including 
tradition, personal history and setting, within which individuals function. 257 These 
elements affect and aid an understanding of individuals and their choices, actions and 
decisions. 258 
Yet, MacIntyre does not discuss adequately the dilemma of conflicting 
traditions and provides no clear framework for deciding between them. The 
implications of this absence are vitally important in a pluralistic society and world 
where there are numerous conflicting backgrounds, traditions, histories and dilemmas. 
We need some means of assessing the myriad of options and views which confront us 
in order to resolve conflict. 259 Without the criteria to judge between competing 
traditions, we might circumvent the plurality of Western society by attempting to 
create a new tradition. 
There are two primary options. We can look to the past, as MacIntyre 
advocates, and attempt to revive values or a society that once existed, or we may look 
within the present for common values we want to encourage. MacIntyre's advocacy 
of returning to one dominant past tradition to shape contemporary morality is not 
plausible given the plurality of the present. 260 So, in seeking some consensus, we may 
'5' See P. 147-9. Also MacIntyre, A V, 211,217,22 1. 
258 See chapter 5,6 and 7. 
259 This difficulty may parallel that of deciding between different assessments of what care means, in 
general or for a particular individual. For example, one person may think the caring action is to allow 
an elderly relative to struggle to live on her own in order to maintain dignity and autonomy. Another 
person n-tight believe caring entails moving the relative into an assisted community, preserving safety 
and her best interests. 
260 This plurality includes not only the ethics of justice, but also the ethics of care. Furthermore, there 
is a difference between pluralism and relativism. Pluralism offers a sociological description of a way 
of being in the world where there are a number of difference traditions, cultures and customs existing 
together in one society. Pluralism can be seen as both a social fact and an individual state of mind. 
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examine different present traditions for some commonality. This might include areas 
such as familial relations, sexual morality, health and well-being, and the role of 
education and work. 261 If general agreement can be reached about the importance of 
these areas, then structures can be created to encourage the upholding and fostering of 
this tradition. Education, within schools and families, would play a key role in raising 
awareness regarding the importance of these areas and these values can be transmitted 
to the next generation. Furthermore, a community may provide a useful framework 
for recognising and teaching particular values. 262 
positive illustration of the fostering of a tradition is related to HIV/AIDS. 
Before HIV/AIDS became so widespread, discussions of the risks of sexual activity 
primarily focused on pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. When the danger 
of the sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS was discovered, vast energy was channelled 
into education and awareness about the risks involved. A result of this concentrated 
effort to instil a value was that people placed greater value on practising safer sex and 
altered their behaviour. It is possible to affect people's values and priorities within a 
pluralistic society. One uncertainty is the degree to which this is possible and the 
length of endurance of the change. 263 
One of its positive characteristics is tolerance. Relativism also advocates tolerance, but it is a 
philosophy which underlies pluralism, not a sociology. Relativism claims there are no absolute truths 
or moral standards. Right and wrong, good and bad are relative to a particular place, time and context. 
See Trevor J. Cooling, "The Epistemological Foundations of Contemporary Religious Education: A 
Study with special reference to the Evangelical Christian Tradition" (Ph. D. diss., University of 
Birmingham, 1992), 159. Cook, Dilemmas of Life, 5 8-67. 
261 Cook, Dilemmas of Life, 62. Cook claims common moral areas found in all societies focus on the 
value and sanctity of human life, parent-children relations, sexuality, property allocation or belonging 
and truth-telling. 
261 The School Curriculum Assessment Authority is concerned with ways to teach and instil values in 
schools. E. David Cook, "Moral Relativism - Schools and Society, " The Whitefield Institute Briefing, 
1 (1996): 1. See also pp. 217-23. 
263 Another attempt to foster a new tradition is seen within the baby-boomers. Many women of that era 
recognised the opportunities offered by the feminist movement, regardless of whether they embraced it 
themselves. Many obtained a university education, but also recognised the greater potential benefits 
for their daughters. Yet, these mothers cannot guarantee their daughters will take full advantage of this 
new tradition. Regarding any new tradition we must be aware certain values are more likely to be 
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Analysis of tradition and history highlights their influence on values and 
fostering new traditions. Tradition is part of the context within which people exist 
and is important for understanding persons. 264 
Humanity and Personhood 
MacIntyre recognises the importance of unity and social roles in a person's 
life. 265 This unity can be linked to integrity, which requires reference to the 
66 9266 1 wholeness of human life' . Recognising individuals are not defined solely by their 
social roles, viewing them as a whole and not simply as parts, is crucial in relating to 
them appropriately. MacIntyre usefully emphasises the importance of integrity, 
wholeness and unity in human life. 
267 
MacIntyre also stresses the role of the virtues. 268 Yet, every life will not 
necessarily fulfil MacIntyre's requirements. He could claim a human life which fails 
to exhibit the virtues and narrative unity is less valid or significant than one which 
does. If he supported this view, then he could end up with a hierarchy of people 
based on their worth and value in meeting his criteria. This evaluation of people leads 
to weighting individuals primarily based on desert and merit. Those who exhibit 
more virtues and greater unity of life are entitled to more benefits and recognition 
from society. 269 Alternatively, for MacIntyre, the aim of virtue could be to produce 
excellence either regarding a particular virtue or overall, holistic excellence in 
persons. 
embodied if awareness about them has been raised, but there is no ultimate method of controlling the 
choices people make. 
2" See pp. 203-8. 
2'5 See pp. 147-8. MacIntyre, AV, 204,218-19. 
1 See p. 163. MacIntyre, AV, 203. 
' See pp. 215-17. 
26' See pp. 160-5. MacIntyre, AV, chapter 15. 
269 MacIntyre advocates the notion of desert, with regard to justice, and critiques theories which do not 
incorporate it. See pp. 157-60. 
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MacIntyre's emphasis on the virtues raises the question of what a virtuous 
person is. A virtuous person may exhibit particular virtues or excel and be excellent 
on multiple levels. Being 'virtuous' might be equated with being 'good' and pursuing 
'good' ends through 'good' means. Yet, because we cannot guarantee people will be 
virtuous or good all of the time, 270 and there may be different conceptions of virtue, 271 
a notion of protection for persons in a society or community will be important. 272 
Regarding personhood, MacIntyre highlights practical reason which is linked 
to phronesis. 273 Yet, MacIntyre notes there are no general rules for applying rules. 274 
Exercising judgment, particularly in moral dilemmas is vital. MacIntyre rightly 
emphasises the need to consider general principles and specific contexts, as both 
affect the dilemma, persons and implications, but he is vague about how to achieve 
and apply this judgment. One useful approach for persons might incorporate a notion 
of appropriateness or fittingness. 275 
Regarding persons, MacIntyre accurately stresses the importance of rationality 
and context in justification. 276 Yet, he does not recognise alternative elements 
sufficiently. Others argue justification requires good reasons for action 277 and may 
involve the laws of logic and principles. 278 What else might justification entail? It 
could involve deductive and inductive reasoning. It also might include areas like 
intuition, insight, and creativity. It is important not to overlook these less concrete 
270 Encouraging virtues, like a new tradition, involves education, training and development. See pp. 
1834. 
271 See pp. 164-5. 
272 See pp. 230-7. 
273 See pp. 150-4,164. MacIntyre, AV, 154,223 and WJWR, 185. 
274 See pp. 174-5. MacIntyre, WJWR, 116-17,195-6. 
275 See pp. 23745. 
276 See pp. 149,153. 
277 E. David Cook, '7he Use of Rationality in Religious and Metaphysical Argument:, (Ph. D. diss, 
University of Edinburgh, 1973), 403,405. Emphasis added. Cook also notes the importance of context 
within justification. He stresses the assessment of good reasons for acting may vary according to the 
circumstances, object and persons concerned. 
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notions, as they contribute to a more emotional and subjective assessment, but are 
nonetheless a vital part of humanness. We should recognise the role they play in 
influencing our decisions and judgments, making them explicit not implicit. 
For example, if a nurse denies or ignores that she is emotionally affected by 
her patients, and that these emotions affect her decisions and interaction with them, it 
is far more difficult to address the reality of the situation than if these elements are 
recognised openly. If the nurse is more explicit about her feelings and judgments then 
it will be easier to deal with tensions between doctors, other nurses, patients and 
families. If her reasons for action remain implicit, it is very difficult for other people 
to interact with these ideas, agree or disagree, but most importantly to offer support 
where needed. 
We all need support at different times and to different degrees. We must 
remember as humans we do not live in isolation. Our actions and emotions affect 
others and vice versa. We are part of a larger society and smaller communities. 
MacIntyre accurately stresses this communal aspect of the self. "' MacIntyre argues 
against emotivist and individualist views of the self. 280 However, there may be an 
important element of humanity which each view of the self emphasises. Rather than 
choosing between these three versions, it might be possible to integrate these insights. 
Part of the dilemma is that the emotivist reduces the individual to emotional 
expression, the individualist focuses too singly on personal choice, and the 
communalist focuses too much on the needs of the group. All of these perspectives 
ignore important elements in the nature of humanity, leaving an imbalanced and 
simplistic perception. A descriptivist could claim people would agree that persons 
278 Mason, "MacIntyre on Liberalism and its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and 
Disagreement, " 234-6. 
" See pp. 149-50. MacIntyre, AV, 220-1. 
2ý* See pp. 142-4. 
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consist of mind and body, reason and emotions. Individuals should not be ruled 
completely by rationality, as they might lose any sense of compassion or connection 
with other people, nor should they be ruled entirely by emotion, as they may lose 
objectivity about people and situations. Both reason and emotion, likejustice and 
care, need to be maintained, encouraged and balanced to hold an accurate notion of 
personhood. Recognising the rational and emotional, as well as the communal and 
individual, dimensions is part of formulating a holistic view of human beings. 281 
CommuniLy 
MacIntyre's view of community incorporates a common projec t282 and notion 
of accountability. 283 Accountability links people together, as anyone can be required 
to explain and justify his/her actions to others at any time. Accountability can serve 
as a means of ensuring certain standards of behaviour or agreed goals are upheld 
within a community. 
284 
Within moral communities, MacIntyre relies on an idealised notion of the 
PaSt. 285 In particular, his account of Aristotelian society mentions only briefly the 
unfair treatment and exclusion of non-citizens, slaves, and women within it. 286 His 
view also implies a belief that in the past a consensus about morality existed . 
287 If So, 
he does not acknowledge there always have been a variety of moral views and 
opinions and that there was no such ideal point in the past. 
211 See chapter 1. Also see pp. 215-17. 
292 Seep. 149. MacIntyre, AV, 156. 
233 See pp. 148-9. MacIntyre, AV, 217-18. 
2" See pp. 222-3. 
's See P. 179. 
216 See MacIntyre, WJWR, 104-6. Furthermore, the virtues were not equally open to all in Athens. 
MacIntyre discusses some of these deficiencies in Aristotle's view of democracy, or "aristocracy", but 
maintains Aristotle's view of the best polis remains unscathed, and does not seem to give them 
ýppropriate weight or consideration. 
237Seepp. 142-3. MacIntyre, AV, 110-11,118. 
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In contrast, MacIntyre argues modem morality has no clear consensus 
regarding its content. 288 Yet, it can be argued there is a moral core found in all 
societies or communities regarding the value and sanctity of human life, parent- 
children relationships, sexuality, property allocation or belonging, and truth-telling. 289 
This is not to claim that all societies and communities have the same view of these 
areas of morality. The point is to highlight that there is a common core and some 
degree of consensus within modem morality. Thus, MacIntyre presents an 
imbalanced view of past and present moral communities. 290 
MacIntyre is correct in noting differences between past and present 
communities, but this does not translate as one necessarily being superior. 
Furthermore, a moral and communal framework of the past is not easily applicable to 
our western society today, as changes in lifestyle, technology, mobility, and 
expectations are different now. A more balanced view of community needs to be 
realistic, not 
idealiStiC. 291 
Analysis of MacIntyre's view of humanity includes context, wholeness or 
integrity, virtuous people, the need for minimum standards of protection, the 
importance of rationality, justification, emotions, community and accountability. 
These elements contribute to a holistic approach to humanity, 292 which also involves a 
moral dimension. 
288 See pp. 142-3. MacIntyre, AV, 2,110-11,226. 
219 Cook, Dilemmas of Life, 62. This is not to claim that all communities would agree on the specific 
content of these areas, but it does point to some areas which are fundamental to morality across 
cultures and time. 
290 In relation to our current western society, we may need to recognise the tension between the 
optimistic Lockean and pessimistic Hobbesian views of human nature. A further area of exploration 
may be which perspective will be the basis of community. Both may have strengths and weaknesses, 
and like care and justice, reason and emotion, the individual and community, we may need both to 
maintain a balanced society. See also Locke, A Second Treatise of Civil Government, 4-5. Hobbes, 
Leviathan, 141-5. 
291 For further discussion of this crucial theme see pp. 217-23. 
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Morality and Moral Theories 
Along with his critique of contemporary morality, MacIntyre attacks the 
rational secular view of nature and morality. 
293 Both MacIntyre's claims about 
rational secularism and whether it is an accurate account of morality are questioned. 
As noted, people are not only rational creatures. Emotions have a role too. 294 
Furthermore, people do not hold a solely secularist view in which this world, 
believing that the here and now, is all that exists. Many people believe in a spiritual 
or mystical realm, as supported by the number of books, publications and groups 
addressing this dimension. So his diagnosis of modem morality seems inaccurate 
given different aspects of modem culture. 
A test of morality is not only its theoretical base, but how people make real 
decisions. We might ask whether people today are better or worse at making moral 
decisions than in the past? Some may claim we are more morally aware now than in 
the past. Many news stories and discussion programmes include or are centred upon 
the moral dimensions of an issue. 
295 There is much discussion in the public domain 
296 
about moral dilemmas, particularly regarding health care ethics. Part of this 
phenomenon could be because information is available more broadly about 
technology and health care advances than in the past. So, there might be raised 
awareness of the theoretical and practical elements of morality. As morality 
incorporates theoretical and practical dimensions, a balanced and sufficient 
framework for moral decision making needs to recognise both. 297 
292 See pp. 215-17. 
293 See pp. 142-3. MacIntyre, AV, 256. 
294 See pp. 186-8. 
295 For example, Everyman, Heart of the Matter and The Moral Maze all focus on moral and ethical 
issues. 
296 Another example of the pervasiveness of moral and ethical issues is that ethics committees within 
the health care professions have become standard features. 
29' See chapters 5 and 6. 
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Morality involves theoretical and practical elements and incorporates the 
virtues. 
Virtues 
Maclntyre defines a virtue as a disposition or sentiment which produces 
obedience to certain rules. 298 Is this the only or most accurate view of virtue? Is the 
nature of virtue a certain quality or attitude? What is the relation between virtues, 
action and behaviour? A virtue might be a disposition exhibited in an attitude, e. g. of 
generosity. Alternatively, it might be a characteristic or quality exhibited more 
directly in a generous act. Yet, a virtue might not be limited to just a disposition or 
quality. Like patience it can be both. 
Perhaps virtues can be seen not only as dispositions but also skills. What is a 
virtuous or good nurse or doctor? One list may includes the virtues of care, 
communication, consistency and truthfulness. Can we inculcate these virtues into 
people? 299 If a virtue is viewed only as a disposition, then we cannot do this 
successfully because a person either has or does not have the disposition. 
300 
Alternatively, if being a good nurse or doctor involves acquiring virtues in the sense 
of skills, we may be able to influence and encourage possession of the Virtues, as a 
skill involves deductive, rational and inductive, practical elements. 
301 If virtues can 
be acquired, we may encourage them in people through training, education and 
practice. 
302 
299 See p. 162. Also MacIntyre, AV, 244. 
2" See pp. 183-4. 
311 This view assumes the virtues are based on nature not nurture. 
31' MacIntyre could support this view as he recognises the importance of rationality, and considers 
p1jactical rationality a virtue, and also emphasises the role of practice. See pp. 150-4,166-7. 
302 See pp. 183-4. 
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Do we need to provide a moral carrot to foster the virtues and a moral stick to 
squelch the viceS? 303 Locke was optimistic about people's nature, wanting to protect 
maximum liberty and believing individuals would by nature be honourable. In 
contrast, Hobbes was pessimistic, viewing humans as naturally at war against one 
another. 304 if we subscribe to an optimistic view, human nature is seen as generally 
good and virtuous. People do not need monitoring and should be left to themselves. 
If we subscribe to a pessimistic view, where people are generally bad and self- 
interested, we would support the need to protect people from one another in 
society. 305 
Such views question whether virtuous people are best formed by a change in 
the persons or their environment and context. For example, one element in producing 
good and virtuous nurses has been a shift in their environment toward increased 
professionalisation. 306 This has included greater emphasis on the theoretical aspects 
of training and increased responsibility, and a reduction in time spent on teaching 
practical skills. Whether this shift has produced better nurses or damaged the caring 
ethos of the profession may depend on the quality of the training, teachers and 
students. It also might depend on a correct balance of the theoretical and practical 
elements. Encouraging virtuous people, if possible, may be complex and involve both 
individuals and their environment, or context. 307 
A view of the virtues, and their role in humanity, is connected to the good. 
-103 One might ask whether the use of carrots and sticks, albeit of a moral variety, leads to genuine 
morality at all. 
304 See pp. 59-60. Also Locke, A Second Treatise of Civil Government, 4-5. Hobbes, Leviathan, 14 1- 
5. 
30 See pp. 230-7. 
306 This professionalisation also can be connected to nurses seeking greater professional status. 
192 
The Good 
MacIntyre's definition of the good is closely tied to the Aristotelian notion of 
eudaimonia, the good and best life for humans '308 and the virtues. 
309 He also 
recognises the importance of community as a context for both. 310 Euddimonia is often 
translated "happiness", and sometimes "human flourishinggo. 311 As a notion of 
flourishing surpasses basic survival, it may be part of a maximum standard, ideal or 
goal in a community. 
312 
A difficulty with MacIntyre's definition is its vagueness and lack of objective 
criteria for defining the good for humans. If individuals are free to interpret for 
themselves what being and doing well entails, then MacIntyre's definition could slide 
into subjectivism or relativism. 313 What needs to be determined is whether there is 
any common ground for further defining this good. A descriptivist approach claims 
most people would agree it is good for people to have certain things, i. e. good health, 
safety and security, relationships and education. 
314 Initially, it might appear that 
Macintyre would disagree with this approach, but he is actually a descriptivist with 
regard to the virtues, as he believes a core conception can be found. 315 Sosome 
3w See pp. 203-8. 
308 See pp. 165-6. Also MacIntyre, AV, 148-9 and WJWR, 108-9. 
3()' See pp. 165-6. MacIntyre, AV, 219. 
310 See pp. 149-50. 
311 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6. 
See chapters 11 and 12 for a more in depth discussion of eudaimonia. W. D. Ross addresses the 
translation of eudaimonia in his introduction to Nichomachean Ethics. John Cooper, Reason and 
Human Good in Aristotle, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). Cooper translates it as 
'human flourishing". 
For a broader discussion of human flourishing see Harman, "Human Flourishing, Ethics and 
Liberty, " 307-322. Tibor R. Machan, "Harman's 'Refutation' of the Flourishing Ethics, " Thomis 49 
(1985): 387-9 1. Rasmussen and Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature, 16-17,36-38,96. Wong, "On 
Flourishing and Finding One's Identity in Community" 324-41. 
311 See pp. 215-17. 
313 See pp. 180- 1. 
314 Maslow provides a descriptivist view of human needs. See pp. 78-9. Cf. Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, 85-99. Finnis argues the seven basic forms of human good are life, knowledge, play, 
aesthetic experience, sociability or friendship, practical reasonableness and religion. 
315 MacIntyre, AV, 186. 
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agreement might be reached regarding minimum and maximum standards in a 
community. 
A core conception of the good for humans recognises needs, in contrast to 
merit or desert. One danger of desert and merit, regarding resource allocation within 
health care, is an unwillingness to treat those with self-inflicted injuries arguing they 
do not deserve treatment. 316 Another endangered group are the less-contributing 
members of a community, the weak or vulnerable. 
317 Because they will not or cannot 
contribute to the good of a community in the same way or degree as others, the danger 
is they will be seen as less valuable and deserve fewer societal goods or benefits. 
This view emerges because desert and merit are linked to an individual's contribution 
318 
or capacities in society, rather than his/her intrinsic worth. Alternatively, allocation 
based on need does not rely on a person's contributions and capacities, but places 
individuals on an equal par and focuses on meeting needs. So, needs play a role in 
providing a basic, or minimum, level of interaction with and treatment for all 
people. 
319 
Within the discussion of the good, the role of flourishing as a maximum 
standard was explored. In contrast, meeting needs may be part of a minimum 
1 320 
standard, which also is linked to justice. 
Justice 
For MacIntyre, justice is based on desert and merit, which are uniform, 
impersonal standards. 321 One danger of using these criteria is they remove or destroy 
They include smokers, HIV/AIDS patients, drug abusers and bungee jumpers. 
They include children, the senile demented and physically and mentally ill. 
319 See pp. 213-15. 
319 See pp. 223-9. 
320 See pp. 230-7. 
321 Seep. 157. MacIntyre, AV, 192. 
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the relational and human element from interactions involving justice. Yet, a person's 
feelings, opinions, wants and desires should not be the most influential factors, or 
given undue weight, in a moral decision. We want to prohibit subjective factors from 
inappropriately influencing moral interactions. So, moral judgments might require an 
objective, rational element which is recognisable and accessible to all. Furthermore, 
&objective' does not necessarily mean totally unemotional. An adequate framework 
for moral decision-making recognises both objective and subjective elements. 322 It 
offers a holistic approach, providing an appropriate place and weighting for both 
reason and emotions. 
323 
What people deserve, want and need may be very different. Some people 
want more than they need, like baby-boomers and yuppies, while others need more 
than they want, like elderly people in hospital. Who decides on the standard of desert 
and need? For instance, in America, Mrs. Bobbitt removed part of her unfaithful 
husband's anatomy. She might claim he received what he deserved or needed, while 
Mr. Bobbitt might claim otherwise. Part of his claim against deserving or needing 
such treatment might be that his wife's punishment was disproportionate to his 
offence, unfair and inappropriate. 
Desert, fairness and appropriateness can be related to rewards and 
punishments. Are rewards and punishments appropriate for all contexts? This seems 
unlikely. In a hospital it is not appropriate to apply a system of rewards and 
punishments to patients, but in reality this happens. Patients are rewarded or punished 
by nursing staff in an informal, subjective way based on patients' personality and 
demand level. Difficult patients are often treated differently from more 
accommodating or likeable patients. One problem is this system of rewards and 
322 See pp. 186-8. 
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punishments is informal and not explicit. Difficult patients are not aware of the 
potential effect of their interaction with nurses, and in danger of being discriminated 
against, however blatantly or subtly. It is not fair or appropriate to respond to patients 
primarily in this subjective way. We need a means of protecting patients from such 
non-explicit biases. 324 
In contrast to desert or fairness, justice may focus on needs and wants. Needs 
may be objective and subjective. 325 Objective needs are primarily those which are 
basic to human life and necessary for survival, while subjective needs are not 
fundamental to survival. Want is connected to, but distinct from, need as it implies 
not having or lacking something. People often confuse these concepts, claiming to 
'need' something which is actually a want. 
Further critical examination of justice noted dangers of desert and merit alone, 
the potential role of fairness and appropriateness in moral decision-making. A 
holistic approach, including rational and emotional, objective and subjective elements 
regarding persons and moral judgments was investigated. These judgments also 
might involve rights. 
Rights 
MacIntyre argues "rights" are "fictionS,, 326 and not universal features of the 
human condition. 327 If this is the case, then what is the basis of rights claims? 
323 See pp. 215-17. 
324 The nurse's own view of practice and responsibility, as well as United Kingdom Code of Conduct 
(UKCC) for nurses, provide some level of protection for patients. See "fhe Code of Professional 
Conduct for Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors, " United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, 
Midwifery and Health Visiting, (London: UKCC, 1984). 
325 See p. 46 where Downie and Telfer discuss absolute and relative needs. 
326 MacIntyre, AV, 70. 
327 Ibid., 66-70. 
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One arena where rights claims might make sense is the legal world. 328 We can 
talk about a woman's right to have an abortion. In Britain, this right was specified in 
law in 1967-68 . 
329 There are restrictions and limitations on the right to abortion, but 
as long as a woman fulfils the legal requirements of the law, she is entitled to an 
abortion. Rights in law imply responsibilities. If a woman has a right to have an 
abortion, then society, usually through doctors, has a corresponding responsibility to 
provide abortions. 
The question arises whether there are human or natural rights above and 
beyond legal ones. MacIntyre argues persuasively that it is not possible to discover 
an adequate base for human or natural rights. 330 
While legal rights make sense, it is less clear how human and natural rights 
can be defended or proved. Within a legal framework, a nation accepts responsiblities 
for its members, who can thus claim rights. It is harder to see how there are 
fundamental rights for people simply on the basis of their humanity, because it is 
unclear who has the reponsibility to provide what is required. 
Yet, despite such arguments against wider notions of rights, Western culture is 
saturated with rights-claims. This may be because people have such a highly 
developed moral sense that they are constantly aware of others' rights. It may reflect 
the rise in autonomy of the self as seen in law and expressed as individual rights. At 
times there is a confusion of human rights with human needs and freedoms. There 
may be basic human needs which we all have a moral responsibility, duty and 
323 Legal rights may depend on a particular view of laws and rules in which they serve as minimum 
standards people must meet or keep. For example, racial discrimination laws were instigated to ensure 
certain behaviour was not permitted or tolerated. 
329 See British Medical Association, Rights and Responsibilities of Doctors, (London: British Medical 
Association, 1992), 67-70. Yet, this law allows for doctors to refuse to Perform an abortion based on 
conscientious objection. Thus highlighting that legality and morality are not necessarily the same. 
330 See pp. 144-5. Cf. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. 
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obligation to meet. 33 1 The recognition of need is not equivalent to the establishment 
of a right. 
There is further confusion in rights talk between freedoms and rights. Suicide 
is not a crime, 332 so some argue there is a 'right to die'. Rather there is a freedom for 
an individual to take his/her own life. There is no responsibility to kill someone. 
Freedom may be a more accurate description of what some claim as 'rights'. 
Rights talk is valid in legal rather than natural or human contexts. It must be 
distinguishable from needs and freedoms and implies correlative responsibilities. 
MacIntyre and Rawls 
The ethics of justice proposed by MacIntyre and Rawls can be both compared 
and contrasted. Regarding their views of humanity, both theorists discuss a notion of 
persons which includes rationality 
333 and justification, 334 motivation 335 and roles. 336 
While Rawls focuses more on individuals and assumes they are rational, self- 
interested and free, 337 MacIntyre views a human life as having narrative unity and 
being placed within a communal context. 338 Both theorists address community or 
society as including shared ends or values. 
339 While Rawls is more concerned with 
340 
social responsibilities, particularly to the least-advantaged , MacIntyre focuses on 
accountability within a community which encourages the virtueS. 
341 Both authors 
331 See pp. 176-8. See also discussion from a care perspective, p. 46-8,52-3. 
33213MA, Rights and Responsibilities of Doctors, 77. The law was changed in the Suicide Act 1961. It 
is not a criminal offence to commit suicide, but assisted suicide is punishable for up to 14 years 
imprisonment. 
333 See pp. 102,150-4. 
334 See pp. 99-100,156. 
335 See pp. 105-6,154-5. 
336 See pp. 107-8,147-8. 
337 See p. 93-4. 
339 See pp. 149-50. 
339 See pp. 94,149. 
340 See pp. 86-8. 
341 See pp. 149-50. 
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include a notion of virtues and judgment within the moral realm, 342 while MacIntyre 
places more emphasis on the importance of virtues, particularly practical rationality 
and justice. 343 Lastly, although both theorists discuss a view of justice in detail, 
Macintyre bases his on desert, 344 judgment and virtue, 345 while Rawls focuses on 
fairness, 346 equality and rules for applying social justice. 347 
Further differences in perspective involve Rawls' philosophical base as a 
Kantian versus MacIntyre's base drawing from neo-Aristotelian and Thomist 
views. 348 Rawls focuses on individualism not communitarianism, attributed to 
MacIntyre. 349 Rawls is concerned with minimum standards of distributive justice 
which attends to equality of needs and opportunities, 350 while MacIntyre highlights 
the important notion of eudaimonia, 351 or human flourishing, as a maximum standard. 
Despite their differences in content, both MacIntyre and Rawls' ethics of 
justice highlight the common themes of humanity and personhood, society or 
community, morality and justice which are vital to integrating the ethics of justice and 
the ethics of care. 
Conclusion 
Critical analysis of MacIntyre emphasised the importance of tradition, 
personal history and setting as part of the context for persons and decisions. As 
decisions are made by persons, a view of humanity is crucial to understanding 
decisions. The importance of rationality, moral judgment, justification, and emotion 
342 See pp. 104-5,160-5. 
343 See pp. 150-4,160-5. 
14 See pp. 157-60. 
345 See pp. 160-5. 
346 See p. 98. 
347 See pp. 89-91. 
348 See pp. 98,109-10,142-6,160. 
349 See pp. 93-4,149-50. 
350 See pp. 86-7. 
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in contributing to a holistic notion of persons was analysed. People exist in 
communities and societies, which involve a shared project, notions of accountability 
and provide a context for wholeness. Such integrity and unity of life contribute to 
human flourishing, which is part of a maximum, or ideal, standard in community. 
Standards in community also are linked to the virtues and involve judging the moral 
appropriateness and fittingness of situations and decisions. Communities also need 
minimum standards in order to function. These are based on needs, protection and 
justice which includes desert, fairness and equality. 
Further Concluding Remarks: The Ethics of Justice and Care 
The ethics of justice as propounded by MacIntyre and Rawls were selected 
and examined due to their influential impact on contemporary discussions of justice. 
Descriptions of both theories were given on their own terms and two levels of critique 
offered. 
352 
General critiques of MacIntyre address his idealistic view of past morality, 
flawed views of humanity, rationality, justice and the virtues. 353 Critical discussion 
highlighted MacIntyre's critique of liberal individualism and rights, and the danger of 
relativism within his communitarianism and view of traditions. 354 Regarding Rawls' 
theory, general critiques focused on his two principles of justice, objections to his 
original position, his view of persons, as highly individualistic, and society. 
Commentators also examined his theory in relation to an opposing utilitarian 
altemative. 
355 
Critique of MacIntyre and Rawls from a middle way perspective highlights a 
"' See pp. 165-6. 
352 See chapters 3 and 4. 
353 See pp. 168-82. 
354 See , pp. 176-8,178-81 
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number of key areas. 356 The importance of justice, which specifically includes 
fairness, equality, desert, entitlement and equity was examined. Analysis of both 
theorists emphasises a view of persons based on rationality, morality and community, 
while stressing the importance of holistic interaction with people based on their 
integrity, dignity and intrinsic worth. While Rawls notes the importance of positive 
and negative responsibilities and duties in society, MacIntyre emphasises the virtues 
and accountability in community. MacIntyre accurately notes community is part of a 
wider context, including traditions and background, which contributes to a proper 
understanding of persons. Further analysis of both theorists drew out the importance 
of a notion of fittingness and appropriateness within morality, whether regarding 
justification or judgment. 
In seeking some integration of the ethics of justice and the ethics of care, 
critical exploration of both ethics has stressed the need for minimum and maximum 
standards in society. 
357 Minimum standards focus primarily on justice, but also can 
be linked to care. Justice includes considerations of fairness, equality and equity, and 
protects against the weaknesses of care, such as relativism, subjectivism and 
optimism. 
358 Maximum standards focus on benefit for people and helping them 
flourish. Both minimum and maximum standards can be paralleled to negative and 
positive responsibilities, which incorporate duties and attend to needs. 
Responsibilities arise within the context of some community, whether professional or 
personal. The context and background within which persons function provide greater 
understanding for choices made. A view of persons 
involves their relationships, 
rationality, morality, integrity and dignity. Recognising the 
intrinsic worth of persons 
355 See pp. 111-2 1. 
356 See pp. 121-40,183-99. 357 See pp. 68-83,121-40,183-99. 359 See pp. 85-7. 
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supplies a moral basis for individual worth and contributes to holistic interaction with 
them. This approach and understanding of persons includes being appropriate with 
and to them. Judging what is appropriate and fitting to persons and situations is vital 
within morality. Part of analysing moral dilemmas, decisions, judgments and 
justifications is assessing their appropriateness. 
Exploring and critically examining both the ethics of justice and the ethics Of 
care has highlighted five key areas: context, a view of persons, responsibilities, 
principles of justice and appropriateness. As these themes are vital to producing a 
genuine amalgam of both the ethics of care and justice and constructing a middle way, 
their nature, content and relationships must be investigated and analysed more fully. 
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Chgpter Five: A Middle-Way Model 
Introduction 
In critically examining the ethics of care and the ethics of justice different 
themes important for an amalgam of both have arisen and been analysed. A middle 
way model, as offered in this chapter, is one proposed means of integrating care and 
justice. It does not mean literally 'in the middle' of care and justice, but represents an 
amalgam of elements from the two ethics and proposes a more balanced framework 
for morality than either ethic alone. 
A middle way model incorporates elements from both the ethics of care and 
justice and should be viewed as a whole. Its five key elements are context, persons in 
relationship, responsibilities, principles of justice and appropriateness. The element 
of context, including setting, background, culture, frameworks and ideologies and 
persons is important because it provides a foundation for understanding situations and 
decisions. A notion of persons involves rationality, their intrinsic worth and value, a 
holistic approach to them and community. Context, relationships and community give 
rise to responsibilities, which involve fulfilling maximum and minimum standards. 
Principles of justice will play a key role in developing minimum standards of 
interaction and decision-making. Appropriateness is vital in any moral decision or 
judgment, as it helps balance the other factors and aids moral decision-making. 
Context 
Context includes setting and background, culture, underlying ideologies and 
frameworks and persons. 
One clear example of the importance of context for understanding any 
situation is found in approaching literature. In examining any literary text general 
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issues of criticism and interpretation arise. To understand the meaning of the work, 
literary criticism explores different levels of writing, ' such as the setting and context 
in which the text was created, the author's own life, aims, beliefs and values, and the 
social customs, norms and values of the time. 2 
Setting is important to understanding a text, situation, or, as MacIntyre 
recognises, persons. 3 There are multiple settings, both public and private. Within 
health care the setting could be a hospital, general practitioner's surgery, clinic, 
hospice or home. The setting is crucial because it will affect the participants, their 
interactions and choices. It can be more advantageous to some participants than 
others, and put people at their ease or make them more anxious. Understanding the 
setting as part of the whole context is vital in its impact on individuals, groups and 
decisions. 4 
The setting also contributes to what is deemed appropriate. For a person to 
approach a nurse at a social party and request a measles vaccination would be 
inappropriate, because the setting is not professional and the person's condition is not 
an emergency. In contrast, a request for the nurse to perform cardiac resuscitation on 
a person having a heart attack would be appropriate. The life-threatening nature of 
the situation temporarily overrides the usual personal and professional boundaries and 
affects ourjudgment of what is appropriate and inappropriate in the setting and 
context. 
1 In contrast to a classic view of interpretation, the post-modernist emphasis is on the reader, subjective 
interpretation and deconstruction of the text. See E. David Cook, Blind Alley Beliefs, (Leicester: IW, 
1996), 949. 
2 This literary sensitivity has been particularly evident in the interpretation of the Bible and other 
religious texts. Much attention has been given to understanding the meaning, interpretation and 
application of them. In fact, a large contribution to the discussion of contextualisation has developed in 
the arena of Biblical translation, interpretation, application and communication. See also pp. 237-45. 
3 See pp. 147-8. MacIntyre, AV, 206. He claims that an understanding of the setting, and its history, is 
vital to an understanding of a person. 
" See pp. 5-6,9. Gilligan describes women's approach to moral development as being more 
contextually based than men's. 
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One specific aspect of setting is background and culture. There are at least 
two levels of culture which need to be recognised; a person's culture of origin and the 
culture which provides the context for the specific situation. The former is crucial in 
understanding an individual's views, beliefs, values, customs and habits, as he/she 
will have been influenced and shaped fundamentally by it. 5 The latter may or may not 
be different, and can have a positive or negative, liberating or restrictive, impact on 
the individual. Culture influences the creation of norms, values and expectations in a 
given context. 
An enlarged concept of context and a deepened understanding of culture is 
"contextualisation", according to Hesselgrave and Rommen. 6 Culture has both an 
interpretative perspective and a knowledge base. It is related to a body of knowledge 
shared by members of a group, 
7 and takes the forms of formal or informal rules. 8 
Hesselgrave and Rommen emphasise the fact of shared knowledge. It is used to 
interpret and evaluate how individuals and groups relate to one another and their 
environment. This evaluation is based on a learned set of rules which determine the 
appropriateness of behaviour, communication patterns, and emotions. 
9 Furthermore, 
context serves as a mechanism of reference in a situation. 
10 From the culturally 
influenced and shared values and norms, people learn to behave appropriately. 
Hesselgrave and Rommen speak, somewhat cryptically, of culture as a layer of 
context, as they believe contexts are nested within contexts and each is a function of 
5 Hesselgrave and Rommen, Contextualisation, 158-9,165. Shorter, Evangelisation and Culture, 30. 
See pp. 60-1. 
6 Ibid., 28. See pp. 60-2. Cf. Benner and Wrubel's definition of background meaning, which includes 
a shared, public understanding of the world. 
7 Ibid., 158. 
a Ibid., 158. 
9 Ibid., 159. 
10 Ibid., 166. See p. 61. 
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the bigger context, all finding a place within the context of culture. " Theirapproach 
to the understanding of context in relation to culture assumes an integrating body of 
knowledge and language behaviour shared by a number of groups or communities. 12 
Context embodies the total system of cultural principles, inter-community 
communication patterns, and forms of acceptable behaviour in that culture. 13 An 
awareness of the shared communication, knowledge and principles is vital to 
understanding any culture, group or individual. This awareness helps explain 
people's perspective, expectations, understanding and interpretation of the world, and 
their priorities and actions. All these factors illuminate the background of and reasons 
for their choices and decisions. 
Within context, an ideology provides the content of belief systems and values, 
while a framework is the form of expression these beliefs and values take. An 
ideology affects what and how a person interprets and understands a situation, while a 
framework affects the expression of that interpretation. Ideologies can be either 
implicit or explicit in the process of interaction and decision-making, and provide 
crucial information about an individual, group or institution's values. It is vital that 
ideologies are not ignored, but explicitly recognised, if we are to understand fully the 
context, including the motives, agenda, methods, and meanings, in any situation. 
Given that in most instances of interaction with people there are likely to be 
more than one set of values and ideologies held, we are bound to face conflicts. In 
being more sensitive to grasping context, we can sharpen our awareness of potential 
11 Ibid., 165. The authors seem to be confusing a description of different layers of culture with that of 
circles of culture. Elsewhere they refer to levels of culture, which is clearer (166-7). 
12 Ibid., 165. They view language as a "means of expressing and disseminating the content of culture, 
and believe it functions as the key to and primary vehicle of the reflective processes which generate the 
ppol of shared knowledge that defines a given culture (161). 
', ' Ibid., 165. They argue we should never overlook this wider dimension in the relationship between 
context and the process of contextualisation, but also recognise the breadth of this dimension may be 
problematic because at this level only general phenomena can be predicted and described. 
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friction points between ideologies. These points include conflicts of ideologies, 
values, beliefs, ends, or means, as well as conflicts of theory, practice or application. 
One means of resolving these different levels of conflict may be an appeal to the 
notion of appropriateness, as it takes many of the factors and layers of context into 
consideration as we judge what is appropriate and fitting to the people, situation, 
roles, values, and resources. 14 
Within each element of context, persons have a crucial place. Interpreting 
context and understanding individuals should begin with a holistic perspective of the 
people involved. In every situation and context, the participants are persons with 
motives, agenda, choices to make, and consequences to face. They are complex, 
rnulti-dimensional beings with personal and social histories. 15 These histories include 
their familial, relational, emotional, intellectual, spiritual, psychological, physical, and 
cultural backgrounds. 
16 To avoid being too simplistic or reductionistic in our dealings 
with others, we must attempt to gain a balanced and complete picture of their context, 
history, and personal story. 17 One key to grasping fully and interpreting accurately a 
particular context is through viewing persons as totalities, and not simply reducing 
them to their role in a particular situation, like patients, clients, nurses, doctors, or 
managers. 18 
14 See pp. 237-45. 
15 Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 27-8. Maclntyre, AV, 217. See pp. 62,145-6. 
16 Ibid., 45-6. See pp. 60-1. This notion of personhood is a crucial theme for this middle way, and the 
discussion will return to and explore it in more depth later. See pp. 208-23. 
17 See pp. 145-6. MacIntyre, AV, 218-19. It is interesting to note that MacIntyre relates the notion of 
texts to personhood. 
Is see also Walsh, "Knowledge in its Social Setting, " 321-36. There are two interesting points to 
highlight in relation to Walsh's article. The first is his claim that far from being irrelevant, the social 
context of claims to knowledge is vital to whether the claims succeed and to their correct adjudication. 
So he also recognises the importance of context. The second point is that Walsh stresses that the 
tradition of a branch of knowledge is important to its progress, because the members of a profession 
... stand on the shoulders of predecessors and 
depend, in a way which is quite unavoidable, on the co- 
operation of colleagues. " We might infer that the tradition and background of a profession, or branch 
of knowledge, is vital to understanding it and to its progress. 
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Gaining a more complete understanding of any situation context is crucial in 
moral decision-making. It involves setting and background, which includes culture, 
its shared knowledge, interpretation, expectations and understanding, and the 
underlying ideologies and frameworks of persons, groups, institutions or 
communi ies. 
Persons in RelationshiI2 
A view of persons is crucial to the theory and practice of a middle way, as it 
shapes our interaction with and expectations of others, particularly in determining 
appropriateness. 
Rationality 
One important aspect of persons is rationality. 19 Part of understanding persons 
involves rational knowledge of others and ourselves. For Blustein, self-knowledge 
involves knowledge about people's concerns and what motivates their own actions 
and influences their lives. 
20 Being realistic about ourselves will help us identify our 
motives, and then assess their appropriateness in relation to decisions, their 
application and context. We must be careful not to interpret a view of self-knowledge 
in too limited a way. It does involve an awareness of why we act as we do, but 
surpasses intellectual and behavioural knowledge of what motivates and influences us. 
Self-knowledge also includes what affects us emotionally and spiritually and how our 
physical being functions and reacts. Self-knowledge must include all of these levels 
19 Cf. Noddings stresses the importance of relationship, receptivity, emotion and caring rather than 
rationality. See pp. 50-1,55-6. Gilligan highlights women's emphasis on relationships, connection 
and responsibilities, not rationality. See pp. 5,11. Cf. Benner and Wrubel's phenomenological view 
pp. 60-2. 
20 See p. 62. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 56. 
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in order to be balanced and holistic, to enable us to assess accurately our motives and 
find appropriate ways of expressing them in the context. 
On an ontological level, rationality is a fundamental part of recognising, 
understanding and expressing what there is and how we describe that reality. A key 
assumption is that our world makes sense, reality is intelligible, and there are patterns 
and regularity in nature which are rational and sensible. We also assume people are 
generally rational and able to make sense of the world, things and other people. 
Because things make sense and people can make sense, people can make sense of 
what makes sense. There seems to be an inherent intelligibility in the nature of things 
and an inherent intelligence in the nature of people. 21 On an epistemological level, 
some people claim rationality is concerned with the process of knowing and what we 
know. It deals with our knowledge and understanding of reality. On a linguistic 
level, some people claim rationality is linked to and makes possible communication. 
The means of communication most often make sense and are reasonable and rational. 
The use of language seems to assume the human capacity for understanding, being 
rational, the ability to express ourselves and to be understood in reasonable ways. 22 In 
these understandings of rationality, ontology, epistemology and communication are 
part and parcel of the rationality of human beings. 
23 
Downie and Telfer place great weight on an individual's rational capacities, 24 
and Rawls assumes people are rational, self-interested and free, or autonomous. 25 For 
21 See p. 148-9. MacIntyre, AV, 217-18. He notes the importance of intelligibility in humans. 
22 Cf. Hesselgrave and Rommen, Contextualization, 161. They view language as a'ýmeans of 
expressing and disseminating the content of a culture". They believe "it functions as the key to, and 
primary vehicle of, the reflective processes which generate the pool of shared knowledge that defines a 
gven culture. " 
T. F. Torrance, Theological Science, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). T. F. Torrance, God 
and Rationality, (London: Oxford University Press, 197 1). 
I See pp. 63-5. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 38-9. 
25 See pp. 86,93. Rawls, TJ, II- 13,141-4. 
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these authors rationality involves, in part, exercising choice. 26 An alternative view of 
individuals is Benner and Wrubel's non-reflective, phenomenological perspective. 27 
One difficulty with accepting a phenomenological view is the two-tiered view 
of persons created, which places non-reflective elements above the rational . 
28 This 
hierarchy, which places bodily over mental knowing, fails to recognise the vital role 
both play in creating a balanced and holistic notion of personhood. For to over- 
emphasise either the mental and intellectual or embodied and physical dimension of 
humans leads to an incomplete and simplistic view of them. 29 
Furthermore, a purely phenomenological view of persons leaves them and 
others without an intelligible means of understanding the world and communicating 
with others. Individuals would not be able to describe reality without some agreed 
form of communication. Their understanding of the world would be limited to their 
own subjective perspective. If knowledge is primarily subject to personal 
interpretation and experience and there is no recognised ontological reality, then there 
is no common base for understanding the world, testing our experience and 
interpretation of reality, or interacting with others. If persons are fundamentally non- 
rational beings, and subjective experience is the essential means of understanding 
reality and different contexts, then there is no intelligible way of communicating with 
or about persons. Reality becomes completely subjective. 
We can verify our assessment of reality by describing it to others and 
comparing it with their description. Our interpretation of reality can be checked 
against reality itself. If there is no objective agreement about reality, then knowledge, 
understanding, and meaning become subjective. If this subjective interpretation is the 
26 See pp. 63-4,93-5. 
27 See pp. 60-2. Benner and Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring, 41-2. 
28 See P. 81. 
29 For a more detailed discussion of holism see pp. 215-17. 
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only way to understand reality, then reality becomes relative to a particular individual, 
time and place. If reality is relativistic, there is no obvious way of interacting with, 
communicating about, or achieving a verifiable understanding of it. 
Not only does rationality involve theoretical knowledge of ourselves, others 
and reality, but also a practical element. MacIntyre argues phronesis is a key virtue. 30 
Choosing the relevant principles and applying them in particular contexts provides a 
basis not only for judgment itself, but the defence or justification of that judgment. 
In exercising phronesis, we may appeal to what is fitting and appropriate, as 
these are part of determining what is reasonable. Principles, their application and our 
choices need to make sense within the context and with respect to the potential 
consequences. Our choices also must be appropriate to the persons involved, their 
natures and roles, the community, relationships and dilemmas involved and resources 
available. 31 So, being reasonable, making reasonable and justifiable choices, involves 
practical considerations in order to make sense and be fitting and appropriate. 
Community or society provides a context for judgments, as shared standards 
of rationality and knowledge are found within them. A community helps make sense 
of being, knowing, and communicating. How would an individual, or others, ever 
know that he/she was rational unless there were common standards by which to judge 
rationality? For through rationality we experience, acknowledge and test our 
observations, perceptions, and reflections and express our understanding of the world. 
Rationality enables us to communicate these to others. 
A crucial aspect of communication is explanation and justification. This 
dimension of rationality assumes we give reasons for our actions and that they make 
sense to other people. We assume agreed forms of justification, namely what counts 
10 See p. 164. 
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as good or bad reasons for doing or not doing something. Yet, there is a deeper level 
on which justification operates. It is an accepted part of life, particularly in our 
Western culture, society and tradition. The fact that we expect people to justify their 
actions, that we do not question the basic appropriateness of requiring justification, 
highlights the universality of this conception. While we may query someone's right 
to call in question what we have done and to demand a justification on the grounds 
that they have no status or standing in the matter, we do not imagine that no one has 
the right to demand some kind of justification. This particular demand for 
justification may be queried, but not justification itself. Justification is assumed and 
linked to rationality, judgment, appropriateness, the context of a situation and an 
understanding of persons and relationships. 
For Rawls, justification is a matter of the mutual support of many 
considerations and of "everything fitting together" into a coherent view. 32 Rawls 
stresses the need for considerations to make sense and to hold together in a coherent 
fashion. If the considerations do not make sense, they are incoherent. As rationality 
is vital to our making sense of the world, this coherence implies some form of 
rationality. That rationality is connected to what is appropriate and fitting. To be 
coherent and justified we need rationality and fittingness to make sense of things. 
Making sense of one part of such systems happens by testing its coherence with the 
rest of the system. Justification and explanation are in light of the whole system. 33 
31 See pp. 23745. 
32 See p. 99-100. Rawls, TJ, 21,579. See further discussion of this point on p. 238. 
33 This can be linked to the coherence theory of truth, where a statement cannot be understood 
appropriately or fully apart from its place in the whole system. The truth or falsity of a statement or 
conception depends on it fitting in with the whole system. See Bradley, Appearance and Reality and 
Essays on Truth and Reality. 
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The rationality, self-knowledge, practical judgments and justification of 
persons have been examined. To avoid placing undue weight and value on their 
rational capacities, other sources of individuals' worth need to be investigated. 
Intrinsic Worth 
As argued, one possible source for valuing persons rests in their having or 
exhibiting certain capacities. 34 Downie and Telfer stress the role of capacities in 
valuing persons. 35 This view leads to basing human worth on desert and merit 
regarding capacities. As individuals possess capacities to differing degrees, this view 
leads to a hierarchy of persons, where some are valued above others. This scenario 
leaves the "less capable" and "less worthy" individuals at risk of being marginalised, 
ignored and exploited. 36 
For example, a patient may have locked-in syndrome and be unable to exhibit 
self-determination, form or pursue ideal values, or make choices and commitments. 37 
The patient could be fully aware of everything taking place around her, but be unable 
to indicate that awareness in any way. This patient might know whether she wants to 
live or die, possessing the capacity for self-determination or forming values, but be 
unable to communicate this self-determination to anyone else. Alternatively, another 
patient might be unconscious and unable to determine anything about her life or 
formulate any values. Under Downie and Telfer's notion of respect for persons, both 
these patients are unable to exhibit any of the necessary capacities, and would be at 
34 See pp. 208-9. 
35 See p. 209. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 38-9,41. 
36 See pp. 63-4,81-2. Downie and Telfer recognise the variation in capacities and distinguish between 
66normal" and "sub-normal" human beings. 
37 See pp. 63-4. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 38-9. 
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risk of being under-valued, deemed unworthy and potentially harmed. This points to 
the need for a more adequate base for valuing human beings. 
Rawls stresses the role of capacity in assessing individual worth. The capacity 
for a sense of justice is a minimum requirement for being entitled to equal justice and 
liberty and for moral personality. 38 The capacity for moral personality is a 
"sufficient", but not "stringent", condition for being entitled to equal justice and 
liberty. 39 Rawls acknowledges some persons do not possess the capacity for moral 
personality, " but does not elaborate on who they might be. They might include the 
severely mentally handicapped and mentally insane. Rawls does claim those with 
"lesser capacity" should be given the "full protection of justice" . 
41 Rawls rightly 
notes the need to provide protection for them, which includes protection from others 
or themselves. One danger is the individuals who do not meet his minimum capacity 
and requirements would not be entitled to the same benefits as others. Rawls 
accurately emphasises the need for an agreed minimum standard in society which is 
linked to protection for all members, particularly the vulnerable, but his basis for this 
claim seems unstable. 
Although Rawls has an underlying Kantian view of individuals, his emphasis 
on capacities may obscure this basis in his theory. 
42 Kant believed that individuals 
should be treated as ends in themselves and never only as meanS. 
43 All human beings 
have dignity and unconditional worth. 44 If something has a price, it can be replaced 
38 See pp. 104. Rawls, TJ, 506-7. 
39 See pp. 104. Rawls, TJ, 504-5. 
40 See pp. 104. Rawls, TJ, 506. 
41 Rawls, TJ, 506. 
42 See pp. 104-5. Rawls, TJ, 179-80. 
43 Kant, The Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, 54. Paton, The Moral Law, 32. In relation to 
ends Kant discusses hypothetical and categorical imperatives (36,44). See also Paton, The Moral Law, 
27-30. 
44 Ibid., 60. See pp. 64-5. Blustein argues it is a morally significant fact that individuals are the 
particular persons they are and have intrinsic and unique value as such. See Blustein, Care and 
Commitment, 203. 
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by an equivalent. If something is above price, and there is no equivalent, then it has a 
dignity. 45 For Kant, 
... that which constitutes the condition under which alone something 
can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i. e., a price, 
but an intrinsic worth, i. e., dignity. 46 
For Kant, humanity, as far as it is capable of morality, has this dignity. 
47 This implies 
that Kant requires people to possess and exhibit some moral capacity in order to have 
dignity. Although there seems to be a tension within Kant's work between the 
intrinsic value and dignity of humanity and a capacity for morality, his main emphasis 
is that human beings are not replaceable and do have intrinsic worth . 
48 Recognising 
this worth and dignity serves as a means of protecting people, as individuals would 
not have to prove themselves by exhibiting capacities, but would have value simply in 
being human. 
Some authors place value on persons because they exhibit certain capacities, 
like rationality and moral personality. The dangers of this view support the need to 
protect the 'less capable'. One way of ensuring all people are not endangered, 
rejected or exploited, and offering a basis forjust, fair, and equitable treatment, is 
acknowledging the intrinsic worth and dignity of persons. Recognising this value 
provides a foundation for an holistic view of them. 
Holism 
To gain and maintain a balanced understanding of persons, we must recognise 
they are complex and multi-dimensiona09 Persons are rational, emotional, physical 
and spiritual. A danger of focusing too heavily on some aspects of persons and not 
Ibid., 60. 
`6 Ibid., 60. 
47 Ibid., 60. 
48 Ibid., 60. 
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others, is of being simplistic in our understanding of them. This over-simplification 
can lead to reductionism, where we view persons through a particular aspect or 
aspects of their being. Reductionism views people only in a narrow way, diminishes 
our understanding of their value or worth. 
50 In contrast to reductionism, MacIntyre argues for the unity of a human life. 
He also notes the effect on persons when they are reduced to the roles they perform. 
The unity of their life disappears. 51 The person of integrity has a life which involves 
"wholeness, entireness, completenesS,,. 52 In contrast, if we view persons only with 
respect to their roles we lack a balanced and complete understanding of them and are, 
therefore, unable to relate to them in a holistic way. Such a reduction of per sons and 
lack of awareness of their integrity may lead to treating them in inappropriate or even 
harmful ways. 
To treat people appropriately and holistically involves both their protection 
and well-being. That requires both minimum standards of protection and restraint of 
harm and maximum standards which facilitate people's flourishing. 
MacIntyre views flourishing as eudaimonia, and ties it to the exercise of the 
virtues. 53 He accurately stresses the importance of community for exercising the 
54 55 
virtues and achieving eudaimonia. Individuals might be able to exist and survive 
in isolation, but they would be unable to thrive and flourish. The idea of well-being 
and flourishing is most productively based within community and relationships. For 
this community to exist and survive, people must recognise a fundamental, minimal 
49 See pp. 131,185 
-50 See pp. 147-8. MacIntyre, AV, 204-5,218-9. 
51 See pp. 147-8. Maclntyre, AV, 204. 
52 See pp. 54-5,163. J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 1066. MacIntyre, AV, 203. 
53 See p. 165-6. Maclntyre, AV, 148-9. Cf. Finnis who connects flourishing to human goods, 
friendship, rights and community. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 87,144,192,219-20,380. 
54 See p. 149. MacIntyre, WJWR, 103 and AV, 147-8. 
51 Seep. 149,165-6. MacIntyre, WJWR, 107-8. 
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56 
responsibility of non-maleficence to others. People also may need to recognise a 
maximum, or ideal, of seeking not only their own, but others' well-being. For, if 
everyone is primarily seeking their own well-being, then only a proportion of society 
will flourish, namely the strong, cunning, and assertive. This is because weaker or 
'less capable' members of society might need the aid of others to attain well-being. 
These members could be placed in particularly vulnerable positions and at a great risk 
of being ignored, exploited or marginalised. This argument for a maximum in 
community is pragmatic. There also may be a principled foundation for such a 
maximum, e. g. we have a responsibility or duty to aid others' well-being and 
flourishing. 57 
A holistic notion of persons acknowledges their many dimensions and seeks to 
avoid being reductionistic or simplistic. It enables people to gain a more complete 
and balanced understanding of others, minimum and maximum standards of 
interaction, recognise people's integrity, value them appropriately and respond to 
them in ways which contribute to their flourishing. Meeting these standards is 
successful within a community which values individuals and relationships. 
Relatedness and Community 
One important feature of community is having shared values and ends which 
members recognise . 
58 This provides a common goal or vision. Rawls claims in a 
social union, or community, the shared end is not merely a common desire for the 
same particular things. He states 
56 The concept of non-maleficence can be found in Kant. See Paton, The Moral Law, 31-2. 
57 For instance see Rawls' discussion of the Kantian notions of duties for mutual aid and respect, p. 
109-10. For further discussion of minimum and maximum responsibilities see pp. 223-9. Both the 
ragmatic and principle base for this maximum are evident in the health care professions. 
'Seep. 94,149. Rawls, TJ, pp. 526-7. MacIntyre, AV, 156. 
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The essential thing is that there be a sharedfinal end and accepted 
ways of advancing it which allow for the public recognition of the 
attainments of everyone. When this end is achieved, all find 
satisfaction in the very same thing; and this fact together with the 
complementary nature of the good of individuals affirms the tie of 
community. 59 
One difficulty with this requirement of shared ends and means is finding a way to 
agree them within a pluralistic society. 
60 There are at least two different levels of 
difficulty here. First, there are many different ends and values which may be 
incompatible and conflict. Secondly, even if we could identify shared ends and 
values, it may be difficult to agree the means of advancing them. 61 For example, 
people might agree on the value and sanctity of human life. Yet, they might disagree 
on the best means of upholding this value. Some might claim maximising individual 
freedom is the best means of achieving it, while others might argue minimising harm 
is vital. While acknowledging the reality of such disagreement, people seem to 
recognise that some agreed minimum and maximum standards are necessary for a 
62 
community or society to function and flourish. 
Individuals do not live in vacuums. 63 MacIntyre, argues it is always within 
some particular type of community that we learn or fail to learn to exercise the 
virtues. 64 A community has a role, whether positive or negative, in shaping our moral 
character and interaction with others. 
65 A community, whether personal or 
59 See p. 94. Rawls, TJ, 526. Emphases added. 
60 See pp. 183-4. 
61 See pp. 129. 
61 See pp. 223-9. Also Cook, Dilemmas of Life, 62. 
63 Rawls discusses the social nature of humanity. See p. 105. Rawls, TJ, 43 8,522-3. Cf Conford, The 
Personal World., John MacMurray on self and society, 7 1. MacMurray not only believes "the isolated, 
purely individual self is a fiction". but that we become persons in community, in relation to others, and 
that human life is inherently a common life. He also states our freedom as individuals depends on the 
co-operation of others. Furthermore the whole apparatus of our life is provided by others, and elements 
including material resources, language, thoughts, ideals are only partially our own (164-5). 
" See p. 149. MacIntyre, AV, 194-5. 
65 Cf. Finnis who states that community is a "means" indispensable to the realising of most aspects of 
human well-being. Community is part of human flourishing. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
192,380. 
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professional, contributes to and affects an understanding of ourselves and others and 
helps us determine what is appropriate and inappropriate. 66 
Within a professional community, the behaviour of a doctor who falls in love 
with one of his patients and acts on these feelings would be deemed inappropriate. If 
he continued to treat her, his personal feelings and involvement would confuse the 
proper boundaries of the doctor-patient relationship. He also might take advantage of 
his position and inappropriately pressurise the patient. The professional community 
has guidelines and standards which define the appropriate nature of a professional 
relationship. 67 If the patient was from another surgery, the doctor could avoid the risk 
of his professional judgment being inappropriately affected by his emotions, taking 
advantage of his role and blurring the appropriate personal and professional 
relationship. Different factors within a community and communities 
68 help determine 
whether a situation, action or relationship is appropriate or inappropriate, including 
setting, context, professional standards and requirements, expectations and 
responsibilities. 
69 
A vital aspect of community is the relationships which comprise it. Gilligan 
claims women view relationships as important and interconnected, 
70 which affects 
their interactions with others. Gilligan accurately notes the connectedness of people, 
highlighting that our perspective of how we relate and are related will influence our 
interactions with others. Our perspective of how people function and operate in 
society, as single or inter-connected individuals, will affect our relationships with and 
66 The impact of community in judging appropriateness can be paralleled to that of culture. See pp. 
203-6,211-12. 
1 General Medical Council, "Professional Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Practice, " (London: 
GMC, 1992). 
" There are at least three different communities with which the doctor is involved: the professional 
community of other doctors, the inter-professional community of his surgery, and the personal 
community of his loved ones and friends. 61 See pp. 203-8. - 
"Gilligan, DY, 19,73. Seep. 5. 
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expectations of others. A nurse might refuse to follow a consultant's request to 
administer a drug dosage which she knows would kill the comatose patient. She has a 
professional responsibility to make her own clinical judgment about the 
appropriateness of the dose and a professional liability for the injection she gives. 71 
As part of a clinical team, the nurse's refusal conflicts with the consultant's 
instruction. The nurse also is part of a professional community with standards 
regarding appropriate and inappropriate levels of medication. As an individual, the 
nurse serves as an advocate for the patient and family's wishes. These different levels 
of relationship affect the nurse's expectations and actions, and involve both her 
professional clinical judgment and personal care and can conflict. 
Rawls also notes the importance of expectations in our relationships with one 
another. He argues people are "chain-connected" and their expectations are "close- 
knit,,. 72 If we fail to recognise that we are connected and that our decisions and 
actions affect others and their expectations, one danger is of ignoring potential 
consequences to and conflicts with others. For example, one nurse thinks she should 
provide euthanasia for a patient, while another nurse believes palliative care is the 
best option. That both nurse and patient recognise the nurse is actually part of a 
professional community, with certain expectation and standards, is imperative. These 
standards provide minimum expectations, protect the patient and nurse and help 
determine what is appropriate and inappropriate in professional relationships. They 
may also point in the direction of an ideal nurse and nurse-patient relationship, which 
is more of a maximum standard. 
Recognising we are part of a community and in relationship entails a degree of 
mutuality and reciprocity. Noddings advocates reciprocity within personal caring 
71 'The Code of Professional Conduct for Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors, " UKCC. 
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relationships and claims is it necessary. 73 Noddings supports not only the expectation 
of reciprocity, but the requirement of it. 74 In contrast, there are at least two categories 
of non-reciprocal individuals: those who are unable to reciprocate and those who 
choose not to reciprocate. 75 The first includes people who are unconscious, and it 
seems difficult to require reciprocity from them. For the second type, it seems unclear 
what type of sanctions we could impose which would make them become reciprocal. 
Yet, if an individual has no concept or awareness of reciprocity at all, we think there 
is something wrong. We view them as amoral or psychopathiC. 76 So, some notion 
and appreciation of reciprocity and mutuality is important. 
Perhaps we ought not to require specific types or views of reciprocity, 
particular actions which qualify as reciprocal or not, but rather require an awareness 
and recognition of it. This awareness may be part of what it means to be moral beings 
and contribute to a minimum standard of what it means to be in relationship and 
belong to a community. 
Exploring reciprocity in relation to needs in a professional realm, Campbell 
argues the core of reciprocity is that both parties have needs and receive something 
through their interaction. 77 Recognising this situation helps avoid imbalance and 
maintain reciprocity. 78 It may be important to recognise needs on both sides of a 
relationship, as they can be appropriate or inappropriate. It could be inappropriate for 
the carer to function in a professional context to fulfil her needs. A nurse who needs 
to be in control can inappropriately influence her patient's decision or choices. She 
72 See p. 90. Rawls, TJ, 80. 
73 See pp. 48-9. Noddings, Caring, 68,71. Noddings does not explicitly elaborate on how caring is 
fulfilled in this passage. She seems to imply that the cared-for must recognise that the one-caring is 
caring in some way for it to be true caring. 
74 See pp. 48-9. 
11 These categories may be similar to those of non-contributing members of a community. 
76 Such individuals might be placed in prison or mental hospitals. 
77 See p. 49. Campbell, Moderated Love, 105. 
78 See p. 49. Campbell, Moderated Love, 106. 
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might present treatment options in a forceful way which is extremely difficult for the 
patient to question. The patient might simply agree to do what the nurse advocates. 
The nurse would be undermining and not valuing the patient's wishes and autonomy. 
It is about requiring reciprocity and having an awareness of appropriate and 
inappropriate aspects of a reciprocal relationship. At least a minimum line must be 
drawn. 
Reciprocity in relationships involves a certain level of commitment to other 
persons. People can make a commitment because they care for or have an interest, 
whether personal or professional, in another. Noddings accurately emphasises the 
importance of making a commitment in caring, because feelings of caring or 
engrossment are not sustained. 
79 Yet, her assumption that people will do this is 
optimistic, 80 and her definition of committing for an appropriate time span is vague. 81 
instead of basing commitment on feelings or an ambiguous time span it is preferable 
to explore commitment as a rational and volitional decision. 82 If people decide to 
make a commitment, then they are more likely to recognise responsibilities in relation 
to others. 
One aspect of commitment involves accountability. 83 MacIntyre's view of 
accountability is connected to providing an intelligible 84 and justifiable explanation of 
our actions to appropriate people, i. e. those entitled to ask for or require justification. 
Accountability also involves being committed to others and fulfilling our 
responsibilities, or providing acceptable reasons why we are unable to do so. It means 
we are answerable to others. The justifications we offer will be judged as acceptable 
79 See p. 54. Noddings, Caring, 16. 
' See p. 71. 
91 See p. 54. Noddings, Caring, 16. 
" See pp. 53-4. Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 8-9. 
" See pp. 148-9. MacIntyre AV, 209,217-18. 
"See pp. 148-9. MacIntyre's, AV, 209,217. 
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or unacceptable, based on the communal or societal standards. Accountability also 
means others are required to offer acceptable, rational justifications for their actions. 
As each person knows he/she is answerable to others for his/her decision and actions, 
accountability may help limit harm done to others in a community. 
Shared values and ends, connectedness, reciprocity, commitment and 
accountability, are important to relationships between individuals and the community 
as a whole. These elements give rise to the need for minimum and maximum 
standards and responsibilities. 
Resp: )nsibilities 
Fulfilling responsibilities makes sense within relationship and community and 
involves reference to minimum and maximum standards. Gilligan and Tschudin 
accurately recognise a connection between responsibilities and relationships. " 
Tschudin also argues responsibilities are related to duty, rights and freedom. 86 They 
87 
can be positive, related to care and benefit, or negative, linked to restraint of harm. 
According to Tschudin, both persons and institutions can have responsibilities 
and these sometimes conflict. 
88 Gustafson and Laney argue the process of decision- 
making sometimes involves conflicting responsibilities. Different levels of 
responsibility in a community or society may require developing a hierarchy of 
responsibilities to aid decision-making and prioritisation when they conflict. 
85 See pp. 5,52-3. Gilligan, DV, 73. Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 74-5. Gustafson and Laney, On 
Being Responsible, 4-5. Gilligan who argues women construct morality in terms of relationships and 
responsibilities rather than abstract rights and rules. Tschudin states being responsible involves a 
ersonal aspect and engaging with people. 
See pp. 52-3. Tschudin, Ethics in Nursing, 74-5. Although responsibilities can be discussed in 
relation to rights, we have argued human rights should not be confused with human freedoms. See pp. 
195-7. 
87 See pp. 52-3. MacIntyre argues against and differentiates rights claims from need, want and benefit. 
See pp. 144-5. 
as See pp. 52-3. TSchudin, Ethics in Nursing, 75-7. 
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Resolving such conflict involves asking what is an appropriate responsibility to and 
for people and things. 89 
Part of the inter-relatedness and interactions of people involves mutual 
expectationeo and mutual responsibilities. Gustafson and Laney note that habituation 
plays a key role in facilitating communal existence and interaction, as we respond 
with customary reactions and assume that others also will respond in this appropriate 
way. 91 Appropriateness can be determined by parents, schools, community, wider 
culture and society which contribute to such habituation. Within our own context, we 
are either taught explicitly or implicitly how to fulfil our responsibilities and the types 
92 
of behaviour which are acceptable or unacceptable. The appropriateness of our 
behaviour and responsibilities is influenced and affected by our context and 
community. 
one specific area where old habits and patterns of behaviour can fail is in 
relation to new problems in society. Gustafson and Laney rightly stress the need for 
reflection on responsibilities in these new dilemmas. 
" With new technology we can 
screen pregnant women and their foetuses for genetically inherited diseases, like 
Huntingdon's Chorea. Previously, the child would have to be born, and maybe even 
reach adulthood, before the disease could be detected. Now we have to decide 
whether to screen or not to screen and where our responsibilities, for the screen results 
and the actions taken, as individuals and a community lie. New dilemmas involve 
new responsibilities. 
" Gustafson and Laney, On Being Responsible, 7. 
90 Ibid., 4. 
91 Ibid., 5. 
92 See pp. 203-8. 
"Gustafson and Laney, On Being Responsible, 5. See p. 53. 
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Regarding responsibilities, Rawls speaks of duties as being positive or 
negative, 94 which parallels beneficence and non-maleficence. This distinction of 
responsibilities may play a key role in discerning what is appropriate to and from 
people both on a minimal and maximal level. For a patient, appropriate treatment 
from a nurse or doctor involves minimally not causing harm. The patient also expects 
that the nurse or doctor will try to do good and to cure him, if possible, which seems a 
maximum aim. There is a difference between a nurse who minimally tends to a 
patient's physical needs and one who relates holistically to him/her. We need to 
recognise some minimum standards which limit harm to persons and maximum 
standards which have the aim of beneficence, ultimately contributing to persons' 
flourishing. 
A minimum standard of doing no harm to people ensures that the vulnerable 
are not exploited, ignored, or marginalised. Rawls is concerned for the least 
95 
advantaged members of society. He builds into his theory of justice protection for 
them, arguing social and economic inequalities are to be distributed so they are to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged in society. 96 In agreeing with the importance 
of protecting the least advantaged and vulnerable in society, the need for 
responsibility which surpasses the socio-economic realm is emphasised. We cannot 
isolate the socio-economic level of personhood without being reductionistic and, 
instead, we need to protect persons on all levels whether physical, mental, emotional, 
or spiritual. So we need a notion of responsibilities which is more extensive than 
Rawls appears to offer. 
" See pp. 109-10. Rawls, TJ, 114. 
95 See pp. 86-8. 
96 See p. 86. Also Rawls, TJ, 15,302. Maclntyre takes issue with Rawls' notion of distributive justice 
based on equality with respect to needs and the 'worst-off' sector, and notes that Rawls' conception of 
justice leaves no room for the notion of desert. See p. 160. MacIntyre, AV, 247-52. 
225 
A wider notion of responsibility involves balancing the needs of all members 
of a community or society. This happens on both micro and macro levels regarding 
resource allocation. ' In health care with limited resourceS, 97 a doctor and nurse may 
have a responsibility to balance one patient's need for a hip replacement with another 
patient's need to have heart surgery. On another level, a hospital must balance the 
needs of all its different departments, its nurses, doctors, managers, patients and their 
families. On a macro level, the National Health Service as a whole must decide both 
whether to focus, in principle and practice, more on preventative or curative measures 
and treatments and which particular areas will receive the greatest portion of the 
resources allocated. So responsibilities, particularly regarding allocating limited 
resources on macro and micro levels, involve prioritising needs. 
Downie and Telfer usefully distinguish between absolute and relative needs. 
This distinction can prevent people from demanding all their needs be met in the same 
way and to the same extent. 98 As the material, financial, and relational resources are 
limited in society, and people's needs often seem unlimited, it would be helpful to 
have some means of prioritising and judging between various needs. One such 
ordering is found in Maslow's work. 99 We might not accept or agree with Maslow's 
exact ordering, but it provides a general guideline for prioritising needs. We must 
recognise that basic, physiological needs, like food, clothing and shelter have to be 
met for everyone in a community to function and survive. Then we can address safety 
needs, or keeping people from doing harm to others or themselves. The level of social 
97 See Donna Dickenson, "Is Efficiency Ethical? Resource Issues in Health Care, " in Introducing 
Applied Ethics, ed. Brenda Almond, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 22946. Roger Crisp, David Ebbs, 
and Tony Hope, 'The Asbury Draft Policy on Ethical Use of Resources, " British Medical Journal 312 
(1996): 1528-31. J. F. Kilner, Who Lives? Who Dies?, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
98 See p. 46. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 29. See also pp. 192-3 for discussion of this area. 
" See pp. 78-9. Lyttle, Mental Disorder, 134-5. Also Kate Robinson and Barbara Vaughan, 
Knowledgefor Nursing Practice, (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1992), 100-9. Robinson and 
Vaughan discuss Maslow's hierarchy of needs in relation to nursing practice. 
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needs addresses areas like education and jobs which are important for the preservation 
and development of a community. After these levels of needs are met, then we might 
be able to concentrate on higher level, self-actualisation needs. To attend to self- 
actualisation needs, for Maslow, implies a holistic view, as all levels of needs must be 
met before focusing on this level and to achieve the flourishing of a person. Meeting 
basic and safety needs can function as minimum responsibilities, while higher level 
needs are linked to maximum responsibilities and the flourishing of individuals and 
communi y. 100 
Not only within a society generally, but within the health care community 
more specifically, it seems vital to have some prioritisation of needs. One example is 
triage nurses who have been introduced to rationalise and prioritise resource 
allocation in response to different levels and urgency of need in Accident and 
Emergency Departments. A triage nurse in accident and emergency receiving patients 
must be able to prioritise the time frame of their treatment. She must assess which 
patients' needs are urgent and life-threatening, e. g. a heart attack, serious but not life- 
threatening, e. g. a broken leg, and minor injuries, e. g. scrapes and bruises. This 
ability to prioritise needs and levels of need is a vital one in a community with limited 
resources, both personal and professional. 
In contrast, within the professional realm, Downie and Telfer seem to imply a 
responsibility to meet all needs. Yet, just because someone makes a claim or demand 
on a professional community does not necessarily mean there is a correlative 
responsibility to meet it. 
101 The need to have open heart surgery is necessary for 
survival, while the need to have cosmetic surgery is not. Furthermore, even if there 
100 See pp. 78-9. 
101 See p. 47. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 11-2. 
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was a responsibility to meet all needs, there do not seem to be sufficient resources to 
do so. 
Limitations in meeting needs involve time, energy, knowledge, skill, financial 
or other resources. 102 It is important to explore some limits within care and caring in 
relation to both minimum and maximum standards. The care offered by people and 
communities, whether from government, professions, or individuals, is not usually 
unconditional, but has limits or requirements which people must abide by to receive 
care. Most governments do not provide unlimited support and care for the 
unemployed, as social security benefits are given in limited amounts and in response 
to fulfilling particular requirements. A government may refuse to care for 
unemployed people unless they can prove they are seeking employment. In health 
care, a nurse does not provide unconditional or unlimited care for a patient. She will 
not do anything or everything a patient requests. She will refuse if a patient asks her 
to masturbate him, on both professional and personal grounds, to avoid sacrificing her 
integrity as a nurse and a person. There may be many reasons for limiting care, 
including professional, personal, practical, emotional, and physical limitations. 
While exploring these limits as part of the minimum standards of care, it is 
important to examine responsibility which functions above these minimums. We 
have a responsibility to care for others in some way, and caring, as well as justice, 
involves a recognition of our specific responsibilities, both minimally and 
maximally. 103 Blustein usefully discusses different types of care. To "have care of' 
includes the responsibility for supervising, managing, providing for, attending to 
102 See Gustafson and Laney, On Being Responsible, 7-9. They argue for the necessity to accept 
limitation, finitude and contingency in moral life because we are finite and limited beings. Part of 
acknowledging our limitations is recognising conflicts in responsibilities and needs. T'hey claim one 
way of deciding between these conflicts is to assess to whom and for what one is responsible. 
103 See pp. 137-40. For further discussion of both types of standards see pp. 230-7. 
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needs, or performing services. 104 Caring-about involves wanting to do something that 
will benefit, enhance or keep the other from danger. 
105 Caring-about highlights the 
responsibility to help the other benefit and flourish, as well as minimise harm and 
offer protection. "Having care of' others usefully incorporates a recognition of 
particular needs and responsibilities in taking care of them. So, care is connected to 
responsibility, needs, benefits and limiting harm. 
The idea of care requiring people to be careful of, to care for, or to take care of 
others is fruitful in relation to minimum and maximum, negative and positive 
responsibilities. These notions deal with the way in which we treat others and we can 
specify what they mean within particular frameworks or standards. For a nurse to 
care for or take care of her patients means that she provides food, warmth and comfort 
for them. 106 She takes care of them by helping meet these basic needs. This is part of 
the nurse's responsibility to fulfill professional standards, and she can be assessed in 
relation to them. These minimum levels of care are required of her in a way that a 
maximum level of care cannot be required. 
Responsibilities are connected to relationships and community and can be 
positive or negative. Conflicting responsibilities and limited resources support the 
necessity of prioritising responsibilities. This involves assessing their appropriateness 
to, for and from people and institutions, and examining levels of need. The 
responsibility to care incorporates both minimum standards, including non- 
maleficence and protection, or maximum standards, focusing on benefits and 
flourishing. Both types of responsibilities and standards are linked not only to care, 
but also to justice. 
104 See p. 39. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 27-8. 
'05 See p. 39. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 28-9,32. 
106 "United Kingdom Code of Professional Conduct for Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors, " 
UKCC. 
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Princil2les of Justice 
Justice contributes to negative and positive standards in a community or 
society. 107 It provides minimum standards which deal with negative responsibilities 
and should apply to all persons, which include refraining from harming others and 
protecting the vulnerable. 108 Justice also can serve as a maximum goal or final aim in 
the sense of providing total justice for all people. 
Within a minimum standard, justice is linked to distribution. Rawls advocates 
this type of justice as a means of protection for socially and economically vulnerable 
members of society. 109 Rawls' view is inadequate, so a notion of justice will need to 
be more extensive if we are to interact with people in appropriate ways. ' 10 
Regarding Rawls' distribution, MacIntyre claims 
Rawls makes primary what is in effect a principle of equality with 
respect to needs. His conception of 'the worst-off' sector of the 
community is a conception of those whose needs are gravest in respect 
of income, wealth and other goods .... For Rawls how those who are 
now in grave need come to be in grave need is irrelevant; justice is 
made into a matter of present patterns of distribution to which the past 
is irrelevant. "' 
This notion of "grave" need is emphasised and may mean basic or minimally 
necessary needs. ' 12 Basic needs can be those necessary for survival, without which 
people will die, e. g. food. This description involves a comparative element as some 
forms of meeting needs are more basic than others, e. g. providing a sandwich versus a 
gourmet meal. A second type of basic need means an urgent or emergency one, e. g. 
needing to have someone's appendix removed. 
107 See pp. 121-7. 
108 See pp. 137-40. 
" See pp. 225-6. Rawls, TJ, 302-3. 
110 See pp. 225-6. Also see pp. 215-17. For a more detailed discussion of Rawls' position see chapter 
3. 
"' Maclntyre, AV, 248. My emphases. See Rawls, TJ, 302-3. 
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Rawls' position implies the disadvantaged 'need' to have inequalities, such as 
social, economic or educational inequality, levelled as members of a society. The 
advantaged also have 'needs', but their specific social, economic, and educational 
needs have already been met. Rawls' view could support positive discrimination if 
the disadvantaged demand to have their needs met in the same way as the advantaged. 
His conception of disadvantage shifts beyond a notion of basic needs, ' 13 and may 
confuse equality of goods with equality of opportunity. 114 Addressing needs with 
respect to opportunities is one aspect in a just and fair society, but not necessarily the 
most fundamental. People are at risk from harm in society and might be unable to 
make use of opportunities if they are weak and vulnerable. It could be the case that 
all are disadvantaged if they lack basic needs, but once these are met our notion of 
disadvantage might change. We might view disadvantage more in terms of lack of 
opportunity or benefits in a society. To assess positions of advantage and 
disadvantage regarding opportunity prior to meeting everyone's basic needs seems 
premature. 
In discussing basic needs and the disadvantaged, a helpful basis for minimum 
standards incorporates equality with respect to needs. One way of addressing equality 
of needs in society is through institutions! 
15 Rawls argues the best way to protect the 
disadvantaged and create a just society is to choose principles of justice, including 
equality, which will ensure institutions and structures are jUSt. 
116 If we are concerned 
112 See p. 225. 
113 See pp. 46,78-80. 
"" See pp. 86-8,88-9 1. Rawls, TJ, 62,92,303. Rawls defines social primary goods as liberty and 
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases for self-respect. He does seem to place goods like 
income and wealth in the same list as opportunity which implies the two types of goods, or needs in our 
discussion, are the same. 
115 We should note institutions can have dangers. Particularly within their bureaucratic structures and 
hierarchies people may be forced to serve institutions, rather than vice versa. This scenario may place 
individuals or groups at the mercy of institutions, rather than institutions serving to protect them. 
116 See pp. 88-91. Rawls, TJ, 504-5. He discusses equality with respect to justice as regularity, the 
application of equality, and the idea of equality and those beings owed the guarantees of justice. 
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to address needs, it seems reasonable to assume they can be met by or through 
institutions. As individuals may allow personal biases to affect their interaction with 
others to a greater degree if left to their own devices, part of the reason for creating 
institutions is to ensure equal treatment of people. Some notion of equality within 
institutions may be necessary for supporting a minimum standard of treatment of and 
interaction with people. 117 We want the National Health Service to ensure an equal 
basic level of treatment for all patients, i. e. providing food, warmth, control of pain, 
care and treatment. 118 The need for equality in institutions relates to equality for and 
from people. 
Justice as equality is useful as part of a minimum standard of interaction. 
Equality guarantees that people can expect a basic minimum of equal and consistent 
treatment from others and institutions. Justice as fairness also contributes to this 
minimum standard. 
Justice as fairness is an important conception for Rawls, as it is central to the 
principles which form the basic structure of society. 
' 19 One way of utilising fairness 
is as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a minimum standard. It is necessary 
to ensure persons are not harmed or subjected to unfair treatment in society. Fair 
treatment involves viewing and treating like cases in like ways. Fairness allows for 
variation in style but not the content of how people are treated. It views unfair 
treatment of like cases as unacceptable and unjust. In not permitting unfair or unjust 
treatment of individuals, fairness provides a moral basis for restraining harm and 
protecting the vulnerable. 
120 
117 Particularly as institutions also can have their own biases. 
118 Although feeding patients is now legally considered a medical treatment, some people still consider 
it a basic human need which should be met in hospital. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [ 1993] 1 All ER 
821. 
111 See p. 98. Rawls, TJ, II 
120 See pp. 124-6,195-6. 
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AlternativelY, justice as fairness might not be sufficient because treating 
people in the same ways may not always be appropriate or desirable. Issuing crutches 
to an eighteen and an eighty year-old, each with a broken leg, is fair but inappropriate, 
and even harmful, treatment. The younger person would be able to manoeuvre 
himself on crutches without difficulty, and recover within an average time span. The 
older person might not be able to manage the crutches, and might fall and injure 
himself further. In this instance apparently fair and equal treatment of two individuals 
may have harmful consequences. More than justice as fairness is required if we are 
aiming to deal with people in appropriate ways. 
Justice as fairness also involves a minimum notion of desert, in the sense that 
all individuals deserve a minimum level of protection from harm, based on their 
intrinsic worth as human beings and as members of a society or community. This is 
not 'desert' in the sense of evaluating whether people are worthy to receive benefits or 
protection in society, based on capabilities, contributions and actions. 121 Instead of a 
notion of desert, entitlement might be more accurate. Because human beings have 
intrinsic worth, value and dignity they are entitled to a certain minimum standard of 
interaction and level of protection in soqiety. If we agree persons are entitled to this 
minimum of justice, we argue they are entitled to have certain basic needs met, 
because without these basics they could not survive and function. 
In contrast to justice as fairness and equality is the notion of equity. Downie 
and Telfer define equal consideration as consistent treatment between persons 
appealing to the same rule, or equity where there are justified differences of 
treatment. 122 Equity allows for justified differences in treating others, in response to 
121 See pp. 123-4,194-6. 
122 See pp. 46-7. Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 76. Rawls recognises the need to justify 
departures from equality. See p. 126. 
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the specific, unique individuals and dilemmas in a given situation. Equity may be 
useful in discerning appropriate and fitting ways of dealing with others. 
Downie and Telfer argue justified differences are based on variations in need, 
where like cases are treated similarly and unlike cases are distinguished for 'morally 
appropriate reasons'. 123 This necessity for justification is crucial, but Downie and 
Telfer do not elaborate on what constitutes "morally appropriate reasons". 124 It would 
be morally, and legally, inappropriate for a nurse or doctor to insist that an adult 
Jehovah's Witness receive a life-saving blood transfusion. Such action is 
inappropriate because it contradicts a competent patient's explicit wishes regarding 
her own best interests and would be treating her against personal, moral or religious 
beliefs. The argument relates not only to best interests but also autonomy. It is in our 
best interests to have our autonomy recognised and harmful for our autonomy not to 
be recognised. We must be free to make our own choices, even if they are harmful 
ones. To ignore or over-ride the adult Jehovah's Witness's autonomy and view of 
best interests would be inappropriate. In contrast, it would be morally, and legally, 
appropriate to insist a child of a Jehovah's Witness is given a life-saving blood 
transfusion. This would be in the child's best interests, and may or may not conflict 
with his autonomy, as without the transfusion he would die. Furthermore, there are 
different senses of the child's best interests depending on who decides, the parents or 
clinicians. The latter view life as in the child's best interests, as opposed to some 
form of eternal merit. Failing to treat the child would cause great hann to him and, 
thus, be inappropriate and unjustifiable. 
Determining what is equitable and appropriate in a given situation may 
involve different levels and standards which are legal, professional, cultural, or social. 
123 Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 76. 
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Legal standards of interaction may provide the category of minimum justice, as the 
law often focuses on restraining harm to people. Legally we are not allowed to injure 
others, steal from or slander them. These areas deal with restraining harm to others, 
whether physically, materially, professionally, or psychologically. We are also 
legally restrained from harming ourselves, as we must wear seat-belts and motorcycle 
helmets. 125 In restraining harm to individuals, the standards of law not only dcrine 
limits, but contribute to considerations of appropriateness and inappropriateness. 
Rawls recognises two standards of assessing appropriateness. He believes that 
guaranteeing the establishment of a just society, through the selection of his principles 
of justice, and applying them to particular situations is appropriate. 
126 The first level 
of appropriateness focuses on setting up standards themselves. This level is 
concerned with which standards are to be adopted in society and which arguments 
support them and their justification. The second level of appropriateness focuses on 
applying these standards to particular cases and vice versa. These two ways and 
levels of expressing appropriateness need to be carefully distinguished. 
Another level of standards for determining what is equitable or appropriate are 
professional ones. 
127 They are guidelines for behaviour and interaction with clients 
and colleagues below which a professional should not fall and may also have direct 
legal implications. If a professional does fall below these standards, sanctions or 
disciplinary actions are taken. In health care, disciplinary actions may include things 
like severe reprimands, or being struck off. For example Dr. Nigel Cox committed 
12' ibid., p. 76. 
125 Suicide is a good example. Interestingly, until 1961 suicide was illegal, but is no longer. The 
change in law was based on the view that 
if an individual was not successful, then the courts were an 
inappropriate place to deal with him. The appropriate setting was viewed as the psychiatric and 
psychological arena. They aim still being to restrict self-harm, 
but not through legal reprimand or 
P unishment. 
26 See pp. 86-97. 
121 For example the UKCC and GMC Guidelines. 
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euthanasia on an elderly woman, allegedly with her consent, and recorded his fatal 
dosage of potassium chloride in his notes. 128 A nurse reported his action to the 
hospital. 129 He was charged with attempted murder, found guilty, but given a 
suspended sentence. 130 In the professional arena, Dr. Cox was severely reprimanded 
by the General Medical Council, as they viewed his treatment of this patient as 
inappropriate. 13 1 The nurse's decision to report Dr. Cox demonstrates herjudgment 
that he had fallen below the professional and legal standard and his action was 
unacceptable. He claimed to be doing good to the patient, but killing her was viewed 
as being harmful. Within professional standards there are different elements 
considered in assessing what is just, equitable and appropriate including guidelines 
from law, a professional body and colleagues. 
Cultural and social standards also contribute to an assessment of what is 
appropriate. 132 In some patriarchal African and Muslim cultures clitorectornies are 
performed on young women. The procedure is done to control their sexuality by 
removing a large degree of their sexual pleasure. In these cultures, a clitorectomy 
generally is considered an acceptable, appropriate and expected practice. In our 
Western culture and society, by contrast, clitorectornies are seen as highly 
unacceptable because we do not believe such patriarchal controls over women, their 
bodies and sexual pleasure are appropriate ways of treating them. As well as pointing 
out cultural variation regarding what is acceptable and appropriate, this example 
12' Clare Dyer, "Rheumatologist Convicted of Attempted Murder, " The British Medical Journal, 305 
(1992): 731. 
121 Ile fact that it was a nurse who reported him may not be surprising given the strict professional 
standards of conduct set out and enforced by the UKCC for nurses. 
I" The sentence was suspended because the body had been cremated and so it could not be proven that 
the dose of potassium chloride was the cause of death. What could be proven was Cox's intention to 
kill her from his notes. 
131 Clare Dyer, "GMC Tempers Justice with Mercy in Cox Case, " The British Medical Journal, 305 
(1992): 1311. The GMC required him to re-train in the area of palliative care, to bring his 
professional conduct up to the required standard of treating patients. 
132 See pp. 203-6. 
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raises a more general difficulty of conflict between the individual and collective or 
communal good. For each young woman who must be put through this painful and 
medically unnecessary procedure the practice does not contribute to her individual 
good directly. The good which is served is a value held by the larger community. 133 
The young woman might share the value of the community and believe the procedure 
to contribute to her individual good. It is likely she will be harmed or shunned by the 
community if she rejects its values and chooses differently. This tension emphasises 
the levels which contribute to judgments about appropriateness. They include 
restricting harm to people on cultural, physical, mental, legal and emotional levels. 
Regarding justice, a minimum standard that serves to restrict harm to people 
and meet their basic needs, including equality and fairness, was supported. Treating 
people the same does not always fulfil the criteria of avoiding harm, so equality and 
fairness alone are insufficient. Equity helps decipher morally justified reasons for 
treating people differently, through legal, professional and cultural standards. Equity 
is vital in ensuring our interactions with others are acceptable and appropriate. All 
three types of justice are vital to a middle way. 
Annr2 P-nLa-t -enle Mss 
There are various elements within the nature of appropriateness. Fittingness 
and decorum will be key themes in judging what is appropriate to the context of a 
situation, nature of the individuals involved, their roles and values, and nature of the 
cultural community. All of these factors are part of determining what constitutes an 
appropriate decision and action. 
133 The young woman might be unaware of any alternative choice or view of her body and well-being. 
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An important means of determining what is appropriate involves seeking what 
is fitting, as Cook accurately states 
There is an old-fashioned expression which sums up appropriateness 
appropriately: 'It ain't fitting'. Appropriateness is what is fitting .... Our 
response must be appropriate to the particular context, noting that in 134 
most situations there are multi-levelled contexts. 
What is fitting is a useful way of discovering what is appropriate to the context of a 
particular situation. 
135 
There are different views of "fittingness", one of which comes from natural 
IaW. 136 Natural law theory advocates all things should "follow nature" and the whole 
universe is governed by laws which exhibit rationality. Man has the capacity to 
choose whether to obey or disobey these natural laws, but he acts in accordance with 
reason only if he obeys them. 
137 Thus his actions are deemed fitting and reasonable 
only if and when he abides by natural laws. 
Cicero, as a proponent of natural law theory rightly notes the importance of 
"decorum", or fittingness. 138 He distinguishes general "decorum", which is apparent 
in every good action, from particular "decorum", which is appropriate to a particular 
action. 139 Furthermore, "decorum" can be seen in all our deeds, words, and in 
physical movement and bearing. It is apparent in natural beauty, the due order of 
parts, and the outward embellishment suited to the appropriate function, according to 
114 Cook, Responsible Decisions, 12. 
135 Cf. Niebuhr, -rhe Meaning of Responsibility, " 3 1. Niebuhr claims in an ethics of responsibility the 
fitting action is alone conducive to the good and the right. The fitting action is one that fits into a total 
interaction as response and as anticipation of further response. Gustafson and Laney also point out in 
their introduction that Niebuhr's notion of fittingness in response suggests we determine what action is 
most appropriate in light of our interpretation of a given situation (12-3). 
136 See pp. 146-7. For more general discussions of natural law theory, see Stephen Buckle, "Natural 
Law, " in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 161-73. Richard 
Wollheim, "Natural Law, " in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, vols. 5-6., ed. Paul Edwards, (New 
York and London: Macriiillan, 1967), 450-3. 
137 In contrast to humans, inanimate objects obey the laws of nature out of necessity, and brutes obey 
out of instinct. 
138 Cicero, On Moral Obligation, 72. See pp. 146-7. Also, Mary Mothersill, "Fittingness, " in The 
Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker, (Chicago and London: St. James Press, 1992), 378- 
80. 
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Cicero. 140 Decorum and fittingness help determine what is appropriate both on a 
general level and for specific situations and actions. 
Cicero argues the properties of "decorum" are such that it cannot be separated 
from moral goodness, "for what is fitting is morally good, and what is morally good is 
fitting. "141 For "whatever there is in any action that is fitting, is apparent in that it has 
true goodness as its prerequisite. " 142 Cicero contrasts this notion of fitting with things 
that are not fitting. A just action is fitting. Injustice is unfitting and disgraceful. 
Whatever is done in the spirit of manly courage is seen as worthy of a man and fitting, 
while the opposite is unworthy and unfitting. 
143 "Decorune' is relevant to every good 
action, and its relevance is such that it should be obvious rather than requiring any 
abstruse processes of reason for its discovery. 
144 
Cicero does not seem to elaborate on how one recognises the obvious 
relevance. This knowledge might come from intuition, common sense, or be self- 
evident. There are likely to be discrepancies between the conclusions drawn as 
different intuitions and senses arise. While Cicero accurately stresses the role of 
fittingness or "decorum" in moral goodness, he is unclear how to decipher its 
139 Ibid., 72. 
140 Ibid., 83. Yet, there may be different views of what constitutes beauty. For example, some people 
may consider tall, dark and lanky men to be beautiful, while others view blond, tanned, muscle-bound 
men as beautiful. Agreement on 'apparent' natural beauty may not be as obvious as Cicero seems to 
imply. 
141 Ibid., 72. Cf. Finnis who connects fittingness, or convenientia, to human good and well-being. 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 46. Finnis notes that Hugo Grotius describes what is fitting to 
human nature is acting to follow "well-ordered" judgment, i. e. rational nature (434). See for instance, 
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, trans. W. S. M. Knight, (London: Sweet and Macwell, 1922). 
142 Ibid., 72. Cicero is not clear in his meaning of prerequisite here. He does state that what is f itting is 
,, apparene' in his present section on moral conduct, which is honourable conduct, and the three 
previous headings of courage, justice, and truth (35-6). 
In determining what is fitting, it may be useful to ask 'Fitting with what? ' The answer could include 
what fits with what you arc, what you should be, what someone else expects of you, what your role is, 
or what all persons would do. Considering what all humans would do involves universalisability, and 
fittingness might be one test for it. 
143 Ibid., 72. Cicero's further examples of what is fitting include the use of reason and moderate 
speech, due consideration before action, and perception of and regard for what is true. Things that are 
not fitting include mistakes of fact, judgment and action. 
239 
relevance to good actions. What needs to be considered is the crucial role that 
fittingness plays in morality as a whole. Fittingness is linked to the complete 
coherence of a view, justification or theory. 145 It helps guide our choice of decisions 
and actions in determining what fits or does not fit, what is appropriate or 
inappropriate to a given context. Our moral framework must be coherent and our 
actions and decisions consistent with that framework as a whole. 
For Cicero, one of our primary obligations is to pursue harmony with nature 
and the observance of its principles. If we take nature as our guide we will never go 
wrong, but will pursue what is by nature wise and true, what is in harmony with the 
principles of human society, vigorous and brave. 146 To achieve "decorua' each man 
should stick to what is natural for his own character, provided it is not harmful, should 
follow the dictates of his own nature as far as is consistent with the universal nature of 
man, and always act in a way which does not conflict with this universal. 147 
There is a shift in Cicero's requirements from our own nature to the universal 
nature of humankind. The nature of persons must be understood not only in 
individual terms, but includes their universal nature as humans. Even if we could gain 
an understanding of our own nature, acting to avoid conflict with it relies heavily on a 
level of consistency of personhood, and an understanding of what the nature of 
personhood is, which is not always how things function in reality. There are different 
and conflicting levels of human nature. The universal good and universal bad, 
universal good and particular bad, universal bad and particular good, and particular 
good and particular bad nature of humans can conflict. Human nature itself contains 
11 Ibid., 72. It is interesting to note that Cicero states what is right and proper can be conceived at the 
very root of all virtue, but the distinction between "decorum" and virtue is theoretical not empirical. 
He claims "decorum" is inextricably linked to virtue, so as to be only conceptually distinguishable. 
145 See p. 212. Rawls addresses fittingness in regard to justification. Fittingness also may be linked to 
the coherence theory of truth. 
146 Cicero, On Moral Obligation, 74. 
240 
both good and bad elements, those we want to encourage versus discourage. These 
can be paralleled to descriptions of the virtues and vices in human nature. 
Nevertheless, an appeal to nature, either specific or universal, as our moral guide is 
problematic in that it needs to be grounded in both the individual and humanity as a 
whole. 
More general critiques of natural law include a confusion between 'law' as a 
formulation of regularities in nature and 'law' as norms and rules to which voluntary 
behaviour ought to conform. A crucial difficulty with this theory is how we choose 
those aspects of natural behaviour or laws of nature which can and should legitimately 
serve as guides to moral behaviour. As it may be difficult to find guides to moral 
behaviour in nature, it also will be difficult to assess the fittingness or unfittingness of 
our actions. An obvious example is in the realm of contraception. Roman Catholics 
support the use of natural contraceptives, i. e. the so-called 'safe period. Nature is so 
contracted that women are fertile at certain times and infertile at other times. Does 
this description of nature and natural law give any specific warrant to the use or 
refrain from using other contraceptive methods? What fits with natural processes? 
We cannot pretend to extract a uniform message from nature, or even one universal 
definition of nature. So, it is very difficult to regard the maxim 'follow nature' as a 
substantive guide to conduct. 
148 
An illustration of the importance of the concept of "decorumý', or fittingness, 
can be found not only in philosophical works, but also in biblical texts. The idea of 
fittingness is raised by the apostle Paul in I Corinthians 14: 40, where he is addressing 
147 Ibid., 78. 
149 These difficulties are damaging to natural law theory because the 'nature' in terms of which the 
norms of justice are defined is not always internally consistent. See Buckle, "Natural Law, " 161-73. 
Wollheim, "Natural Law, " 450-3. Furthermore, proponents of natural law can fall prey to the 
naturalistic fallacy. See pp. 72-3. Pidgen, "Naturalism, " 421-2. Hudson, 71e Is-Ought Question. 
Moore, Principia Ethica. 
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the issue of order in worship. This verse has been translated "everything should be 
done in a fitting and orderly way. "149 The Greek word for fitting, cuaXilgov(Dý, or 
euschemonos, argues for propriety in the assembly. 150 As an adverb this word has 
been translated "decently" 151 and "well-formed", 152 and as a noun as "seemliness". 153 
Regarding "seemliness", Robertson and Plummer interpret "fitting" to mean 
ecclesiastical decorum. 154 
Gerhard Kittel interprets the root word, cuaXT1ýL, or euschemon to mean, 
"honest", "orderly", and "becoming". 155 He states it also can mean "noble". 
"honourable", "excellent", or "prominent". Kittel notes the Greek translation of 
"fitting" refers to "honest conduct';, or being "Suitably clad". 156 Kittel's translation of 
"fitting" as honourable relates it to morality, while the notions of being orderly and 
suitable tie it to decorum and appropriateness. 
There are three important points to note in relation to this Corinthian passage. 
The first is that there are a variety of translations of the original Greek word, and no 
firm consensus. Secondly, despite this fact all the translations carry some notion of 
order, decency, and propriety with them. The concern seems to be that the 
149 Gordon D. Fee, The New International Commentary on the New Testament: The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1987), 713. Edward W. Goodrich and John R. 
Kohlenberger, III, eds., NIV Exhaustive Concordance, (Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), 403. 
I" Fee, 7he New International Commentary on the New Testament, 713. 
15' H. L. Goudge, Westminster Commentaries: 7he First Epistle to the Corinthians, (London: 
Methuen, 1903), 13 1. David Prior, 7he Message of I Corinthians: life in the local church, (Leicester: 
Intervarsity Press, 1985), 252. The Interpreter's Bible, (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1953), 214. Matthew Henry, An Exposition of the Old and New Testament, vol. 3, (London: Joseph 
ýfle Robinson, 1828), 1060. 
'5 D. Guthrie, J. A. Motyer, A. M. Stibbs, and D. J. Wiseman, eds., 7he New Bible Commentary, 
(Leicester: Intervarsity Press, 1970), 1069. 
153 RL Rev. Archibald Robertson and Rev. Alfred Plummer, The International Critical Commentary: A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, vol. 35, 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911), 328. 
154 Ibid., 328. They state that beauty and harmony prevail in God's universe where each part discharges 
its proper function without slack or encroachment, and this beauty and harmony ought to prevail in the 
worship of God. 
155 Gerhard Kittel, ed., The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1964), 770. 
15" Ibid., 77 1. Kittel claims the last translation is too restrictive. 
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Corinthians should not let their assembly fall into disorder or allow inappropriate and 
unfitting worship to take place. Instead, they ought to be seeking to act in ways which 
fit with orderly, honest, and decorous worship, namely worship which is appropriate 
for human beings to offer and conduct and appropriate to God. Thirdly, the 
assessment of what is fitting takes place within the context of a moral argument for 
paul, so it also is offered as a test for what is good or bad, right or wrong. 
In applying an understanding of orderly and fitting behaviour we must 
recognise the opposite sometimes occurs and people behave in unfitting ways, both 
intentionally and unintentionally. The latter might be because people misunderstand a 
situation, action, or text and, therefore, gain an inaccurate or ill-fitting perspective of 
it. As with every text, we must be aware of the proper context in which and to which 
it was written, to gain a balanced reading and understanding. There are at least two 
levels of potential disagreement about a given text, namely about its literal translation 
and its application. We can examine the following verses as an example of these 
levels and in relation to fittingness. 
As in all the congregations of the saints, women should remain silent in 
the churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in 
submission as the Law says. If they want to inquire about something, 
they should ask their own husbands at home; for it is disgraceful (not 
fitting) for a woman to speak in the church. 157 
In these verses, it is not so much the translation of fittingness which is highly 
debatable, but the application. With these verses, what was fitting when they were 
written might not be fitting now. Keeping women separate and silent in the church 
may have been fitting in that context, setting, culture for very particular reasons, but it 
would not necessarily be fitting in our present context. These verses have been 
misused to curtail women from speaking or teaching in churches in modem times. 
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This was not Paul's intention, as he was addressing a problem in the Corinthian 
church in particular, not presenting a general rule. 158 To use these verses to subjugate 
and silence women in the church ignores the proper context in which the passage was 
written. It is notfitting with regard to Paul's original intentions, or to an appropriate, 
present day application of the text. Therefore, it is an inappropriate and unfitting 
reading. To achieve an appropriate interpretation of this, or any, text we must 
examine the past and present cultures to understand more fully what was and is 
considered fitting. 
Recognition of variation in fittingness and appropriateness is important within 
the realm of customs and manners. Here the notion of "decorum" may be used again, 
as it deals with what fits within a social context. To determine what is fitting, we 
must be aware of and sensitive to customs and manners which may have cultural, 
societal, and communal bases. 159 For example, to burp aloud after a meal may be 
considered highly offensive and rude in one culture while being fully accepted and 
considered a great compliment in another. So, there may be some difficulty in 
discerning what fittingness means even in a given context, particularly for those 
unfamiliar with that context. Part of this difficulty is the fact that we live in a pluralist 
society-160 This society is multi-cultural, and even within any given sub-culture there 
are variations in what constitutes acceptable and appropriate customs and manners, 
e. g. wearing the veil in Muslim countries. Different people will have different 
Corinthians 14: 34-5. New International Version of the Bible, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Bible 
publishers, 1978), 1054. 
15' See Guthrie, Motyer, Stibbs, and Wiseman, The New Bible Commentary, 1070. James Hastings, 
ed., The Speaker's Bible, vol. 3, (Aberdeen: Turnball and Spears, 1927), 110-1. The Interpreter's 
Bible, 212-3. It is interesting to note that as with I Corinthians 14: 40, Paul was concerned with orderly 
worship and is possibly protesting against the disturbance of services by feminine chatter or the 
uncontrolled use of praying in tongues. Yet, he does not condemn women to complete silence in the 
church, as elsewhere he mentions women who are able to prophesy, which was a spiritual gift exercised 
in public. See I Corinthians 11: 5 and Acts 21: 9. 
" See pp. 234-7. 
160 See pp. 183-4. 
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perceptions of what fittingness entails. As other people's customs shape their 
expectations of and interaction with us, we need cultural and contextual sensitivity to 
ascertain what is fitting in relation to them. 161 In assessing fittingness within a variety 
of cultures, there may be common bases for assessing appropriateness, but the 
variation itself may highlight the need for minimum standards to ensure protection 
and consistency in treatment of people in society. 162 
The notion of appropriateness involves what is fitting and unfitting. The 
shortcomings of a fittingness based in natural law point toward the need for more than 
what is 'natural' as a guide to moral fittingness. This can include either or both an 
appeal to universal natural and moral law or universal laws which people establish 
and apply to all. 163 There also are difficulties in determining fittingness on a literary 
level, particularly in relation to the interpretation and application of a text. Finally, 
the role that culture and customs play in determining what is fitting and appropriate 
was examined. Because of the variety of cultures that exist and the difficulties caused 
by such a variety, appropriateness is needed to help us discern what is fitting to a 
situation and context. 
Conclusion 
In developing a middle way model, the thesis has drawn elements from both 
the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. A middle way emphasises the importance 
of context in decision-making as it provides a fuller understanding of the situation and 
persons involved. Persons and their relationships play a crucial role in any decision 
and their rationality, intrinsic worth and value, holistic interaction and existence in 
community were emphasised. A middle way incorporates responsibilities, which 
161 See pp. 203-6. 
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arise in relation to a community or society, involve minimum standards, which 
include protecting the vulnerable, restraining harm and meeting basic needs, and 
maximum standards, which include beneficence and flourishing. Justice contributes 
to the minimum standard, particularly with respect to equality, fairness, desert, 
entitlement and equity. Appropriateness was drawn out and examined in relation to 
fittingness, decorum, interpretation, application and contexts. 
These five elements are crucial in proposing an amalgam of the ethics of care 
and the ethics of justice as they draw themes from both approaches to decision- 
making, but provide a more balanced and complete approach than either care or 
justice alone. Together they form a grid or framework by which to conduct the 
process of moral decision-making and to test the adequacy of both the decision and 
process. This model now has been expounded more fully in theory, but needs to be 
applied to analyse how it will work in practice. 
162 See pp. 223-5,230-7. 
163 For example the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Chapter Six: The Child B Case 
Introduction: Application of a Middle Way Model 
It has been argued that a middle way is sufficient in theory, but it also must be 
tested in practice. In applying this model, the particular 'Child B" case was chosen 
because it received a high degree of publicity, was much debated and raises issues 
regarding conflicting decisions, needs, relationships, responsibilities, justifications 
and views of appropriateness. Before applying a middle way model, it is necessary to 
examine how both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice would approach this 
case. 
The ethics of care would primarily focus on the specific context, people, 
relationships and responsibilities. It is concerned with the emotive nature of the case, 
particularly as it involved a child patient. Given these factors, the ethics of care 
would tend to support the parents' view. Yet, this ethic lacks a view of justice, the 
universalisability of decisions and reality of distributing limited resources. It has too 
narrow a view of appropriateness, based on certain specifics of the case. 
Alternatively, the ethics of justice would focus primarily on fairness, equality, 
equity, desert, entitlement, duties and responsibilities, the universalisability of 
decisions and allocation of resources. The ethics of justice would tend to support the 
health authority's view of the case. Yet, this ethic incorporates a stringent view of 
desert and entitlement based on exhibiting capacities. It holds too narrow a view of 
the importance of the effect that persons, relationships and context do have on any 
case, and too legalistic a definition of responsibilities and appropriateness. 
Both the ethics of justice and care are insufficient in themselves and in 
application to this, or any, case. A more balanced framework is needed. A middle 
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way model provides such an approach, recognising the importance of the specific 
context, persons and relationships, responsibilities, principles of justice and 
appropriateness of the decisions made. 
Description of the Case 
Child B1 had been diagnosed and treated for acute lymphoblastic leukaernia at 
age five, from which she recovered. She later developed acute myeloid leukaernia, 
and in January 1995, aged 10, was given about eight weeks to live. National Health 
Service (NHS) consultants at Addenbrookes and the Royal Marsden Hospitals agreed 
that the possible treatment was neither very likely to succeed nor in her best interests. 2 
This proposed treatment would be administered in two stages, the first being further 
chemotherapy costing; C 15,000, and the next being a second bone marrow transplant, 
costing E60,000, administered if remission was achieved. Both had a similarly 
estimated 10-20% chance of success. 3 Clinicians based their judgment of the 
inappropriateness of the treatment on its very slight probability of success and the fact 
that it would cause considerable pain and distress. 4 
1 In October 1995 Child B's father applied to the court to lift the identification ban on her name so he 
could publicise her case and raise funds for further treatment. She was revealed to be Jaymee Bowen. 
See Richard Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " British MedicaLjournal, 312 
(1996): 1587. 
2 Ibid., 1587. See also Caroline Richmond, "Is the Issue the Price of a Child's Life, or the Futility of 
Heroic Measures?, " Canadian Medical Association Journal 152 (1995): 2035. 
3Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 129. 
4 Bill New, "The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " British Medical Journal 312 (1996): 1596. My 
emphases. Interestingly, there is some discrepancy in the reported chances of further chemotherapy 
and a second bone marrow transplant being successful. New cites a 2.5% chance of a second bone 
marrow transplant being successful while the Law Report referred to a 10-20% chance of success for 
both parts of the treatment. Furthermore, Richmond claims that Dr Peter Gravett, the private doctor 
who eventually treated Jaymee, said that treatment, both the chemotherapy and the second bone 
marrow transplant both had a 10% chance of success. In other words, Richmond points out that 
jaymee's treatment may have had only a 1% chance of success, if the variables were independent. See 
Richmond, "Is the Issue the Price of a Child's Life, or the Futility of Heroic Measures?, " 2035. 
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Jaymee's father disagreed with the decision and sought second opinions in the 
5 
United States and Great Britain. Some of the advice he received from abroad was 
that the transplant did have a significant chance of success, and so he pressed for 
further treatment, this time from Hammersmith Hospital in London. Based on 
clinicians' advice, the Cambridge Health Authority refused to pay for the extra- 
contractual referral. 6 There was some disagreement among clinicians in Britain, as 
Professor Goldman of Hammersmith Hospital wrote to Dr Pinkerton of the Royal 
Marsden Hospital that he thought it would be "reasonable to give [B] further 
chemotherapy". He did acknowledge this treatment might not succeed, and even if it 
did a second bone marrow transplant was a "high risk strategy", though not a "totally 
impossible task. " He further stated the second transplant could be carried out at the 
I-jammersmith, in certain circumstances, but because they did not have nor were likely 
to have any available beds in the next two to three weeks he had no option but to 
Suggest that B's father seek treatment in the private sector, and recommended Dr 
Peter Gravett. 7 In February 1995, Dr Gravett indicated he was willing to treat 
jaymee, if she and her family agreed that the proposed treatment had a "worthwhile 
chance of success", 
8 but Cambridge Health Authority still refused to fund the 
treatment. 9 The case attracted much media attention and an anonymous private donor 
paid for Jaymee's private treatment. The intensive chemotherapy met with limited 
success, so Dr Gravett decided against a second bone marrow transplant. 
10 Instead he 
used an experimental treatment called donor lymphocyte infusion. Only 20 people 
were said to have received the treatment at that time, and Jaymee may have been the 
513radbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case: ' 1587. 
6 New, 'Prhe Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
7Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 132. 
8 Ibid., 133. 
9 Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case: ' 1587, 
10 Ibid., 1587. 
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only child to have received it. The treatment was initially effective and the cancer 
went into remission for over one year, but it eventually recurred and Jaymee died in 
May 199 . 
11 
Legal Case 
The legal case arose in March 1995 when Jaymee's father took Cambridge and 
Huntingdon Health Authority to the High Court for refusing to fund further 
chemotherapy and a second bone marrow transplant. 
12 The health authority argued 
that in reaching its decision not to fund this treatment for Child B it had considered 
these factors: the appropriateness of the treatment; the guidance given by the 
Department of Health regarding non-proven or experimental treatment and the fact 
that the proposed treatment was neither standard nor formally evaluated; whether the 
expenditure was an effective use of resources given the small prospect of success, 
acknowledging the authority's responsibility to ensure it had sufficient funds for 
others patients' treatments which were likely to be effective. 
13 The High Court ruled 
that the health authority should reconsider its decision, 
14 but did not require it to fund 
the treatment. This judgment was based on the alleged lack of regard the health 
authority had shown for the father's views, that it had wrongly refused to allocate 
funds because it regarded a second bone marrow transplant as experimental, when it 
referred to the use of resources it had not explained adequately the funding priorities 
11 Ibid., 1587. New, "The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
12 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 129. Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of 
the Child B Case, " 1587. New, 'Ile Rationing Agenda in the NHS, - 1596. 
13 Ibid., 129. 
14 Ibid., 129-30. Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 1587. New, 'The Rationing 
Agenda in the NHS, "1596. 
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that led to its decision, and it had wrongly considered the issue to be an expenditure of 
E75,000, when the initial expenditure was only E15,000.15 
Later that day, on March 10th, when the case went to the Appeal Court, the 
health authority's decision, and right to make a decision in such a manner, was upheld 
on the basis that it had been made rationally and fairly. 
16 The Appeal Court argued it 
... could only consider the 
lawfulness of the decision at issue and it was 
not for the court to decide between conflicting medical opinions or to 
decide how a health authority's limited budget should be allocated 
between opposing claims on its resources. 17 
This court was clear on certain facts, namely that the High Court judge had 
been wrong to criticise the manner in which the health authority had reached its 
decision, that the authority's decision was not flawed, it had proceeded correctly, and 
the court was not in a position to decide on the correctness of "difficult and agonising 
judgments" which it had to make regarding a limited budget being used "to the 
maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. " So, the appeal was 
aowed and the High Court judge's order rescinded. ' 8 
Lilins 
One difficulty surrounding this case was the disparate accounts of the health 
authority's decision-making process. It wrote to Jaymee's parents claiming the 
decisions would be taken on the grounds of her best interests, not on financial 
grounds, but it later cited in court whether the treatment was an "effective use of 
resources" as one of four main considerations. 
19 So, contrary, and in addition, to what 
15 ibid., 130. 
16 Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 1587. New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the 
NHS, 'g 1596. 
17 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 130. 
18 Ibid., 130. 
19 Ibid., 129. 
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the health authority indicated initially in court it was Jaymee's best interests weighed 
against the interests of others and financial grounds which were considered. 
20 
Further disagreement came at the appeal stage, as the Appeal Court refuted 
much of the High Court's ruling. The High Court also had called for further 
explanations in deliberations and financial calculations, while the Appeal Court 
claimed this was an unreasonable expectation. 
21 While the former drew attention to 
the health authority's lack of consideration for the father's opinion, in listing the 
opinions it had sought and the weight attached to them, the latter rejected this 
argument, claiming the health authority was "vividly aware"' of the parent's view. 
The Appeal Court stated that a high value was placed on human life in a society like 
ours, but if the health authority ruled that E75,000 was not an effective use of 
resources, then this was an intelligible though painful line of reasoning. It was not up 
to the court to say whether the judgment was valid, that depended on the way the 
authority balanced opinions. In disagreeing with the High Court, the Appeal Court 
ruled that the authority was not under a legal obligation to show how this judgment 
had been reached. This was a crucial decision implying that any health authority 
remains within the law if it can show it is broadly conscious of different points of 
view, but it is not under any obligation to show explicitly how it decides between 
them. 22 
Examining the details of this case emphasises differences in opinion about 
Jaymee's treatment between her parents, the health authority and both the High and 
Appeal Courts. These conflicting views highlight the need for further critical 
reflection and analysis on this case and the issues it raises. This will be done through 
20 David Price, "Lessons for Health Care Rationing from the Case of Child B: ' British Medical Journal, 
312 (1996): 168. 
21 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 137-8. 
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applying a middle way model and its five elements of context, persons in relationship, 
responsibilities, justice and appropriateness to this case. 
Context 
in seeking to understand this case one important aspect is the background, 
which includes medical and cultural history. Regarding Jaymee's medical history it is 
important to note she had been treated for leukaemia previousl Y. 13 Although the 
transplant procedure itself was fairly standard, it was the fact Jaymee would be 
receiving a second bone marrow transplant which was significant and debatable. 24 
Jaymee's medical background appropriately or inappropriately influenced decisions 
, -bout a second course of treatment, its likely success and the resources used. 
Background also includes the cultural climate within which the case arose and 
decisions were made. In modem Western culture there is wide-spread knowledge 
about and use of medical technology. So, people have a high level of expectation that 
medical technology can offer some benefit for almost every patient. The standard of 
technology available affected the expectations of Jaymee and her parents regarding 
what the health authority, doctors and nurses could and should have done for her. 
More specific to British culture was the expectation that the government and NHS 
should pay for all Jaymee's health care treatment, because of the provision of a 
socialised health care system. Yet, this expectation conflicted with the reality of 
having to allocate resources within a market system. 
22 Price, "Lessons for Health Care Rationing from the Case of Child B, " 168. Rv Cambridge Health 
Authority, ex pB [199512 All ER 136-8. 
23 Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 1587. 
24 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 199512 All ER 129. 
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A further cultural expectation was that because the technology was available it 
should be used on Jaymee. In this case, despite the slight chance of success from 
further treatment, Jaymee's parents strove to ensure she would receive it. 25 In part, 
they expected the doctors and nurses, by aid of technology, to try to preserve 
Jaymee's life at all costs. In Western culture, the fact and knowledge that an 
advanced technology has been developed often leads to the expectation that it will and 
ought to be used. An underlying view is that death can be resisted and controlled and 
life can and should be infinitely sustained and preserved at all costs. This cultural 
expectation is not necessarily possible or appropriate. 
We might ask whether having a particular technology means we ought to use 
it at all or all of the time. In this case, part of the debate was that doctors and nurses 
knew an experimental technology was available which had a very limited chance of 
helping Jaymee. In light of its poor success rate and its experimental nature, as well 
as the pain and distress which the treatment would cause, most NHS doctors involved 
decided it should not be used on her. 26 This general consensus affirms that the 
existence of a technology does not necessarily mean it must, or should, be used. it 
might not be useful in some instances and may raise ethical and moral questions with 
which society as a whole or the medical and nursing professions do not want to cope 
or attempt to resolve. 
In a context people interact, form relationships and make decisions. In this 
case the settings were primarily NHS and private hospitals and the courts. Within the 
public health care setting clinicians decided treatment was not in Jaymee's best 
25 Ibid., 129. Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 1587. New, 'The Rationing 
Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
26 Ibid., 129-30. At least one doctor, Peter Gravett, was willing to try the treatment (133). 
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interests, 27 while, not surprisingly, the private sector was more willing to treat, 28 
provided someone funded it. The health authority's justifications for not treating 
Jaymee seemed to shift focus when presented in the High and Appeal Courts. When 
the case arose originally, the health authority refused to fund further treatment 
because it was not in Jaymee's best interests. Yet, when presented in court, an 
additional justification was that the treatment was not an effective use of resources. 29 
Context also includes the underlying ideologies and frameworks. People and 
institutions have different attitudes toward values such as the sanctity of life, intrinsic 
worth of individuals, fairness, and equality. As part of the content of an ideology, 
individuals or institutions place value on specific areas like rationality, efficiency, 
compassion, or the meeting of needs. 
In court, the health authority appealed to the financial implications of treating 
jaymee against the interests of other patients. 30 Ideologies can have moral bases. So, 
the notion of best interests may be rooted in the moral view that humans have intrinsic 
worth and dignity, which places value on individuals in and of themselves, 31 or 
respect for persons, which can be based on individuals' capacities or contributions in 
a given context. 
32 Yet, there are difficulties in assessing best interests, particularly 
regarding who decides what they are, as in this case the views of the doctors, nurses, 
health authority, the patient and family conflicted. Also, the timing of the decision is 
vital as people's assessment of what is in their own or another's best interest can alter 
27 Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 15 87. New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the 
NHS, " 1596. 
28 Ibid., 15 87. See also Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 129. 
29 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 129. For a broader view of the health 
authority's stance, see Ron Zimmern, "Challenging Choices: the second annual report of the director 
of health policy and public health for Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Commission, " (Cambridge: 
Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Commission, 1995). This health authority highlights six core 
values for facing difficult decisions. They are equity, effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, 
accessibility and responsiveness. 
30 Ibid., 129. 
31 See pp. 213-15. 
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over time. This change can occur due to personal reasons, like age, state of mental 
and physical health, number of dependants, or advances in technology. There are 
conflicts between different ideologies and views of best interests, which can be based 
on people's intrinsic worth or respect for persons. 
In contrast to either of these two moral bases, the Appeal Court focused on a 
utilitarian base which it saw the health authority utilising to apply a limited budget "'to 
the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patientS.,, 33 Although, in theory, 
utilitarianism provides one clear answer or goal for decisions, maximising the greatest 
happiness and good for the greatest number, in practice its answers are unclear. In 
arguingfor Jaymee's aggressive treatment, a utilitarian could claim that giving 
pleasure to Jaymee contributes to the greater good as it brings her happiness, that the 
quantity of her life could be increased, and all children should be treated, as this 
benefits society as a whole. In analysing the quality of Jaymee's life, a utilitarian 
could argue for or against further treatment, as it might improve her condition, but 
adds pain and distress. A utilitarian would argue against further treatment if assessing 
the usefulness of the resources used to treat Jaymee over other patients. One danger is 
utilitarianism could require that the relatively few expensive patients, like Jaymee or 
those in intensive care units, should not be treated aggressively because they consume 
too many resources. Not only could expensive patients be refused such treatment, but 
it could be in the interest of the greater good and the majority in society if they are left 
to die or even killed. Then the resources they would have consumed could be used to 
bring about greater happiness for a greater number of people, even after the pain of 
the patient and the grief and loss of the family have been recognised. Utilitarianism is 
unhelpful as it provides conflicting assessments of decision-making in practice. 
32 See pp. 213-14. 
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An alternative to a utilitarian approach is that of treating Jaymee as an end in 
herself. Viewing Jayrnee as an end in herself and not a means to an end would have 
meant deciding whether or not to treat her primarily on the basis of her best interests. 
This view would not support her best interests being weighed against the interests of 
other patients, or refusing to treat her as a means of providing treatment for other 
patients. This view acknowledges the intrinsic worth, value and dignity of each 
individual person, but still leaves the difficult question of defining best interests. 34 
Persons have a key role within a context, as they make and are affected by 
decisions. 35 The people involved ranged from the patient, Jaymee Bowen, to her 
parents, nurses and doctors- in the NHS and private sector, as well as other patients 
and the wider community. The NHS doctors' decision not to treat Jaymee 
aggressively, and the health authority's decision not to fund her extra-contractual 
refeffal36 affected all the people involved in the case, whether directly or indirectly. 
As the patient, Jaymee was the central figure, because it was her illness around 
which the case formed and her medical treatment which was debated. Her father was 
a key protagonist, as he was the primary person who pressed the health authority to 
fund the treatment, took the case to court, and helped raise money for her private 
treatment. 37 The consultants were notable because of the variation in their clinical 
opinions, primarily between those in the NHS and private sector, 
38 and their 
responsibility to provide care and treatment. 
The participants in this case also can be analysed regarding their relationships 
with others, the roles they played, and the way both affected the decisions. Jaymee 
33 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 130. 
34 See pp. 213-15. 
35 The role of persons in this case will be analysed in more depth. See pp. 260-8. 
36 New, "The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B 
Case, " 1587. 
37 Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 1587. 
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was a daughter, patient, child, human being, and member of a community. Her father 
and mother were parents, human beings, and members of a community. The doctors 
and nurses were professionals, human beings, and members of a community. The 
health authority had a relationship with Jaymee, her parents, clinicians, other patients, 
the courts, government, and wider community. 
These lists may seem self-evident, but one key element in understanding the 
context of this case is noting how different levels of relationship and roles interacted, 
especially in conflict. On one level, the doctors and nurses dealing with Jaymee 
experienced a tension between relating to her as one individual patient, and wanting to 
pursue her best interests, while at the same time being aware that giving her 
inappropriate or appropriate treatment would take away resources from their other 
patients. On another level, the Cambridge Health Authority's decision not to fund 
aggressive treatment for Jaymee 
39 conflicted with Jaymee and her parents' views of 
her best interests. 40 
This tension can be viewed as that between individuals in relationship versus 
the organisations or institutions relating to individuals. Her parents disagreed so 
strongly with organisational opinion that they took the health authority to court in an 
attempt to force it to fund Jaymee's further treatment. 
41 The legal institutions 
themselves were divided. The High Court decision went against the health authority 
and required it to reconsider its decision. 
42 Thus, it supported the parents' view of 
jaymee's best interests. This ruling was overturned by the Appeal Court supporting 
38 Ibid., 1587. Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 131-5. 
39 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 129,131-2. 
40 Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 1587. New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the 
NHS, 11 1596. One NHS doctor was willing to treat Jaymee aggressively. 
41 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 199512 All ER 129. Price, "Lessons for Health Care 
Rationing from the Case of Child B, " 167. Bradbury, et al., "Media Coverage of the Child B Case, " 
1587. New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
42 Ibid., 129-30. 
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the health authority's view of Jaymee's best interests. 43 So there was disparity 
between the courts' judgments of Jaymee's best interests. 
In justifying its decision to Jaymee's parents the health authority initially 
claimed to rely on clinicians' advice. Dr Zimmem of Cambridge Health Authority 
wrote to Jaymee's parents 
Should there be any misunderstanding I should state quite clearly that 
any decision taken by the [authority] will be made taking all clinical 
and other relevant matters into consideration and not onfinancial 
grounds. " 
Later, in court, the health authority referred to the use of resources in reaching its 
decision. 45 The Appeal Court upheld this consideration, stating difficult decisions 
must be made in allocating limited resources to the "maximum advantage of the 
maximum number of patients". 46 This second line of justification highlights the 
responsibility of the health authority for other patients. The authority claimed it had 
considered 
... whether the expenditure 
involved was an effective use of resources 
given the small prospect of success and having regard to the 
authority's responsibility to ensure that it had sufficient funds for the 
treatment of other patients which was likely to be effective. 47 
Because resources are limited, this and any other health authority, its nurses and 
doctors, constantly have to weigh up the needs of some patients against others. 
In applying a middle way model, the effect of background, particularly 
Jaymee's medical and cultural background, on expectations and decisions was 
analysed. A change from professional to legal setting exposed a shift in the health 
authority's justifications for its decision from Jayrnee's best interests alone to 
allocation considerations for treating other patients. The underlying ideology is 
13 Ibid., 136-8. 
44 Ibid., 133. Emphasis added. 
45 Ibid., 129. 
46 Ibid., 137. 
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utilitarianism which fails to provide a consistent practical means of decision-making. 
The alternatives of treating Jaymee as an end in herself, based on intrinsic worth and 
respect for persons, which considers best interests, were investigated. 48 The persons 
and their conflicting roles were examined, while recognising the relationship of health 
authorities, doctors and nurses to the wider community of patients and the reality of 
limited resources. 
Persons in Relationship 
Rationality was significant in this case as NHS doctors and the health 
authority were required to justify their decisions to the courts. There was 
disagreement regarding the appropriateness of the justification provided. The High 
Court did not accept the authority's rationale as appropriate or sufficient. 49 The 
Appeal Court overturned this ruling. 50 Although the Appeal Court decision went 
against the family's wishes, the judge recognised the parental pressure placed on the 
health authority as "perfectly legitimate". 51 This court upheld the justifications of the 
health authority as appropriate, 52 presumably on the basis that they were rational and 
understandable, though not easy to accept. Judgment about the health authority's 
justification as sufficient, adequate or appropriate varied. 
The doctors and nurses, health authority, and even Jaymee's parents had to 
provide reasons and justifications for their decisions and actions. The requirement of 
justification for our choices and actions relates to accountability. Within any 
community and set of relationships, whether personal or professional, we are 
47 Ibid., 129. 
48 It is not surprising that a middle way model is critical of utilitarianism as both the ethics of care and 
the ethics of justice oppose it too. 
49 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 129-30. 
" Ibid., 130,136-8. 
51 Ibid., 136. 
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accountable for past and present choices. This accountability entails providing 
understandable rationale for our actions. 53 The role of the law in community is to 
judge between competing perspectives of justification and for what and to whom we 
are accountable. 
Rationality is one part of persons and relationships, but reasons for decisions 
and actions sometimes conflict. As we have seen in this case, there are conflicts 
between people, their wants, needs and justifications. These arise because of different 
priorities, values and assessments of best interests. Individuals themselves experience 
conflicting desires, like those between what they want versus what they ought to do. 
Relationships are marked to a lesser or greater extent by conflict. Therefore, it is 
crucial to recognise the fact, nature and content of conflict, as well as means of 
resolving it. 
In this case, part of the conflict arose because the doctor-patient relationship 
contained a variety of elements including need, demand, clinical judgment, 
management decisions, and financial limitations. When assessing Jaymee's situation, 
NHS doctors had to consider Jaymee as their first priority, but the other factors could 
not be ignored. In particular, it seems the financial constraints operating within the 
health authority, and the NHS generally, played a significant role. 54 There was a 
conflict between the health authority's ability to provide care for Jaymee and its other 
patients. In assessing the health authority's relationships to all its patients, we may 
ask what kind of role these constraints did and should play. In the best of all possible 
worlds financial constraints would not be an issue because there would be sufficient 
funds for all treatments. Yet, if financial resources were available for every treatment 
doctors and nurses might try to preserve human life at all costs and times. People 
52 Ibid., 136-8. 
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might receive officious treatment causing greater harm to their bodies and minds, 
distress to their loved ones, and diminish their integrity, than if they are allowed to die 
with dignity. Even in this seemingly ideal world, we recognise that all treatment 
would not necessarily be appropriate treatment. 
In judging the appropriateness of the financial considerations in this case, 
Jaymee's parents appealed to the courts for clarification. The relationship which the 
law has to the health care arena and a community as a whole is important. It functions 
to set and maintain some minimum standards, primarily restraining harm to people. 
This minimum standard means restraining harm both for one and/or for many. In 
justifying its decision to the courts, the health authority considered the effectiveness 
of this use of resources and its responsibility to provide effective treatment for other 
55 
patients which had a greater likelihood of success. 
The High Court supported the family's view of restraining harm to Jaymee, 
which included treating her aggressively. This court ruled the health authority should 
reconsider its decision not to treat. 56 In contrast, the Appeal Court over-turned this 
57 
ruling and supported the health authority's decision. The general desire to restrain 
harm to Jaymee was consistent from her parents, the health authority and the courts, 
while the decisions and applications of it conflicted with each other. 
The impact of identifying and trying to universalise a particular approach to 
decision-making must be explored. If patients are viewed primarily in terms of the 
financial resources they consume, it would have been more cost-effective to let 
Jaymee die or even kill her, as this decision would have released resources to be used 
on others. This cost-effective view harbours a utilitarian framework which can 
53 See pp. 222-3. 
4ý4 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 199512 All ER 129-30,137-8. 
55 Ibid., 129. Emphases added. 
56 Ibid., 129-30. 
262 
support resources being used to treat as many patients as possible. One danger with a 
utilitarian base for assessing and dealing with needs is it treats people as means and 
not ends in themselves, thus over-looking the intrinsic worth and value of some 
patients for the greater general happiness of others. 58 
Interestingly, in justifying its decision to Jaymee's parents, the health authority 
stressed her best interests, while in court the issue of effective use of resources 
became more prominent . 
59 There was some discrepancy between the doctors' 
reasoning at the time of making the decision and the justifications offered by the 
health authority later in court. The Appeal Court seemed to allow and assume an 
utilitarian base for making decisions within a health authority. 60 If Jaymee's 
treatment was not funded by the health authority for this reason, then she was 
6sacrificed' for the good of other patients. If the Appeal Court did uphold such a 
utilitarian base, then it was not fulfilling a minimum standard of restraining harm to 
her, but perhaps only to others. 
An alternative to a utilitarian approach is treating Jaymee based on her 
intrinsic worth and value. 61 If Jaymee was being valued intrinsically, did this mean 
doctors and nurses were to do anything she or her parents wanted? Did it entail doing 
anything and everything to keep her alive? 'No' seems to be the answer to both of 
these questions. Valuing Jaymee as an individual, in part, meant treating her based on 
her wishes. Apparently she and her parents wanted the aggressive treatment, and they 
may have claimed providing it would be respecting her dignity. Alternatively, 
valuing her as an individual also could have meant not treating her based on wanting 
to help her maintain her dignity. Although maintaining Jaymee's dignity could have 
17 Ibid., 136-8. 
5' See pp. 255-7. 
59 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 129-30,136-8. 
60 Ibid., 130,137. 
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supported either view of treatment, it did not necessarily mean doing anything and 
everything she, or her parents, wanted to keep her alive. 
In contrast to Jaymee and her parents, NHS doctors judged that a second 
course of treatment was not in Jaymee's best interests. Dr Broadbent stated 
I have considered very carefully whether a second allogeneic 
transplant operation would be in [B's] best interests. I have considered 
the prospects of success and the suffering which [B] would undergo as 
a result of such treatment. First [B] would have to undergo a course of 
intensive chemotherapy with the hope of achieving a complete 
remission. Such chemotherapy would in itself cause considerable 
suffering. Only if complete remission could be achieved could a 
second allogeneic transplant be considered. In fact a complete 
remission is unlikely to be achieved. Further, the prospects of a second 
transplant being successful are only in the region of 10 per cent. I took 
the view that it would not be right to subject [B] to all this suffering 
and trauma when the prospects for success were so slight. 62 
Part of Dr Broadbent's calculation of Jaymee's best interests considered her 
diminished quality of life due to additional "suffering and trauma". 63 This quality of 
life assessment could have been related to doctors' judgments that further aggressive 
treatment would diminish Jaymee's integrity, or wholeness, as a person due to the 
"considerable suffering" and further damage she would have to endure, without a 
sufficient guarantee or chance of a successful outcome in terms of life expectancy. 64 
Such considerations imply not only the physical, but also mental and emotional, levels 
of suffering. 
65 
NHS doctors believed offering Jaymee a course of palliative care would be 
preferable, and in her best interests. One clinician, Dr Pinkerton, stated 
This [course of palliative therapy] would enable her to enjoy several 
weeks or months of normal life prior to progression. A further course 
of intensive chemotherapy and a second transplant would mean several 
61 See pp. 256-7. 
62 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 134. Emphases added. Dr Broadbent had 
been responsible for treating Jaymee since her illness was initially diagnosed. 
63 Ibid., 134. 
64 Ibid., 134. 
' For further discussion of a holistic approach to Jaymee's treatment, see pp. 266-7. 
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uncomfortable and distressing weeks or months in hospital which in all 
probability [B] would not survive. 66 
In recommending palliative care rather than aggressive treatment for Jaymee and by 
not adding to her pain and suffering, but trying to reduce them, the NHS doctors 
seemed to be trying to preserve her quality of life, best interests and integrity. 
Individuals have integrity and we all have an obligation not to hann, but to 
uphold it. This is part of what it means to treat people with dignity. We can speak, 
therefore, of someone's dignity, worth and value, by which we imply not to interfere 
with who and what a person is fundamentally, what a person wants, his/her own 
integrity, wishes, desires, well-being and wholeness, both as that person sees them 
and as the community would accept. A community context is necessary for the 
recognition of integrity and dignity, for without a community we would not 
necessarily be aware of others' integrity and dignity, or have a context within which 
to respect and uphold them. 67 
Respecting dignity in this case does not only relate to Jaymee or her parents, 
but also to the doctors and nurses. Individuals have different ideas about how best to 
respect and maintain their own or another's dignity. When these conflicts arise, we 
need to balance the dignity of one person with that of others. Jaymee and her family 
seem to have felt that respecting her dignity entailed giving her the more aggressive 
treatment. While acknowledging these wishes, NHS doctors and nurses had to try to 
maintain their dignity and integrity as persons too. To do this doctors and nurses 
could not be forced to treat Jaymee against their better judgment, however difficult 
the decision, as this would compromise their dignity and integrity both as persons and 
professionals. As professionals, being forced to give a treatment which doctors and 
66 Rv Cambridge Health Authority ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 134-5. 
6' See pp. 213-14,214-23. 
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nurses thought was inappropriate would go against their clinical judgment and 
professional standards for treating patients, their conscientious views of Jaymee's best 
interest, and their commitment to provide care for her, particularly as they thought the 
treatment was likely to cause her more harm than palliative care alone. As persons, 
they might have believed the treatment to be inappropriate and morally wrong 
because of its unlikely chance of success, experimental nature and high risk of early 
mortality. 68 In deciding not to treat Jaymee aggressively, the doctors and nurses 
maintained their dignity and integrity. 
As integrity involves wholeness, it is connected to a holistic view of persons, 
which includes their rational, emotional, physical, and spiritual dimensionS. 69 In this 
case we know much about Jaymee's physical state, but less about her emotional, 
mental and spiritual states. She and her parents must have been under great emotional 
stress due to her illness, the conflict with health authority and court case. In pursuing 
further aggressive treatment for Jaymee, her parents' actions were understandable if 
they were fighting for her survival and trying to preserve her life at all costs. Their 
actions were not fully understandable in light of the additional pain, distress, and risks 
of treatment. 70 
In deciding not to treat, the NHS doctors weighed up the effects of the 
treatment on her quality of life and her life itself. Dr Pinkerton wrote 
This is a very sad case and I fully understand [the father's] endeavours 
to do everything possible for the sake of his daughter. However, I 
remain of the view that it would not be in [B's] best interest to subject 
her to a distressing course of treatment which is most unlikely to be 
successful and carries a high risk of early morbidity. 71 
"Rv Cambridge Health Authority ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 129,134-5,136-8. 
69 See pp. 215-17 
70 Rv Cambridge Health Authority ex pB[ 199512 All ER 134-5. I'liere may be further debate about 
whether Jaymee's parents were placing greater value on life itself rather than the quality of her life. If 
they were, then they may not have given appropriate consideration to the quality of life Jaymee would 
endure to survive, if possible, and in that surviving. See pp. 278-8 1. 
71 Ibid., 135. My emphases. 
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Dr Broadbent conferred that the treatment was not in Jaymee's best interests for 
similar reasons. 72 
It is important to note the NHS doctors were not necessarily approaching 
Jaymee's case with only her physical dimension in view. If doctors had considered 
only Jaymee's physical condition they would have been treating her in a reductionistic 
way. It is likely that in considering the potential distress, suffering and trauma caused 
by the potential treatment, 73 some doctors recognised the treatment's effects beyond 
the physical level. This implies their awareness of Jaymee's mental and emotional 
states of being. Recognising and considering all dimensions of personhood 
contributes to a holistic view of persons and is crucial to appropriate interaction. 74 
Through her treatment with Dr Gravett, Jaymee's leukaemia did go into 
75 remission for approximately one year, but the cancer returned and she died. One 
concern in treating Jaymee holistically is that in the desire to keep her alive at all 
costs, Jaymee endured more pain and distress, physically, emotionally, andmentally, 
from this treatment than from palliative care. We are appropriately concerned if some 
people's desires, wishes, and values have the effect of bringing about pain, distress, 
suffering, or harm to others on different levels. To prevent this from happening we 
need a means of monitoring and balancing different levels of personhood and 
ensuring minimum standards of protection for people. 76 
In utilising a middle way model to analyse the persons and relationships in this 
case rationality is crucial in making and justifying decisions. The role of the law in 
ensuring protection and prioritising conflicting decisions was explored. Conflict 
72 Ibid., 134-5. Seep. 264. 
73 Ibid., 134-5. New, "The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
74 See pp. 215-17,237-45. 75 New, Ile Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
76 See pp. 223-37,268-73. 
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arises because of differing values and frameworks which affect people's choices and 
decisions. Some dangers of a utilitarian framework in health care decisions were 
emphasised. In contrast, the importance of holistic treatment of Jaymee, including the 
role that intrinsic worth and value have in balancing the dignity and integrity of 
patients and clinicians, was examined. This balance included considerations of 
Jaymee's quality of life versus her life itself and prolonging it at all costs. Such 
decisions and conflict resolution involves assessing our responsibilities. 
Responsibilities 
In this case, there are a number of people who had responsibilities, such as the 
patient, even a child patient, family, doctors, nurses, health authority, courts and 
government. As the central figure, Jaymee had a responsibility to share with the 
doctors information about her condition and her wishes regarding treatment options. 
As family members, Jaymee's parents had a responsibility to protect and pursue her 
best interests and provide care and support for her. Some could argue they also had a 
responsibility to pursue every chance of lengthening their daughter's life, however 
small. If so, it was appropriate for Jaymee's parents to pressurise the doctors, nurses 
and health authority for further treatment, but they could not force them to treat her. 
A difficulty arose when her parents' responsibilities to Jaymee, as their daughter, led 
to conflict with the doctor and nurses' responsibilities to her as patient. 
The doctors and nurses first had a minimum professional responsibility of 
non-maleficence to Jaymee based on treating her as an individual with intrinsic worth 
and value and as an end in herself. Doctors and nurses also had a responsibility to 
provide care for her, to assess and protect her best interests, to explain the treatment 
options and likely outcomes, and to help cure the leukaemia if possible. The doctors 
268 
also had a further professional responsibility to offer to refer her for a second opinion 
if her parents wished. The doctors and nurses did not have a responsibility to treat 
Jaymee based on pressure or demands, from her or her parents, which went against 
their clinical judgment. Simultaneously, the doctors and nurses also had wider 
responsibilities to their other patients, other professionals, the health authority and 
government. 
Instead of treating Jaymee aggressively and experimentally, the doctors and 
the health authority sought to fulfil their professional responsibility to protect her best 
interests. They believed the proposed treatment was not likely to be successful, 
would cause 'considerable suffering' and distress to Jaymee, and that a course of 
palliative care was preferable. 77 In protecting Jaymee's best interests, as they judged 
them, the doctors also sought to fulfil another part of the minimum standard, namely 
non-maleficence. 
In attempting to restrain harm the doctors faced a dilemma. They knew the 
proposed chemotherapy and second bone marrow transplant would cause significant 
suffering, 78 but if they did not treat Jaymee she would die. Consequently, they had to 
choose between the lesser of two harms. Considering the very slight likelihood of 
success, the doctors decided sparing Jaymee additional pain and distress would be in 
her best interests, even though the leukaemia would progress. They believed her 
remaining quality of life would be better without further intensive medical 
treatment. 79 Recognising the need for prioritising responsibilities when they conflict 
and that we might have to choose between the lesser of harms, rather than between a 
harm and benefit, is vital for decision-making in reality. 
77 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 199512 All ER 134-5. 
78 New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB 
9 
4udgment [ 1995] 2 All ER 129. 
Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 199512 All ER 134-5. 
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In contrast to the doctors, Jaymee's parents focused on seeking a potential 
benefit for her, rather than avoiding some harm. As Jayrnee's parents ultimately were 
trying to protect her from harm, their decision to seek further treatment was somewhat 
questionable given its experimental nature, 80 the very small chance of it being 
successful, 81 and the pain and distress it would cause her. 82 Jaymee's parents were 
not fulfilling their minimum responsibility to protect her from pain and harm. 
Alternatively, they chose to pursue a maximum responsibility. As they were pursuing 
any chance of extending her life, which they viewed as a benefit, then seeking further 
treatment was their only option. Yet, it is necessary to question whether the extension 
of life was actually a benefit to Jaymee. This extension might not have been as 
significant a benefit to Jaymee as she endured the additional and considerable pain 
and suffering of further treatment. It might have been more beneficial to her parents, 
as they wanted to prolong Jaymee's life and not lose her. In so doing, it seems 
Jaymee's parents placed more value on her life itself rather than its quality. 
Her parents' perspective of what was in Jaymee's best interests and would 
benefit her conflicted with the NHS doctors' and health authority's view. When 
disagreement arose, Jaymee's parents appealed to the courts. 83 Part of the function of 
the legal realm is to help prioritise responsibilities when they conflict and the conflict 
cannot be resolved amicably. Its other responsibilities include restraining harm to 
people, upholding and enforcing the law, dealing with abuse and lawbreaking, and 
supporting justice and fairness. In this case the courts were divided as to the priority 
so Ibid., 134,135,136-7. 
81 Ibid., 129,132,133,134. 
82 Ibid., 134-5. 
83 Ibid., 129. 
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of responsibilities. " Ultimately, the health authority's view of Jaymee's best interest 
and minimising harm to her was upheld and supported. 85 
There may be a difference between fulfilling responsibilities for minimum 
standards, like doing no harm, and maximum standards, like benefiting others. 
Maximum standards in a society or community include doing good, benefiting, or 
helping persons flourish. Doing good to Jaymee, according to her parents, meant 
prolonging her life. 86 Yet, prolonging life may not always achieve beneficence and, if 
it prolongs or adds to pain, suffering, and distress, it may actually be maleficent. For 
the doctors doing good to Jaymee meant relieving her suffering and providing 
palliative care. 87 Benefiting Jaymee also involved seeking her best interests. For her 
parents, this meant pursuing aggressive treatment. For the doctors, the slight chance 
88 
of benefit from the treatment had to be weighed against the pain it would cause her. 
Flourishing for Jaymee would have happened if the disease had been conquered 
completely. This was not possible and, even though she received some aggressive 
treatment, she experienced only a temporary remission. 89 It is important to note that 
helping a person to flourish may be part of an ideal standard for interaction in society, 
but the ideal is not attainable in all situations. The doctors and nurses involved in this 
case were more realistic in accepting the ideal of complete cure was unlikely to be 
attained, while Jaymee's parents, understandably, found it harder to accept this 
reality. An alternative view of flourishing for Jaymee was that she should be able to 
die with dignity. This ideal entailed that respect for Jaymee be maintained and she 
84 Ibid., 129-30. See p. 258-9. 
85 Ibid., 129-30. 
86 Ibid., 129,13 1. See also the previous discussion in this section, pp. 269-70. 
87 Ibid., 134-5. 
88 Ibid., 134-5. 
89 New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. Jaymee and her parents might argue that even 
temporary remission was worth the struggle, pain and distress. 
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not die in agony. The doctors and nurses treating Jaymee sought to relieve her pain 
and suffering and were aware of this more attainable ideal standard. 90 
Furthermore, the notion of flourishing raises the issue of how the health 
authority balanced the considerations of treating Jaymee and attempted to help her 
flourish, against the flourishing of others. In Jaymee's case, the health authority 
decided not to treat her aggressively, so it choose to forego this slight chance of 
flourishing. The authority could have chosen to pursue the ideal standard of Jaymee 
dying with dignity. This maximum aim would not have conflicted with pursuing 
benefit to other patients. Instead, in justifying its decision to the courts, the health 
authority appealed to utility, not Jaymee's best interests and dignity alone. 91 This 
case highlights the potential conflict of interests in considering the flourishing of one 
life against many. 
In applying a middle way model to responsibilities, doing good conflicts with 
the reality of limited resources. Doctors, nurses, patients, families, health authorities, 
and governments all have limited resources, whether physical, emotional, mental, or 
financial. There are more needs and demands being made than resources to meet 
them, which requires a means of prioritisation. The first stage in prioritising 
responsibilities is to identify for what and whom we are responsible. Then we assess 
our responsibility for upholding minimum standards of interaction with others, like 
the NHS doctors sought to do in restraining harin'to Jaymee, protecting her best 
interests and providing care for her. Next we examine our responsibility to fulfil 
maximum standards, like facilitating benefits to people and helping them flourish. 
We also must acknowledge that our responsibilities are often complex and can be a 
90 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 134-5. 
91 Ibid., 129,132-3. 
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choice between harms rather than a harm and benefit, minimum rather than maximum 
responsibilities. 
Principles of Justice 
Part of what is needed to provide a minimum standard in society is a notion of 
justice as fairness and equality. 92 For Jaymee as patient, justice as fairness might 
involve giving her what she deserved or to what she was entitled. Desert would have 
depended on her exhibiting certain capacities or making certain contributions to a 
community, which as a terminally ill child she was not able to do. Fairness as 
entitlement would have depended on the amount of treatment she had received and 
resources used previously. 93 One alternative perspective of fair treatment would have 
been to view Jaymee as an individual with intrinsic worth and value and as an end in 
herself. Treating her this way would not necessarily have supported further 
aggressive treatment, but instead preserved her integrity by allowing her to die with 
dignity. 94 Even if this view did support further treatment, one crucial difficulty would 
be the non-universalisability of the decision, as not all patients in her condition would 
be able to receive this treatment. For some, if the decision was not universalisable, it 
would not have been fair. If it was not fair, it would not have been properly 
justifiable. These perspectives of fairness would not support further treatment for 
Jaymee as being just. 
Addressing what is just and fair regarding Jaymee's parents entails being just 
to them and noting their view of justice. This includes listening to them, considering 
their wishes, taking their views seriously, explaining treatment options, and offering 
92 See pp. 230-3. 
93 New, '7he Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [199512 
All ER 129. 
94 See pp. 263-6. 
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to refer them for a second opinion if they so desired. After determining whether the 
decision was fair, the health authority assessed whether saying 'yes' or 'no' to her 
parents' wishes was in Jaymee's best interest. In saying 'no' the authority was acting 
in a fair and just way as it decided the treatment was inappropriate. 95 Furthermore, 
the authority could universalise this decision and not treat other patients in Jaymee's 
condition aggressively, but provide palliative care. The authority did justice not only 
to Jaymee and her parents but also to others and, in fact, the Appeal Court upheld the 
authority's justification of its decision. 96 Different factors within fairness affect 
decision-making, including desert, entitlement, intrinsic worth, universalisability and 
justification. 
Being just and fair to the doctors and nurses in this case entailed considering 
their clinical diagnosis, prognosis, andjudgment of the patient. The health authority's 
decision was closely related to the clinicians' assessments, as it carefully considered 
their views regarding Jaymee's condition and treatment. In being fair and just the 
authority also had to consider the views of the patient, family and other potential 
patients. Justice from the authority's point of view may have entailed treating Jaymee 
appropriately and in her best interests, while being aware of the implications, 
primarily financial ones, that treating her had for other patients. 97 Given the unlikely 
chance of success, 98 the treatment's experimental nature, 99 and the pain and distress it 
would cause, 100 the authority acted fairly in refusing to treat Jaymee further. 101 
So, justice as fairness involves desert, entitlement, and treating Jaymee as an 
individual with intrinsic worth and as an end in herself. Fairness also entails not 
95 New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
"Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 136-8. 
97 Ibid., 129-30,135. 
98 Ibid., 129,132,133,134,136-7. 
" Ibid., 129-30,135,136-7. 
100 Ibid., 134-5. 
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conceding to people's desires, requests, and wishes, as with Jaymee's parents. These 
views of justice do not support further aggressive treatment in this case. 
Justice includes not only fairness, but also equality. 102 To apply equality in 
this case, we need to be assured either that the Cambridge Health Authority would 
have treated a similar case in the same way or a different health authority would have 
made the same decision about Jaymee's treatment, ceteris paribus, other things being 
equal. Justice as equality implies a necessary level of consistency in treating like 
cases in similar ways. Alternatively, we would consider it unequal treatment if a 
similar case was funded by the Cambridge Health Authority, or a different health 
authority had funded treatment for Jaymee, ceteris paribus. In opposing inequality, 
we want to prevent inappropriate discrimination among and between cases. Equality 
requires a level of consistency and safeguards against inappropriate discrimination in 
decision-making. 
Part of the difficulty with being fair and equal in treatment of patients is 
highlighted when extraordinary treatment is needed. This case required 
4'expcri mental", 103 or extraordinary, treatment. The doctors and the health authority 
had difficulty in assessing what was fair and equal for Jaymee, particularly because 
she required a second bone marrow transplant. 104 This dilemma might have been 
exacerbated because there were not accepted standards for providing this 
experimental and extraordinary treatment. Ibis lack of accepted standards may have 
required new criteria for treatment and that clinicians proceed with caution. They 
could have looked for parallel cases to guide their decisions. Yet, the unusual or 
exceptional nature of Jaymee's case did not necessarily justify treating her. If it had, 
101 Ibid., 129-30,136-8. 
102 See pp. 230-3. 103 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 129,136-7. 
104 Ibid., 129. 
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then the authority would have set a difficult standard to follow in treating other 
exceptional cases. The authority could not universalise such a decision and treat all 
such cases because resources are not set aside for extraordinary and ordinary 
treatments in the same way. Given its constraints, the health authority chose fairly, 
equally and appropriately. Doctors, nurses, patients and health authorities have 
difficulty balancing best interests, needs and resources to make a fair and equal 
decision, particularly in exceptional or experimental cases lacking an accepted 
standard of treatment. 
When closely examining the views of the doctors in this case, there was 
differentiation in their assessments of Jaymee's condition and the likely success of 
treatment. Among NHS doctors involved, most believed the treatment was not in her 
best interests, 105 but one clinician, Professor Goldman at the Hammersmith Hospital, 
indicated willingness to treat Jaymee. 106 The private sector, not surprisingly, also was 
willing to treat her. 107 So, depending on which doctors assessed Jaymee's condition, 
her treatment would not have been necessarily the same. Yet, some differentiation 
between clinicians' decisions seems inevitable given different personalities, moral 
perspectives, treatment options and judgments. This reality supports the nee d for 
certain minimum standards of treatment for patients and minimum professional 
standards for doctors and nurses to use in decision-making, such as non-maleficence, 
providing care, and seeking the patient's best interests. 108 It is crucial to recognise 
105 Ibid., 133-5. 
106 Ibid., 132. Although he noted the Hammersmith did not have any available beds at the time, and so 
he was not able to offer Jaymee treatment. 107 Ibid., 133. 
108 See pp. 268-70. See also discussion of responsibilities in chapter 5, pp. 223-9. 
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that different perspectives and criteria inevitably will help or hinderjustice depending 
on what has been agreed and defined as just. 109 
Equity allows forjustified differences in treatment, particularly for morally 
appropriate reasons. 110 In this casejustified reasons for the health authority not to 
fund Jaymee's further aggressive treatment included its small chance of success, III 
the pain and distress caused, ' 12 the fact that her doctors did not think it was in her best 
interests, " 3 and its experimental nature. 114 The Appeal Court supported the 
authority's justifications and its decision not to treat Jaymee. 1 15 Incontrast, one 
justified reason for the health authority to fund Jaymee's treatment was her young 
age. The Appeal Court recognised the importance of this factor, stating "that this is a 
case involving the life of a young patient and that that is a fact which must dominate 
all aspects of the case. " 116 Ultimately, despite this fact, the Appeal Court did not view 
it as an overwhelming orjustiflable reason to rule against the health authority's 
decision and force it to fund the treatment. 117 
Justice as fairness, equality and equity as a means of assessing the decisions 
made in this case were analysed. Fairness based on desert, entitlement or intrinsic 
worth did not support further aggressive treatment for Jaymee as being just. Equality 
involves consistency and opposes inappropriate discrimination. The extraordinary 
and experimental treatment in this case, the universalisability of decisions and 
" For example, prioritising treatment with respect to age rather than needs would have serious 
implications for the elderly, as within this criteria they could be refused treatment in favour of younger 
patients. See Crisp, Ebbs and Hope. 'The Asbury Draft Policy on Ethical use of Resources, " 1528-3 1. 
These authors offer an interesting discussion of different ethical perspectives for allocating resources. 
They note that age, the dependency on the patient of close relatives, and the patient's responsibility for 
causing harm to his/her condition are factors which may be relevant to allocation resources. 
'10 See pp. 233-7. See also Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing, 76. 
111 New, "The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 19951 
2 All ER 129. 
112 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 134-5. 
113 Ibid., 129. 
114 Ibid., 129,136-7. 
115 Ibid., 136-8. 
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difficulty of balancing best interests, needs, resources and providing equal treatment 
for all patients were examined. Equity considered justified differences in treatment, 
including Jaymee's age, and the appropriateness of the decisions made by the health 
authority. The considerations of fairness, equality and equity supported the health 
authority's decision as just. Applying and assessing justice is an important aspect of a 
middle way model. 
Appropriateness 
The dispute regarding the appropriateness of Jaymee's treatment arose 
because her parents disagreed with the doctors and health authority's decision. NHS 
clinicians did not view aggressive treatment as appropriate for Jaymeel 
'a and 
proposed a course of palliative care. 
' 19 An appropriate aim of the doctors was to 
provide comfort for Jaymee. Generally, appropriateness is determined with reference 
to a particular aim or end. There are particular features of the circumstances and 
context of a situation which surpass others in importance and, in light of these and 
other limits, appropriateness can be assessed. 
Jaymee's parents, by contrast, thought that the health authority's decision was 
inappropriate and took it to court. 120 Given Jaymee was their daughter and they 
wanted to pursue every possible chance of cure, their actions were appropriate to and 
for her and their relationship. Her parents may have thought it was fitting that their or 
any child be given every chance of life. 
121 The High Court supported Jaymee's 
116 Ibid., 135-6. 
"' Ibid., 138. 
"I New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. This was because these treatments were unlikely 
to succeed and likely to add more pain and distress to her condition. 
119 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB[ 1995] 2 All ER 134. 
'20 Ibid. 129. 
"I It can be argued that the decision to treat Jaymee, as a child, aggressively would have been 
supported from Rawls' original position. An agent behind the veil of ignorance would not consent to a 
system which discriminates against ill children. This is because the agents choosing from behind the 
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parents, and required the health authority to reconsider its decision, claiming the 
health authority "had not had regard to the father's views as to B's best interests". 122 
This court saw the views and actions of Jaymee's father, in particular, as being 
appropriate to seeking her best interests. Although the Appeal Court overturned this 
decision, the judge noted the family's view of Jaymee's best interests, and the 
pressure placed on Dr Zimmem as "perfectly legitimate". 123 Thus, the Appeal Court 
also recognised that the pressure exerted by Jaymee's parents was appropriate. It is 
appropriate for parents to exert pressure as parents because they have special 
responsibility for their children. In cases where life-saving treatment is being desired, 
it is appropriate for parents to bring maximum pressure in order for their child to 
receive treatment. 
These differences in opinion and conflicting judgments about what treatment 
and justification was appropriate for Jaymee stem partly from different relationships, 
but also different roles, which persons had in this case. The doctors had professional 
standards and responsibilities of non-maleficence and to protect Jaymee's best 
interests. One justification given in court by the doctors and health authority was the 
experimental nature of the treatment. The High Court ruled the health authority "had 
wrongly refused to allocate funds because it considered a second bone-marrow 
transplant 'experimental 999.124 This court did not view the term "experimental" as an 
accurate description of the treatment nor an appropriate ground on which to refuse to 
fund it. In contrast, the Appeal Court judge stated 
veil of ignorance are adults and to consent to a system in which one may not reach adulthood results in 
a logical absurdity. See Dickenson, "Is Efficiency Ethical?, " 235. 122 Ibid., 130. 
123 Ibid., 136. 
124 Ibid., 130. 
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The plain fact is that, unlike many courses of medical treatment, this 
was not one that had a well-tried track record of success. It was, on 
any showing, at the frontier of medical science. 125 
Thus, this court upheld the health authority's use of the term "experimental" and 
viewed this as part of an appropriate justification for not treating Jaymee with it. 
Despite the "experimental" nature of the treatment, at least one clinician, Dr 
Gravett, was willing to try a second bone marrow transplant provided Jaymee and her 
family thought it had a "worthwhile chance of success". 126 His willingness to treat on 
this ground supports the view that Jaymee's family, in contrast to doctors and nurses, 
knew what was best for her. 
In fact, Jaymee received a different experimental treatment. 
... the treatment ultimately provided by Dr Gravett was not bone 
marrow transplantation but a leading edge treatment - namely, donor 
lymphocyte infusion. Only about 20 patients have received this 
treatment and Jaymee is thought to have been the only child. 127 
A vital question is whether using experimental treatments on people, particularly 
children, is appropriate. Administering experimental treatment could permit treating 
people as means to an experimental end, rather than ends in themselves. The 
proposed treatment was not appropriate to Jaymee as a patient and for Jaymee as a 
child, based on the potential risks being too high and the side-effects too 
unpredictable. Even though Jaymee's parents were willing to take the risks involved, 
ultimately she had to cope with the treatment and suffer its consequences. Her 
parents' actions and desires were understandable given their relationship and that 
they were trying to give her any chance of life, regardless of how small. Yet, they 
acted inappropriately in pursuing this treatment, and allowed their desire for Jaymee 
125 Ibid., 137. My emphasis. 
126 Ibid., 133. 
127 New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
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to live at all costs to cloud their judgment about her ultimate best interests and well- 
being. 
The health authority justified the inappropriateness of the treatment on its 
"experimental" nature, the pain and distress it was likely to cause, its slight chance of 
success 128 and consideration of resources. 
129 The High Court ruled the authority had 
not "adequately explained the funding priorities that had led to the decision". 130 Yet, 
this court did not clearly rule that the consideration of the use of resources was 
inappropriate. Instead it required the health authority to produce a more detailed 
account of how it reached its decision regarding resources. That qualification implies 
a recognition by the court of the appropriateness both of the decision-making process 
per se and of the place of resource allocation in that process. The detail demanded 
would then appear likely to offer a more sufficient and appropriate justification for the 
decision than had been supplied. 
In contrast, the Appeal Court judge ruled references to resources were a reality 
for 6ealth authorities, and that 
Difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited 
budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum 
number ofpatients. That is not a judgment which the court can make. 
in my judgement, it is not something that a health authority such as this 
authority can be fairly criticised for not advancing before the court. 131 
This court upheld the idea that any health authority would have to address the notion 
of limited resources. It did not criticise the authority for not producing a more 
specific list of reasons for its choice, and supported the appropriateness of such 
decisions being made by a health authority and not the court, in the professional rather 
128 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex pB [1995] 2 All ER 129,132-5. New, 'Ibe Rationing Agenda 
in the NHS, " 1596. 
129 Ibid., 129-30. Cf. Dickenson, "Is Efficiency Ethical?, " 229-46. Kilner, Who Lives? Who Dies?. 
130 Ibid., 130. 
131 Ibid., 137. My emphases. 
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than legal realm. Yet ajudgment on the appropriate arena for making such decisions 
is not the only implication of this court's statements. The Appeal Court judge stated 
Having weighed the matter up and taken advice, particularly bearing in 
mind the suffering which even embarking on the treatment would 
inflict, the authority thought that they should not fund the treatment at 
all. I regret that I find it impossible to fault that process of thinking on 
their put. 132 
In the overturning of the High Court's ruling the Appeal Court judge seemed to 
support the health authority's decision as an understandable and appropriate one 
given all the considerations and circumstances of the case. 
The decision of Jaymee's parents to seek aggressive treatment was 
understandable given they wanted to pursue every chance of a cure for their daughter, 
preserving her life at all costs. Yet, their decision was inappropriate given the added 
pain and distress of the proposed treatment and its experimental nature. 133 In contrast, 
when the doctors, nurses and the health authority considered these same factors, they 
judged the treatment as inappropriate for Jaymee. 134 Although the courts disagreed 
with each other, ultimately the authority's view of appropriate treatment was upheld. 
Conclusion 
A middle way model provides a frame of reference by which to assess the 
process of decision-making and the decision itself. It highlights key aspects, blending 
the ethics of care and justice, by which to explore the validity of decisions and the 
decision-making process. It provides a practical means of understanding, clarifying, 
evaluating and assessing moral decisions in nursing, medicine and the caring 
professions. 
In examining the context, Jaymee's cultural and medical background affected 
132 Ibid., 138. 
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expectations and decisions about her treatment. The change from health care to a 
legal setting highlighted a shift in the authority's justifications for its decisions. In the 
legal setting, the authority appealed to a utilitarian ideology, which conflicted with an 
assessment of Jaymee's best interests alone. 
Persons are a key element within context and in their own right. The 
relationships and roles of the persons in this case affected their choices and decisions. 
In supporting those decisions, rationality and justification were crucial. The doctors 
and nurses used their clinical judgment regarding Jaymee's best interests. They 
sought to maintain their own and her integrity, highlighting the importance of holistic 
treatment of people. Jaymee's parents and the health authority held differing views of 
her best interests and offered different rationale and justifications for their decisions. 
The nature of the relationships, professional or personal, resulted in different 
judgments, decisions and justifications in this case. 
Different types relationships support different responsibilities. Clinicians 
fulfilled their minimum responsibilities of non-maleficence and protecting Jaymee's 
best interests, through providing palliative care, and their maximum responsibility by 
attempting to allow her to die with dignity. The decision of Jaymee's parents to 
pursue further aggressive treatment was understandable particularly if they sought any 
chance of extending her life or to fulfil their maximum responsibility to help their 
daughter flourish. Yet, in trying to attain this ideal they did not fulfil their minimum 
responsibility of protecting her from harm. The health authority sought to fulfil its 
minimum responsibilities to protect Jaymee's best interests and to provide care for its 
other patients. These different responsibilities conflicted and the courts were called 
on to prioritise them, eventually ruling in favour of the health authority. 
133 Ibid., 129,132-5. New, 'The Rationing Agenda in the NHS, " 1596. 
283 
Applyingjustice involved faimess, equality and equity being assessed in 
relation to Jaymee, her parents, doctors and nurses, other patients and the health 
authority and the decisions made and justifications given. Fairness which focused on 
desert or entitlement did not support further aggressive treatment for Jaymee. 
Equality required a level of consistency in decision making and opposed inappropriate 
discrimination. The universalisability of deciding not to treat Jaymee aggressively, 
particularly regarding the treatment's extra-ordinary nature, supported the health 
authority's decision as fair and equal. Regarding equity, the health authority 
considered Jaymee's medical background, her age, the experimental nature of the 
aggressive treatment, its small likelihood of success and the additional pain and 
suffering. Although the health authority initially justified its decision based on 
jaymee's best interests, it later relied on an utilitarian ideology. Such a framework 
does recognise the reality of limited resources, but does not necessarily provide a 
consistent means of making decision in practice and can allow the vulnerable or 
minorities to be 'sacrificed' for the good of others. Despite this danger the health 
authority's decision involved fairness, equality, was universalisable and equitable. 
Analysing appropriateness in this case highlighted the decisions of Jaymee's 
parents as inappropriate given the experimental nature of the treatment and its further 
pain and distress. Their decisions were understandable as they were pursuing every 
chance of life for her and wanted to prolong her life at all costs. The doctors and 
nurses viewed further aggressive treatment as not in her best interests and 
inappropriate. The health authority agreed with clinicians' assessment, but also 
appealed to utilitarian considerations. Ultimately, the authority's decision and 
justifications were judged as appropriate by the courts. 
134 Ibid., 129. 
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Practical assessment of this case supports the decision of the health authority 
in not treating Jaymee aggressively, but disagrees with its justifications. Instead of 
treating Jaymee over and against other patients and appealing to an utilitarian 
ideology, the health authority could have appealed to the maximum standard of 
allowing her to die with dignity. This justification would have been much clearer 
regarding the priority of Jaymee's best interests, intrinsic worth and value alone, not 
as weighed against other patients. It would not have conflicted with fairness, equality 
or equity and would have been a more holistic way of treating her. It would have 
been consistent with both the ethics of justice and care. This justification would have 
been both just and avoided the dangers of a utilitarian framework. Thus it would have 
been more appropriate. 
Wider reflection on the application of a middle way model highlights key 
moral issues in practice. One important dilemma is the reality of conflicting views 
and assessments of best interests. These can be linked to different levels or types of 
responsibility, whether minimum or maximum, personal or professional. The 
necessity of prioritising responsibilities sometimes entails fulfilling minimum not 
maximum standards. This involves accepting the reality of deciding between the 
lesser of two harms, rather than a harm and a benefit. The legal realm has an 
important role in this prioritisation when conflicting views cannot be amicably 
resolved. Despite differences in responsibilities or relationships, the minimum of 
restraining harm, whenever possible, should be sought and achieved for all people. 
More specifically, we may experience difficulties in decision-making when 
faced with extra-ordinary treatments or new moral dilemmas. In approaching these 
dilemmas it is helpful to look for parallel treatments or situations from which to draw 
guidance and to reflect carefully on the potential implications of our decisions in both 
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the short and long-term. More fundamentally, justifications for decisions, whether 
our own or others', can shift or change depending on the setting, context and 
advantages of hindsight. Shifts in justifications, as well as the justifications 
themselves, may be judged appropriate or inappropriate through critically reflecting 
on the situation. A middle way model provides a clear framework from which to 
assess decisions and justifications. 
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Chgpter Seven: Conclusion 
In reflecting on the application of a middle way model we inevitably return to 
the origins of the thesis, in the tension between the ethics of care and the ethics of 
justice, which highlighted the need for a middle way. ' We need to focus in a self- 
critical way on the strengths and weaknesses, further development and application of 
a middle way model. 
In exploring the debate and tension between the ethics of care and the ethics of 
justice, one main problem was in dichotomising these approaches to moral decision- 
making, implying that one was superior and the other inferior or that they were 
incompatible. A second difficulty was that those theorists who recognised both care 
and justice contained valid elements and approaches to morality did not provide a 
sufficient, coherent and comprehensive notion of a middle way. 
2 Gilligan broached 
the idea of integration of care and justice, but her view is inadequate. 3 Friedman 
offered two possible means of incorporating care and justice in morality. The first 
was not integration at all, but relegated care to close personal relationships and justice 
to less familiar interactions with others. This approach involves settling for a 
dichotomization of both ethics. The second proposed a genuine "balance between" 
abstract and particularised commitments, justice and care, but did not elaborate on 
4 
how this is to be achieved . 
A middle way seeks to offer a more coherent and sufficient model for the 
integration of the ethics of care and justice. It is more sufficient than either ethic 
I See pp. 1-3. 
2 See pp. 1-3. 
See chapter 1, especially pp. 14-20. 
4 See pp. 26-7. Friedman, What are Friends For?, 138-9. 
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alone as a framework for moral decision-making. 5 The adequacy of a middle way has 
been argued for in theory as well as its application tested in practice. 6 In drawing 
from both ethics in its development, the content of a middle way acknowledges the 
importance of both care and justice within morality. It is sensitive to the impact and 
effect that context, including background, setting, ideologies and frameworks, have on 
the choices and persons involved. 7 As people are crucial in any decision, a middle 
way acknowledges the importance of understanding their relationships and 
relatedness in community, whether personal or professional. It recognises the vital 
role that rationality and justification have for persons and their moral decisions, but 
balances this aspect with valuing people's intrinsic worth and dignity and a holistic 
perspective of them. Thus it avoids reductionism. 8 Within the context of 
relationships and communities arise responsibilities, both positive and negative. 
Maximum, or ideal, responsibilities and standards include doing good, benefiting 
others and helping people flourish. These are contrasted with minimum 
responsibilities and standards, which include non-maleficence, restraining harm and 
providing protection, and meeting basic needs. 9 A key factor in ensuring these 
minimum standards are upheld is recognising the import of and appealing to 
principles of justice, involving equality, fairness and equity. Equity entails assessing 
what differences in interaction are justifiable and appropriate in treating individuals 
and specific cases-10 Appropriateness tempers the dangers of being too narrowly 
focused on either the particular or general levels of a moral dilemma. Its focus and 
application requires sensitivity to the specific, concrete aspects and the abstract 
5 See pp. 247-8. 
See chapters 5 and 6. 
7 See pp. 203-8. 
8 See pp. 208-23. 
9 See pp. 223-9. 
10 See pp. 230-7. 
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principles in a given situation. " Thus a middle way model aims to provide a more 
adequate and holistic approach than the ethics of care, the ethics of justice or other 
proposed integrations. This is not to claim that a middle way is without limitation or 
problems. 
Potential Problems with a Middle Wav Model 
In critically analysing a middle way model, potential difficulties and 
limitations can be located in its origins and nature as an amalgam, and the nature, 
status and application of the model. 
Origins and Nature of an Amalgam 
In creating any amalgam, a danger is that some benefit from the original 
sources may be lost. Therefore, in creating a middle way there is a danger that 
benefits provided by either the ethics of care or the ethics of justice are lost because 
its very nature as an amalgam gives substance to this criticism. It could be necessary 
to explore what is actually lost and whether or not such a 'loss', if so deemed, is or is 
not offset by the gains of a middle way. In fact, the actual analysis of these ethics 
showed neither ethic on its own was perceived as adequate. 
12 In that light, some 
theorists recognised there might be room to explore the notion of care and justice 
working together. In practice, these theorists did not provide sufficient content to this 
possibility. 13 While acknowledging the risks inherent in any amalgam, a middle way 
model is proffered as one possible means of combining elements from both the care 
and justice ethics in an attempt to demonstrate, both theoretically and practically, that 
11 See pp. 237-45. Also chapter 6. 
12 See chapters 2-4. 
13 See pp. 1-3. 
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they can be used to provide a more balanced and sufficient means of approaching 
moral decisions than either ethic alone. 
On a different level, another danger of this amalgamated model is that in 
transposing core ideas from one arena to another, such as the ethics of care or justice, 
the framework and context for a full and proper understanding of those ideas or 
elements is lost. There is the danger of decontextualising aspects of care or justice. 
Secondly, in drawing core ideas from both care and justice, the elements of a middle 
way may try to marry different underlying philosophies which may, in fact, be 
irreconcilable. A coherent framework for approaching moral decisions might not be 
forthcoming. 
A response to these critical points may be made on two levels. It is interesting 
to ask how any knowledge, science or understanding would be possible if we did not 
transpose ideas and theories from one context to another. Nursing and medical 
sciences depend on just such a transposition for diagnosis, prognosis, care and cure. 
Ideas obviously do arise and are framed in contexts, but that does not mean they 
contain only particular relevance. They may have universal aspects, components and 
significance. Any idea may have both specific and universal meaning and elements. 
Taking ideas from one context and transposing them to other contexts does require 
care and awareness of any change of meaning or use. However, any universal 
elements will be universalisable and may be used without loss of that meaning. For 
example, the thesis addresses the importance of the element of community as part of 
our understanding of persons in relationships. In any and every context, the nature of 
specific communities needs to be defined and understood. There may be common 
elements in all communities such as relationships, need meeting, care, belonging, and 
including and excluding criteria. These may be universal. But even more basic and 
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universal is the very concept of community itself, which can be properly applied 
across and between different communities and contexts. 
Another level of response to these critiques is to propose that the five elements 
of a middle way model have both specific meanings and philosophies from which 
they are drawn and universal components. There seems little doubt that any adequate 
examination of moral decisions, must involve some awareness of the importance and 
significance of context, persons in relationship, responsibilities, justice and 
appropriateness, or some synonyms for these concepts and realities. 
Furthermore, it might be suggested that the development of this middle way 
points towards a common form and content of morality. When we have and 
participate in moral discussion and debate, we inevitably make reference to the issues 
and content of these five themes. They are part of what it means to take part in moral 
discourse at all. In such moral discourse, we recognise what counts as and offer 
suitable justifications for our decisions and actions. Justification is a universal aspect 
of moral language and processes. We deem these justifications as morally acceptable 
or unacceptable. 14 People often do not agree on specific moral justifications or issues, 
but they recognise moral discussion and justification as necessary in society. 
The middle way of the thesis also points to some areas which may comprise 
part of a common content, or core, within morality. Such a moral core may entail 
some recognition of context and its importance in understanding the role of 
frameworks and ideologies; 15 responsibilities, whether minimal or maximal; 16 the 
importance of some type of justice, whether as fairness, equality, equity, desert or 
entitlement; 17 and explore commonality in humanity, particularly regarding 
14 See pp. 222-3. 
15 See pp. 203-8. 
16 See pp. 223-9. 
17 See pp. 230-7. 
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rationality, dignity, holism and some form of relationships and community. 
18 The 
thesis seeks to give specific content to some of the universal, common elements which 
are part of the existence of morality and moral justification. This middle way tries to 
point to a universal recognition of the importance of morality, as well as offering 
content to a potential common moral core. 
Problems may or may not be associated with the origins and nature of any 
amalgam. The nature and status of a middle way model may also raise issues and 
questions. 
The Nature, Status and Application of the Middle Way Model 
Within moral philosophy generally, it may seem that there is little new under 
the sun. The nature and novelty of any middle way is open to debate. The tension 
between justice and care, abstract principles versus particular people and contexts, can 
be found in classical philosophy. This particular middle way model stands within, yet 
seeks to go beyond, the recent academic debate between the ethics of care and the 
ethics of justice. It provides a concrete model of one amalgam of the ethics of care 
and justice in theory and seeks to test its application in practice. 
Some might argue the middle way model is too complex to be of use to people 
in practice or that its content is too cumbersome to retain and utilise in daily life. It is 
appropriate to reflect on the nature of the model. Perhaps most moral decision- 
making in medical or nursing practice seems to happen by osmosis or automatically. 
Yet, it is vital to have in place a framework for moral decision-making. This is 
potentially important when the old, tried and tested ways of approaching moral 
18 See pp. 208-17. 
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dilemmas break down and do not work or when facing a brand new problern.,, It is 
not clear yet how effective this middle way model will be until it is regularly and 
widely practised. The more it is applied, the more reliable will be any judgment about 
its usefulness. 
The claim that it is too complex depends on whether this level of analysis and 
detail is expected all the time and in every situation. This need not be the case. What 
is important is to demonstrate that the model can and does deal sufficiently with 
complicated and hard cases. Moral decisions and dilemmas are often extremely 
intricate. It is no surprise, therefore, that the framework proposed is relatively 
complex. If it was not, it would be of little theoretical or practical value. 
The second objection is that the model is too cumbersome. The content of the 
middle way can be streamlined to focus on the five core elements of context, persons 
in relationship, responsibilities, principles of justice and appropriateness. This 
criticism seems to imply a rather static view of the model. In fact, it can be 
understood more dynamically offering a range of entry points to dilemmas at* any one 
of the five main elements. It is then possible to progress through the model returning 
to the original entry point. Such flexibility is vital in the application of the model to 
different cases or situations. The following diagram illustrates the various entry and 
flow options and seeks to give an idea of the content to be considered under each 
element. 20 
Even with such flexibility, too much must not be claimed for this model. It 
needs to be tried and tested beyond the scope and confines of this thesis. Any 
complexity and cumbersomeness may be overcome as it is more widely practised and 
'9 See pp. 183-4,224. Brand new moral dilemmas have been created with the advancement of medical 
science, such as genetic screening and engineering. 
" See Diagram 1, p. 294. 
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adapted to specific moral dilemmas and decisions. It cannot be a totally finished 
product. It needs refining and improvement in light of its application, performance 
and usefulness to a wide range of cases. 
In contrast to viewing the middle way as being too complex, some might argue 
that it is, in fact, too common-sensical . 
21 However, what may appear as a vice can be 
construed as a virtue. This middle way has origins in common sense, but it builds on 
and moves beyond common sense. It articulates what happens within moral decision- 
making in actual practice, rather than merely being based on the application of some 
theoretical construct. It seeks to develop this practical decision-making further 
through providing a clear structure and framework which support a consistent and 
reflective means of approaching and assessing moral dilemmas. 
If a framework for moral decision-making is to be useful in theory and 
practice, appealing to common sense is not necessarily a negative trait. Common 
sense can be a good and useful characteristic, particularly when it contributes to 
clearer communication about dilemmas and choices. As this middle way incorporates 
common sense, it is not too obscure or removed from the realities of life. People may 
be more likely to appeal to and use it. Yet, being common-sensical does not mean 
this middle way is simplistic. The combination of concrete and abstract elements 
recognises the complexities of moral life and decisions and encourages people to 
reflect on them both in theory and practice. This middle way does not gloss over the 
difficulties of moral dilemmas, but provides a clear framework and structure for moral 
consideration and making choices. It offers key elements to maintain a balanced 
approach to moral decisions which is not just common sensical. 
22 
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Morality in General 
In addressing morality more generally, MacIntyre argues that modem moral 
23 
pluralism makes it impossible either to engage in or resolve moral debate. An 
alternative view might propound that moral pluralism furnishes an opportunity for 
genuine moral discussion and debate. Despite its limitations, a middle way model 
provides a moral framework which incorporates and builds on common sense and 
opposes relativism. It articulates the content of and context for moral discussion as 
well as decision-making. 24 
Part of the usefulness of this middle way may be the moral areas to which it 
draws attention. The middle way highlights views of human nature, whether 
optimistic or pessimistic, and their implications for decision-making. 25 It also notes 
human values, which can include virtues. Virtues can be described as sentiments, but 
are more adequately viewed as skillS. 26 Virtues are drawn from both the ethics of care 
and the ethics of justice, including integrity, reciprocity, commitment, responsibility, 
justice, fairness and rationality. 27 Underlying these values and virtues are ideologies, 
whether Kantian, utilitarian, individualistic, communitarian or principled. Through 
analysing these assumptions and ideologies this middle way clarifies their impact on 
moral decision-making and points to a common core for morality and common 
process of decision-making. 28 It is vital to note that this common moral core is a 
combination both of key elements from the framework itself and the practical 
21 Yet this critique is contradictory to a middle way being too complex. So, both objections cannot be 
true. 
22 See pp. 237-45, chapter 6. 
23 See pp. 142-3. 
2' See chapters 5 and 6. 
See pp. 59-60,68-84,223-37. 
Seep. 19 1. 
27 See chapters 2-4. 
28 See chapter 5. 
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application of a middle way. Thus, this model seeks to integrate not only the ethics of 
care and justice, but moral theory and actual practice. 
Although the sufficiency of a middle way model has been argued for both in 
theory and practice, 29 there may be limitations in applying it. One such limitation 
may arise because the model draws on three principles of justice - fairness, equality 
and equity - rather than simply focusing on one. In practice, any such decision- 
making model may need to rely, at least primarily, on one principle of justice. 
Whether this is necessary or ideal, and how one might choose between competing 
principles of justice, will need further work and reflection. 
No view is without weaknesses. In critically reflecting on the potential 
problems of the middle way model we have identified for further debate, reflection 
and practice the risks inherent in any amalgam, the danger of decontextualising ideas 
and elements, whether this model is too complex, cumbersome or common-sensical in 
nature, and limitations in its application. 
Beyond a Middle Wa 
In critically reflecting on this middle way, there are numerous areas which 
warrant more detailed investigation. These include the effect of context on people 
and their choices, 30 the importance of commitment and accountability in community 
or communities, 31 some means of assessing reciprocity and mutuality both 
professionally and personally, 
32 limits within caring, 33 the relationship between 
34 
different capacities and justice as desert or entitlement, how rationality, particularly 
29 See chapters 5 and 6. 
'o See pp. 203-8. 
" See pp. 222-3. 
32 See pp. 220-2. 
33 See pp. 227-9. 
34 See pp. 209-10,233. 
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phronesis, aids fitting and appropriate judgments 35 and the nature of equity, 
36 ia. 37 appropdateness and eudaimon 
We live in a world where one of the key moral issues facing health care is the 
allocation of resources. Any decision-making framework must be able to address 
such questions. One way forward is in extrapolating from a middle way by exploring 
the distinction between needs and wants, as addressing them relates to minimum and 
maximum standards and responsibilities in society. Exploring further the nature and 
content of both standards also is vital if we are to fulfil the minimum for all people 
and begin to aim for the maximum. Practical means of achieving these different 
levels and goals needs further research if a middle way is to be applied more widely 
and used in teaching and communication. 
Emphasis on the vital role of minimum and maximum standards and 
responsibilities within morality is a vital and beneficial aspect of this middle way. 
Being clear which standard is the focus in a decision is crucial for clarifying the 
expectations, implications and appropriateness of the choices made and justifications 
provided. The minimum standards necessary in any society or community include 
non-maleficence, meeting basic needs, and fair and equal treatment. The middle way 
also recognises the importance of striving for maximum, or ideal, standards which 
include doing good and benefiting others, helping all people flourish and being 
equitable. 38 Distinguishing between these standards also assists in prioritising to and 
for whom and what we are responsible. 39 Clearly, more work is needed in developing 
and applying relevant criteria and standards for needs, wants, maximum and 
minimum standards. 
35 See p. 211. 
36 See pp. 233-45. 
37 See pp. 216-17. 
39 See pp. 223-9. 
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Beyond the confines of this thesis, this middle way model can be applied to a 
variety of dilemmas and decisions. Potentially it may be utilised on both macro and 
micro levels. It might be applied to decision-making within a larger framework, such 
as a hospital and to a specific patient's difficult case. It could be used in educating 
and training health care professionals, particularly nurses and doctors, as it provides a 
clear structure and framework for approaching moral dilemmas. A middle way model 
does not necessarily produce one 'right' answer in a given case. What it does is 
illuminate the minimum standards below which it is unacceptable to fall, maximum 
standards for which to aim, implications and more or less appropriate decisions. It 
helps everyone involved identify the nature, practice and scope of moral decision- 
making and of the justification of and for decisions made. 
Concludiniz Remarks 
In critically reflecting on a middle way model, its formation, development and 
application, its sufficiency and superiority to either the ethics of care or the ethics of 
justice alone has been shown. In contrast to other proposed integrations, a middle 
way furnishes a more coherent and comprehensive amalgam of these ethics. Through 
its core elements of context, persons in relationships, responsibilities, principles of 
justice and appropriateness, it seeks to provide a clear framework for entering into, 
comprehending and positively contributing to moral discussion and dilemmas. It not 
only illuminates the importance of values, ideologies, assumptions and their 
implications, but offers a means of assessing them and making decisions. This model 
can be applied to communicating with, educating and training people, both 
professionally and personally, to reach good and appropriate decisions through 
39 See pp. 223-4. 
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balancing the concrete particulars and abstract principles and distinguishing between 
the minimum and maximum standards in any situation. It is not the only way of 
exploring decision-making; nor is it fully or finally developed. However, it is not 
simply a starting-point, but part of a process indicated by feminist writing, Gilligan's 
work and the critical debate which followed, refined by various care and justice 
theorists to produce a contribution to decision-making and justification of moral 
decisions. In aiming for and achieving this wider application, the hope is that this 
middle way model uniquely contributes to moral theory and to the cultivation of good 
and virtuous people. 
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